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Abstract
Why water? And why pricing?
Many millions of poor people struggle to obtain ten litres of water per day yet much of the 
water currently supplied is used to support the meat-rich diets of the affluent, to fill their 
swimming pools and to irrigate golf courses for their leisure. These contrasts have never been 
more stark than they are today. Tensions and conflict over access to water, already prevalent 
in many regions, are certain to increase. In this context, what are the consequences of water 
pricing, what role should water pricing play and to what end?
Pricing policy advocacy based on neo-classical economic theory asserts that the objectives of 
Pareto-efficient and sustainable resource use can be attained through much greater reliance on 
markets, privatisation and pricing, and that issues related to the distribution of resources are a 
separate, essentially political, matter.
I contend that the theoretical basis of this policy advocacy is fundamentally flawed and that a 
more comprehensive theoretical framework is needed in order to understand pricing decisions, 
the affect of these decisions on different groups and the prognoses for change. In particular, 
these decisions and their influence need to be understood with reference to the specific 
political-economic context, both current and historic.
The objectives of the thesis are thus twofold: to point out the weaknesses and fallacies 
inherent in the neo-classical theoretical framework underpinning current policy advocacy in 
the urban water sector and to develop a comprehensive theoretical and methodological 
framework for the analysis of urban water pricing.
I make two original contributions to the literature on water pricing. I develop a 
methodological framework which is informed by critical-realism for understanding and 
analysing urban water pricing which is unique and specific to the urban water sector and I use 
primary and secondary data to demonstrate the implications of using this methodological 
framework.
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Preface
Outline of argument and sources
I review the contemporary water pricing policies of the OECD and World Bank, two 
influential multinational agencies, highlight the weaknesses of their policies and demonstrate 
the divergence between pricing policy advocacy and practice in Chapter 1.
Critical-realism stresses the need for methodological, epistemological and ontological self- 
awareness. It addresses the specificity of water as a particular commodity with social content 
and recognises that water pricing practice will be contingent on the particular geographic, 
socio-economic, political and historical context. I argue in Chapter 2 that this methodological 
framework is more satisfactory than the positivism which underpins neo-classical economic 
theory and the functionalism implicit within new institutional economics. The methodology 
shares common elements with that of political economy but they are not equivalent. Chapters 
1 and 2, when read together, provide the motivation for the development of a critical-realist 
approach to urban water pricing.
The claims of neo-classical pricing theory are flawed and the theory is logically inconsistent. 
Nevertheless, most neo-classical economists apply the theory to urban water in an uncritical 
fashion. The problem of the second-best is generally ignored as a theoretical irrelevance. The 
necessarily subjective nature of marginal-cost price determination, particularly in the context 
of large capital indivisibilities, typically is unacknowledged. I examine these and other 
weaknesses of neo-classical economic theory in detail in Chapter 3.
The market structure has a fundamental influence on urban water pricing practice. The market 
structure, in turn, is a product the political-economic context. In Chapter 4 I illustrate how an 
analysis of the political economy of water pricing can shed light on pricing practice by looking 
at water pricing in Los Angeles. Based on this analysis, and drawing on primary and 
secondary material on the political economy of water pricing in other cities, I develop a set of 
‘stylised facts’ pertaining to the political economy of water pricing. These facts can help to 
inform specific enquiries into context-specific water pricing practices.
The meaning and importance of equity are contested. Utilitarian moral philosophy asserts the 
primacy of “equality of marginal utility” . Rawls’ “justice as fairness” gives priority to 
liberty and the equal holding of primary goods. Sen prioritises “equality of capability” . I 
examine the implications of these different philosophical approaches for water pricing in 
Chapter 5. The utilitarian philosophy supports the neo-classical focus on marginal utility or
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preferences. Both Rawls’ “justice as fairness” and Sen’s “equality of capability” support at 
least a basic needs approach to pricing in which a specified minimum consumption of water is 
universally guaranteed. Both “justice as fairness” and "equality of capability” are open to 
more radical interpretations calling for a more fundamental redistribution of resources 
(“primary goods” and “capabilities” ). The choice of ideology fundamentally influences the 
choice of water pricing system. The measurement of equality is also dependent on the choice 
of ideology and theoretical framework. I advocate the use of nonparametric density analysis 
to examine the social welfare effects of price reform, arguing that this tool is theoretically 
neutral and the methodology is transparent.
Water is inextricably linked to the environment. The early focus on technical solutions to 
environmental problems has given way to greater emphasis on economic and social factors. I 
argue in Chapter 6 that the prescriptions of environmental economics are too narrow and fail 
to take adequate account of the political economy of water-use and pricing practices. The 
valuation of environmental resources is subjective and fundamentally contingent on wealth 
distribution and the political-economic context. Neo-classical economists in general, and 
environmental economists in particular, place great stress on the role of pricing to promote 
Pareto-efficient water use. I examine the empirical literature on the relationship between water 
demand and price in detail and show that this literature is flawed. I propose two alternative 
operational definitions of water-use efficiency -  X-efficiency and optimal beneficial use and 
argue that these definitions are more suitable for use in the evaluation of the efficacy of water 
pricing.
In contrast to the view presented by Schama (1995),1 the contemporary provision of water 
needs to be examined within the hegemonic social, economic and political framework of 
capitalism. Neo-classical economics obscures this framework. In the concluding chapter I 
draw the above themes together and present the outlines of a methodology for analysing urban 
water pricing which illuminates this framework and hence provides a more accurate picture 
than is presently available to (or at least used by) the water economics profession. In this way 
I hope to have made an original contribution to the literature.
The thesis draws on three sources of material: primary and secondary texts on economic 
theory, sociology and philosophy; secondary sources containing relevant published data and 
analyses of the water sector; and primary data on the water sector in South Africa and 
Uganda.
1 “Fountains of ancient Rome like standpipes ... in medieval cities of Europe have played roles in building 
civic culture as well a s  quenching thirst. They have become occasions for civic dialogue and meeting 
places central to creating a sen se  of civic belonging and responsibility” (Scham a, 1995: 288).
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The thesis emphasises the limitations of existing theoretical approaches to pricing with the 
view to developing a more satisfactory and comprehensive approach. The primary material 
covered has therefore been necessarily broad with a consequent loss in the depth of the 
analysis. The areas covered include neo-classical economics, institutional economics, political 
economy, environmental economics, political philosophy, economic methodology and 
econometrics. The choice of primary materials also has been influenced by the way in which 
theory is applied to water pricing. For this reason, the latest developments in neo-classical and 
new institutional economics have not been covered as these are not reflected in the literature 
on water pricing and in practical applications.
I have made extensive use of secondary sources covering a wide range of topics, periods, 
types of approach, geographic focus etc. I have used these sources to illustrate, substantiate 
and enrich my theoretical and methodological criticisms and the conclusions drawn from 
these.
The collection of primary data has not been a key focus of the research. Nevertheless, the 
primary data gathered does play an important role in substantiating my thesis. My data on the 
South African urban water sector comes from ten years of professional experience working in 
the sector, including a three-year project funded by the Water Research Commission 
specifically on urban water pricing. The project activities included interviews with key experts 
in the South African water sector involved at the national, regional and local levels. I also 
undertook two city case studies during this project: Durban and Grahamstown. During the last 
two years I have made more than ten trips to Uganda while working on an urban water sector 
reform project, staying in Kampala for more than five months altogether. The project enabled 
me to have access to a range of personnel involved in the urban water sector from the chief 
bureaucrats to drivers, consultants and community workers. The field information used in this 
thesis was obtained through a series of interviews and personal communications and a review 
of available reports and documents. As part of this project, I also undertook a study tour 
examining water pricing and institutional arrangements in Ghana, Cote dTvoire and Senegal, 
meeting with key sector experts in government, international development agencies and the 
private sector. Through these and other mechanisms, my professional experience in the sector 
has enabled me to obtain information through personal communications that otherwise would 
not have been readily available.
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Chapter 1: Theory, policy and practice
The need for a new approach
Why should the choice between feasible options only take account o f individual 
preferences i f  people tend to adjust their aspirations to their possibilities?
(Elster, 1982: 219)
1. Introduction
The challenges
Three critical issues face the urban water sector: there is gross inequality, current practices 
are unsustainable and resource-use is inefficient.2 The nature and scale of these challenges are 
illustrated briefly below.
The global urban population, which is almost 3 billion currently, comprises 47 per cent of the 
world population and is increasing by about 75 million per annum (World Bank, 1999). Most 
of this increase will be in developing countries where 75 percent of urban dwellers live 
(UNDIESA, 1998). Large cities with populations of more than 1 million account for 36 
percent of the urban population (World Bank, 1999: 128). It is not untypical that informal 
settlements make up 30 to 60 percent of the population in large cities in developing countries 
and it is estimated that 100 million people have no permanent home (Biswas, 2000, World 
Bank, 1999: 48).
More than one billion people do not have adequate access to potable water services and nearly 
three billion people are without adequate access to basic sanitation services (Gleick, 2000: 1). 
Almost all of these people live in the developing countries. These numbers have been 
increasing with time (Biswas, 2000: 8). The consequences of inadequate services are stark: 
between 14 000 and 30 000 people die every day from water-related diseases; and, at any 
given moment, about half of the total developing world population suffer from disease caused 
by contaminated water or food (United Nations, 1997, in Gleick, 2000: 1).
2 Biswas (2000) identified the following problems: rapid population growth, large proportions of urban 
populations living in informal settlements, increasing costs of water provision, poor economic 
performance in many development countries, poor m anagem ent of system s leading to high operation 
inefficiencies, inappropriate investment choices leading to the wasteful use of scarce resources, and low 
levels of w astew ater treatment leading to deteriorating water quality. These problems reduce to the 
three core issues identified.
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Access to water services in urban areas in developing countries is highly skewed: some 80 
percent of high-income households have access to a water supply connection compared to just 
18 percent of low-income households (World Bank, 1999: 146). Households without adequate 
access to safe potable water supplies are often forced to buy water from vendors at many 
times the price of water from the network,3 invest in their own (often costly) supply or storage 
systems,4 or buy bottled water.5
Large and rapidly growing cities have not been able to cope well with wastewater. In South 
America, for example, it is estimated that only 2 to 6 percent of collected wastewater is 
treated adequately (Biswas, 2000: 7). This has exacerbated the adverse health conditions in 
many cities in developing countries.
Many large and rapidly growing cities are on the point of infrastructure collapse. The situation 
in Karachi, for example, has been described as follows: “Because Karachi is growing more 
than 5 percent per annum, many basic services are strained to the point of collapse. 
Moreover, much of Karachi’s population increase is being accommodated in sprawling 
squatter settlements that have become grounds for social unrest” (United Nations, 1988, as 
quoted in Biswas, 2000: 9).
Costs of expanding water supplies are often more than twice as expensive as historic costs and 
current operations are often inefficient (World Bank, 1992). For example, unaccounted-for 
water is typically more than 30 percent and often more than 50 percent (Biswas, 2000: 2 1).6
High investment costs (exacerbated by inefficient investment) stretch country and household 
budgets. In Uganda, for example, the average investment cost per water connection is about 
$1200 whereas the country GNP is just $320 per capita and 69 percent of the population live 
off less than $1 per day.7
Very large disparities exist in patterns of water use. In Europe, average per capita 
consumption among urban domestic consumers typically is in the range of 100 to 200 litres
3 In Uganda, for example, vended water typically costs in the range $1.50 to $3.50 per m3 compared to 
$0.70 from the network (field visit, Uganda, 1999). Similar or higher multiples are widely reported (World 
Bank, 1992).
4 Altaf (1994).
5 The water available to households in cities in developing countries through both piped networks and
alternative sources is often of dubious quality, giving rise to a  rapidly growing bottled water market. In 
India, for example, bottled water sa les increased by a factor of four in a period of five years in the early 
1990s (Biswas, 2000:18).
6 In Kampala, for example, unaccounted-for water is about 50% (field visit, Uganda, 1999). Well-managed 
public utilities in both developed and developing countries typically have unaccounted-for water of less 
than 15%.
7 Investment cost data are from field visits (Uganda, 1999); GNP and poverty data are from World Bank 
(1999). The $1 a day is at 1995 prices.
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per capita per day (led). Consumption is much higher in the USA -  425 led.8 It has been 
suggested that the minimum water requirement to sustain a healthy domestic environment is 
50 led (World Bank, 1992; Gleick, 1997). Average domestic consumption for significant 
proportions of the population in many cities in developing countries is much less than that.9 
Households without access to onsite potable water frequently use less than 15 led (which 
typically is obtained from vendors, public standpipes or alternative informal water sources).10
Although urban water use is small compared to irrigation, water use is increasing rapidly in 
urban areas.11 Total water use (domestic, industry and irrigation) is increasing by about 2 to 
3.5 times the rate of population growth (Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1995). By 2020 it is 
estimated that the share of water used by urban areas and industries in developing countries 
will increase from the current 13 percent to 27 percent.12
Competition for water between cities and agriculture already exists in many areas and is likely 
to intensify over time. The following two examples suffice to illustrate the point: local farmers 
have lost out in the face of increasing water needs in Beijing; and, there is intense and 
increasing competition for water rights between farmers and cities in California.13 Postel 
(1999) argues that increasing urban and industrial demand, together with food substitutions 
arising from economic growth, will significantly affect the price of grains in the foreseeable 
future.14
Growing water use in urban areas (driven by population growth, industrial expansion and 
economic growth) is also placing a strain on the water environment more directly. In 
Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila, for example, water demands are being partially met by overuse 
of groundwater resources (Postel, 1999: 115).
8 S ee  Sullivan (1996) and Postel (1985).
9 Actual supply is typically h'gher than 50 led, but high losses result in low average consumption levels.
S ee, for example, Uitto ana Biswas (2000).
10 For example, in urban areas in Uganda, including Kampala, typical consumption from public standpipes 
is about 10 led (field visit, 1993/
11 Globally, urban and industrial use is about 800 cubic kilometres per annum at present com pared to 
irrigation use of more than 3000 cubic kilometres per annum (Postel, 1992:40). W ater dem ands by 
households and industries in developing countries are expected to increase by 590 cubic kilometres 
between 1995 and 2020 (Postel, 1999:112). The total “stable" fresh w ater resource availability is 
approximately 14 000 cubic kilometres, but much of this is needed to sustain ecosystem s (Postel, 1992: 
28). Of course, global figures hide wide disparities in the distribution of w ater resources and water use 
between regions.
12 R osegran tand  Ringler (1998) in Postel (1999:112).
13 S ee  Chapter 4 and also Postel (1999:113) who provides further exam ples.
14 Economic growth enables greater m eat consumption which in turn requires disproportionately more 
water. Pork production, for example, requires twice as much grain (and hence water) com pared to 
chicken, but much less than that required for beef production (Postel, 1999: 260).
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Inadequate solutions
Many neo-classical economists argue that the problems outlined above can be overcome 
largely through a strategy of “ getting the prices right” . More particularly, these economists 
argue that prices should be set equal to the marginal resource costs in order to maximise 
welfare. I contend that this argument is essentially fallacious. In the following two sections, 
the nature and shortcomings of influential policies based on neo-classical economics are 
examined in more detail.
Urban water pricing policies advocated by the OECD are derived directly from neo-classical 
economics. However, actual pricing practices in OECD countries differ significantly from the 
OECD policy prescriptions. The reasons for this divergence are not explained by neo­
classical economics.
Urban water policy issues faced by developing countries are different from those of developed 
countries: poverty and equity are usually more important concerns in developing countries 
where income distribution is typically more unequal and poverty much greater. The World 
Bank is the most influential multinational agency active in the water sector in developing 
countries. I show that its policies, which are strongly influenced by neo-classical economics, 
suffer from similar weaknesses to those of the OECD. I argue that the weaknesses of the 
policy prescriptions of both the OECD and the World Bank are directly linked to the 
ideological framework within which the policies were developed, namely neo-classical 
economics.
There is a need for a new methodological approach to urban water pricing theory and practice 
which is both more comprehensive and context-specific than that provided for by neo-classical 
economics. In this thesis I attempt to develop such an approach. In particular I seek to 
addresses the theoretical, empirical and practical issues related to urban water pricing theory, 
policy and practice in developing countries in a more satisfactory manner than the existing 
methodologies allow. I assert that this methodological approach should be unique to the urban 
water sector and should account for historical developments both in water pricing practices 
and pricing theory. Further, I argue that this approach also should take adequate account of 
the issues of justice, inequality and sustainability as an integral part of the methodology.
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2. OECD: Policies and practice 
Pricing objectives
The first OECD reports considering water management in any focused way were published in 
the 1970s (OECD, 1972, 1976, 1977). These reports were commissioned by the OECD to 
obtain a better understanding of water in relation to economic development in member 
countries. They are largely descriptive and contain little by way of policy recommendations. 
In the latter part of the 1980s, the OECD published a further set of reports on water 
management, and more specifically, on water pricing (1987ab, 1989). The motivation for 
these reports appears to have stemmed from the increased attention given to environmental 
issues within OECD countries. The primary concerns dominating these reports are the need 
for environmental improvements, water demand management and greater integration in water 
management. Further reports focusing on environmental issues were published in the 1990s 
(1991a-c, 1993, I994a-e, 1995). Recently, progress with respect to water pricing policies and 
practice in OECD countries during the past ten years was reviewed (OECD, 1999a-d).
The report entitled “Pricing of water services” (hereafter referred to as the 1987 report) 
remains the most comprehensive report on water pricing published by the OECD (OECD, 
1987a). This report is used together with the recent review (OECD, 1999a-d) as the primary 
source material for the discussion that follows.
The earliest OECD report on water management identified six objectives of water 
management: equity, economic efficiency, regional development, environmental
improvement, co-operation with local administration, and international co-operation (OECD, 
1972). The concept of equity was very loosely defined. The report noted that different 
countries had different equity objectives: for example, some were more concerned with 
vertical equity, that is, income distribution considerations, while others concentrated on 
horizontal equity or fairness. The report noted one example of a formulation of an equity 
principle: “Hardship and basic needs of particular groups within the general public shall be of 
concern, but care shall be taken to avoid resource use and development for the benefit of a 
few or the disadvantage of many” (OECD, 1972: 8). On the question of efficiency, the report 
noted that most countries understood efficiency in the context of water resource management 
to mean using the least amount of resources to achieve a desired outcome, that is, a least-cost 
conception of efficiency. The impossibility of practically implementing the neo-classical 
economics definition of Pareto-efficiency was stressed: “ No country, however desirous of 
greater economic efficiency, has yet developed the analytical tools necessary for knowing 
what steps will unambiguously move the economy towards efficiency or recognising when it
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has been achieved” (1972:9). Regional development was seen as a further extension of the 
equity objective, noting that almost all examples of regional development had the practical 
effect of favouring resource allocation to a particular region.
By 1987, the interpretation of principles had changed significantly. In addition, some of the 
objectives had been dropped and replaced by others.15 Primary emphasis was now placed on 
the economic purposes of water rather than on the dual economic and social purposes of water 
given prominence in the earlier reports.16 The definition of efficiency was changed from 
“ least-cost” to the more theoretical (and difficult to implement) concept of “ allocative- 
efficiency” ,17 This objective is also given priority: “ an economic approach to water 
conservation suggests that efficient allocation o f resources should be the prime objective o f a 
charging system. The other criteria to be listed act largely as constraints which generate 
pressures on tariff designers” (OECD, 1987a: 23, own emphasis). Equity had been presented 
as the first (and implicitly most important) objective in the 1972 report.
The other principles of water pricing included were financial requirements, public health, 
consumer acceptability and administrative costs. The objectives of regional development and 
inter-agency and international co-operation were omitted. In relation to financial requirements 
the report states that water service providers are “usually required” to raise sufficient revenue 
to cover all their operating costs and “ all or some” of the debt associated with capital 
expenditures (1987a: 28). This is not stated as an explicit principle or objective. The principle 
related to public health is phrased as follows: “ charging systems should not be designed or 
operated such as to put public health in any significant danger” (30, own emphasis).18 The 
interpretation of this is left open. The consumer acceptability principle states that “ the
15 Som e variation in em phasis and interpretation of the objectives and principles between reports written 
by different authors and in different decades is inevitable. Some of the differences may simply reflect 
personal em phases (for example, ordering and prioritising of objectives). Notwithstanding this caution, 
the differences do indeed appear to be of som e significance. Official OECD committees had editorial 
control.
16 The title of the 1972 report is “Economic and social purposes related to w ater m anagem ent” (OECD, 
1972, own em phasis). The 1987 report states: “water is thus granted the sta tus of an economic good" 
(1987a: 18). This principle w as re-affirmed in the so-called “Dublin Statement" at the “International 
Conference on W ater and the Environment: Development Issues for the 21st Century" held in Dublin in 
January 1992. The em phasis on “water a s  an economic good” w as som ew hat countered at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Here it was 
argued that w ater should be recognised a s  a  natural resource (part of the ecosystem ), a s  well as a 
social and economic good, and that water should be allocated between uses  through a combination of 
dem and m anagem ent, pricing and regulatory tools or m echanisms (UNCED, 1992).
17 Allocative-efficiency w as defined to mean: “Water services should be provided such that the 
community’s  net benefits are m axim ised.... W here the w ater service is priced, it implies that the price 
should reflect the incremental costs to the community of satisfying marginal dem ands. Such a charging 
system  is usually known as marginal-cost pricing" (OECD, 1987a: 23).
18 It is curious that the word “significant" has been inserted. A more appropriate phrasing might have been: 
“charging system s should not be designed so as  to endanger public health”.
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charging system should be comprehensible to consumers and command broad acceptance 
among them” (31). This principle is based on the argument that price signals that are not 
understood are unlikely to induce appropriate responses. Lastly, the report states that 
administrative costs should be efficient in the least-cost sense.
Another consideration related to pricing is highlighted in the report: the influence that pricing 
has on employment. The report notes that employment objectives may be a high priority and 
that it is important to understand the links between pricing and employment. However, there 
is no detailed discussion of this.
The recent review states:
More than ten years after the OECD last formally stated the criteria which 
should inform the design o f  sensible water seiyice charging systems (OECD,
1987a), the list today would probably look not very different. Few would 
quarrel with the inclusion o f  the following: allocative (economic) efficiency; 
equity; financial requirements; public health; environmental efficiency; 
consumer acceptability and understanding; and administrative costs. On the 
other hand, two criteria on the 1987 list (energy and employment) would 
probably be omitted in the late 1990s, not because o f any re-evaluation o f 
priorities, but rather because it is generally now believed that there are better 
ways o f  addressing these two issues than by reflecting them in the water 
pricing system. (OECD, 1999a: 17)
The primary goal of allocative-efficiency is maintained whilst acknowledging that pricing is 
used in practice to attain multiple objectives. No guidance is given on how these (often 
conflicting) multiple objectives are to be reconciled.
Allocative-efficiency as a primary policy goal
The 1987 report asserts that, if the water sector were either perfectly isolated from other 
sectors of the economy or all sectors of the economy were perfectly competitive, then setting 
prices to equal marginal costs (where marginal costs are understood as marginal opportunity 
costs) would maximise allocative-efficiency. Where this is not the case, the report 
acknowledges that achieving maximum efficiency by equating price and marginal cost is not 
justified by theory. Nevertheless, the report goes on to state that “ optimal departures from 
price/marginal cost equality may be calculated only when precise information is available 
concerning the nature of the interdependence” (OECD, 1987a: 24). This statement is not 
theoretically correct given the problem of the second-best.19
The report continues: “ Shortage of information will usually mean that the relationship of price 
to marginal cost required to satisfy efficiency criteria in the water services is assumed to be
19 S ee  discussion of second-best in Chapter 3.
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one o f  equality" (OECD, 1987a: 24, own emphasis). The report thus, in effect, glosses over 
the theoretical difficulties presented by imperfect markets and other externalities. In this 
context, it is not correct to assert that marginal-cost pricing will maximise efficiency.
The report notes that strict use of marginal-cost pricing is impractical given the multiple 
objectives faced by water service providers, and hence advocates a “sensible use" of this 
approach: “ efficient pricing methods, based on the principles of marginal-cost pricing but 
responsive to day to day realities of water resources management, [are] an important policy 
instrument that could improve the economic and environmental efficiency of water resource 
use” (1987a: 13, 16, own emphasis). These statements are further qualified: “ [It] is not 
straightforward to determine in practice what marginal system costs actually are in a given 
situation and whether the introduction of marginal-cost pricing would be practical” (1987a: 
25, own emphasis). Nevertheless, the report still advocates marginal-cost pricing as the 
benchmark and asserts the need for some kind of “ approximate” marginal-cost pricing 
methodology.
The report also goes on to claim that “ it is clear that [the] other objectives [equity, finance, 
consumer acceptability, administrative costs, environmental considerations] confronting water 
managers could be accommodated within the pursuit of the economic efficiency objective and 
that these other objectives need not necessarily be reasons for the adoption of pricing 
principles in contravention of economic efficiency principles” (16, own emphasis). This 
assertion is not justified in the report. The notion of Pareto-efficiency is not treated correctly 
in terms of neo-classical theory. Although the problems associated with marginal-cost pricing 
are dealt with in a relatively frank and open manner, the report’s conclusions and 
recommendations fudge the problems raised.
Household water tariffs
Water pricing practices in OECD countries are reviewed below in order to show the 
divergence between the prescribed policies and the water tariffs found in practice.
The dominant tariff structures found in OECD countries are summarised in Table 1, ranked in 
terms of the “conservation signal” provided by the tariff structure (OECD, 1999a).20 The data 
presented are largely illustrative and statistical analysis has not been undertaken. Data 
availability is limited with the result that data sets are often incomplete and sample sizes small,
20 The “conservation signal” refers to the degree to which the tariff structure discourages the wasteful use 
of water. Different tariff structures imply different marginal prices of w ater and different incentives for the 
amount of w ater consumed. An overview of the relationship between tariff structure and the marginal 
price of water, together with examples of cities using different tariff structures, is given Appendix 1.
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the data are often not strictly comparable, much of the data are highly approximate, and the 
data exhibit very wide ranges over a small sample size. Under these conditions, tests for the 
statistical significance of relationships between variables may be misleading.
Table 1: Household Tariff Structures in OECD Countries
C a te g o r y 1 C o u n tr ie s  In c lu d e d N u m b e r %
C onserva tion  an d  
social pricing 2
Belgium , G re e c e , Italy, J a p a n , K orea, 
M exico, P ortugal, S pain , T urkey
9 31
V olum etric tariff only C z ec h  R epublic , H ungary, P o land 3 10
Two part tariff: 
fixed fe e  with a  
volum etric tariff
A ustria, A ustralia, D enm ark , Finland,
F ran ce , G erm any , Luxem bourg, N eth e rlan d s , 
S w e d en , Sw itzerland , USA
11 38
Fixed fee C a n a d a , Iceland , Ireland3, N ew  Z ea lan d , 
N orway, UK
6 21
All 29 100
S o u rce : A d ap ted  from  O ECD  (1999a). N o te s :1 D om inant c a te g o ry  in country . S e e  so u rc e  
for m ore  deta iled  inform ation by country . 2Typically an  inclining block s tru c tu re  with a  low 
m arginal price for low consum ption  an d  a  high m arginal price for high c o n s u m p tio n .3 
R e v e n u e  for w a te r  se rv ic e s  is derived  from g en e ra l ta x es .
Available, though rather incomplete, evidence suggests a shift in tariff structures within 
OECD countries over time away from fixed fees and declining block structures towards 
constant volumetric and inclining block (“conservation”) pricing, a move which is 
presumably a response to the increasing pressures on the water environment and intended to 
increase the “ conservation signal” (Gleick, 1993, Raftelis, 1998, and OECD, 1999a).
The degree to which a water tariff is effective in affecting water consumption is not only 
dependent on the structure of the tariff, but is also affected by the proportion of total revenue 
derived from a volumetric-based charge, the absolute price level of the volumetric charge and 
the magnitude of the water bill as a proportion of household income.21 Information on these 
factors for selected couni lies, based on data availability, is summarised below.
21 Of course, supply considerations could have a significant effect consumption. In the discussion that 
follows it is assum ed that, for all practical purposes, supply is unconstrained. This is a plausible 
assumption for the OECD countries under discussion, but certainly would not be a  reasonable 
assumption for most households in developing countries.
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Table 2: Proportion of tariff income from volumetric tariff in some OECD countries
Country Income from volumetric tariff 
(% of tariff income)
England and Wales1 Oto 10
Netherlands 15
Switzerland 50
Sweden 70
France 75
Denmark 85
S o u rc e : Sullivan (1996). N o te :1 ± 87%  of h o u se h o ld s  a re  no t m e te re d .
Tariffs in Denmark, France and Sweden are likely to be much more effective in encouraging 
water conservation compared to tariffs in England, Wales and the Netherlands, other things 
being equal.
The ability to levy tariffs that are based on consumption is dependent on metering. The extent 
of metering in OECD countries is generally quite high. Meter penetration in single-family 
houses exceeds 90 percent in 20 OECD countries (OECD, 1999a). In a few countries, meter 
penetration is very low: Ireland (0%), Iceland (0%), Scotland (0%), England and Wales 
(12%), Norway (“ low”), New Zealand (25%), Canada (55%), and Denmark (64%) (1999a: 
46). Water supplied to multi-family apartment buildings is almost universally metered within 
OECD countries, however, metering of individual apartments is not prevalent. The countries 
with high penetration of individual apartment meters are Greece, Japan, Korea, Spain and 
Turkey (1999a). It is notable that Greece, Spain and Turkey are (water) resource-constrained 
compared to most other OECD countries.
Price comparisons between countries are fraught with difficulties and comparative price data 
should be viewed with caution. Nevertheless, it is possible to show rough approximations of 
the difference in the price levels for water supplied to households in different OECD 
countries. Data from a recent comparison are presented in Table 4, showing significant 
variability in price levels between countries (OECD, 1999a).
The significance of the absolute price level for a household is dependent on the income level 
of the household. Estimates of aggregate affordability of household water bills are presented 
in Table 3.
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T a b le  3: In d ic a to r s  o f  a g g r e g a te  a f fo rd a b ility , s e le c te d  O ECD  c o u n t r i e s
A ffo rd ab ility
i n d e x 1
W a te r  Bill 
a s  % o f  In c o m e  2
W a te r  C o s t  
a s  %  o f  I n c o m e 3
1996 1997/8 1997/8
H ungary 3.62 3.0%
G erm any 1.32 1.0% 1.2%
N eth e rlan d s 1.13
F ra n ce 1.12 1.1% 1.5%
E ngland 1.05 1.3% 1.3%
S w itzerland 0 .94
D enm ark 0 .68 0.8% 0.9%
S w e d en 0 .59
USA 0.46 0.8%
S o u rce : O ECD  (1999a). N o te s :1 T h e  ratio of th e  typical h o u se h o ld  m onthly  
w a te r  bill for a  family of four to  country  G D P p e r  cap ita  multiplied by 100. A 
low er index  n u m b e r in d ica tes  g re a te r  affordability. W ate r bill for typical 
w a te r  consum ption  for a  family of four a s  p e rc e n ta g e  of a v e ra g e  h o u se h o ld  
incom e for th e  c o u n try .3 A ctual c o s t of supp ly  su b stitu ted  for w a te r  bill.
The data indicate that there is a significant range in aggregate affordability levels across 
OECD countries. The difference in affordability between Germany and the USA can be 
explained primarily in terms of differences in the absolute price level of water, whereas the 
difference in affordability between Hungary and the USA is largely the result of the difference 
in average household income (see Table 4).
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T a b le  4: W a te r  p r ic e s ,  d o m e s t ic  c o n s u m p t io n  a n d  a f fo rd a b ility
W a te r  P r ic e  
1
P ric e  in c r e a s e
2
C o n s u m p tio n  A ffo rd a b ility C o s t
R e c o v e ry 5
US$/kl % pa y e a rs led6 index % full co s t
G erm any 1.69 3 .8 92 to 97 116 1.32 83%
Belgium 1.68 2 .7 88 to 98 122 1.09
E ngland 1.60 2 .0 94 to 98 153 1.05 100%
F ra n ce 1.58 7.0 91 to  96 137 1.12 73%
N eth e rlan d s 1.41 4 .6 90 to  98 130 1.13
D enm ark 1.34 6 .3 84 to  95 139 0.68 89%
J a p a n 1.20 0 .3 95 to 98 278 0 .60
S w e d en 1.04 1.9 91 to 98 190 0.59
USA 0.58 2.4 92 to  98 350 0.46
Italy 0.51 2.0 92 to  98 213 0.43
H ungary 0 .48 18.7 86 to  96 102 3.62
S o u rce : A d ap ted  from  O EC D  (1999a). N o te s :1 A v erag e  w a te r  p rice for typical ho u seh o ld  
co n su m p tio n  a t m ark e t e x c h a n g e  r a t e s . 2 R eal price in c re a se . A v e ra g e  h o u seh o ld  
consum ption . 4 S e e  Table 3 for definition. 5 W ate r bill for typical h o u se h o ld  a s  p e rc e n ta g e  of 
full c o s t of s u p p ly .6 led = litres p e r  cap ita  p e r day.
There is a much stronger relationship between the affordability index and consumption 
compared to the absolute price level and consumption. The former relationship is shown in 
Figure 1. Higher average domestic consumption levels are associated with greater levels of 
affordability (that is, a low value for the affordability index).
400
♦ USA
300 - ♦ Japan
HungaryItaly
200 -
Sweden
♦
Denmark
JJK
100 - B®!9' Fr-Germani
Neth.
0.5 1
affordability index
F ig u re  1: H o u s e h o ld  c o n s u m p tio n  ( litre s  p e r  c a p i ta  p e r  d a y ) a n d  a f fo rd a b ility
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Affordability appears to be a strong factor in the relatively low recent consumption levels in 
Hungary which have dropped significantly in recent years in response to significant price 
increases (see below).
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Figure 2: Household water consumption (litres per capita per day) in OECD countries
Trends in household consumption over time are shown in Figure 2 (OECD, 1999a). The 
significant decreases in average domestic water consumption in Hungary, Denmark and 
Germany are associated with sustained real increases in the price of water of 18.7, 6.3 and 
3.8 percent per annum respectively in the recent past (see Table 4). On the other hand, 
household consumption has continued to increase in the UK (England and Wales only) and the 
Netherlands despite significant increases in the price of water of 2 and 4.6 per cent per annum 
respectively over the last number of years. In the UK, only 10 percent of households are 
metered and in the Netherlands, only 15 percent of tariff income for households is derived 
from a volumetric tariff. Hence households in these countries have little incentive to conserve 
water even though water prices have increased significantly.
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It may be concluded that domestic water pricing practices in OECD countries do not follow 
neo-classical policy prescriptions closely. A similar conclusion can be reached based on a 
review of industrial water pricing practices in OECD countries.22
The divergence between theory and practice
Four key points arise from the review of urban water pricing policies and practice in OECD 
countries. First, the only theoretical touchstone used to inform pricing policies is neo-classical 
theory. Second, it is recognised that Pareto-efficiency is only one objective of pricing whereas 
the pricing process is typically constrained by multiple objectives. OECD policies are unable 
to address the problem of how to reconcile these multiple objectives other than to prioritise the 
Pareto-efficiency objective and to have the other objectives constrained by this prior objective. 
Third, the choice of efficiency as the primary objective appears to have more to do with the 
orientation of neo-classical theory (which only addresses allocative-efficiency) than with the 
needs of water managers and others involved in the tariff design and implementation. Actual 
tariff structures appear to be contingent on factors other than the policy prescriptions of the 
OECD.23 Fourth, the discussion of equity and other policy and pricing objectives is 
remarkable vague: no appeal to theory is made. Equity considerations appear to play a part in 
pricing practice, but not in any systematic, theory-based way.
3. World Bank: policies and practice 
Pricing objectives and policies
In the World Bank’s Policy Paper on Water Resources Management (hereafter referred to as 
“ The Policy Paper” ), the organisation’s primary objective and its relationship to water 
resources management are described thus: “The Bank’s overarching objective is to reduce 
poverty by supporting the efforts of countries to promote equitable, efficient and sustainable 
development [which entails, inter alia] support for the provision of potable water and 
sanitation facilities, flood control, and water for productive activities in an economically 
viable, environmentally sustainable, and socially equitable manner” (World Bank, 1993b: 13). 
In order to achieve these objectives, the World Bank advocates expanded markets, greater 
competition, increased private sector participation (with a concomitant reduction in the
22 S ee  OECD (1999b) and Eberhard (1999a).
23 Mann, for example, notes that in the United States, “the neglect of pricing and costing matters has 
produced general underpricing of urban w ater services in the United S tates ... [which] is a function of 
historical accounting [and] consum er pressure combined with the political orientation of water rate 
determination" (1989:164).
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involvement of the public sector), “ economic pricing” (opportunity cost or marginal-cost 
pricing), reduced subsidies, decentralisation (“managing at the lowest appropriate level” ) and 
active user participation (World Bank, 1992, 1993b, 1994). I argue below that, at least in the 
context of urban water pricing, these policies are selectively interpreted and applied with 
adverse consequences, particularly for poor people.
The principle policy statements of the World Bank concerning water resources management 
are to be found in their policy paper “ Water Resources Management” (World Bank, 1993b). 
This and the annual World Development Reports (particularly 1992, 1993a and 1994) are the 
primary sources for the review given below.
The key objectives of pricing for the Bank are improved efficiency and sustainability. 
Equitable development is also a goal for the Bank; however, it typically does not recommend 
adapting pricing mechanisms for the purposes of promoting equity. In general, the Bank 
regards prices as the best means to create the “ right” allocative-efficiency incentives and 
argues that equity can be addressed via (usually non-water sector based) transfers. There is an 
inherent inconsistency in this position because all transfers involve price distortions of some 
kind. If price “distortions” are ruled out on the grounds of inefficiency, and if transfers are 
ruled out on the grounds of price distortions, then a circuitous argument is generated which 
justifies the status quo with respect to equity considerations.
World Bank policies With respect to the objectives of efficiency, equity, cost recovery, 
subsidies, institutional arrangements and the sustainability are described below.
Efficiency. The World Bank Policy Paper advocates opportunity cost pricing as the key means 
for promoting greater efficiency in water use:
I f  economic criteria alone are employed, water should be allocated to a given 
use when the opportunity cost is lower than the selected use. ... Economic 
efficiency would be obtained by setting water charges equal to the opportunity 
cost o f water. (World Bank, 1993b: 42, 49)
The report goes on to note, however, that the immediate adoption of such prices “ often
proves to be politically difficult” and that cost recovery would be a good starting point
(1993b: 49).
The initial goal of cost-recovery refers to recovering the financial costs of providing water to 
end-users (the capital and operating costs of the infrastructure and necessary related services). 
This is quite clear and easily understood. However, notwithstanding the text’s contention that 
pricing urban water is “ generally straightforward” , the policy statement “ economic efficiency
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 1: Theory, policy and practice Page 24
would be obtained by setting water charges equal to the opportunity cost of water” is not 
discussed in any detail and is, in fact, remarkably undefined and ambiguous.
The concept “ opportunity cost” is difficult to define as an operational term for at least two 
reasons. First, there is an almost infinite array of possible alternatives in the economy and it is 
very difficult (if not impossible) to choose the optimum output from this array. Second, 
having chosen an alternative, it is not possible to place an objective social value on the output 
foregone. This is partly because the social valuation of a set of outputs is dependent on the 
existing income distribution which will change as a result of the project/pricing intervention.
In other World Bank documents, and in their operations, the World Bank is more explicit 
about advocating a marginal-costing approach. For example, in an important World Bank 
sponsored text on urban finance, Bahl and Linn state that “ the basic rule of efficient pricing 
states that the price of a public service should be set equal to the marginal cost of producing 
the service” (1992: 241).24 The World Bank Mission to South Africa on water pricing 
strongly advocated marginal-cost pricing (Roome, 1995: personal communication).
Equity. The World Bank recognises that “ the potential health benefits from improved water 
and sanitation services are huge” and that in order to secure these benefits water supply must 
be uncontaminated and water use greater rather than less (World Bank, 1992: 101).25 Thus, 
the World Bank contends that extending adequate access to safe water supplies is the most 
important contribution to equity that a government can make in contexts where these minimum 
conditions are not universally met. Where access is not universal and resources are scarce, the 
World Bank argues that it is equitable for those that have access to pay the costs of that 
service for two reasons: it reduces the inequity between those that do have access and those 
that do not, and the additional resources thus made available may be channelled to extending 
access. (Of course, the second reason is only compelling if service coverage is indeed 
improved.) An example of their line of argument is given below:
Many governments fear that fully recovering costs will hurt the poor, yet 
increasing prices to enable cost recovery may actually help the poor. They 
often pay much higher prices per unit fo r  privately provided water because 
they are not connected to the public service networks that have lower unit 
costs, and because they do not benefit from the subsidies to users o f  the public 
system. Expansion o f access benefits the poor by allowing them to rely on 
much less costly sources o f water. (World Bank, 1994: 49)
24 They then go on to give a thorough exposition of marginal-cost pricing. S ee  Chapter 3.
25 The World Bank notes that a  supply of 50 led is much more likely to secure health benefits than 30 led or 
less and that this higher consumption is only likely if water is supplied directly to the house or yard. 
Collection of water from communal street taps typically results in water usage that is much less that 30 
led (World Bank, 1992).
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To ensure that “ appropriate” services are provided, the World Bank advocates a demand 
responsive approach with willingness-to-pay a key determinant. The World Bank reluctantly 
admits that subsidies may be appropriate and uses strong language to caution against the 
dangers associated with subsidies:
In urban areas there is abundant evidence that most people want on-plot water 
supplies and are willing to pay the fu ll cost o f  these services. In some areas 
this standard solution will have to be adjusted and special efforts made to 
accommodate poor people. In Latin America and, more recently, in Morocco 
utilities have helped poor families to install a connection and in-house 
plumbing by giving them the option o f  paying over several years. Another 
option is a “social tariff” whereby the better-off cross-subsidise the poor. 
Properly executed, such policies are both sensible (since the poor use 
relatively little water) and compassionate. But there are dangers. Social tariffs 
can lead to a general spread o f  subsidies. And the assignment o f  non­
commercial objectives to a public enterprise generally has an insidious effect 
on the achievement o f  all its objectives, commercial and non-commercial 
alike. (World Bank, 1992:104, own emphasis)
For piped water supply, the Bank recognises that increasing block rates may be appropriate to 
achieve equity, efficiency and cost-recovery objectives. However, at least some policy 
analysts in the Bank remain sceptical of the efficacy of these tariffs in practice.26
Financial cost recovery and autonomy. A key justification given by the Bank for advocating 
financial cost recovery is management autonomy:
A pricing strategy [should be] designed to ensure cost recovery, which creates 
a desirable form  o f financial independence fo r public utilities. ... With fewer 
budgetary transfers, the government has less occasion to intetfere, a key to 
managerial autonomy. (World Bank, 1994: 37; 47)
This sentiment is also set out in the Policy Paper, with the additional motivation of 
sustainability:
Given the low level o f  cost-recovery at present and the extent o f  under-pricing, 
fees that establish the water entity's financial autonomy would be a good 
starting point to ensure the entity’s independence and the sustainability o f  
operation. (World Bank, 1993b: 49)
Possible mechanisms to achieve cost-recovery are explained in the 1994 Development Report:
The general principle fo r  pricing public utilities to recover costs without 
distorting the allocation o f resources is to set the price equal to all the short- 
run costs in efficiently producing an additional unit o f output while keeping 
productive capacity constant -  that is price equals the short-run marginal 
costs. However, water systems periodically require large investments and
26 S ee, for example, work commissioned by the Bank and reported by Whittington (1992). A World Bank 
mission to South Africa specifically focusing on water tariffs strongly recom m ended against rising block 
tariffs (Roome, 1995, personal communication). More recently, the World Bank advocated the removal 
of block rates in Uganda (field visit, Uganda, 1999).
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average costs fa ll as production is increased, and the efficient price is below 
the average cost. Charging that price would result in a deficit and hence a 
loss o f financial autonomy. Adjustments in the general pricing formula can be 
used to avoid an operational deficit and minimise the trade-offs imposed by 
the need to jointly address equity, efficiency and financial goals. In general, i f  
financial autonomy is a requirement, the public price has to be revised to 
cover the cost o f  providing the service plus a mark-up, often resulting in multi­
part tariffs and possible cross-subsidies. Two common options to minimise the 
distortions (to efficiency and equity) o f achieving financial autonomy are 
increasing block tariffs and time-of-use tariffs. Under increasing block tariffs, 
consumption o f  services is priced at a low initial rate up to a specified volume 
o f use and at a higher rate per block thereafter. The number o f  blocks varies 
from  3 to as many as 10. The most effective structure is the simplest, 
particularly when monitoring and administrative capacity are constraining.
(World Bank, 1994:48)
Here the potential role of increasing block and seasonal tariffs is acknowledged.
Subsidies. Despite a general resistance to subsidies (for example, “ the demand-driven 
approach remains appropriate in most places, even in low-income settings, ... and should be 
compromised only in rare circumstances” ), the World Bank does recognise that public 
investment in infrastructure which benefits the whole community , which is important for 
environmental quality and health, and for which there is a low willingness to pay among 
households, could be undertaken using public funds (World Bank, 1993a: 94).
The case for subsidies for water supply, in particular, is reluctantly conceded:
Even though willingness to pay fo r  improved water and sanitation services 
may be high, affordability may still not be enough to cover the costs. Subsidies 
may be justified in such situations. But the rationale should primarily be one 
o f redistribution: a society may choose to provide cheap water or other 
services to the poor as one o f many alternative means o f  improving their 
welfare. Health benefits alone do not generally provide a rationale fo r  public 
subsidy o f  water and sanitation. (World Bank, 1993a: 93)
When willingness to pay is much less than costs, it is usually a mistake to 
justify subsidies on the basis o f health benefits alone. First, such subsidies 
compromise the demand driven approach to service provision (that is, services 
that people want and are willing to pay for); lack o f accountability and 
efficiency are the inevitable consequences. And second, i f  public financed 
investments in these services are being considered fo r  health reasons, it should 
be noted that such investments cost more per DALY gained than other [directly 
health related] interventions.27 (World Bank, 1993a, 106, own emphasis)
The Bank uses strong language against the potential pitfalls of subsidies by alleging that they 
lead to the “general spread of subsidies” and that they are “ insidious” .
27 DALY stands for disability-adjusted life year. For a definition and discussion of this m easurem ent, see  
World Bank (1993a: 26). The World Bank contends that a com prehensive (primary) health package 
could cost about $4 to $7 per capita per annum w hereas the infrastructure costs for water supply and 
sanitation could cost between $30 and $200 per capita per annum (1993a: 106).
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Institutional arrangem ents. The World Bank is pessimistic about the public provision of 
services:
Supply-side failures are largely caused by inefficient and unresponsive public 
sector monopolies which, in the water sector, typically provide subsidised 
services at between one-third and two-thirds the fu ll economic cost. Massive 
public investments, often supported by the donor community and the World 
Bank, have been made in public or quasi-public agencies responsible fo r  the 
delivery and maintenance o f  household services. The net result has often been 
bloated public agencies with low accountability to their customers and few  
incentives fo r  improving efficiency; a middle class that is increasingly well 
served with subsidised services; a poorer class that receives little or no 
service; and a ripe environment for patronage. (World Bank, 1993a: 93)
As a minimum, the World Bank recommends the commercialisation of service provision, 
although it does recognise that regulation, or “public oversight” , is necessary:
Urban piped water and sewerage at the municipal or metropolitan level should 
be provided by enterprises run on commercial principles. Professional 
management accountable to users and having clear incentives fo r  providing 
high-quality, reliable services and efficient asset management is also 
desirable. The responsibility o f government in such situations is, at a 
minimum, to ensure commercial operation, which can be achieved through 
delegation to a private company via a management, lease, or concession 
contract. Public oversight is necessary to ensure access fo r  low-income users 
and to protect public health and environmental quality. In countries with 
modest technical capacity, concessions can successfully draw on international 
expertise. Pricing water to reflect the jM l financial, environmental and 
economic costs o f  supply is essential fo r  generating funds to expand service 
and fo r  promoting efficient use. (World Bank, 1994:117, own emphasis)
Typically, the World Bank views political intervention as necessarily malevolent and wishes to 
isolate management from this:
Infrastructure must be conceived o f  as a “service industry ” providing goods 
that meet customer demands. Such a commercial orientation contrasts sharply 
with the situation in most government departments and state-owned public 
utilities, which suffer from multiple and conflicting objectives and inadequate 
accounting fo r  costs or financial risks, and which put little emphasis on 
revenue collected and the quality o f service delivered. Managers have little 
motivation in such circumstances to satisfy customers or to achieve a 
reasonable return on assets through efficient operation and adequate 
maintenance. Typically providers of infrastructure are subject to pervasive 
interference by political authorities, which adversely affects operational 
decisions on investment, pricing, labour, and technological choices. (World 
Bank, 1994: 33, own emphasis)
The World Bank promotes privatisation, ostensibly as a means of improving efficiency:
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More private involvement in the operation o f water companies is warranted.
Many industrial countries have found it difficult to reform public enterprises, 
except as part o f  a move to privatise them. Indeed, privatisation is 
increasingly seen as a way not only to effect performance improvements but 
also to lock in the gains. (World Bank, 1992:110)
This strongly expressed view is qualified to some extent: “private sector involvement in the
sector is not a panacea and is never simple” , noting that the privatisation of the water sector
in the United Kingdom (England and Wales) was the most complex of all of the privatisations
undertaken in the country, and that, in developing countries, “ there are formidable problems”
(World Bank, 1992: 111). Yet despite these important qualifications, privatisation continues to
be strongly advocated. Moreover, the equity implications of the concentrated private
ownership of public infrastructure are rarely discussed.28
Where public agencies are not privatised, the World Bank envisages three core instruments to 
commercialise and increase the efficiency of operations: corporatisation -  creating quasi­
independent public enterprises insulated from non-commercial pressures and constraints; 
management contracts -  holding managers (both private and public) to performance contracts; 
and “ a pricing strategy designed to recover costs which creates a desirable form of financial 
independence for public utilities” (World Bank, 1994: 37).
Other institutional and/or management themes prevalent in World Bank advocacy are 
decentralisation and user participation. The World Bank supports the decentralisation of 
service delivery functions to local government particularly where local capabilities are 
adequate but, even where not, will support the development of local capacity (World Bank, 
1993b: 72). The Bank “will encourage the participation of beneficiaries and affected parties in 
the design and implementation of projects it supports. ... Particular attention will be given to 
the participation of women since they are essentially the managers of domestic water” (World 
Bank, 1993b: 73).
Although these policies may be appropriate in certain contexts, it is not necessarily true that 
decentralised management is more effective and efficient than centralised management. 
Centralisation may, in fact, be more effective than decentralisation in resource-scarce 
contexts. The World Bank policy on decentralisation is in danger of prescribing a solution that 
may not always be appropriate.29 The World Bank appears to have qualified its support for
28 Cairncross has criticised the World Bank for the lack of attention given to the long-term equity 
implications of privatisation. Subsequent to this criticism he has not been re-invited to consult to the 
World Bank {Cairncross, 1997, personal communication).
29 This is evident in Uganda where there are clear advantages to the centralised m anagem ent of urban 
water services. This is admitted by the Principle Water and Sanitation Specialist for East Africa at the 
World Bank (Locussol, 1999, personal communication). However, because of the World Bank policy of 
decentralisation, the official World Bank advice to the Government of Uganda is to decentralise the
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decentralisation further more recently, acknowledging that where capacity is weak, 
decentralisation can increase corruption and reduce access to basic social services (World 
Bank, 2001: 107).
Sustainability. On the water supply side, the Bank advocates that new projects should “give 
consideration to protecting the natural ecosystems and to directing development to less 
sensitive or already altered watersheds” and should look carefully at investing in existing 
systems first (rehabilitation, investment in water saving technologies etc.) to improve water- 
use efficiency rather than increasing supply (World Bank, 1993b: 61).
The Bank recommends that water quality be protected through a multi-pronged strategy which 
includes the following: effluent charges, pollution permits, public investment in wastewater 
treatment, incentives for water reclamation and reuse, public disclosure of effluent discharge 
data, citizen mobilisation and regional environmental assessments (World Bank, 1993b: 74).
Pricing practices in South Africa and Uganda
Water pricing practices in two developing countries, South Africa and Uganda, are briefly 
reviewed here in the light of World Bank policies in general and their specific advocacy in 
these two countries.
South Africa. The responsibility for water services is the constitutional responsibility of local 
government in South Africa. Local government can provide the service itself or contract with 
another party (public of private) to provide the service. In either case, the local government 
retains responsibility for setting the water tariff subject to national government guidelines. The 
guidelines specify cost recovery tariffs for non-domestic consumers and inclined block tariffs 
for domestic consumers with the first block provided at a concessionary rate, the second at the 
cost recovery rate and the third at a higher “ conservation-orientated” rate linked to the 
marginal cost of system expansion. Local governments are left to specify the structure and 
level of the industrial tariff and the block sizes and tariff levels for domestic consumers. 
Consequently, a wide variety of tariffs exist in urban areas in South Africa, but all have two 
common characteristics: they generally cover the costs of supply (overall) and equity 
considerations are built in with a “ life-line” tariff for low levels of consumption.
responsibility for the m anagem ent of urban water services to local government, a  policy which is almost 
certainly doomed to failure.
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The World Bank advocated the implementation of long-run marginal cost based tariffs in the 
Gauteng area and urged the scrapping of the inclined block tariff for domestic supplies in 
favour of a constant volume based tariff. The government rejected both of these arguments.30
Uganda. Although local government is constitutionally responsible for water services 
provision, a single public utility owns the assets and provides the services in twelve large 
towns in which about 66 percent of the urban population live. A uniform tariff structure is 
applied to all twelve towns. An inclined block tariff is applied to non-domestic consumers 
(differentiated between institutional, commercial and industrial), a flat rate is applied to 
domestic consumers and a concession rate is offered to licensed standpipe holders. Service 
provision in the other towns is decentralised at present (though options for reform are being 
considered) and tariffs vary widely.
The World Bank has advocated that prices be set at the long-run marginal cost of supply that 
was calculated to include the costs of wastewater collection and treatment (available only to a 
minority of consumers although the tariff would be applied to all consumers). The World 
Bank has also advocated the elimination of subsidies from government and cross-subsidies 
between larger and smaller towns.31 The government has rejected this reasoning. However, 
the World Bank is an important financier of water infrastructure in Uganda (which is not the 
case in South Africa) and has considerable influence over government policies. It is possible 
(and even likely) that the World Bank’s proposed policies and reform recommendations for 
Uganda, including a private concession for the three largest urban centres, could be imposed 
on the government in the near future.32
The divergence between theory and practice
Neo-classical economic thinking has come to dominate the policy advocacy of the World Bank 
which has a very significant influence on water pricing policies in developing countries 
because of its role as financier.
A careful reading of World Bank publications appears to suggest the possibility of using their 
policies to advance a nuanced approach to the complex problems facing urban water managers 
in establishing water tariff policy and setting tariffs. The publications do recognise, at least to 
some extent, the “political realities” and inequalities inherent in the real world of water
30 Roome (1995, personal communication).
31 No discussion of the potential health benefits arising from safe water w as given, and certainly no 
justification for public subsidies w as provided (field visit, Uganda, 1999). This seem s to be typical of the 
divergence between the policy (to recognise health benefits) and practice (to ignore these benefits).
32 Locussol (1999, personal communication). Further discussion of the political-economic context is 
provided in Chapter 4.
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supply and that the role of subsidies will continue to be important. Nevertheless, the themes 
that tend to dominate the policy advocacy arena are those derived from neo-classical economic 
theory, namely, marginal-cost pricing, eradication of subsidies, managerial autonomy from 
government influence and privatisation. Furthermore, World Bank practice appears to ignore 
the nuanced arguments presented in the World Bank’s published policies.
For example, while the motivation for privatisation is ostensibly pragmatic (improving both 
efficiency and equity), the single-minded implementation of privatisation across a large variety 
of contexts and with limited consideration of either the equity implications or the regulatory 
requirements leaves the Bank open to allegations of ideological bias.33 The potential 
disadvantages of privatisation, including the longer-term effect on inequality through the 
concentration of resources, are either not mentioned at all or are under-emphasised.34 
Numerous examples of positive outcomes from privatisation are cited whereas privatisation 
failures are rarely mentioned, or if they are, are blamed on the public sector.
The almost universal non-application of marginal-cost pricing in the water sector does not 
appear to limit the World Bank's advocacy of this pricing practice.35
Policies that seek to increase efficiency invariably have equity implications. It may be 
considered irresponsible to advocate efficiency-enhancing policies without adequate analysis of 
the equity implications, a practice the World Bank has frequently followed.36
Perhaps the key failing of the World Bank policy advocacy on water pricing is that the 
policies are not grounded in specific contexts. Each urban water supply situation calls for a 
particular approach. Some of the policies advocated will be applicable in some contexts, but 
clearly not all policies will be applicable in all contexts.37 Constructing the right policy mix
33 S ee footnotes 34 and 36. S ee  also Cramer (1998).
34 In the ca se  of Uganda, for example, World Bank advocacy of a concession for three large towns has 
adverse equity implications. It is a  classic case  of “cherry picking” with the low cost, high affordability 
area being given to a  private operator and the government being left with a  high cost, low affordability 
area which is very difficult to m anage without the economies of scale available when all of the towns are 
m anaged together. The potential risks attached to privatisation are also not mentioned at all in World 
Bank communications with the government (field visit, Uganda, 2000).
35 The potential lack of congruence between the advocacy of marginal-cost pricing for public enterprises 
and franchise bidding for long-term lease contracts (the adjudication of which often hinge on the water 
tariff a s  one of the key determinants, with the lowest price bid being deem ed the m ost efficient) is not 
discussed at all.
36 For example, in World Bank policy advocacy related to water pricing in South Africa, the Bank w as very 
explicit that its brief w as to improve efficiency and that the equity implications were something for South 
Africans to look after (Roome, personal communication, 1995). Similarly, the equity implications of 
privatisation in Uganda have also not been adequately considered by the World Bank.
37 The importance of context is dem onstrated in more detail in Chapter 4. For now, it suffices to note that 
conditions is Uganda and South Africa are completely different, yet the World Bank is advocating 
essentially the sam e policies (no subsidies, marginal-cost pricing, constant volumetric rates and
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requires a thorough understanding of the particular context. The key point being made here is 
that policy advocacy cannot be undertaken in a contextual vacuum and the “universal” policy 
truths advanced by the World Bank and other multinational agencies are in danger of doing 
just this.38
4. Towards a new approach
The review of pricing practice, undertaken as part of the research for this thesis, found no 
instances of “pure” marginal-cost pricing in which the marginal-cost price was applied to all 
units of water sold (although some instances of selective marginal-cost pricing were found).39 
The disjuncture between neo-classical pricing advocacy and the practice of water pricing is 
stark. Most theorists pose the question: why is there a general failure to implement marginal- 
cost pricing? While this question is certainly valid, an alternative and equally valid question is 
seldom asked: why do (neo-classical) economic theorists continue to advocate marginal-cost 
pricing in the face of overwhelming evidence that such pricing appears to be an anathema to 
citizens, government and water managers alike and that political-economic realities universally 
and persistently render the implementation of “pure” marginal-cost pricing unfeasible? The 
answers to both of these questions lie in a more serious analysis of the political economy of 
pricing (the topic of Chapter 4).
Neo-classical theory is one-dimensional with its exclusive focus on Pareto-efficiency, refusing 
to answer the question posed by Elster and quoted at the start of the chapter. The theory 
steers away from equity issues because of the inherent subjectivity that is a necessary and 
inescapable part of such analysis. Proponents of the theory are unwilling to recognise the 
subjectivity of the neo-classical paradigm itself. Furthermore the theory is ahistorical. The 
theory asserts that there are sets of universal normative policy prescriptions that may be 
applied everywhere to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and, therefore, the overall
privatisation). T hese policies do not take adequate account of the local political-economic context and it 
is not surprising that the policy advocacy has met with resistance.
38 A more charitable reading of World Bank policy advocacy would em phasise their frequent use of 
contextualised examples. However, this method is also subject to the criticisms of selective sampling 
and reductive reasoning. For example, the “success" of water markets are repeatedly cited by the World 
Bank and Chile is praised for following a neo-liberal economic agenda. Yet a World Bank report 
specifically examining water markets in Chile failed to mention equity issues once, whilst an external 
evaluation of the water markets in Chile raised important concerns in relation to the negative equity 
effects (Briscoe, 1996; Bauer, 1998). In another example, SODECI, a  private company providing 
services in Cote d’Ivoire is praised a s  a positive role model yet the company does not provide 
connections to the large informal settlem ents in Abidjan (World Bank, 1999:148; field visit, Cote d’Ivoire, 
1999).
39 The review comprised both a  literature review of secondary sources a s  well a s  primary data gathering 
for a number of cities in South Africa, Uganda and the United S tates. Current and historical pricing 
practices were reviewed for a  selection of cities in both developed and developing countries on all five 
continents. The review is reported in Eberhard (1999b).
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wealth of society. The theory concentrates on static equilibrium analysis with little 
understanding of dynamic processes and how current economic conditions have arisen, and 
how and why these change over time. The theory is also universalistic. It does not recognise 
the specificity of the object of its analysis, applying a universal method to all commodities. 
Water is a very specific “ commodity” which is profoundly linked to cultural, social, 
religious, political and economic processes. To treat water as any other commodity represents 
a particular ideological position.
The extent of the protection of the environment and the degree of equity desired are 
essentially political decisions that will be influenced by the political-economic balance of 
power. Any policy advocacy that is to stand a chance of successful implementation must be 
firmly rooted within such a contextualised political economy analysis. The implications of this 
are that a positivistic approach to policy advocacy is flawed, and that policies must be 
developed on a case-by-case basis and with a proper understanding of the political economy at 
both the country and city level. Notwithstanding this, within a country-specific context, it may 
be possible to develop a generalisable methodology that is applicable to a number of cities and 
towns.
The intention of this thesis is to develop a pricing theory and methodology that is not 
exclusively focused on Pareto-efficiency but is able to account for multiple objectives, is 
context-specific, is able to account for and explain dynamic historical changes in pricing 
practices and institutional arrangements over time, and is specific to the unique physical, 
social, cultural and economic properties of water.
This task is taken up from Chapter 4 onwards. First, the methodology employed in this thesis 
is justified (Chapter 2) and neo-classical pricing theory, which is so pervasive in policy 
advocacy in the water sector, is examined in further detail (Chapter 3).
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Chapter 2: Reflection on methodology
The argument for a critical-realist methodological approach
Starting from  the point which helped inspire epistemology, namely that there 
are tools used in knowledge, and that these deserve and require examination, 
there is an attempt [within postmodernism] to link this to the indisputable fact 
that in this world there is a great deal o f inequality o f  power. Could there be a 
link between the way the tools o f  knowledge make the worlds which they claim 
to find, and those inequalities? (Gellner, 1992: 42)
1. Introduction
There is remarkably little discussion of economic methodology within the “mainstream” 
economics literature (Dow, 1997).40 This is rather surprising given the important influence 
that methodology has on the process of economic theorising and policy-making.41 Mainstream 
economics has traditionally based the justification of its methodology on logical positivism. I 
will argue that mainstream economic methodology has not responded to the substantive 
criticisms of this schema, in particular, the postmodernist challenge to universal truth claims. 
I argue that critical-realism avoids the methodological pitfalls of positivism and allows for the 
development of a more satisfactory range of understandings pertaining to the necessarily open 
system of water pricing.
Methodology is fundamentally influenced by the choice of subject matter, that is, the 
epistemological base. Mainstream economics is predominantly concerned with the problem of 
maximising Pareto-efficiency. This preoccupation means that questions related to the 
underlying market structure and how this came about tend not to be addressed. This is a 
particularly significant shortcoming when neo-classical economics is applied to water pricing 
where equity issues are prominent. The epistemological basis for the critical-realist 
methodological approach adopted in this thesis is set out at the end of Section 3.
Methodology is contingent on the choice of ontological system which, in turn, is influenced by 
ideology (“ a shared system of meaning and comprehension” ).42 I argue that neo-classical
40 In her critical review of mainstream economic methodology, Sheila Dow (1997) does not define 
“mainstream". It may be assum ed to refer primarily to the current hegem ony of neo-classical economics 
and also to the new institutional economics and the new political economy (to the extent that these 
branches replicate the methodology implicit within neo-classical economics).
41 “The way an issue is formulated, and the perspective that is adopted, often crucially shapes the policy 
conclusions that follow” (McNeill, 1998: 261). This is a  rare admission in the literature on water 
economics.
42 The definition com es from Bromley (1990: 86).
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economics is dominated by the “ ideology of efficiency” and I subject this ideology to detailed 
criticism. The ideologies informing new institutional economics and classical political 
economy also are briefly presented and criticised.
Critical-realism stresses the need for methodological, epistemological and ontological self- 
awareness. I argue that a critical-realist approach to urban water pricing presents an 
improvement over existing approaches to the extent that it is able to achieve self-awareness 
and reduce ideological bias by critically evaluating water pricing theory and practice with 
reference to the epistemological, ontological and ideological “ prisms” implicit in three 
important economic schools of thought: neo-classical economics, new institutional economics 
and political economy.
2. Methodology as scientific method
The methodological foundation of mainstream economics is logical empiricism, an outgrowth 
of logical positivism. This requires that theories be both logically coherent and consistent, and 
predictive. Milton Friedman (1953) asserted that predictive success (and not the truth content 
of assumptions), should be the primary criterion for the appraisal of a theory. This 
methodological approach, which is termed instrumentalism, encouraged economists to develop 
theories in terms of an internal agenda that was free of constraints, subject only to empirical 
testing of outcomes (Dow, 1997). This lack of grounding in external methodological 
principles has been criticised by Lawrence Boland (1982) and Hausman (1994). Hausman 
argues that “ even if all one cares about is predictive success in some limited domain, one 
should still be concerned about the realism of the assumptions of an hypothesis and the truth 
of its irrelevant and unimportant predictions” (1994: 220). This is a direct and valid 
methodological challenge to Friedman’s narrow conception of instrumentalism.43
Instrumentalism is distinctly limited because no amount of empirical confirmation of a theory 
can prove it to be true. Karl Popper (1957) sought to overcome the problem of induction by 
proposing falsification as the appropriate testing procedure. If conjectures from a theory could 
be expressed in such a way as to be falsifiable, then a theory could be assumed to be true 
unless it was falsified. Even though this approach allowed for the existence of axioms that 
were not falsifiable (such as the rationality axiom in neo-classical economics), it proved to be 
impossible to put the approach into practice (Dow, 1997). The criticism of falsification is 
reinforced by Bayesian theory which asserts that evidence is likely to fall within a Bayesian
43 Friedman’s  methodology is not a true instrumentalist methodology because it is not concerned with all 
the observable consequences of a theory. Hausman (1994: 217) argues that the logic implicit in this 
narrow version of instrumentalism is flawed.
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distribution and has the implication that a contrary observation is not sufficient to refute a 
theory. Dow comments: “The notion of confronting a range of theories with a set of 
independent facts is misconceived” (1997: 76).
Donald McCloskey (1983) has analysed the rhetoric of mainstream economics and concluded 
that, in contrast to the rhetorical claim that logical empiricism was the methodological 
foundation for theorising, persuasiveness was the criterion actually employed by economists 
for appraising economic theories. This conclusion accords with postmodern drinking which 
claims that there is not one universal knowable truth, but only multiple, subjective and partial 
truths.44 Hence the hegemony of one truth can only be obtained at the expense of other truths 
and must be achieved through the powers of persuasion.45
It is important to point out that distinct methodological pitfalls lurk within the pluralist and 
postmodern schools of thought. For example, McCloskey's attempt at offering a pluralist 
pragmatic criterion of appraisal (“A theory is to be preferred which is accepted by an 
academic community, i.e. which has proved to be most persuasive”) is itself a prescriptive 
methodological claim (McCloskey, 1994 in Dow, 1997: 79).46 Similarly, the statement “ there 
is not one universal knowable truth” is itself a universal truth claim. Nevertheless, it is useful 
to think of the process as dialectic: the modernist claim to absolute truth, the postmodern 
rejection of this claim and the synthesis of these two claims. Dow describes this synthesis as 
follows: “We are now in transition to a synthesis consisting of new ways of generating 
knowledge which aim to identify a version of the truth, while admitting the impossibility of 
identifying absolute truth, on the one hand, but asserting the feasibility of different versions of 
the truth, on the other” (1997: 86).
44 Dow claims that postmodernism “denies the possibility of identifying truth of any kind” and “also involves 
a denial of the basis for humanism, or government intervention" (1997: 79, 86). Ernst Gellner, while 
noting that it is almost impossible to give a  coherent definition or account of postmodernism, interprets 
its practical outcome in the following terms: “In the end, the operational meaning of postmodernism in 
anthropology seem s to be something like this: a refusal (in practice rather selective) to countenance any 
objective facts, any independent social structures, and their replacem ent by a pursuit of ‘meanings', both 
those of the objects of inquiry and of the inquirer. There is thus a double s tress  on subjectivity: the world 
creation by the person studied, and the text creation by the investigator" (1992: 31).
45 This is, of course, an assertion. Nevertheless it begs a  more fundamental question highlighted by 
Gellner: “And yet there is a  hint of an underlying more or less coherent idea in [postmodernism]: starting 
from the point which helped inspire epistemology, namely that there are tools used in knowledge, and 
that these deserve and require examination, there is an attempt to link this to the indisputable fact that in 
this world there is a great deal of inequality of power. Could there be a  link between the way the tools of 
knowledge m ake  the worlds which they claim to find, and those inequalities?" (1992: 42). Posing this 
question is, perhaps, the m ost important contribution that postmodernism has m ade to social theory.
46 Dow com ments that the “purist (non-criticai) pluralist position leads to the type of untenable position 
occupied by McCloskey when she denies the role of prescriptive methodology in prescriptive 
methodological terms" (1997: 80).
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Within mainstream economics there is an ongoing tension between deductive and inductive 
logic. The theorists emphasise deductive logic whereas the empiricists concentrate on 
inductive logic. Both methodologies are inherently flawed: it has proved difficult, if not 
impossible, to test the deductions derived from pure theory, and inductive logic is subject to 
the impracticalities of falsification.47 It seems as if the methodological debate within 
mainstream economics has not progressed much beyond this dualistic preoccupation. Boland 
(1991) argues that mainstream economics still operates within the methodological framework 
of positivism whereas the philosophy of science has moved beyond this.
There is, however, a third strand. The advocates of this third way, called the “ Minnesota 
Agnostics” by Johnston (1991), use inductive logic (like the empiricists) but not for the 
purposes of testing or proving theories. Rather, they employ econometric techniques 
deliberately designed to be atheoretical (Dow, 1997). This approach, also termed “ letting the 
data speak for themselves” , argues against the process of mainstream theory construction 
which consists of developing axiom-based closed systems yielding equilibrium solutions 
(1997: 82). This approach is compatible with the critical-realism that is described below.
Traditional mainstream economics methodology is based predominantly on a closed systems 
approach. However, social systems are inherently open. Both logical and empirical certainties 
are severely constrained because the full range of variables is not known and dynamic 
processes limit the scope for replicable events. These limitations have long been recognised by 
major non-mainstream economists such as Hayek, Keynes, Robinson and Kaldor (Dow, 
1997).
A promising open systems methodological approach is critical-realism. Dow describes this 
approach as follows:
[Critical-realism ] s t r e s s e s  th e  req u irem en t to g round  all ep istem ology , 
m e thodo logy  and  th eo ry  in an  ontology. Specifically, it is a rg u e d  th a t o b se rv e d  
reality is g e n e ra te d  by underly ing s tru c tu re s  an d  p ro c e s s e s ,  a n d  th a t it should  
b e  th e  p u rp o se  of sc ie n c e  to  identify th e s e  s tru c tu re s  an d  p ro c e s s e s .  But 
b e c a u s e  th e s e  s tru c tu re s  and  p ro c e s s e s  a re  organic , ou r k n o w led g e  of them  is 
inevitably incom plete; reality c a n  only b e  u n d ers to o d  a s  an  o p e n  sy s tem , so  
th e re  is s c o p e  for a  ra n g e  of u n d e rs ta n d in g s . But e a c h  u n d e rs ta n d in g  can  b e  
d is c u s se d  rationally  in rela tion  to  p e rc ep tio n s  of th e  underly ing  s tru c tu re s  and  
p ro c e s s e s .  T h e  logic is th u s  fundam en tally  d ifferent from  th a t o f m a in s tream  
ec o n o m ic s  w hich is g e a re d  to identifying em pirically, o r form alising 
m athem atically , e v e n t regu larities a long  logical, positiv ist lines. ... 
M ethodological a w a re n e s s  is crucial, but d o e s  not go  fa r e n o u g h  -  ev e n  m ore 
crucial is on tological an d  ep istem o log ical a w a re n e s s . (1997: 88)
47 Dow notes that there has been a “shift in relative power exercised in the profession by pure theorists 
relative to empiricists, with a  growing gulf between the two groups" (1997: 82).
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Critical-realism acknowledges the primacy of subjectivity in an open systems context (a 
concern highlighted by postmodernism) and seeks to mitigate this through self-awareness in 
the method of enquiry as well as in the systems of belief and knowledge informing the 
enquiry.
In addition to its commitment to open systems, Fine (2000a) identifies three other key 
characteristics of critical-realism: it is systematic and requires an understanding of social and 
historical content; it recognises that there is no direct relationship between theory and 
empirical observation; and, it renders much of neo-classical economic theory redundant 
because of its philosophical base (methodological individualism) and its preoccupation with 
equilibrium as an organising concept.
Fine (2000a) criticises critical-realism for not being critical enough; for not engaging with the 
content of neo-classical theory; for failing to address the system within which economic theory 
is practised, that is, capitalism; for its naivety with respect to the methodologies and content 
of other social science disciplines, in particular, classical political economy; and, for a limited 
incorporation of history. These criticisms seem to carry more validity with respect to the 
actual practice of critical-realism rather than the methodological approach itself.
Given its current hegemony, neo-classical economists tend to set up neo-classical economics 
as the appropriate methodology, asserting an exclusive truth claim to the analysis and 
understanding of economic processes. This claim has certainly been adopted within the water 
economics literature, as shown in Chapter 1. From a critical-realist perspective, such a claim 
is flawed. Neo-classical economics may reveal “ truths” , but these are partial truths generated 
within a particular ontological system. Other truths, generated from different ontological 
systems, can co-exist together with the (partial) truth claims of neo-classical economics. An 
examination of the question of water pricing using the methodology of mainstream neo­
classical economics is inevitably partial and incomplete. A more complete understanding of 
water pricing can be achieved by using the critical-realist approach, the approach adopted in 
this thesis.
Although it would be possible to address the topic of urban water pricing purely from a 
classical political economy perspective, it will be argued that such an approach would not be 
helpful for the development of urban water pricing theory and praxis if it were to be 
undertaken on its own. Similarly, an institutional approach to urban water pricing has distinct 
limitations.48 A critical-realist approach creates the “ methodological space” for the 
examination of water pricing using different approaches. Three approaches are examined in
48 The specific limitations of institutional economics are dem onstrated in Chapter 4.
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this chapter: neo-classical economics, institutional economics and political economy. I argue 
that although each approach adds insights into urban water pricing, none of the methodologies 
on their own provides a satisfactory explanation of the theory and practice of water pricing, 
and therefore, a more satisfactory explanation can be obtained by selecting and combining the 
insights in a critical way, using the methodology of critical-realism. The implications of this 
approach are shown in the chapters that follow. The success of the approach is evaluated in 
the concluding chapter.
3. Methodology as epistemology
A second dimension of methodology has to do with the choice of subject, that is, the 
epistemological base. There are marked differences between the subjects studied and the kinds 
of questions asked in the three main branches of economics: neo-classical economics, classical 
political economy and (new) institutional economics. At the risk of over simplification, the 
core subject matter and key questions asked within these three branches of economics are 
briefly encapsulated below.
Mainstream neo-classical economics is almost exclusively concerned with the problem of the 
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources in the context of scarcity. The primary question asked 
is: how can resources be allocated more efficiently so as to maximise social welfare (usually 
equated with aggregate wealth)? The basic unit of analysis is the rational calculating 
individual (methodological individualism). Aggregates (for example, a firm) are treated as if a 
single rational individual could represent their actions. The dynamics of capital accumulation 
and the distribution of power that influences how the surplus is allocated are largely ignored in 
the analysis. Methodological individualism refers to the dominance of the individual unit 
(household in the case of the consumer and firm in the case of the producer) as the basic unit 
of analysis (Hodgson, 1986). In classical economics, also called classical political economy, 
the focus of analysis was on economic interest groups and their interaction (at the risk of over 
simplifying, mercantilists and monopolist traders versus others in the case of Adam Smith, 
landlord versus the landless in the case of David Ricardo, and the owners of capital versus 
labour in the case of Karl Marx).
The ahistorical approach of neo-classical economics differs markedly from classical political 
economy. Geoffrey Ingham (1996) asserts that the latter sought to answer three questions: 
first, an explanation for wealth creation, second, what determines the distribution of this 
wealth, and third, why this occurs in a “ reasonably ordered manner” when the potential for 
violence arising out of self-interest is great. The dynamic of accumulation and the power 
relationships related to this were thus explicitly part of the subject matter.
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The key features of neo-classical economics which stand out in contrast to classical economics 
have been succinctly summarised by Krishna Bharadwaj (1986) as follows: “ (a) The [neo­
classical] theories introduced through their characterisation of the productive process and their 
concept of ‘costs’ a symmetry among all the revenue categories and offered a uniform 
explanation of ‘factor rewards’, (b) The theory of price subsumes the theory of distribution in 
the sense that both product and factor prices are explained by the same processes, 
equilibrating demand and supply, (c) The ‘individual’ making optimising decisions in response 
to prices is the basic unit of analysis, (d) A formal and apparent symmetry was introduced in 
the roles that production and consumption play in determining prices. This introduced, 
prominently, considerations of individual subjectivity; for ultimately consumption provided 
not only the raison d ’etre for production but also the basis for determining factor rewards; 
while consumption was itself explained on the basis of utility maximisation by individuals, 
guided essentially by relative prices, the system of preferences of the individual was taken as 
foreknown, (e) Analysis shifted prominently to the sphere of circulation, or exchange; both, 
the determination of all the quantities and of distribution, being subsumed under the general 
theory of relative prices, the latter came to acquire analytically the key role as the driving 
force behind change” (1986:311).
Much of the new institutional economics (epitomised by the contribution of Oliver 
Williamson, 1985) is functionalist in its methodology. New institutional economics seeks to 
explain the existence and/or persistence of economic and social institutional arrangements in 
terms of their efficiency (vis-a-vis other alternatives). This approach is subject to at least three 
serious logical and substantive difficulties: first, effects are treated as the cause or origin, thus 
reversing the time sequence of conventional causal analysis; second, it is not possible to 
measure any particular item's net contribution to efficiency; and third, other functional 
alternatives may exist and functionalism gives no explanation as to why this particular system 
emerged (Ingham, 1996: 251). New institutional economics, like neo-classical economics, 
expressly excludes the analysis of power relations.49
An analysis of water pricing solely in terms of neo-classical economics is severely limited by 
its preoccupation with Pareto-efficiency concerns. Institutional economics adds value through 
its concern with the institutional structures underpinning economic relations. Classical political 
economy, through its exploration of historical processes and the dynamic of accumulation 
over time, asks a different set of questions which may be used to complement and criticise the 
above analyses.
49 In a survey article on institutional economics by Geoffrey Hodgson, a  key proponent of this approach, 
power relationships are not mentioned once (Hodgson, 1998).
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 2: Reflection on methodology Page 41
Using critical-realism as the methodological approach, this thesis seeks to understand water- 
pricing using all three “epistemological sets” defined by the three main branches of 
economics. The questions posed in this thesis require an understanding of static allocation 
issues, dynamic allocation and accumulation, institutional structures (and the changes to these 
over time), and historical economic processes encompassing an analysis of power and conflict 
over resource allocations and outcomes.
In the above light, the data required to examine urban water pricing would include (but not be 
limited to) the following: costs and cost structures related to the supply and distribution of 
water; demand and demand structures related to the consumption and use of water; the 
distributions of both supply and demand in relation to consumer classes and income 
distribution; environmental, health and social benefits and costs related to the supply, 
distribution and consumption of water and distributions of these benefits and costs; the 
institutional structure and characteristics of the specific “market” for water, in particular, the 
governance and regulation of water provision, the extent of monopoly, the ownership and 
management of assets, the effectiveness of service provision and the distribution of rents; and, 
the historical processes that have resulted in the present institutional structures and the 
distribution of costs and benefits and, specifically, the role of capital accumulation in this 
process and the distribution of the surplus.
It is obvious that much of this data will be specific to a particular urban water context. Hence, 
the analysis in the following chapters is presented with reference to context-specific data, with 
a particular focus on urban water pricing practices in South Africa, Uganda and the United 
States of America. Secondary data have been supplemented with primary data where 
necessary. Primary data have been collected through field visits in South Africa and Uganda 
and through personal communications with influential policy makers in the water sector in 
these countries, the World Bank and the United States,
4. Methodology as ideology
Methodology is contingent on the prior choice of ontological system. In turn, the choice of 
ontological system is influenced by ideology. Hence methodology is contingent on ideology 
and the choice of methodology involves a choice of a belief system and set of norms.
A cornerstone of the ideology of efficiency is the subjective preference theory of value that 
simply stated, means that commodities have value because they are wanted, and wanted
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because they (presumably) have some use or utility for the individual.50 This has two crucial 
consequences: first, it treats individuals and their structure of wants (preferences) as the 
ultimate and independent data of the economic problem; and second, the theory of distribution 
becomes incidental to the pricing process. To link allocation decisions so directly and 
unambiguously to consumer preferences, as neo-classical economics does, is clearly 
problematic. Sagoff (1994) points outs that the implications of this for welfare economics in 
particular are catastrophic because preferences have no demonstrable relation with well­
being.51
In neo-classical theory, the subjective value of individual preferences becomes objectified in 
the measure of marginal utility. This marks a distinct departure from classical economics that 
sought an objective base for the measure of value. The subjective preference theory of value 
has been criticised by Maurice Dobb (1973) and others for failing to concern itself with the 
social conditioning of the individual’s desires or behavioural reactions: “The concept of the 
individual making free choices on the basis of an autonomously given scale of preferences 
conflict[s] directly with reality, when consumers’ preferences [are] directly moulded by the 
availability of consumables and by the individual’s environment and class position” 
(Bharadwaj, 1989: 188).
A key assertion of neo-classical theory is that the overall welfare of society is maximised 
when free agent producers and consumers interact through voluntary exchange (free 
competitive market), with individual consumers seeking to maximise their utility and 
producers seeking to maximise their profits. Such a state of maximum welfare is said to be 
Pareto-efficient if it is not possible to increase overall welfare without causing some 
individuals in society to become poorer. The theory claims that Pareto-efficiency is attained 
when individual producers produce up to a point where the marginal cost of production equals 
the marginal revenue received (that is, the sale price in a competitive market) and individual 
consumers consume up to the point where the marginal utility of consumption equals the 
marginal loss of utility (or opportunity cost) of foregoing consumption of other goods (that is, 
the purchase price in a competitive market).52 These claims rely on the validity of the two
50 “The methodology ushered in by the ‘Jevonian revolution' and given more system atic formulation by 
Menger and the ‘Austrian school’ sought to derive an explanation for exchange-value from the attitudes 
of individual consum ers towards commodities as  use values catering for satisfaction of individual wants” 
(Dobb, 1973: 33). S ee  also Cole et al (1991).
51 In terms of modem neo-ciassical economic theory, utility reduces to subjective consum er preferences. 
Sen notes that there is som e ambiguity in this “preference” view of utility (1992: 6): preferences can be 
defined purely in term s of individual choice, in which case there is no content to interpersonal 
comparisons, or a t least not in any straight forward way: alternatively, preferences can be defined in 
term s of desires or satisfactions. S ee  Chapter 5.
52 In this way, neo-classical economics se ts  up symmetry between producer and consumer. Again, this is 
markedly different from the views of classical economists, particularly those of Marx, who recognised the
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fundamental theorems of welfare economics: competitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto- 
efficient; and, any Pareto-efficient allocation can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium if 
appropriate lump-sum transfers are made.53 For the purposes of application, these theorems 
require that economies are in competitive equilibrium and that lump-sum transfers can be 
made without cost or the creation of market distortions. Neither of these conditions pertain in 
real economies.
It is also necessary to address the problem of welfare changes that result in some individuals 
being made better off and others worse off (which is the norm rather than the exception). 
Neo-classical economists defend the primary goal of improving Pareto-efficiency in this 
context by appeal to the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle. This states that if an economic 
policy has the consequence of making one set of people better off and another worse off, then 
a potential Pareto-improvement can be said to have occurred if the gainers could compensate 
the losers and still benefit from the change. Dinwiddy and Teal (1996) criticise this principle 
on three counts: the notion of “potential” is problematic: payment does not have to occur, in 
which case the notion of Pareto-improvement as an ideological justification for neo-classical 
welfare economics is misleading to the point of being completely undermined; costless lump­
sum transfers are not possible; and, the Scitovsky paradox shows that even if costless lump­
sum transfers do occur, the direction of social welfare change may be ambiguous (Scitovsky, 
1971).
In practice, neo-classical economic policy-making relies heavily on the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation principle. The emphasis of most neo-classical analyses in support of particular 
policies is on “potential Pareto-efficiency improvement” ; the question of the distribution of 
losses and gains inherent in almost any economic intervention is typically left to a political 
process (that is, it is ignored in the analysis). Neo-classical economics consciously chooses 
this route in an attempt to avoid the inevitable subjectivity of welfare economics and in this 
way sets itself up as an “ objective” science. However, this objectivity is a thin and misleading 
veneer for a number of reasons. First, as already noted, almost all economic policies have 
very real consequences for income distribution whether these are acknowledged and factored 
into the analyses or not. Second, the process of establishing policies which seek to maximise 
potential Pareto-efficiency improvements is hardly objective, requiring numerous subjective 
judgements. Third, the many accommodations required to account for imperfect or incomplete
asymmetries between the owners of the m eans of production on the one hand and consum ers on the 
other.
53 Formal proofs of these theorem s are provided by Mas-Colell et al (1995).
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markets, externalities, imperfect or asymmetrical information, capital indivisibility, and 
transaction costs render the potential Pareto-efficiency claims implausible.
One of the most important failings of neo-classical economics is that it does not treat income 
distribution logically and coherently. Neo-classical economics asserts that Pareto-efficiency is 
independent of income distribution, that is, any distribution of income can be Pareto- 
efficient.54 However, this is inconsistent within the theory’s own logical framework. Clearly, 
the prevailing structure of market demands is dependent on the income distribution. 
Therefore, the whole pricing process implicitly assumes a postulated initial income 
distribution, which contradicts the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
Thus the theory of price actually subsumes the theory of distribution (Bharadwaj, 1986). In 
fact, in some development of neo-classical theory, the claim to explain distribution has been 
given up, with “ the theory being avowedly designed only to explain price formation” 
(Bharadwaj, 1986:31). Dobb expands on this point:
A theory o f distribution, in other words, i f  it is conceived as a theory o f 
derived prices o f productive services or factors, cannot be independent o f 
initial income-distribution as essential premise. ... [In the classical approach,] 
income distribution is treated as being a result o f social institutions and social 
relations, whereas in [the neo-classical approach] it is determined by the 
conditions o f exchange. [For classical economists,] social conditions and class 
forces are more fundamental than relations o f exchange. [For neo-classical 
economists,] income distribution (at least between factors) is supra- 
institutional and supra-historical. (Dobb, 1973: 35)
The theory of welfare economics thus ends in a logical quagmire and the assertion that perfect 
competition maximises welfare and is in the best interests of all is untenable. The existence of 
imperfect markets, market power, income inequality, imperfect information, transaction costs 
and uncertainty poses insuperable problems for welfare economics.
The key danger of neo-classical economics is that the pure theory (which describes, and is 
only applicable to, an artificially constructed abstract world) is translated into a dogma that 
asserts that free competition and self-interest (utility maximisation and profit maximisation) 
are good for every one.
An important and direct consequence of the philosophical basis of the neo-classical theory is 
the tacit support it gives to the view that the existing distribution of wealth is a result of 
ability, hard work and efficiency and thus the wealthy have “ earned” their wealth in a fair
54 This is the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
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and just way.55 Although most self-respecting neo-classical economists would dissent from 
such a view, there is an important sense in which the philosophy underpinning neo-classical 
economics, with its obeisance to the market and its support of the notion that the pursuit of 
“utility maximisation” results in the “ overall good” for society as a whole, supports a form 
of social Darwinism. Indeed, the moral justification of wealth (in the presence of poverty) in 
many modern European and North American countries is achieved by appealing to neo­
classical economic theory.56
The policy conclusions arising from the neo-classical economic analysis of Pareto-efficiency 
therefore must be viewed critically in the light of the inherently ideological content of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the theory.
New institutional economics operates within a similar ideological framework to that of neo­
classical economics with respect to the ideology of efficiency. Efficiency is regarded as the 
“ objective yardstick” which can be used to explain institutional forms. Efficiency is implicitly 
understood to be Pareto-efficiency and is reliant on the subjective preference theory of value. 
Hence, new institutional economics is subject to the same methodological criticisms as neo­
classical economics, with the exception that new institutional economics does not require the 
strong rationality assumption used within mainstream neo-classical economics. Williamson, a 
key proponent of the new institutional economics, assumes that human agents are 
opportunistic (“ self-interest seeking with guile” ) but exhibit bounded rationality (“ intendedly 
rational but only limitedly so”) as a result of incomplete information and uncertainty about the 
future.57 He asserts that this is “human nature as we know it” and admits that “ the resulting 
conception of nature is stark and rather jaundiced” (Williamson, 1985: xiii). These are 
slightly milder assumptions than those used for standard neo-classical economics. The 
assumption of imperfect information is an implicit acknowledgement of the fact that social 
systems are inherently open. This allows institutional economics to move away from the static 
equilibrium analysis inherent in standard neo-classical economics. For example, Douglas
55 The pure form of this view is proclaimed by social Darwinists. For a vivid description of social Darwinism, 
s e e  Galbraith (1984:48). S ee  also The Economist (August 21 ,1 9 9 9 :1 3 ) for a more contemporary view 
of the sam e phenom enon.
66 S ee  Galbraith (1984: xiv).
57 Williamson states: “I do not insist that every individual is continuously or even largely given to 
opportunism. To the contrary, I merely assum e that som e individuals are opportunistic som e of the time 
and that differential trustworthiness is rarely transparent ex ante. As a consequence, ex  ante screening 
efforts are m ade and ex post safeguards are created. Otherwise those who are least principled (most 
opportunistic) will be able to exploit egregiously those who are more principled.... One of the 
implications of opportunism is that ‘ideal’ co-operative modes of economic organisation, by which I mean 
those where trust and good intentions are generously imputed to the membership, are very fragile" 
(1985: 64). North (1990) asserts  that one of the key roles of institutions is to reduce uncertainty.
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North attempts to explain the persistence of inefficient institutions by appeal to the notion of 
“ fuzzy feedback” which is a characteristic of imperfect information (North, 1990).
In contrast to new institutional economics, “old” institutional economics was not concerned 
with the primacy of individual behavioural assumptions. Both John Commons and Thorstein 
Veblen, the pioneers of the discipline, were interested in how institutions affected individual 
behaviour.58 Like classical political economy, old institutional economics sought an 
explanation for why things were as they were. This is very different to neo-classical 
economics with its focus on the predictive success of theoretical models to explain prices and 
distribution.
The methodological challenge to the critical approach of classical political economy is to make 
the ontology explicit and to be self-aware about the limitations imposed by ideology. By way 
of example, Marx set out his premises with respect to the development of a materialist 
conception of history as follows:
The method o f  approach is not devoid o f premises. ... Its premises are men, 
not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically 
perceptible process o f  development under definite conditions. ... Talk about 
consciousness ceases and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is 
depicted, philosophy as an independent branch o f knowledge loses its medium 
o f existence. At most its place can be taken by a synthesis o f  the most general 
results that may be abstracted from observation o f  the historical development 
o f men. Separated from actual history, these abstractions have in themselves 
no value whatsoever. ... The difficulties only begin when we set about the 
observation and arrangement -  the real depiction -  o f the materials, whether 
it be o f  a past epoch or the present.59
Marx makes both the premises of the methodology and its limitations explicit. The 
methodology is premised on a study of human action under real and specific social 
conditions.60 The method seeks to understand this action in relation to the historical 
development of humankind and requires abstractions and generalisations which nevertheless 
must be routed in actual and specific histories. The limitation of the methodology pertains to 
the fact that the abstractions from an open social system must necessarily involve subjective 
judgements and choice.61 In this context, Friedrich Engels pointed out that “ there are
50 S ee  Commons (1950) and Veblen (1909). For a discussion of the methodological differences between 
old institutional economics and neo-classical economics, se e  Dugger (1994).
59 Karl Marx, The German Ideology. London. 1965. As quoted in Giddens (1994: 22).
60 Marx m akes the obvious point that “production by an isolated individual outside society ... is as much an 
absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other 
(Marx, 1994:120). In an important sen se  the methodological individualism of neo-classical economics 
ignores this very point.
61 Of course, this limitation applies to all theoretical abstractions.
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innumerable intersecting forces .. which give rise to one result -  the historical event” .62 The 
task of attributing causation to a historical event therefore is fraught with difficulty. If history 
is understood to be an attempt to understand the present in terms of the past, then it is not 
correct to speak of the history of an event y  (say), but only of a history of y. This does not 
deny the existence of objective facts, but rather seeks to make explicit the inherent subjectivity 
involved in the selection and interpretation of a necessarily finite  set of facts from an 
essentially infinite open system.
The methodology of classical political economy in a specific instance is compelling to the 
extent that it is able to provide a more comprehensive and satisfactory explanation of the 
observed phenomena compared to rival explanations.
5. Critical-realism and water pricing
The critical-realist approach adopted in this thesis seeks to be self-aware of the ideologies 
employed in the analysis of water pricing by neo-classical economics, institutional economics 
and classical political economy. By looking at water pricing through different “ ideological 
prisms” , an economic analysis will be developed which provides multiple, partial-truth views 
of the complex open system of water pricing. It is contended that this approach, which has not 
been attempted before, provides a superior understanding of water pricing compared to 
approaches that rely exclusively on one ideological framework. This represents an original 
contribution to the economic analysis of water pricing.
62 Engels to J. Bloch, in Konigsberg, 21 Septem ber 1890.
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Chapter 3: Widgets and water
Neo-classical economic theory and urban water pricing
The task o f  translating [the principles o f marginal-cost pricing] into actual 
price schedules is so extraordinarily difficult that it is entirely possible to 
accept their validity while at the same time concluding that the task o f 
following them is an impossible one [and that even] the most sophisticated and 
conscientious effort to apply these principles inevitably involves large doses o f 
subjective judgement. The uncertainty o f the estimates [counsels] a temperitig 
o f the principles themselves. (Kahn, 1988:1:182)
We find  ourselves forced to hunt fo r  a solution in the dark jungles o f  the 
second best. (Baumol, 1978: 802)
1. Introduction
Much of the literature on urban water pricing is premised on the basic pricing schema 
advocated by neo-classical economics -  marginal-cost pricing. The theoretical basis for this 
approach is usually taken as given in the water pricing literature and the underlying 
assumptions necessary for the theory to hold are seldom critically examined. For these 
reasons, it is useful to take a step back and re-examine the essentials of the general positivistic 
and axiomatic neo-classical approach to pricing. A critical evaluation of neo-classical pricing 
theory reveals that the Pareto-efficiency claim is not robust. The theory is forced into a 
seemingly endless retreat from the original Pareto-efficiency and welfare maximisation claim 
as a result of pervasive externalities, informational asymmetries and imperfect competition. 
The measurement of marginal costs also is uncertain, requiring subjective judgements. 
Moreover, the practical outcome of marginal-cost pricing may be highly inequitable and 
socially undesirable.
The application of neo-classical economics to water pricing typically is undertaken in an 
uncritical fashion. The key debates in the literature have to do with superficial aspects of the 
theory, for example, the definition of marginal costs and the techniques for incorporating 
“externalities” within the pricing-frame work. Although some of the characteristics of water 
supply, such as capital indivisibility, are taken into account, water is commodified and could, 
for all intents and purposes of the theory, just as well be a widget. That is, the theory does not 
address all of the specific characteristics of water nor does it take into account adequately the 
political-economic context.
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Neo-classical pricing theory can assist with the definition and estimation of costs and benefits. 
However, the distributions of these costs and benefits can only be understood within a 
dynamic political-economic framework. A critical-realist pricing methodology is able to 
overcome the limitations of neo-classical theory by addressing urban water pricing theory and 
practice in a more comprehensive way.
2. The pricing of widgets 
The claim
The primary claim of neo-classical theory in relation to pricing is that Pareto-efficiency is 
maximised when the (selling) prices of commodities are equal to the marginal cost of supply. 
This claim is universal in that it applies to all commodities in all contexts. It is contingent on 
the axiomatic treatment of demand (in terms of rational consumer choice) and supply (in terms 
of profit maximising production) and a competitive equilibrium between demand and supply in 
the whole economy (that is, perfect information, zero transaction costs and no externalities).
The basic theory of consumer demand relies on six axioms:63 (1) reflexivity -  each bundle of 
“ consumer goods” is considered to be as good as itself; (2) completeness -  the consumer must 
always be able to state a preference between two possible alternatives;64 (3) consistency -  
choices are not allowed to cycle;65 (4) continuity -  the consumer’s preferences cannot exhibit 
“jumps;66 (5) non-satiation -  the consumer always prefers more to less;67 and (6) convexity -  
indifference curves are convex to the origin.68
The key difficulties with the set of consumer choice axioms used in neo-classical theory, are 
that the role of socialisation, the effect of income distribution and the influence that producers 
have on consumer choice, are largely ignored. The notion that consumer choices are pre­
63 S ee, for example, Mas-Colell et al (1995).
64 This requires that consum ers are able to evaluate alternatives that may be far from their realm of 
experience and that this evaluation has already taken place.
65 Failure to satisfy this axiom will result in the invalidation of much of consum er choice theory. Axioms 2 
and 3 together assu re  that consum ers' choices are rational.
66 That is, a consum er preferring each elem ent in a sequence {xn} to the corresponding element in a 
sequence {yn} cannot suddenly reverse his/her preference a t the limiting points of these sequences x 
and y. This rules out lexicographic ordering for the sake of mathematical convenience even though such 
orderings represent a perfectly reasonable system of choice
67 The consum er choice problem can thus be reduced to one of maximising utility subject to a budget 
constraint.
68This may be interpreted a s  diminishing marginal rates of substitution, that is, for any two commodities. It 
can also be regarded a s  a formal expression of a basic inclination of economic agents to diversify. Of 
course, there are choice situations in which this is violated and not all of the theory relies on this 
assumption, however, it is of critical importance for welfare analysis. ,
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 3: Widgets and water -  a critique of neo-classical theory Page 50
determined, fully known and absolute, and, indeed, that there is such a thing as a 
representative consumer, is fanciful. Knowledge of the full range of choice is almost always 
incomplete. Choices may also be inconsistent and not all choices have to do with scarcity of 
resources (Green, 1996, Sen, 1977).
Using all of the above axioms, and assuming a linear budget constraint, consumer choice (and 
hence demand) reduces to the standard problem of utility maximisation.69 The solution shows 
that an increase in the relative price of x  must lead to a fall in its purchases provided utility is 
held constant. However, this simple algebraic solution has defects: it requires convexity of 
preferences; it relies on tangency arguments;70 and, the functions need to be continuously 
differentiable twice. The solution therefore requires additional onerous restrictions not 
guaranteed by the axioms themselves.71
While the mathematics of the standard neo-classical theories of consumer choice and utility 
maximisation may be elegant, the validity of much of the practical application of these 
theories to the real world is, at best, misleading, and, at worst, simply wrong. For example, 
Deaton and Muellbauer argue that demand functions are primarily consequences of budget 
constraints rather than preferences and that non-linear budget constraints and corner solutions 
are common (1980: 24).
The utility maximisation problem can be restated as one of minimising costs to achieve a 
desired level of utility. The results of this approach give four basic properties of demand 
functions of the Marshallian72 and Hicksian73 form: they add up; the Marshallian demands are 
homogenous of degree zero in prices and total expenditure;74 the compensated price responses 
of the Hicksian demands are symmetric;75 and, these price responses form a negative 
semidefinite matrix.76 Adding up and homogeneity are the consequences of specifying a linear
69 S ee, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980: 31).
70 This hold under special circum stances only, for example, every consum er m ust buy every commodity.
71 A variant of consum er choice theory using a  less restrictive se t of assum ptions based  on observable 
choice behaviour exists. Unfortunately, the stronger assum ptions used in the preference-based 
approach are of critical importance for the analysis of welfare.
72 The Marshallian dem and function is in the form dem and ~ g(x, p) where x is the vector of outlays of 
goods x, and p is the vector of prices p, for each x, .
73 The Hicksian dem and function is in the form dem and  = h(u, p) where u is the utility of the consumer.
74 That is, equal proportionate changes in prices and total expenditure will not alter dem and.
75 That is 8h/{u, p) / dp; = dh;(u, p) / Spy.
76 The N x N matrix M is negative semidefinite if z • Mz < 0 for all z e 9tN.
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budget constraint. Symmetry is a guarantee of the consumer’s consistency of choice. 
Negativity comes from the concavity of the cost function, that is, that costs are minimised.77
There are three important implications: an equal percentage change in all prices and wealth 
leads to no change in demand; total expenditure cannot change in response to a change in 
prices; and, total expenditure must change by an amount equal to any wealth change.
The above theory deals with the demand of individual consumers only. Aggregate or market 
demand is usually of much greater importance in economics. Not all of the properties of 
individual demand hold for aggregate demand without additional restrictions. A necessary 
condition for exact aggregation is to be able to treat aggregate consumer behaviour as if it 
were the outcome of a single maximising consumer. This requires quasi-homothetic 
preferences.78 This is a stringent condition unlikely to be satisfied in the case of narrowly 
defined commodities and where the focus is on demand response differences between high and 
low income households.79 This is particular pertinent to water demand in developing countries 
where there are wide disparities in income, access and consumption patterns and where 
demand responsive varies greatly across consumers.80
There is no guarantee that consumer choice is “ rational” in the sense defined. Although the 
weak revealed-preference approach represents consumer choice more closely, it does not have 
the mathematical convenience of the utility function derivable from preference theory, nor can 
it be used to establish the fundamental axioms o f  welfare economics. The alternative approach 
to consumer demand based on cost-minimisation (the duality approach) also suffers from 
distinct limitations. The requirement that an equal percentage change in all prices and wealth 
leads to no change in demand is only likely to be valid under restrictive conditions. The 
requirement that consumers spend all of their wealth is also restrictive, even if a life-cycle 
approach to consumer choice and spending is adopted.81 Thus, total expenditure may change 
in response to a change in prices, and total expenditure may not change by an amount equal to
77 This is less restrictive than the convexity of preferences required in conventional utility maximisation.
78 Homothetic preferences imply that the a  consum er's preference ordering is independent of wealth and 
hence all expenditure-elasticities are equal to one. For Quasi-homothetic preferences, preference 
orderings (or actual expenditure patterns) are a  weighted average of value sh ares  appropriate to very 
rich and very poor consum ers, and expenditure-elasticities tend to unity a s  total expenditure increases.
79 This is so because exact aggregation models a representative consumer, w hereas additional demand 
for specific goods is likely to occur at both the extensive margin with new consum ers entering the market 
and a t the intensive margin with the sam e consum er buying more of a  good (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980:151).
80 Price-elasticities of dem and are discussed in Chapter 6.
81 The introduction of life-cycle analysis brings new restrictions: not only m ust consum ers have perfect 
knowledge of current potential choices, they m ust also have perfect knowledge of all future opportunities 
and choices.
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any wealth change. Additional demand for specific goods is likely to occur at both the 
extensive and intensive margins making aggregate and individual demand schedules different 
from each other. This latter point is highly relevant to urban water supplies in developing 
countries where much of the new demand arises from new connections to the system.82
The neo-classical theoretical approach to supply proceeds largely in an analogous fashion to 
that of consumer choice theory with suppliers or producers (firms) assumed to maximise 
profits (or minimise costs for a given output). Supply theory is based on the following general 
properties of production sets (Z), not all of which are assumed to hold under all 
circumstances:83 (1) Z is non-empty -  there is always something that a firm can plan to do; (2) 
Z is closed -  there are technical limits to the extent of the production set; (3) there is no free 
lunch -  it is not possible to produce something from nothing; (4) it is possible to do nothing; 
(5) there is “ free disposal” -  it is possible to absorb additional inputs without any reduction in 
outputs; (6) production is irreversible -  output cannot be re-transformed into the original 
inputs at zero cost;84 (7) there are constant returns to scale; (8) there is free entry into 
production; and, (9) the production set is convex.
If it is assumed, in addition to the above, that the firm is producing for a competitive market 
and is a price taker, then the theory asserts that a profit maximising firm will produce at the 
point where the marginal cost of output equals the marginal revenue from sales.
Property 5 (free disposal) denies the existence of externalities.85 Property 7 (constant returns 
to scale) is often not true to real production processes, although it is a fundamental assumption 
for much of the theory (see Property 9). Property 8 (free entry) is certainly not true in all 
contexts. Thus competition is threatened and the problem of market power arises (see below). 
Property 9 (convexity) is one of the fundamental assumptions of microeconomics. Convexity 
encompasses non-increasing returns to scale and the notion of “ balanced” inputs being more 
productive than “ unbalanced” ones, neither of which is necessarily true. Non-convexities in 
production can arise from capital indivisibilities, fixed costs or increasing returns to scale, all 
of which are present in the urban water supply sector.
82 In Uganda, for example, the number of active connections is anticipated to double in the next 10 years 
and total water consumption is likely to increase by about 50 percent.
83 S ee, for example, Mas-Colell et al (1995:130) and Debreu (1959).
84 Properties 1 ,2 , 3, 4 and 6 are trivial and impose no significant restrictions on supply theory.
85 The treatm ent of externalities in neo-classical economics is discussed in a separate  section below.
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The possibility of increasing returns to scale raises at least two logical problems for 
equilibrium analysis: the assumption of competition is threatened;86 and, the notion of 
technological change is externalised as an exogenous variable that cannot be explained within 
the analytical framework.87
The assumption that firms maximise profits has been criticised from an empirical point of 
view as an inadequate description of the motivation underlying decisions taken by firms. 
Simon (1959) argues that firms aim for a minimum satisfactory profit because they operate in 
a world on uncertainty.
If firms maximise profits taking prices as given, then the production side of the economy 
aggregates perfectly. Efficient production may be defined as a production vector y  for which 
there is no other feasible production vector y' that generates as much output as y  using no 
additional inputs. If y  is profit maximising for a given vector of prices, then y is efficient. 
This applies even if y  is not convex. If y  is convex, then every efficient production y is a 
profit-maximising production for a given p.
The existence of a firm implies the suspension of markets within a firm.88 Increasing returns 
to scale, both within individual firms as well as across a group of inter-related industries 
threatens the assumption of competition and invalidates the Pareto-efficiency claim of 
marginal-cost pricing. Although game theory attempts to model firm behaviour under these 
conditions, its practical relevance has yet to be proved.
Whilst the theory distinguishes between private and public goods on the demand side, it 
largely fails to make an equivalent distinction on the supply side between those goods that can 
be supplied by individuals and/or firms, and those requiring the collective action of groups or 
society.89 In the case of water supply, for example, the social consequences of private water 
production (in the absence of adequate public regulation) have been dire.90
86 The theories of monopolistic and oligopolistic competition cater, to an extent, for this threat to 
competition, although the outcomes are shown to be necessarily sub-optimal under most realistic 
conditions. S ee  “Market power* below.
87 Recently, attem pts have been m ade by theorists in the neo-classical tradition to incorporate 
technological change a s  an endogenous variable. S ee  Fine (2000b) for a  critical assessm en t of this 
literature. Classical economists sought to explain technological advance within their theories of value 
and distribution.
68 This contradiction within neo-classical theory has given rise to the literature on transaction costs and 
institutional economics (see Chapter 4).
89 Ostrom (1990) has developed a theory of collection action which is d iscussed in Chapter 4.
90 A classic example is provided by the history of water supply to New York w here the private water 
company w as a key obstacle to improving health conditions through improved access  to safe water 
(Koeppel, 2000).
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The claim for Pareto-efficiency requires the existence of a competitive equilibrium between 
supply and demand, that is, markets must clear with the implication that the desired 
consumption and production levels for all commodities are mutually compatible. Market 
clearing also requires that there is no “ false” trading, that is, trading at prices other than those 
at the general equilibrium. The notion of a competitive general equilibrium is a hypothetical 
theoretical construct requiring extremely restrictive assumptions. It is, in fact, impossible to 
conceive of any real market that could achieve such equilibrium. Howard points out the 
theory’s high degree of abstraction renders its distributional content inconsequential (1988: 
195).
Neo-classical theory seeks to explain changes in output, consumption and distribution all 
within the domain of price theory. This restricts the analysis to a static equilibrium framework 
that imposes distinct limitations on the theory’s ability to explain dynamic changes over 
time.91 The symmetrical treatment of consumption and production, while being mathematically 
elegant, belies the fundamental asymmetries in power and wealth that exist between the 
majority of producers and consumers and the consequences of these asymmetries on 
outcomes.
Adjustments for a non-ideal world
Four important categories of departure from the theoretical ideal world of perfect competition 
are incomplete markets (externalities and transaction costs); incomplete information 
(uncertainty); market power; and, capital indivisibility.
In the neo-classical view, externalities arise where markets are missing, and missing markets 
result from the incomplete allocation of property rights.92
Although the concept of externality is straight forward, it does not lend itself readily to 
theoretical analysis. Mas-Colell et al propose the following definition as a point of departure: 
“ A [non-pecuniary] externality is present whenever the well-being of a consumer or the 
production possibilities of a firm are directly affected by the actions of another agent in the 
economy [without compensation]” (1995: 352).
According to the Coase Theorem, “ if trade of the externality can occur, then bargaining will 
lead to an efficient outcome no matter how property rights are allocated” , provided that 
property rights are both well-defined and enforceable (Mas-Colell et al: 1995: 357). The
91 S ee  footnote 87.
92 This view is directly related to the philosophy underlying neo-classical econom ics which asserts the 
primacy of the individual and individual property rights.
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actual allocation of the property rights does not affect the efficiency of the outcome, though it 
does affect distribution. The validity of Coase’s Theorem requires the externality itself to be 
traded competitively and with zero transaction costs. Alternatively, provided adequate 
information is available (without cost), an outside agency can impose a quota or tax/subsidy 
such that the optimal allocation of resources is achieved. Although these approaches are 
equivalent in theory, asymmetries in information and the costs of obtaining information will 
mean that the outcomes of the different approaches will be both different from each in 
practice.
The presence of externalities poses serious problems for the notions of economy-wide Pareto- 
efficiency and welfare maximisation. Once an externality exists, any “ solution” will be sub- 
optimal, by definition. Thus externalities give rise to the problem of the second-best. Lipsey 
and Lancaster have shown that if only one of the many conditions necessary to achieve Pareto- 
efficiency is not met, then other Paretian conditions are not, in general, achievable (1956:16). 
The response of economists to the implications of this problem varies widely, but many ignore 
it.93 Lipsey and Lancaster’s proof essentially destroys the general theoretical claim that, in an 
imperfectly competitive economy, setting the price o f any one particular commodity equal to 
marginal cost will be Pareto-superior to setting the commodity price to any other level.
Externalities are pervasive in market economies and hence pose a serious challenge to the 
Pareto-efficiency claims of marginal-cost pricing in general and its application to the water 
sector in particular.
Another important source of incomplete markets is transaction costs, that is, the cost of 
undertaking economic exchange or making contracts. Most importantly, transaction costs 
typically lead to information asymmetries that in turn lead to Pareto-inefficient resource 
allocations and distributional inequalities.
Incomplete information may arise for a number of reasons. Information may be costly to 
obtain, or it may be asymmetrically distributed. Another important source of incomplete 
information is uncertainty. Uncertainty has particular relevance for the efficiency of 
investment decisions and efficacy of cost-benefit analysis.94
The most significant threat to the neo-classical claims of Pareto-efficiency is market power.95 
Of particular interest here is “ natural monopoly” which arises as a result of economies of
93 This is particularly common in the theoretical literature on water pricing. S ee  page 68.
94 S ee  Baumol (1977), Baumol and O ates (1975) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
95 An extensive literature exists on this subject; see  Robinson (1933), Chamberlain (1933) and Hall and 
Hitch (1939) for landmark early discussions of monopolistic competition; Mas-Colel! e ta l  (1995: 383f) 
provides a more recent theoretical overview.
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scale and is particularly applicable to the urban water sector.96 Market power enables a 
monopoly to restrict output and raise prices away from the optimal level (from society’s point 
of view) thereby reducing consumer surplus and resulting in the Pareto-inefficient allocation 
of resources. Monopoly regulation is discussed in Chapter 4.
Capital indivisibility makes the definition of marginal cost ambiguous because there is a 
difference between short-run marginal costs where the level of capital investment is held 
constant and long-run marginal costs with variable capital investment. Capital indivisibility 
typically is an important characteristic of the urban water supply industry because significant 
economies of scale may be derived through investments in large increments in water supply, 
for example, new dams. Although the definition of short-run marginal cost is fairly clear and 
straightforward to measure, this is not the case for the long-run marginal cost. Different 
measures exist in the literature. None of these measures provides for the precise and objective 
determination of the long-run marginal cost. All are subject to future uncertainty (future 
demand, supply and costs) and involve subjective choices with respect to the time-frame of the 
analysis and choice of discount rate.
There is no consensus in the literature on whether the price should be related to the short-run 
or long-run marginal cost of supply. One school of thought advocates commodity pricing with 
respect to the short-run marginal cost, with the fixed costs (sunk investments) being regarded 
as irrelevant to the determination of price once the investment has already occurred. 
According to this school of thought, the investment decision should be determined separately 
from (though not wholly independently of) the commodity-pricing decision. The investment 
decision could be decided through undertaking a social cost-benefit analysis and the costs of 
the investment may be recovered in a number of ways, for example, through tax revenues97 or 
fixed charges.98 In general, the theoretical case for Pareto-optimality of short-run marginal- 
cost pricing in the presence of non-convexities and within a general equilibrium framework is 
weak.99
96 A French w ater m anager recently described (with satisfaction) the urban water supply business as “the 
ultimate natural monopoly” {The Economist, 24 February 1996).
97 Hotelling (1938) w as the first to argue that short-run marginal-cost pricing together with income taxes 
w as Pareto-superior to average-cost pricing. Ruggles (1949-50ab) surveyed the controversy sparked by 
Hotelling (1938) and concluded that the marginai-cost pricing rule did not, in fact, m eet the conditions for 
maximising welfare if the m eans of raising the subsidies were taken into account (Ruggles, 1949-50ab).
98 C oase (1946) proposes discriminating two-part tariffs as  a m eans of recovering overhead costs specific 
to individuals. Brown and Sibley (1986) argue within a partial equilibrium framework that such a 
discriminating two-part tariff is Pareto-optimal. However, Vohra (1988) refutes this within a general 
equilibrium framework.
99 See, for example, Brown and Sibley (1986) and Cornet (1988).
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Another school of thought advocates setting commodity prices equal to long-run marginal 
costs thereby including die cost of future capacity expansion in the commodity price. The 
advocacy of this method is particularly prevalent in the water pricing literature (cf. Bahl and 
Linn, 1992 and Hanemann, 1997). The theoretical claim of Pareto-optimality using the long- 
run marginal cost commodity pricing approach also is weak. (See Section 3 below.)
Taxes and subsidies impose further, unavoidable, distortions on the economy. All countries 
impose taxes on firms, citizens and economic transactions that distort markets and hence result 
in the Pareto-inefficient allocations of resources.100
In addition to the problem of distortions discussed above, there are also problems related to 
measurement of capital and the choice of discount rate.
It may be argued that the value of capital is not independent of prices and the rate of profit, 
and that this poses problems for the consistency of general equilibrium theory and hence the 
Pareto-efficiency claim of marginal-cost pricing.101 Although this viewpoint is contested, there 
is a significant question mark attached to the logically coherent valuation of capital and this 
casts a shadow over the validity of marginal-cost pricing theory.102
Discount rates are important for water pricing for two interrelated reasons: discount rates 
affect cost-benefit analysis which in turn affect project decisions, project prioritisation and 
project timing; and, discount rates affect long-run marginal-cost pricing both because of its 
effect on projects and because of its direct influence on the calculation of long-run marginal 
cost. In a context where a project has high initial investments and is expected to produce 
benefits for many years to come (which is the case for water supply), the choice of discount
100 There is an extensive literature on the theory of taxation in the context of externalities commencing with 
Pigou (1920). More recently, the taxation of negative environmental externalities has achieved 
prominence. See, for example, Baumol and Oates (1975).
101 Bharadwaj describes the problem as  follows: “In the case  of capital, in particular, the construction of a 
‘dem and function for capital’, consistent with the theory, has met with severe difficulties. In the economy- 
wide models, the usual data of the system  are taken to be the available quantities of primary resources 
(usually land, labour and capital), a given preference system  defined over the final goods and the 
technology in the form of production possibilities relating to inputs and outputs. A quantitative notion of 
capital enters both a t the stage of defining availability of capital and in defining production possibilities.
In the aggregate versions of the model, capital in its aggregate form is denoted as  a vaiue-sum. 
However, capital goods are them selves produced goods and as such it is not possible to talk about 
‘quantity’ of capital independently of prices. To generate the dem and function for capital with ‘well 
behaved’ properties, it is essential that the various methods of production (depicted by their capital 
intensity, capital however m easured) that would em erge as optimum at respective rates of profit 
maintain a  monotonic inverse ordering with the variations in the rate of profit. By now, theoretical 
discussions have established that such a  proposition cannot be maintained except under extremely 
restrictive conditions without violating the internal consistency of the theory” (1986: 54).
102 There is an extensive literature on the subject. See, for example, Harcourt (1972). The fate of Sraffa’s 
criticism of the neo-classical aggregate production function provides the lesson that the acceptance of 
theories is not just a  function of logic but also a function of the cultural and institutional context within 
which the theories have been produced. (See Hodgson, 1997.)
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rate is important: for example, a discount rate of 10 percent compared to 2 percent will 
decrease the present value of a benefit 50 years in the future by a factor of more than 40.
At the conceptual level there is disagreement over whether the discount rate should be based 
on the of the social rate of time preference or on the marginal rate of return on investment in 
the private sector.103 This dilemma aside, the empirical measurement for each approach is not 
straightforward. For example, both the marginal rate of return on capital and the consumption 
rate of interest need to be estimated in order to derive the social rate of time preference and 
the shadow price of capital (Lind, 1982: 24). But public investment decisions result in an 
almost “ infinite stream” of consequences for both consumption and private investment which 
“ greatly complicate” the problem of evaluation because most publicly produced goods are not 
sold in the market and it is not possible to observe all the benefits and costs in each year 
(1982: 26, 71).
There is also disagreement on the appropriate way to account for risk and uncertainty in the 
choice and use of discount rates.104 Furthermore, at a practical level, it is common for a wide 
range of discount rates to be used, reflecting the disagreements both at the philosophical level 
and in measurement methodology.105 At a theoretical level, a strong case can be made for the 
argument that a different “correct” discount rate exists for every project, and possibly even 
for every time period.106 This adds considerable complexity and uncertainty to the choice of 
discount rate. Furthermore, Lind (1982) shows that the choice o f  discount rate is inherently 
subjective and hence it is appropriate that the choice of discount rates is subject to the political 
process.107
It can be readily appreciated that the adjustments required to cater for the non-ideal real world 
of pricing introduces uncertainly, measurement problems and subjectivity. Under these
103 A survey of the theoretical, m easurem ent and practical issues related to discount rates is presented in 
Lind (1982). More recent discussions on discount rates may be found in Lind (1990) and Lind (1997).
104 One point of view is that the discount rate should not be adjusted for risk (Lind, 1982: 22). On the other 
hand, practitioners commonly adjust discount rates for risk.
105 Lind notes that prior to the political standardisation of discount rates, different US government agencies 
used discount rates ranging from 3 to 12 percent (1982: 5).
106 "If one w ere to establish the social discount rate so that it properly reflected the differences in 
opportunity costs and riskiness of different projects and so that it properly reflected the social rate of 
time preferences a s  well, one would have to se t a different rate for almost every project, and the choice 
of the social discount rate for each project would depend on many things" (Lind, 1982: 22).
107 The choice of the social discount rate for evaluating public policy choices is itself a public policy 
decision that in m ost c a se s  will be politically determined. The choice is likely to depend not only on the 
merits of the supporting economic argum ents but also on the policy implications of one choice versus 
another and on the political strength offerees in support of those implications (Lind, 1982). The key 
issues here are the intra- and inter-generation distribution of benefits and costs. “If one adopts the 
position that the appropriate rate of discount for evaluating benefits and costs over time from a public 
perspective is unrelated to private rates for whatever reasons, then the discount rate must be chosen on 
the basis of a  political process based on political goals" (1982: 59).
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circumstances, the objective Pareto-efficiency claim of neo-classical economic theory does not 
stand-up to scrutiny. This point which is taken up in more detail in the following section.
Does the claim stand up?
Two basic questions may be asked with respect to the validity of the primary Pareto-efficiency 
claim. Is the theory coherent and internally consistent? Is the theory predictive? I contend that 
the theory is logically flawed and that its predictions do not concord with the real world 
economy.
The theory is logically flawed on two primary counts. First, neo-classical economics asserts 
that Pareto-efficiency is independent of income distribution, that is, any distribution of income 
can be Pareto-efficient, but this is inconsistent within the theory’s own logical framework 
because the prevailing structure of market demands is dependent on the income distribution 
which contradicts the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Second, because of 
the problem of the second-best and the pervasiveness of externalities, the Pareto-efficient 
claim of marginal-cost pricing is fallacious. The presence of externalities, transaction costs, 
uncertainty, information asymmetry, market power, capital indivisibilities, taxes and 
subsidies, together with theoretical and empirical measurement problems related to the 
valuation of capital and the choice of discount rate, forces neo-classical economics into a 
seemingly endless retreat from its original Pareto-efficiency and overall welfare maximisation 
claims. Further, the justification of sub-optimal states as optimal (in the sense of the best that 
can be achieved) through theoretical quests of increasing mathematical sophistication and yet 
apparently of decreasing practical relevance to policy-making means that there is a very real 
danger of neo-classical theory falling prey to the circuitous and meaningless argument: 
whatever exists (at least in the private sector) is optimal, an argument of infinite regress.
At the practical level, the determination of marginal costs is prone to measurement problems 
arising from future uncertainty and subjectivity in the choice of the time- frame of analysis 
and discount rate.
Even if the theoretical Pareto-efficiency claim of marginal-cost pricing is accepted, the 
practical outcome of marginal-cost pricing may be highly inequitable and thus socially 
undesirable (see Chapter 5).
Despite these strong criticisms of the marginal-cost pricing rule, this rule is still widely 
advocated by neo-classical economists. For example, Kahn, while admitting the seriousness of 
the problem of second-best pricing, and noting that the marginal-cost pricing rule does not
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necessarily produce optimum results if applied partially and where there are market distortions 
in an economy, comes to the following remarkable and illogical conclusion:
In the author's view, in principle it does not make solution impossible in 
specific situations, nor does it make it practically impossible in such 
circumstances to make the type o f  informed piece-meal decisions policy 
makers must inevitably make about how far and in what directions to qualify 
the basic rule o f marginal-cost pricing. (Kahn, 1988:1:70)
In the water sector, the marginal-cost pricing rule remains the “holy grail” whose pursuit is 
strongly urged (almost universally) by water economists notwithstanding its inherent logical 
flaws and practical limitations. The specific application of the marginal-cost pricing rule to the 
urban water sector is discussed below.
3. Urban water pricing
Partial versus general equilibrium analysis
Much of the theoretical literature on urban water pricing implicitly assumes the validity of a 
partial equilibrium framework without discussion or justification. General equilibrium analysis 
of water pricing issues in general, and urban water pricing in particular, is rare.108 Although 
it is not surprising that most studies have opted for partial equilibrium analysis, there is 
remarkably little discussion on this issue.109
Welfare analysis in the partial equilibrium context starts from the premise that demand curves 
reflect willingness to pay for a commodity: “ Given the assumption that consumers equate 
relative marginal utilities with relative prices, changes in individual welfare or ‘utility’ can be 
translated into monetary measures and a measure of individual welfare change can be based on 
the analysis of changes in price and income levels” (Dinwiddy and Teal, 1996: 264).110 When 
moving from one consumer to many consumers, two problems arise. First, if marginal 
utilities of income are not constant, then the analysis is strictly not valid, although Dinwiddy 
and Teal (1996: 264) assert that for small changes in welfare the approximation should
108 Hanemann (1997) presents the theory of intermediate (industrial) w ater dem and within a more general 
equilibrium framework, however, his review of urban water dem and studies in the United S tates does 
not include one general equilibrium study out of more than 50 studies cited.
109 In a  rare remark on the topic in the literature on urban water pricing, Hanke and Davis note that a 
general equilibrium analysis is necessary in order to deal with the problem of the second-best but admit 
that “this type of analysis is a manifestly impossible task” (1973: 811).
110 Marshall (1920) defined consum er surplus as  the excess of price which [the consumer] would be willing 
to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which he does actually pay . In its most basic 
conception, consum er surplus is m easured by the “area under the dem and curve". Whilst absolute 
consum er surplus is difficult (if not impossible) to m easure, relative changes in consum er surplus are 
less so. Welfare economics is usually concerned with welfare effects, that is changes in welfare, rather 
than absolute welfare.
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hold.111 Second, “ aggregating price and income changes over different households implies a 
comparison of interpersonal utilities and requires a value judgement about social value of 
income accruing to individuals in different circumstances” (1996: 265). This latter problem is 
more fundamental because no ready solution exists.
Mas-Colell et al summarise the conditions under which partial equilibrium analysis is 
(approximately) justified as follows: prices of all commodities other than the one under 
consideration remain fixed and there are no wealth effects in the market under study (1995: 
341). Within the residential water demand sector in developed countries, wealth effects are 
likely to be small in view of the fact that monthly bills for water services are typically less 
than one percent of income. If the arguments presented by Dinwiddy and Teal (1996) are 
accepted, then the partial equilibrium analysis of residential water demand in this context is 
likely to be valid at a general level. In other words, it is likely that changes in the prices of 
non-water commodities, in general, will not have a profound effect on water demand. 
However, this conclusion is not likely to be universally valid, even within a developed country 
context. Where marginal prices for water consumption are perceived to be significant, then 
the price of both water itself and water using appliances are likely to affect water demand.112
Amongst poor households in developing countries, wealth effects may be significant. 
Cairncross and Kinnear (1978) show that poor households in Khartoum spend up to 20 percent 
of their income on water. Expenditures on water in excess of 10 percent of household income 
are not uncommon in Uganda.113 In such cases, marginal-cost pricing may have unpalatable 
welfare consequences.114 This is because in these circumstances, water has become an 
essential subsistence good necessary for survival, and the near zero price-elasticity is not an 
indication that a given price rise will exact a smaller social cost in consumer surplus reduction 
(relative to the increase in producer surplus), but rather that the household is forced  to make 
other substitution choices (for example, reduction in food expenditure). That is, the consumer 
surplus reduction may be reflected in the reduction of demand for other basic commodities. In 
this context, welfare effects are profound and certainly cannot be ignored. On the other hand,
111 “From an applied point of view, the pertinent question is the size of the real income effect. In partial 
equilibrium analysis it can be assum ed that m ost goods will play a  relatively minor role in the overall 
household budget and the assumption of zero real income effect may be a  good approximation” 
(Dinwiddy and Teal, 1986: 31).
112 The degree to which the price of water is perceived to be significant is an empirical matter. S ee Chapter 
6 .
113 Field visits, Uganda (1999, 2000).
114 The welfare effect will be exacerbated where price-elasticities are very low and marginal pricing is 
implemented along the lines advocated by Baumol and Bradford (1970), that is, deviation from marginal- 
cost pricing in inverse proportion to price-elasticity. Cairncross and Kinnear (1978) have shown that poor 
households may have very low price-elasticities of demand.
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amongst wealthy households in developed countries, wealth effects arising from water price 
increases are likely to be negligible.115
The marginal-cost pricing rule in the urban water sector
Many neo-classical economic texts on urban water pricing begin with the twin premises that 
water is a public service and that prices should be administratively set equal to marginal costs 
in order to maximise allocative-efficiency.116 For example, Hanke and Davis state that “of the 
many pricing policies available, marginal-cost pricing is most conducive to the efficient 
allocation of resources” (1973: 808), and Hanemann states that “ economic theory supports 
some version of marginal-cost pricing on the principle that all users draw on the system at the 
margin and should be signalled the scarcity value of water” (1997: 147, original emphasis).117 
The literature generally ignores the problem of the second-best when asserting that marginal- 
cost pricing promotes allocative-efficiency.
The definition of marginal cost in the urban water services industry is not straight-forward for 
at least two broad categories of reasons: the service is multi-dimensional (there are many 
different marginal costs to consider) and there exist important capital indivisibilities.
There are three different types of marginal access costs: local distribution infrastructure costs 
-  the incremental capital costs of building, expanding, replacing and maintaining the local 
distribution infrastructure neighbourhood infrastructure; connection to the network- the 
incremental capital cost of installing a new connection including the related marginal capital 
replacement and maintenance costs; and the readiness of the agency to provide the service -  
the incremental cost of the administrative and management capacity necessary in order to 
serve an additional customer, for example, the institutional capacity required to undertake an 
additional meter reading, send out another bill, and undertake related financial accounting 
activities for an additional customer.
In addition to these, there are two types of marginal consumption costs: capacity costs -  the 
marginal capital cost of building or extending capacity, including the marginal capital 
replacement and maintenance costs; and operating costs -  the marginal operating costs 
required to deliver an additional unit of water to a consumer.
115 Obviously these judgem ents must be contextualised and subjected to empirical verification. See 
Chapter 6.
116 This discussion focuses on the public administration of pricing rules.
117 S ee  also Bahl and Linn (1992: 21) and Meier (1983:170).
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Marginal access and consumption costs are likely to vary spatially. These differences arise 
from physical factors such as length of pipeline and height to be pumped which are in turn 
related to settlement patterns and the nature of terrain. Marginal consumption costs may vary 
temporally, particularly seasonally and diumally. Marginal costs of water supply typically 
differ between the dry and wet seasons. Marginal costs will also typically vary by consumer: 
local access costs will depend on the consumer’s physical location and demand, marginal 
capacity and operating costs will depend on individual consumer demand. Marginal costs will 
also typically differ between existing and new consumers. Existing consumers whose demand 
is not growing over time arguably do not contribute to marginal capacity expansion costs, 
although opinions differ on this.118
The multi-dimensionality of marginal costs has at least three implications. There is not one 
marginal cost, but an array of marginal costs relating to different aspects of the service. The 
calculation of marginal costs may be quite complicated and resource intensive. Important 
dimensions of the marginal costs relate to the future and hence are uncertain.
The provision of urban water supply is characterised by significant capital indivisibility. 
Short-run marginal costs may diverge substantially from long-run marginal costs and 
expenditure on short-run costs may be a small fraction of total expenditure.119 Much of the 
literature on marginal-cost pricing addresses this problem.
Mann et al describe their view of a “ theoretically correct” approach to marginal-cost pricing 
in the presence of capital indivisibilities:120
The marginalistic (sic) approach requires that price equal short-run marginal 
cost when capacity is less than fully utilised; but, i f  existing capacity becomes 
fully utilised, price should be raised to ration existing capacity. This 
procedure should continue to where consumers pay a price fo r  additional 
output equal to short-run marginal cost plus the [periodic] equivalent o f  
marginal capacity cost. Where existing capacity is fully utilised and price 
equals long-run marginal cost, investment in additional capacity is justified.
Once the investment has been carried out, however, price should fa ll again to 
short-run marginal cost. Price thus plays the dual roles o f  (1) obtaining 
efficient utilisation o f resources when operating at less than fu ll capacity and 
(2) providing a signal to invest in additional capacity. (Mann et al,1980: 603)
118 S ee  Hanke and W enders (1982) and Hanemann (1997:147). It should be noted that the impact of 
pricing schem es that differentiates between old and new consum ers may be quite regressive.
119 Hanemann notes that the difference between SRMC and LRMC is particularly “huge” in the water 
industry because of its unusually high capital intensity. In the United S tates, the a s se t requirement per 
dollar of revenue is $10 to $12, which is three to four times the capital intensity of the telephone and 
electricity industries (1997: 152).
120 S ee also Saunders and Warford (1976).
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They readily recognise that such a pricing system is not operational for a number of reasons: 
it will result is excessive price fluctuations, it will give rise to considerable uncertainty about 
future prices leading to sub-optimal investment in water-using appliances and additional water 
capacity (Mann et al, 1980).121 Thus this “ theoretically correct” pricing structure is not 
Pareto-optimal even on its own terms.
In the light of this, “ almost all advocates of marginal-cost pricing have recognised that some 
method must be employed to average out cost and thus price fluctuations over time” (Bahl and 
Linn, 1992: 265). The problem is that there are several different, but equally “valid” , ways 
of doing this (Hanemann, 1997: 147). For example, Mann et al (1980) present four definitions 
of marginal cost, each differing in how they treat capital expenditures and Beecher et al 
(1991) add a further definition.
Mann et al note that the choice of definition depends on the demand or supply increment, the 
time horizon of the analysis, the desired emphasis on short-term versus longer-term allocative- 
efficiency, how rapidly economies of scale are expected to affect costs, the extent to which 
price stability is desirable, and revenue implications and requirements (1980: 604). On the 
same topic, Bahl and Linn comment as follows:
The criterion fo r  the selection o f the optimal smoothing device should be that 
the costs (losses from mistaken investment decisions and additional 
administrative costs) saved by averaging should just equal the losses 
(consumer surplus forgone or non-price-rationing costs) which arise i f  the 
short-run marginal cost principle is not applied. (1992: 265)
Hidden in an endnote is the following comment:
Other considerations, such as higher, more stable revenue generated by 
alternative pricing systems and political advantages o f  more stable prices, will 
also enter the selection. In fact, they may be more important than efficiency.
(1992: 504, own emphasis)
It is remarkable that this comment is not given more prominence. Notwithstanding this 
important qualification, Bahl and Linn recognise that the information requirements for such a 
calculation are onerous and that it is not surprising that “ shortcuts or rules of thumb” are 
applied (1992: 265). Some theorists even doubt the possibility of measuring marginal costs. 
For example, Turvey, a theorist advocating marginal-cost pricing, concluded that marginal 
costs could not be measured for practical reasons and therefore some sort of “ average- 
marginal cost price” should be used instead (Turvey, 1967).
121 Investments in additional water capacity will be sub-optimal because these  investments need to be 
planned and built a number of years prior to the point when price equals the marginal capital cost of 
capacity expansion. As this point is unknown, the investment will only be optimally timed as a matter of 
luck rather than planning.
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There are three key points to be noted. First, there is no one “ correct” definition of marginal 
cost where capital indivisibilities and economies of scale are present. For example, Mann et al 
(1980: 604) conclude that, “where capital indivisibility is present, it is impossible to construct 
a precise set of rules that can be mechanistically followed in applying the marginal cost 
principle” . Second, different choices of the definition of marginal cost (and its translation to 
water pricing) will typically result in quite different outcomes (in terms of water price, water 
demand and distributional consequences). Third, the actual measurement of marginal cost may 
be either impossible or subject to large uncertainties.
Balancing short and long-run considerations
The prevailing view of public utility pricing earlier this century and up to the 1960s was that 
the commodity price (the marginal price of the sale of an additional unit) should be set equal 
to the short-run marginal cost of production and that the fixed investment cost should be 
funded separately, either through taxes or through a two-part tariff.122 Typically, project 
evaluation was separated from the question of who pays for the project output on the basis that 
the project decision was undertaken on the grounds of a combined efficiency and welfare 
analysis. The decision of who pays for the project was made on cost sharing or equity 
grounds.123
Dasgupta describes this approach as follows: “The rule that [a] State enterprise would ideally 
follow would be for it to determine the optimal level of output, set price equal to the marginal 
cost of production, and ensure that its losses are covered by a lump-sum subsidy” (1993: 
148). However, Dasgupta does caution that such an approach “ is unlikely to work in poor 
countries where governments are strapped for cash” , and further notes that efficient (optimal) 
lump-sum taxes are not feasible, even in developed countries, hence he recommends that the 
rule be amended: “ so the correct thing to do is to set price equal marginal cost plus a tax” 
where “ the magnitude ov the user tax depends on the necessary revenue to be collected, the 
pattern of consumption by income classes, and so forth” (1993: 148). He goes on to further 
qualify the rule to take into account poverty: “ For the very poor regions the infrastructure has 
to be provided free of charge, the expenditure being financed by general taxation” (147).124
122 S ee  footnotes 97 and 98.
123 See, for example, Eckstein (1958).
124 This is justified on the basis of the positive externalities that basic infrastructure provides in terms of 
health benefits and promotion of economic growth. For example, Dasgupta notes that the World Bank 
relates low returns on investment in sub-Saharan Africa to the lack of infrastructure (1993:147). S ee 
also World Bank (1994).
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However, he is reluctant to theorise about this, noting, “ these are matters of institutional 
detail over which it is difficult to theorise” (148)
This approach has lost ground, particularly in the United States, although it is still practised in 
some countries.125
Hanke criticises this approach saying “ although there are differences in emphasis between 
project evaluation and pricing policy, they cannot be separated in proper economic analysis. 
The amount and method by which beneficiaries pay for the output of a project does influence 
efficiency; the assessment of charges has been shown to affect the rate at which a project is 
used” (1978a: 809).126 Similarly, Hanemann criticises an approach where consumers are not 
forced to face the long-run marginal costs when asked to make decisions concerning 
investment in additional capacity (1997: 153).127
Urban water price policy advocacy undertaken within a neo-classical economic framework 
(and particularly in the United States) since the early 1970s overwhelmingly endorses a long- 
run marginal-cost pricing approach in general, and the use of the average incremental cost 
(AIC) pricing method in particular.128 For example, this approach is favoured and 
recommended by the World Bank; Bahl, Linn, Mann, Saunders, Warford, Hanemann, Hanke, 
Saleth, Dinar and Winpenny, to name a few.129 It is also an approach favoured by some (but 
not all) neo-classical public utility theorists. For example, Kahn asserts the following:
The practical achievable benchmark fo r  efficient pricing is more likely to be a 
type o f  average long-run incremental cost computed fo r  a large expected 
incremental block o f  sales, instead o f short-run marginal cost estimated fo r  a 
single additional sale. This long-run incremental cost would be based on (1) 
the average incremental variable costs o f those added sales and (2) estimated 
additional capital costs per unit fo r  the additional capacity that will have to be 
constructed i f  sales at that price are expected to continue over time or to 
grow. Both o f  these components would be estimated as averages over the same 
period o f  years into the future. (Kahn, 1988: 85)
125 The electricity industry in France is an example of this model. Investment costs and operating losses of 
the government owned electricity utility arising from short-run marginal-cost pricing are funded through 
lump-sum sta te  subsidies (Dasgupta, 1993).
126 The impact on w ater use through implementing metering and a positive marginal price is clearly 
dem onstrated in the study by the sam e author (Hanke, 1970).
127 Hanemann cites the example of the Washington Public Power Supply System , an investment that was 
m ade on the basis on consum ers’ estimated willingness to pay the short-run marginal cost rather than 
the long-run marginal cost, which resulted in the largest municipal bond default in U.S. history and which 
still has “serious financial repercussions for the Pacific Northwest" (1997:153).
128 Long-run marginal costing is also gaining currency in the United Kingdom within the framework of 
regulated private water com panies. See, for example, London Economics (1997) who incidentally give 
rather curious definitions of long-run marginal costs.
129 S ee  Bahl and Linn (1992: 299, footnote 8; 208), Mann etal (1980: 604), Hanem ann (1997:154), Hanke 
(1978b), Saleth and Dinar (1997) and Winpenny (1993:105).
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Bahl and Linn describe this method in the context of water supply as follows: “ average 
incremental costs can be calculated by dividing the discounted value of future supply costs by 
the (similarly discounted) amount of additional water to be produced” (Bahl and Linn, 1992). 
They present the following justification:
In practice, any version o f  discounted marginal-cost pricing has to be 
approximate, and ultimately some averaging o f costs over a range o f  output is 
always required. Average incremental costs will therefore be theoretically less 
desirable the greater the degree o f  capital indivisibility, fo r  while capital 
remains idle, price will be in excess o f  the currently relevant marginal cost. 
However, in view o f  the difficulties inherent in any system requiring 
fluctuating prices, this method appears to be the best practical approximation 
to optimal pricing that can be achieved in the water supply field, and is one 
that, in general, we recommend. (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 208)
In a similar vein, Mann et al comment on the AIC pricing method:
AIC  avoids severe price fluctuations, although it does not adhere closely to 
[the short-run marginal cost] either at capacity points or during periods o f  
excess capacity. It is a compromise solution, neither adequately signalling 
justification fo r  any specific investment, nor corresponding to the short-run 
margifial cost. That is, with the introduction o f  capital indivisibility, AIC  
becomes more appropriate, compromising between avoiding price 
fluctuations, signalling justification in investment, and making the best use o f 
existing capacity. (1980: 604)
The two approaches described above reflect different philosophical assumptions and
ideologies. The advocates of short-run marginal-cost pricing believe in the efficacy and
efficiency of the state, that is, the ability of the state to compensate adequately for market
failure. They assert that it is efficient for the state to undertake the cost-benefit analyses and to
make the appropriate choices with respect to investment in urban water capacity, and further,
that the state is efficient in raising taxes to make the required capital investments and to
subsidise the losses arising from pricing at the short-run marginal cost. On the other hand, the
advocates of long-run marginal-cost pricing are more sanguine about the ability of the market
to generate the “ correct” signals for investment in additional capacity and implicitly have less
confidence in the ability of the government to make efficient investment and taxing decisions.
Each approach is likely to have very different distributional consequences.
The currently prevailing neo-classical view favours using the market to allocate resources, 
leaving distributional issues to the political process (appealing to the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation principle). The alternative view is that the initial distribution fundamentally 
affects the systems of demand that in turn affects income distribution. Thus an examination of 
the current system of demands in isolation from income distribution considerations is both 
myopic and politically naive.
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Critical-realism highlights the inherent subjectivity of each framework of analysis, seeks to 
make this transparent and emphasises the need to contextualise the problem of pricing.
Adjustments to account for externalities
There are two basic types of externality: missing markets and distorted markets. (Both are 
strongly inter-related.) The former can be classified into positive externalities (typically public 
health benefits) and negative externalities (typically environmental costs). Distorted markets 
arise from imperfect competition, and asymmetrical information and uncertainty.
The basic neo-classical treatment of externalities is, in principle, straightforward: prices are 
adjusted to eliminate distortions and to reflect prices under perfectly competitive conditions.
Water economists generally ignore the problem of the second-best implicit within externality 
adjustments.130 Some dismiss it as a theoretical irrelevance -  this is typical of World Bank 
marginal-cost pricing advocacy (Gam, personal communication, 1996). Others misinterpret it, 
for example, Lai (1983) gives a rather curious and essentially meaningless interpretation of 
the second-best. A few take it seriously; for example, Hanke and Davis (1973: 811) note that 
“unless one performs a general equilibrium analysis of the situation, deviations from optimal 
pricing anywhere in the economy make it impossible to conclude that the application of 
marginal-cost pricing in any one sector will be desirable” . They go on to state that “ since this 
type of analysis is manifestly an impossible task, the theory of the second best appears to be a 
counsel of despair” (811). Nevertheless, they claim that a “ rough and ready 'third best' 
approximation will at least be better than ‘standing by and sadly sucking our thumbs under the 
sign of second best’ ” (811). They go on to recommend the “ third best” guidelines proposed 
by Turvey (1968, 1971), and interpret them as follows: “ One can justify pricing water 
services above marginal cost if (1) close substitutes sell significantly above marginal cost or 
generate external economies, (2) products using water as a major input sell significantly below 
marginal cost or generate large external diseconomies, (3) close complements sell significantly 
below marginal cost or generate large external diseconomies, and (4) major inputs of the 
water undertaking are purchased at significantly below marginal cost or involve large external 
diseconomies. In short, there is no substitute for judgement when it comes to the job of 
applying marginal-cost pricing principles” (Hanke and Davis, 1973: 811). Interestingly, in an 
exposition of the practical application of marginal-cost pricing given by the same author 
(Hanke, 1978b), these principles are not applied and the problem of the second-best is 
presumed not to exist. This is not surprising. The complexity of the suggested guidelines
130 See, for example, Hanemann (1997) and Hanke (1978b).
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become readily apparent when capital indivisibilities are present not only for water but also 
for its substitutes and complements. In this context, the appropriate marginal cost for water, 
its complements, substitutes and inputs, and the extent to which these cost/prices deviate from 
marginal costs, are imponderables. For those unwilling to give up the exercise altogether, 
Baumol (1978: 802) provides an apt conclusion: “we find ourselves forced to hunt for a 
solution in the dark jungles of the second best” .
The practical application of externality adjustments is not only patchy but also tends to be 
asymmetrical. There appears to be a general presumption in much of the literature in favour 
of including negative environmental externalities and yet ignoring positive health related 
externalities.
The discussion on positive externalities given by Bahl and Linn (1992: 253f) is typical of the 
neo-classical economic treatment and proceeds as follows. Externalities related to access to, 
and consumption of, the service are differentiated from one another. If positive externalities 
are related to access to the service (rather than consumption), then it is the connection costs 
which should be subsidised, and if they are related to consumption of the service, then the 
consumption costs of the service should be subsidised. Where the positive externalities exist 
only for relatively small quantities of consumption, as is the case for water supply, then access 
to the service should be subsidised rather than consumption if the level of consumption at 
marginal cost prices exceeds the quantity exhibiting positive externalities. Where capacity 
constraints limit consumption or connection to a level below that determined by setting prices 
to marginal costs, then consumption or connection should not be subsidised because this 
would lead to a more inefficient allocation of resources. Their conclusion is sceptical of 
subsidies:
In summary, it is not sufficient merely to cite the likelihood o f  external benefits 
in arguing fo r  subsidised provision o f services. One also needs to know which 
dimension o f  service provision is conveying the externalities; the extent o f  
externalities; and whether there are capacity constraints which require price 
rationing. Because o f these practical difficulties and because o f  the natural 
tendency o f actual and potential users to clamour fo r  service charges below 
marginal costs, one should be very cautious in accepting arguments fo r  a 
digression from marginal-cost pricing o f  urban services on account o f  external 
benefits. (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 253f)
Contrary to the cautionary conclusion given by Bahl and Linn above, there is actually a very 
strong case to be made for positive externalities for at least a “basic” water supply. 
Investment in urban water supply has been historically justified on the basis of community 
health benefits based on the conventional wisdom that “20 - 40 litres per capita per day of 
readily available water, if accompanied by adequate waste disposal facilities and sound
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hygienic practices, are sufficient to attain the main benefits of water use” (World Bank, 
1980a). In fact, more recent literature has shown that water use of 50 led has more beneficial 
health effects compared to a lesser volume, and that this is a necessary condition for improved 
health (World Bank, 1993a). The importance of these positive externalities is readily apparent 
when typical consumption levels in many cities in developing countries are much less than the 
“basic” requirements specified above (see Chapter 1).
Negative externalities related to the consumption of water exist on the water production side 
(the environmental costs associated with water withdrawals) and on the return of wastewater 
to the environment. Neo-classical economists generally strongly urge that these costs are 
estimated and included in the cost of water provision notwithstanding the fact that estimation 
procedures are often highly subjective, uncertain and dependent on prevailing income 
distributions. For example there may be significant asymmetries between the value that rich 
households place on the loss of a pristine river environment (which, say, is used for recreation 
and valued on this basis) compared to the value that a poor household places on an 
incremental quantity of water supply. These asymmetries arise not so much because of 
differences in preferences but rather because the ability to pay between the households is so 
different (see Sagoff, 1994).
Neo-classical economists are quick to point out the uncertainties involved in the estimation of 
positive externalities arising from investment in urban water supplies and use these 
uncertainties to caution against using them to justify a deviation from marginal-cost pricing. 
Yet these same economists are not self-critical concerning the uncertainties and subjectivity 
inherent in the estimation of negative externalities and the choice and calculation of the 
“ appropriate” marginal cost on which to base the price. This inconsistent approach is 
particularly serious when the distributional effect of the pricing policy is regressive.
For example, in Kampala, the World Bank has urged the application of a water tariff that is 
equal to the long-run marginal cost of water supply as well as wastewater collection and 
treatment. Only a small minority of households are connected to the sewerage system, hence a 
tariff that includes the wastewater costs and is applied to everybody (as advocated by the 
World Bank) is grossly inequitable because large water consumers contribute 
disproportionately to the environmental costs.
Distortions in the input and output prices arising from imperfect markets tend to be ignored.131 
For example, Bahl and Linn state that: “ [a] widely accepted view is that distortions in the
131 For example, the World Bank’s  calculation of the long-run marginal cost of w ater supply in Kampala 
(cited above) included no estimations of shadow prices (field visits, Uganda, 1999).
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factor and product markets do need to be accounted for [through shadow pricing] but often do 
not matter much” (1992: 259). Nevertheless, an extensive literature detailing methodologies 
for calculating shadow prices exists.132 Although details differ, the general approach in these 
methodologies is similar: marginal cost is interpreted as the marginal opportunity cost to 
society, that is, the cost of output forgone in providing an additional unit of the commodity.
In theory all tradable input prices should be calculated using border prices and non-tradable 
input prices using indirect border prices.133 In practice water tariff studies are often limited to 
netting out duties and taxes for purchased inputs and using a shadow exchange rate to adjust 
the foreign exchange component of capital costs (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 306). The sensitivity 
of water charges to shadow pricing has not been widely explored. Available evidence suggests 
that marginal costs are more likely to be sensitive to the cost of capital and the choice of 
discount rate. One study showed that a 20 percent increase in the exchange rate resulted in the 
average incremental cost (AIC) increasing by 7 percent (Linn, 1976). In the same study, a 
change in the discount rate from 8 to 12 percent resulted in a 10 percent increase in AIC. It is 
pertinent to note here that the World Bank’s calculation of the marginal cost of water supply 
in Kampala did not discuss or justify the choice of the single discount rate used in the 
calculation (field visit, Uganda, 1999).
Distortions in the output markets should also be taken into account, especially where the 
product has important substitutes or complements. For example, in the case of public water 
supply, the availability of cheap but contaminated alternatives (for example, water from local 
streams or open wells) may distort willingness to pay for the safer but more costly alternative. 
Because there is a negative health externality associated with the low-cost contaminated water, 
the externality distorts prices in the output market. Large consumers (wealthy households, 
industry and commerce) may extract ground water at a lower financial cost to themselves 
compared to the public water supply whereas the private extraction of groundwater may have 
a higher social cost than die private financial cost. In this case, private extraction should be 
taxed so that the private costs reflect the social costs.
Shadow price corrections are analogous to corrections for externalities and both are subject to 
the problem of the second-best -  there is no confidence in knowing whether a shadow price 
correction is Pareto-superior to the alternative of doing nothing.
132 S ee, for example, Dinwiddy and Teal (1996), Brent (1990), Curry and W eiss (1993), ODA (1988), Little 
and Mirrlees (1968,1974,1991), Little and Scott (1976) and Squire and van derT ak  (1975).
133S ee  Squire and van der Tak (1975).
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Transaction costs refer to all of the “ additional” costs necessary to implement an efficient 
marginal-cost pricing system. These costs include the educational costs required to overcome 
the efficiency losses of imperfect information (for example, complex bills), administration of 
the pricing system, costs related to additional physical requirements for the system to work 
efficiently (for example, metering costs), and the costs of developing a comprehensive 
marginal pricing structure.
In principle, each refinement to the pricing rule should be subject to an analysis of the benefit 
derived from the price reform vis-a-vis the cost of implementation. In practice, quantitative 
assessments are difficult and are often of dubious value, requiring numerous subjective 
judgements. One exception is the metering decision for water supply which has been subjected 
to cost-benefit analysis in many cases.134 The efficacy of metering will largely depend on the 
cost and value of water relative to the cost of metering. If water is scarce and costly to 
provide, metering is much more likely to be cost-effective. It is more likely to be cost- 
effective to meter larger commercial or industrial consumers. It may be expected that as the 
cost of water supply increases (as a result of increased demand and higher supply and 
treatment costs), the balance of the cost-benefit analysis will shift towards the cost- 
effectiveness of metering.135
Marginal-cost pricing assumes that the service provider is operating efficiently and is making 
optimal least-cost investment decisions. Production and investment inefficiencies may be large 
and estimates of marginal costs using these as a base may be misleading.136 Where the 
implementation of marginal-cost pricing results in surplus revenue generation, there may be a 
tendency for a service-provider to become less efficient because resources are not constrained 
and there may be no incentive for the service-provider to be efficient. Similarly, marginal-cost 
pricing may result in revenue deficits causing cash shortages, possible inefficiencies in 
operation and inadequate maintenance. This raises important institutional issues that are 
typically not addressed within the neo-classical marginal-cost pricing framework.
134 See, for example, OECD (1987b) and Hanke (1970). The cost of metering includes the capital cost, 
installation cost, m eter inspection, maintenance and repairs, meter reading, bill determination, 
accounting and administration, billing and income collection.
135 In World Bank policy advocacy, it is generally implicitly assum ed that the benefits of universal metering 
exceed the costs. For example, World Bank advocacy of universal metering in urban areas in Uganda 
contained no discussion of the likely benefits vis-3-vis the costs (field visits, Uganda, 1999).
136 For example, the national utility in Uganda has an operational inefficiency of more than 33 percent and 
an investment inefficiency of more than 100 percent (field visits, Uganda, 1999).
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Peak-load pricing
In the urban water sector, the most important variations in peak demand are daily (the 
variation in demand over the day arising from the daily pattern of water usage) and seasonal 
(arising from seasonal changes in temperature, rainfall and irrigation requirements). Sources 
of peak demand can either be random (for example, demand for water for fire fighting 
services) or systematic.
Marginal costs typically will vary in response to changes in peak demand. Urban water supply 
systems may be conceptually divided into three sub-systems: bulk supply, transmission 
(including treatment), and distribution. Bulk supply systems are typically designed to meet 
average annual water demand, transmission systems to meet peak-day demand, and 
distribution systems to meet peak-hour demand. Thus both the distribution of costs between 
the three sub-systems as well as the variation in the average and peak demand will affect the 
costs of supply.
A neo-classical approach to peak-load pricing for the urban water sector is presented below.137 
It should be noted that this is just one interpretation of peak-load pricing.138
The general principles of neo-classical peak-load pricing are that the capacity requirements to 
meet random peak demand should be priced as a fixed capacity-related charge, whereas the 
capacity requirements to meet a systematic peak demand should be priced as a volume-related 
charge. Kahn (1988) formulated the “ rule of peak responsibility” which states that all users 
who contribute to peak demand should pay for the peak (that is, the cost of the capacity 
required to meet the peak). The corollary to this is that off-peak users should not pay for the 
cost of peak capacity.
The local distribution system is generally designed to meet peak-hour demand. If this is 
related to the peak-flow required to fight fires (as it typically is) then, according to neo­
classical theory, the cost of this capacity should be charged as a fixed marginal capital cost to 
all consumers using the system (because all have access to the fire-fighting capability and the 
associated peak-flow availability, and this is a random demand).139
137 This discussion follows Hanemann (1997: 159f).
138 There is a significant literature on seasonal dem and and peak load pricing. See, for example, Greene 
(1970), Griffin and Chang (1991), Lyman (1992) and Mann and Schlenger (1982).
139 W here this is not the case , the capacity costs ideally should be borne in relation to the actual 
contribution to peak daily dem and by each consumer, that is, the charge should be a volume charge. 
However, metering of daily variations in peak dem and is costly, hence this solution is not cost-effective 
and it would need to be based either on monthly dem ands (albeit a  poor indicator of peak-hour demand) 
or a fixed capacity charge.
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The transmission system is designed to meet peak-day demand. Peak-day demand typically 
occurs in the season corresponding to high irrigation demands. Because this is a systematic 
demand, this charge should be volume-related. However, because daily measurement of 
consumer demand is not cost-effective, volume-related peak-load pricing is restricted to 
monthly demands. Hence, according to neo-classical theory, peak-month commodity charges 
should include the average incremental cost of capacity expansion of the transmission 
network. Similarly, off-peak commodity charges should exclude these costs.
The practical application of peak-pricing based on these principles tends to cause disputes and 
conflict because peak-pricing allocates costs between consumer groups and adversely affected 
groups dispute the basis for the allocation. Two prominent examples are Tucson (Arizona) and 
Los Angeles.140
Reliability of supply
In terms of the neo-classical framework of marginal-cost pricing, the price of water should be 
adjusted in relation to its reliability. In developed countries, a very high level of reliability in 
the supply of urban water is generally assumed and hence reliability is implicit in the price. 
However, even in this context explicit pricing for reliability is sometimes undertaken.141 In 
developing countries, it is not uncommon for urban water systems to be unreliable. 
Interruptions or discontinuous supplies may arise because of excess demand over supply, lack 
of system capacity to cater for peak demand and service breakdowns. Households respond to 
service unreliability by investing either in private storage or their own supplies. Altaf (1994) 
has shown that the value of private investment may exceed the cost of upgrading the public 
services to provide improved and more reliable services. This is a case of institutional failure, 
a topic that is addressed in Chapter 4.
Does pricing improve efficiency?
The assertion that marginal-cost pricing is Pareto-superior to other forms of pricing is 
contingent on the assumption that water demand is price-elastic (or at least moderately so). If 
demand is price-inelastic (or, more loosely, has a low price-elasticity), then the use of prices 
to pursue allocative-efficiency is largely ineffective. It is therefore important to know how 
responsive the consumption of water services is to changes in prices. Unfortunately, as Bahl 
and Linn note, “price-elasticities of demand for public services are notoriously difficult to
140 S ee  Martin e t al (1984) for a  description of the Tucson case. Pricing reform in Los Angeles is discussed 
in Chapter 4.
141 S ee the discussion on the (Californian) Metropolitan Water District given in Chapter 4.
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estimate” (1992: 276). Controversy exists as to the validity and accuracy of various empirical 
techniques and the ability to infer price-elasticities from these studies in circumstances where 
no studies have been undertaken. See Chapter 6.
Maximizing multiple pricing objectives
Hanemann poses the question: “ should equity concerns be addressed independent of or 
simultaneously with efficiency concerns?” and gives the answer: “ economists generally 
favour that the two problems be addressed independently, though this prescription by no 
means enjoys unanimous consent” (1997: 150). The World Bank is in favour of an efficiency- 
first approach:
It has been a long-standing policy o f  the World Bank that to the extent 
possible the price o f water should be set equal to the marginal cost o f supply. 
Modifications to the marginal-cost pricing rule may be necessary to meet 
objectives other than economic efficiency, but the burden o f  proo f is typically 
on the party proposing the modification to show that a departure from  
marginal-cost pricing achieves other social objectives, such as equity. 
(Whittington, 1992: 85)
In practice, the setting of urban water tariffs almost always involves other considerations such 
as revenue requirements and social equity. (See Chapter 1.) Neo-classical approaches to these 
issues, to the extent that they exist, are discussed here.
Setting prices to reflect “ true” social marginal costs typically will result in differences 
between revenues and expenditures. These may be either deficits or surpluses, depending on 
supply characteristics and the chosen approach to pricing. Two basic solutions to this problem 
have been proposed: either price at the (short-run or long-run) marginal cost and use tax 
revenues to finance any deficits; or stipulate self-financing and revenue neutrality within the 
urban water sector and adapt the water pricing schema accordingly. Each approach is 
discussed below.
Short-run marginal-cost pricing will not generate revenue for investment in capacity expansion 
and will typically result in operating deficits. In this case, revenue can be generated from 
general taxes, an approach which is not uncommon in Europe. The recent “ orthodoxy” 
amongst neo-classical economists is that raising revenue through taxes is generally more 
inefficient than pricing for self-sufficiency.142 Another argument that is used against general 
fund (tax revenue) financing of urban water supply is the presumed reduction in incentives for 
efficient management. At a more pragmatic level, tax revenues in developing countries are 
typically constrained and may simply be inadequate to meet all necessary or desirable
142 S ee discussion on Page 65.
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expenditures. This last argument is perhaps the most compelling practical reason for revenue 
self-sufficiency,143
Where long-run marginal costs exceed average historic costs (a not untypical occurrence in the 
urban water sector), a long-run marginal-cost pricing schema is likely to generate revenue 
surpluses. In this context, there are three general approaches: pool the surpluses with a 
general revenue fund; reduce the surpluses to zero by introducing modifications to the tariff 
(for example, multi-part tariffs); and invest the surpluses to reduce inequalities in service 
provision within the urban sector (implement cross-subsidies). Each has very different 
distributional implications.
It is not uncommon for revenue neutrality to be a stipulation for the agency managing the 
urban water supply in a particular region or city. For example, this is typically the case for 
both private and public water utilities in the United States. Many neo-classical economists 
advocate revenue neutrality. For example, Bahl and Linn (1992: 310) provide six reasons for 
the attractiveness of the self-financing of urban water supply systems: it is “ fair” in the sense 
that people pay for what they get; it avoids the need to raise finance from other sources and 
the potential resource allocation distortions these taxes might involve; it enhances financial 
(and hence potentially political) autonomy at the local level; it creates greater certainty for 
planning and management as a result of not having to rely on uncertain money flows from 
higher tiers of government; it encourages “ appropriate” levels of service provision in line 
with local communities’ willingness to pay; and self-financing is thought to provide good 
incentives for better management. The World Bank advances similar arguments.144
The main problems that arise from imposing a strict policy of revenue neutrality on urban 
water utilities is the inability to address questions of inequality both within and between 
regions (see Chapter 5).
Two-part tariffs can be used in combination with marginal-cost pricing to ensure revenue 
neutrality. Proponents of this approach argue that a levy (or subsidy) should be linked to the 
components of the service that are the least price-elastic, hence having the least affect on 
resource allocation.145 The implication of this for urban water supply is that the access (or 
fixed) charges for high-income households and industries (who are likely to have low 
elasticities of demand for access to the piped system), could be set at a level much higher than
143 For example, the Ugandan government has stipulated revenue self-sufficiency a s  a  key objective for 
the urban water sector primarily for the reason of constrained tax revenues.
144 S ee, for example, Serageldin (1994) and World Bank (1992, 1994).
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the marginal cost. This typically will not be the case where alternative sources of water exist 
and for low-income consumers, unless connection is compulsory and effectively enforced.146 
In this latter case, subsidised access could have distinct equity advantages.
Ramsey (1927) showed that Pareto-efficiency in the presence of a revenue constraint (for 
example, revenue neutrality) requires a systematic deviation from marginal-cost pricing 
whereby the deviation is inversely proportional to the price-elasticity. Hanemann interprets 
this as follows: “ one accomplishes this goal by imposing the [greatest]147 price adjustments on 
the customers whose quantity demanded is least sensitive to price, and the smallest 
adjustments on customers whose demand is most sensitive to price. The result is a form of 
cross-subsidisation that yields a more efficient economy than if one had simply adjusted the 
price for all customers in the same way” (1997: 156). Hanemann notes two obvious problems 
with this approach: “ the formula is extremely complex and usually will require information on 
demand that simply is not available to most utilities” ; and the cross-subsidisation may not be 
equitable (156).148 No examples of Ramsey Pricing were found in the author’s review of water 
pricing experiences.
Multi-part tariffs are a variant of two-part tariffs with different infra-marginal rates. Typical 
multi-part tariffs are increasing block or decreasing block tariffs. Decreasing the infra­
marginal rates when there are surpluses and increasing the infra-marginal rates when there are 
deficits can maintain revenue neutrality. In this way the marginal rates (of the last block) can 
be maintained at the specified marginal cost. The (neo-classical) arguments against this 
approach are twofold. Consumers respond to both marginal and infra-marginal rates and 
hence these rates are not “efficient” . It is impossible to ensure that all consumers are 
responding to the “ right” marginal rate.149 Multi-part tariffs may be justified on other 
grounds: water conservation in the case of increasing block rates and economies of scale in 
the case of quantity discounts using decreasing block rates. Multi-part tariffs are widely used 
in both developed and developing countries.
145 This argum ent is, of course, not strictly correct. Although a levy on a non-price-elastic component of a 
service would not affect the use of that resource, there is an opportunity cost to the payment of the levy 
that relates to the alternative u ses to which the money used for the levy could have been put.
146 The high price-elasticity arises particularly in situations where relatively cheap alternatives are available 
(for example, open wells or stream s, even if these are contaminated), which is the ca se  in most urban 
areas in Uganda, for example. Enforcement is unlikely to be effective a s  affordability may be a real 
constraint. High num bers of illegal connections continue to exist in urban areas  in both Uganda and 
South Africa despite attem pts at enforcement.
147 The text contains an unfortunate error: the text reads “least", but clearly this is incorrect.
148 The problems of estimating price-elasticities of demand are shown in Chapter 6. Ramsey pricing also 
requires estim ates for cross-price-eiasticities that are typically not available.
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Another alternative is to relinquish marginal-cost pricing altogether in favour of a full-cost 
pricing system with uniform use-related charges equal to the average historical-cost. Bahl and 
Linn have the following to say about this approach:
Although this pricing method is not generally advocated by experts o f public 
service pricing as optimal, it is frequently found in operation. A common 
practice is to ignore the multi-dimensionality o f service provision in the actual 
design o f  user charges and to focus exclusively on only one dimension o f 
service provision -  service use or connection (access). When this is done, a 
pricing system which is designed to meet financial or historical accounting 
costs o f  a public service must, by definition, charge average historical cost 
per unit o f  consumption. This type o f  approach is generally easiest to 
implement, since it represents a simple extension o f  financial analysis which is 
generally accepted as an important method fo r  evaluation o f  public enterprise 
performance. It does, however, forgo the opportunity to improve the 
allocation o f  resources through restructuring the pricing system. (1992: 271)
As previously noted, practical considerations may outweigh other considerations in the choice 
of pricing structure.
Some economists are willing to consider equity issues within a neo-classical pricing 
framework. Their approaches are considered in Chapter 5.
No escape from subjectivity
Kahn, an advocate o f  m arginal-cost pricing, concludes as follows:
The task o f translating [the principles o f marginal-cost pricing] into actual 
price schedules is so extraordinarily difficult that it is entirely possible to 
accept their validity while at the same time concluding that the task o f 
following them is an impossible one. Few would go so fa r  as to abandon the 
effort entirely. But all would point out, and correctly so, that even the most 
sophisticated and conscientious effort to apply these principles inevitably 
involves large doses of subjective judgement and, at the very best, can 
achieve the roughest possible approximation o f the desired results. The 
uncertainty o f the resulting estimates and the impossibility o f  devising and 
enforcing rate structures that fully embody them counsel a rounding o f the 
edges, a tempering o f  the principles themselves. Such a tempering is not 
objectionable even on purely economic grounds: the economic costs o f 
ascertaining and enforcing economically efficient rates can well outweigh the 
efficiency advantages that such rates suppose to achieve. (Kahn, 1988:1:182, 
own emphasis)
The above quote provides a rare admission of the limitations of the marginal-cost pricing rule 
and the subjectivity inherent within the methodology. This subjectivity, together with the 
potentially significant distributional effects that marginal-cost pricing can have, provides a
149 According to this particular criticism, all units of water should be priced at the marginal cost in order to 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources.
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strong rationale for the development of a pricing methodology which integrates equity and 
institutional considerations.
4. Implications for a critical-realist pricing methodology
The treatment of income distribution within neo-classical theory is logically inconsistent. It is 
not tenable to maintain a view that Pareto-efficiency is independent of the distribution of 
income. The existing income distribution is a product of past social processes and, in turn, 
fundamentally affects future production and the distribution of wealth. Prices are not simply a 
product of demand and supply but are influenced by the structure of the market that is itself 
determined by the interplay of historical political-economic forces. In order to understand 
these forces it is necessary to ground the analysis in concrete pricing experiences. The 
importance of a historically and context-specific analysis of the market structure and its 
influence on pricing is demonstrated in Chapter 4.
Neo-classical economics treats externalities as an anomaly, an imperfection that needs to be 
corrected. But externalities and other market “ imperfections” are pervasive and are the norm 
rather than the exception. A more satisfactory approach is to accept the existing phenomena as 
given, to understand the origins of these phenomena, their consequences and the prospects for 
change. This approach is very different to the positivistic approach adopted by neo-classical 
economics and is demonstrated in Chapter 6.
Neo-classical theory treats water analogously to a widget. But the water sector both reflects 
prevailing social, economic and political conditions as well as presenting its own set of unique 
characteristics. Water is essential to life, has no substitute and therefore has a particular 
social, cultural and political resonance. Water is ubiquitous and fugitive; it is found almost 
everywhere on earth in many forms and guises. Water is robust (almost indestructible and 
endlessly recyclable) yet also vulnerable to abuse and degradation. Water supply is dependent 
on stochastically distributed climatic variables. Water performs many functions. Water is used 
for, inter alia, drinking, cooking, bathing, the production of food and commodities, cleaning, 
navigation, recreation, ornamentation and other cultural purposes. Water has a high “ options 
value” , that is, choices today concerning the management of water may be irreversible and 
foreclose future options. Consequently, both the systems of consumption as well as the 
“ systems of provision” for water are unique.1501 argue that a critical-realist methodological 
approach to water pricing theory and practice is able to cater for the specificity of these 
unique characteristics of water whereas neo-classical theory is not.
150 The term com es from Fine (1993).
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The “ correct” application of neo-classical pricing is dependent on the “ correct” measurement 
of the marginal costs and price-responsiveness of demand. These measurements are both 
subjective and prone to uncertainty. (The theoretical and methodological problems related to 
the measurement of the price-elasticity of demand are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.) 
Consequently, a low level of confidence can be placed on the Pareto-efficiency claim of 
marginal-cost pricing.
Neo-classical economic pricing theory is preoccupied with static allocation-efficiency. 
However, there is no demonstrable link between static and dynamic efficiency. In the urban 
water sector, dynamic efficiency may be more important than static efficiency. Neo-classical 
economics is not able adequately to explain the nature of dynamic efficiency. I argue in 
Chapter 4 that a political-economic analysis is able to provide a more satisfactory explanation 
of dynamic efficiency and pricing practices over time.
The neo-classical economic theory of pricing in general, and its application to urban water 
specifically, cannot escape from subjectivity. A critical-realist methodology is able to accept 
that neo-classical economic theory provides a partial, subjective analysis and is able to 
critically evaluate this analysis alongside those developed by other methodologies, specifically 
institutional economics and classical political-economy.
Notwithstanding the limitations of neo-classical theory, the theory does provide some 
important building blocks that can be used in the critical-realist approach to urban water 
pricing. These include the definition and classification of costs and benefits and some 
techniques for estimating costs and benefits. An understanding of benefits and costs related to 
urban water pricing, when combined with a critical awareness of the subjectivity involved in 
the definition and measurement of these costs and benefits, can assist the economic analysis of 
water pricing.
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Chapter 4: Understanding the market for water
Towards a political economy of water pricing
Control over water in an arid region provides an important control over 
human affairs.151
Water flows uphill to money.152
A handful o f  companies dominate the international market fo r  private 
management o f urban water supplies. They have a combined market 
capitalisation o f more than $50 billion and annual sales o f  $13 billion (water 
business only), which is about twice the GDP o f Uganda.153
1. Introduction
Market structure has a profound influence on water pricing practices and outcomes.
In the nineteenth century, private provision of piped water supply systems dominated in 
capitalist countries.154 The recognition of the health benefits of clean water led to greater 
public investment in water supply systems serving domestic users.155 Regulation of private 
suppliers increased and, in most cases, public agencies took over the ownership and 
management of urban water distribution systems.156 Public ownership and management 
became the dominant mode in the sector, although a long tradition of private management (of 
publicly-owned assets) exists in some places.157 More recently there has been a trend towards 
greater private management of urban water supplies, typically through management contracts, 
leases or concessions. Rights to manage systems are generally given for a limited time period
161 Ostrom (1953: 229).
162 An old adage quoted in Postel (1999).
153 Uganda GNP in 1998 w as $6.7 billion (World Development Report). Market capitalisation and sales 
from annual reports of Tham es Water, Vivendi and Suez.
154 See, for example, Blake (1956), Mukhopadhyay (1981), Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994) and Tynan 
and Cowen (1998). Private com panies were involved in the provision of w ater to London, Los Angeles 
and New York to nam e a just a few major cities.
155 See, for example, Anderson (1988) and Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994). Foreman-Peck and 
Millward (1994) state that "the social costs of inadequately monitored, policed, and regulated water 
com panies were strikingly dem onstrated in Newcastle upon Tyne during 1853 and 1854. A cholera 
epidemic m ost probably w as caused by contaminated river water supplied by the private water 
company, even though the private company had been established to supply pure water from another 
source" (1994:42).
156 Foreman-Peck and Millward (1994) cite extensive regulatory failure as a key reason for the transfer of 
ownership from private to public hands in Britain. S ee also Mukhopadhyay (1981). Private companies 
were also heavily criticised for providing services only to industries and wealthy neighbourhoods.
157 Private com panies have been continuously involved in the provision of urban water services in France 
since the 1880s (World Bank, 1999).
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and outright private ownership of water assets is rare (World Bank, 1999). The extent of 
private investment in urban water supply systems is small.158
In England and Wales (though not in Scotland and Northern Ireland) water services were 
privatised outright in 1989. (The extent and scale of the privatisation of water in the UK is 
unprecedented.) In France, some 80 percent of the water supplied is by private firms through 
a mixture of service, management, lease and concession contracts.159 Some 25 percent of 
water utilities in the United States were investor-owned in 1990. Privatised water services are 
generally uncommon in much of Europe though eastern European countries are now under 
pressure to privatise services. (Much of this pressure for privatisation comes from multilateral 
lending agencies.)
Private ownership and management of urban water supplies in developing countries is 
relatively rare, but increasing. Some prominent examples of privatised urban water supplies in 
cities in developing countries include Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Jakarta.
Both neo-classical and institutional economists have developed theories of market structure 
(reviewed in Sections 2 and 3) but these give an inadequate account of how and why certain 
market structures have come about. More specifically, the theories do not address and are 
unable to explain the distributional outcomes arising from market structures. Although the 
theory of “public economies” developed by Elinor Ostrom (1990) has some relevance to 
urban water supply, I argue that the analysis is ahistorical and does not take sufficient account 
of political-economic considerations.
I argue that a political economy analysis of market structure provides a more satisfactory 
understanding of the development of markets over time and also that it is able to explain 
distributional outcomes. To support this argument, I examine the political economy of water 
pricing in Los Angeles. The discussion, which is not exhaustive, illustrates how such an 
analysis might be undertaken and the kinds of conclusions that can be drawn. Using this 
analytical methodology as the foundation, I draw on both secondary and primary material on 
pricing experiences in other cities to develop some more general features of a political- 
economic analysis of urban water pricing.
A key point made in the chapter is that the political-economic conditions determine both the 
policies and practices in any particular context as well the outcomes of these practices. 
Theories and policies, therefore, must be adapted so as to be directly relevant to the specific
158 S ee  Footnote 159.
159 Although private m anagem ent dominates in France, private investment has not been significant, 
comprising less than 20 percent of total investment in the last two decades (World Bank, 1999).
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political-economic context, taking into account both current conditions as well as the historical 
path through which these conditions came about. Policies based on neo-classical economic 
theory fail to do this, as demonstrated in Chapter 1.
There is an inherent contradiction in the neo-liberal position (bolstered by neo-classical 
economic theory) that asserts that a minimalist state is in the best interests of society as a 
whole. An efficient market economy with low transaction costs can only exist where there is a 
strong and efficient state that is able to enforce contracts. Advocates of privatisation are 
willing to grant the state the .role of public regulation (and recognise both its importance as 
well as the complexities involved) but deny the possibility that the state could run, for 
example, an efficient water utility. Clearly this is a contradiction.
2. The limitations of a neo-classical approach to regulation 
Key insights
Standard neo-classical economic analysis of the market structure with respect to urban water 
supply proceeds as follows: Urban piped water supply networks are usually characterised by 
high sunk costs, economies of scale and interconnected or networked delivery. These 
characteristics give rise to natural monopoly.160 Consumption of piped water is typically 
“ rival” (consumption by one consumer affects the availability of water to another consumer) 
although the extent of rivalry differs greatly depending on the specific context.161 Urban piped 
water supply is typically excludable in that access to the piped network can be restricted.162 
The combination of rivalry and excludability implies that piped urban water should be priced 
as a private good with price a function of access and use. The existence of significant 
externalities (in relation to both supply and use) means that supply (and pricing) cannot be left 
to the market and either public provision or regulated private provision is preferable to 
unregulated private provision. The market for monopoly provision is contestable, at least in 
theory, and thus it is argued that competitive pressures can be brought to bear on the
150 Multiple parallel networks or the sharing of the sam e network by different supply agencies are 
extremely rare.
161 Because investment in water supply is lumpy, requiring periodic investments in typically large 
increments in capacity, consumption may be non-rival for a significant period over the life of the 
infrastructure.
162 A ccess to groundwater supplies is rarely excludable in practice because of the difficulties and cost of 
monitoring.
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monopoly market through opening the right to supply water in an area to competitive tender, 
that is, franchise bidding,163
This analysis raises three important topics within neo-classical microeconomics, namely 
monopoly pricing, regulation and franchise bidding. The first two topics are discussed below. 
Franchise bidding is discussed in the section addressing institutional economics.
Monopoly pricing
The social welfare maximisation claim of neo-classical economics is dependent on competitive 
markets. Where a monopoly exists, which is the case for piped urban water supply, there are 
two possibilities. Either the monopolist is able to practise perfect price discrimination (by 
making distinct offers to individual customers based on their preferences and the cost of 
supply), in which case social welfare is still maximised (though the distribution of welfare is 
in favour of the monopolist), or the monopolist is only able to practise partial discrimination 
giving rise to a deadweight welfare loss.164 In either case, there is a compelling argument for 
the public regulation of monopolies.
Public regulation
The literature on the economics of regulation is vast and space does not permit even a cursory 
review.165 Rather, this section seeks to distil a few key insights from this literature that have 
implications for pricing methodology.
Both the theory and practice of regulation are influenced by political economy. Chang (1997) 
refers to the “ age of regulation” (1945 to 1970), the “age of deregulation” (1980 to present) 
and a transition period in between. He also shows how (and to a certain extent why) 
regulatory theories and practice have changed over time. During the age of regulation there 
was a general consensus on the need for and efficacy of regulation. Regulation was justified 
on the grounds of market failure and the theory concentrated on what the right policies should 
be. The objectives of regulation differed between the United States and Europe: the former
163 Contestability theory, developed and expounded by Baumol e ta l  (1982), asserts  that the threat of entry 
ensures that the outcome is efficient even if the market is monopolised by a  single producer. The results 
rely on an assumption of zero (or minimal) sunk costs that is clearly not applicable in the urban water 
market. This problem is “overcome” with an argument that efficiency can be attained if the right to supply 
(for a se t period of time) is subjected to competitive bid. S ee discussion on institutional economics.
164 The deadweight welfare loss arises from the fact that the monopolist can reduce supply and hence 
increase prices com pared to those that would exist in a competitive market. S ee  Mas-Colell et al (1995: 
386).
165 See, for example, Chang (1997), Bos (1994), Joskow (1989, 2000), Kahn (1988), Pelzman (1989) and 
Berg and Tschirhart (1995).
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concentrated on monopoly regulation and static allocative-efficiency, the latter on dynamic 
efficiencies (productivity improvements through technology innovation). In the age of 
deregulation there has been a general trend towards deregulation. Numerous economic 
theories were developed in this period that concentrated on government failure.166 These 
theories, and empirical efforts to demonstrate the benefits of deregulation, have placed greater 
emphasis on static efficiency gains rather than dynamic efficiency gains. Chang asserts that 
while various sector studies have shown static efficiency gains, it is not possible to make any 
definitive statements about the general dynamic effects of deregulation (1997: 715). Krueger 
(1980) points out that economic theory does not prove that higher static efficiencies will 
necessarily lead to greater dynamic efficiency and Chang (1997) points out that the static 
efficiency gains are likely to be small compared to the potential dynamic efficiency gains. 
Thus the benefits of deregulation in terms of efficiency are not self-evident.
The government failure school within neo-classical theory assumes that individuals are 
primarily self-seeking and that, therefore, “ self-seeking is all that counts” (Chang, 1997: 
722). Such a crude assumption is clearly untenable: were human beings to be totally selfish 
the modern economy as we know it would not be able to function.167
Vickers and Yarrow (1987) examine the affect that ownership has on efficiency from a 
theoretical perspective within the neo-classical economic framework. They conclude that 
“ where product markets are competitive, it is more likely that the benefits of private 
monitoring systems (e.g. improved internal efficiency) will exceed any accompanying 
detriments (e.g. worsened external efficiency). ... In the absence of vigorous product market 
competition, however, the balance of the advantage is less clear cut and much will depend on 
the effectiveness of the regulatory policy” (1987: 44). 168 The empirical literature on the 
influence of ownership is similarly inconclusive (Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994: 200, 
322). Bhattacharyya et al (1994) study 225 public and 32 private water utilities in the USA 
using data made available from the AWWA. The use of a generalised variable cost function 
(with fixed capital held constant) shows that private water utilities are less efficient, on 
average, than public utilities, although the dispersion in efficiencies is much less for private
166 S ee  Stigler (1971) on regulatory capture and Krueger (1974) on rent seeking.
167 Chang (1997) cites the fact that workers adopting a “work to rule" approach can reduce output by 30 to 
50 percent whilst not violating any work codes.
168 They use principal-agent theory to derive these conclusions. S ee  also R ees (1985).
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utilities.169 Heilman and Johnson (1994) argue that, in the case of wastewater treatment, 
economic benefits arising from privatisation have not been found in empirical studies.
Regulating (or deregulating) an industry typically has consequences for distribution. Public 
regulation of utilities often has explicit distributional goals, for example, universal service. 
Whilst the argument for deregulation is typically made on the grounds of efficiency 
improvements (social welfare enhancement), the distributional consequences of deregulation 
are often not made explicit.170
In a classic neo-classical work on the regulation of utilities, Kahn concludes that “ the central 
issue of public utility regulation remains the one that I identified at the time [seventeen years 
previously] -  finding the best possible mix of inevitably imperfect regulation and inevitably 
imperfect competition” and that “ industries differ one from the other, and the optimal mix o f 
institutional arrangements fo r  any one o f them cannot be decided on the basis o f ideology 
alone” (1988: xxxvii, own emphasis).
Within the water sector, the following trends with respect to regulation are evident:
Universal recognition of desirability of public regulation. The recognition of the need for 
public regulation of water supply and distribution is almost universal.171 Regulation is 
generally justified on the grounds of the existence of monopoly supply and externalities 
(environment and health). Distributional concerns are also recognised as being important. 
(The way in which regulation has changed over time has been described in the introduction to 
this chapter.)
Application of regulatory theory. Within the United States, the focus of economic regulation 
is on allocative-efficiency through price regulation. Reference to marginal-cost pricing is 
frequent, but actual practice of this appears to be limited (see Chapter 1). Where there is 
franchise bidding (for a lease or concession), the price of water is usually based on 
competitive tender and marginal-cost considerations seem to take second place.
169 Bhattacharyya et al (1994) quote two other studies in support of their conclusions: Atkinson and 
Halvorsen (1986) report similar results for the electricity sector in the USA and Feigenbaum and Teeples
(1983) show that private water utilities are less efficient than public utilities,
170 Trebing, for example, argues that “the neoclassicists have essentially disregarded equity and 
distributional effects, and have failed to establish a  framework for examining social values" (1984: 362). 
An institutionalist critique of neo-classical economics argues that “the neoclassical treatm ent of 
regulation and deregulation contains an ideological bias against intervention” and that “deregulation 
based on neoclassical analyses has not adequately addressed residual market power, social costs and 
economic d islocations.... Since the negative impacts are often borne by the poor and the powerless,
(on the face of it) som e neoclassical analyses appear not to be value neutral, but to actually perpetuate 
current structures of political and economic power” (Berg and Tschirhart, 1995: 310).
171 There are, of course, exceptions. See, for example, Lee (1999) w hose ideological advocacy of 
privatisation is unabashed.
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Implications for water pricing methodology
Regulatory theory both influences, and is a product of, the political-economic context. The 
relative emphasis of regulation on static versus dynamic efficiency considerations will 
significantly affect the choice and use of regulatory instruments. Access to cheap water, for 
example, may help in the establishment of an industrial base and enhance future economic 
growth, contributing to the dynamic accumulation of capital.
The theoretical arguments and empirical support in favour of the social welfare benefits of 
private ownership and management vis-d-vis public ownership and management are not 
convincing.172 In specific circumstances it is possible that private ownership and management 
could result in significant welfare improvements but this will not necessarily be the case. In 
the water sector the benefits of private ownership and management may be proscribed by the 
need for public regulation. In addition, the distributional consequences of privatisation may be 
politically unpalatable. A key point here is that the political-economic conditions will 
determine the outcomes of regulation, public provision and privatisation. This point is 
illustrated in more detail in Section 4.
The optimal mix of inevitably imperfect regulation and competition must be determined with 
reference to the specific political-economic context and the characteristics of demand and 
supply pertaining at the time (Kahn, 1988). Taking this a step further, the actual mix of 
regulation and competition found in practice will be, itself, a product of the historical 
development of the political economy.
3. Insights from institutional economics 
Key insights
Neo-classical economics asserts that individual actors (consumers and producers) together 
with their utility and profit maximising behaviour mediated by the market lie at the heart of 
economic analysis, whereas political economy, at least in the Marxist tradition, holds that an 
analysis of the history of power struggles between different socio-economic groups is 
necessary to understand economic behaviour. Broadly speaking, institutional economics may 
be said to fall somewhere in the “ middle ground” between the methodological individualism 
of neo-classical economics and the analysis of (political) power embodied in political 
economy. In part, institutional economics may be thought of as a continuation of the historical 
tradition established by Max Weber (1958). However, there is much ambivalence within
172 S ee  footnote 198.
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institutional economics about the precise relations between itself and neo-classical economics 
and the political economy approach respectively. For the most part, new institutional 
economics allies itself with the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of neo­
classical economics, seeing its agenda as being largely complementary. However, some 
institutional economics may be viewed as contradicting, rather than complementing, neo­
classical economics. To the extent that methodological individualism is rejected, and (locally 
and historically specific) power dynamics and social structures emphasised, the boundary 
between institutional economics and a political economy approach becomes fuzzy.
The two most important insights of institutional economics are that the market is just one of 
many institutions within society and that these institutions exert a profound influence over 
both the workings and outcome of the market.173 The approach of institutional economics to 
resource allocation thus encompasses a broader set of explanatory variables. Price is not only 
a function of demand and supply in a conceptual market, it is also determined by the structure 
and power of institutions and the forces that gave rise to these. Thus “ the search for 
optimality or for optimal solutions is either formally empty or can be given substance only by 
the introduction of antecedent normative assumptions as to whose interests count, whereas in 
the real world such questions have to be worked out both within institutions and through 
contests over institutional adjustment and reformation” (Samuels, 1987: 865).
Transaction cost analysis
Williamson (1985) argues that institutional arrangements (which provide the context within 
which transactions take place) are determined by both the nature and cost of transactions. His 
key thesis is that the primary factor responsible for the development and adaptation of various 
forms of economic organisation over time is the efficiency gains in transaction costs that arise 
from institutional changes.
Williamson may be criticised for being ideologically biased in his belief that efficiency gains 
through reduced transaction costs are the primary force driving institutional change. Although 
he gives an apology for focusing exclusively on the efficiency criterion as the primary cause 
of contracting forms (namely that institutional economics is underdeveloped and hence 
exclusive focus on this is warranted) and notes that transaction cost arguments are best used in
173 Commons (1934) drew attention to the fact that there are different types of transactions of which the 
bargaining transaction (a key focus of neo-classical economics) is only one. Two other types of 
transactions are “managerial transactions" and “rationing transactions”. The former describes a 
manager-worker transaction and the latter the rationing of property rights. Both of these transactions, at 
least to a certain extent, are involuntary a s  there is an asymmetry in the exchange and hence they differ 
in important respects from the bargaining transaction (Commons, 1934). The em beddedness of 
institutions within capitalism in ably dem onstrated in Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997).
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conjunction with, rather than to the exclusion of, other ways of examining the same 
phenomena, Williamson is guilty of logical error. It is not possible to prove efficiency as the 
primary cause if other possible causes are not properly examined (which Williamson fails to 
do).
Williamson does not give an adequate treatment of asymmetry in information (and ways of 
overcoming this) and inequality in power relationships and resource-access (and the effect of 
these on contracts). A further weakness in his argument is the use of comparative-static 
analysis to try to explain dynamic effects. For example, it is not necessarily true that an 
organisational mode that economises on transaction costs in the short-term will out-perform a 
different organisational mode in the long-term. Many context-specific factors other than 
(static) transaction cost economising will have an important influence over the outcome.174 
Nevertheless, Williamson’s approach may be used to shed light on certain aspects of 
institutional arrangements relevant to the provision of water. An application of transaction cost 
analysis, which constitutes an extension or modification of neo-classical economic analysis, to 
the analysis of the market structure for urban water provision is given below.175
Urban water market structure -  a transaction cost approach
In the neo-classical approach to water pricing, the primary question is related to the 
appropriate price level of urban water for any given set of (physical) circumstances. The key 
criterion for the price level is the influence that the price level has on resource allocation 
(optimal allocation of currently available resources being the principle goal). The institutional 
context is implicitly assumed (typically either a public or regulated private monopoly). The 
existence of the monopoly is explained on the basis of increasing returns to scale, that is, 
urban water services are considered to be a natural monopoly}16 However, what is not 
explained is the choice between a private regulated or a public water utility and the influence 
this has on the price setting process. This issue is examined below using Williamson’s 
transaction cost theory. The particular contracting choice that is examined is franchise bidding 
for the natural monopoly market in urban water services.
174 There is evidence that it is becoming more costly to transact in the United S ta tes economy. Less 
adversarial forms of transacting may substantially reduce transaction costs (Casson, 1991).
175 The account given here is based on Williamson (1985). Subsequently, Williamson position has moved 
closer to Douglass North’s approach (Williamson (1998ab). North’s approach is discussed later in this 
chapter. Nevertheless, useful insights are gained by applying Williamson’s transaction cost approach to 
the water sector.
176 Williamson's argum ent that monopoly can be explained primarily or exclusively on the basis of the 
economising of transaction costs is not convincing.
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Contracting models and governance
Williamson (1985: 31) argues that the need for governance arises where bounded rationality 
(uncertainty), opportunism (self-interest) and asset-specificity (uneven playing field) coexist.177 
He further asserts that both the nature of the investment (asset-specificity) and the frequency 
of contract affect the choice of the appropriate governance form under different 
circumstances. Market governance is appropriate where transactions are non-specific.178 
Trilateral governance is appropriate where there are occasional transactions of a mixed or 
idiosyncratic kind. Once such a contract has been entered into, there is a strong incentive to 
carry the contract through. Market alternatives are not attractive because of the specific 
investments undertaken. Here, some form of third party support is desirable to facilitate 
conflict resolution and mediate disputes. Bilateral governance is appropriate where recurrent 
transactions are supported by investments of the mixed and highly specific kinds. Continuity 
of trading is valued (because of the specific investments) and the recurrent nature of the 
exchange potentially allows the cost of specialised governance structures to be recovered. 
Bilateral structures of governance maintain the autonomy of the parties, whereas unified 
structures remove the exchange from the market and place it within the firm subject to an 
authority relation (vertical integration). Unified governance becomes more appropriate the 
greater the degree of asset specificity. That is, incentives for trading weaken as transactions 
become more idiosyncratic. Uncertainty differentially influences non-specific, mixed and 
specific investments, with little influence over non-specific assets and much greater influence 
on more specific investments.
Using these conceptual tools, Williamson addresses a number of practical issues related to 
market structure such as vertical and horizontal integration, firm size and franchise bidding 
(1985). The application of this conceptual framework to the issue of franchise bidding in the 
urban water sector is given below.
Franchise bidding for the right to supply urban water
It has already been argued that the monopoly structure of the urban water industry can be 
explained more convincingly by appeal to the decreasing cost structure of the industry (that is, 
technological factors) rather than to the economising of transaction costs. Nevertheless, 
transaction cost theory can be used to analyse the efficacy and efficiency of alternative 
governance structures for the monopolised urban water industry. Of primary interest here is
177 Williamson argues that when only bounded rationality and opportunism coexist, then the appropriate 
contractual model is competition, and when only opportunism and a s se t specificity coexist, then the 
appropriate governing model is planning.
178 B ecause the product or service being exchanged is standardised, alternative purchase or supply 
arrangem ents are presumably possible at zero extra cost.
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the choice between public ownership (and management) and private ownership and 
management by means of a franchise entered into through a competitive tender process.179
Demsetz (1968) and Stigler (1968) were the first to argue that monopoly-pricing outcomes can 
be avoided by using ex ante bidding to award the monopoly franchise to the firm that offers to 
supply the product on the best terms.180 This efficiency-based argument has been used to 
promote franchise bidding for public utility services such as water supply.181 Advocates of 
franchise bidding usually ignore or underplay the complexities and problems involved. 
Williamson asserts that the argument for efficiency gains through franchise bidding is 
deficient because both ex ante and ex post contracting features have to be examined: “ only if 
competition is efficacious at both stages does the franchise bidding argument go through. The 
attributes of the good or service to be franchised are crucial to the assessment. Specifically, if 
the good or service is to be supplied under conditions o f uncertainty and i f  non-trivial 
investments in specific assets are involved, the efficacy o f  franchise bidding is highly 
problematic” (1985: 40: own emphasis). Moreover he asserts that “ the enthusiasts of 
franchise bidding claim too much for the efficacy of that organisational alternative” (1985: 
328).
Williamson provides a theoretical framework within which efficiency arguments in favour of 
franchise bidding can be critically examined. This is used below with specific application to 
the urban water sector.
The general influence of uncertainty. In the presence of uncertainty, it is not possible to 
write complete contracts as all eventualities cannot be foreseen. However, open contracts pave 
the way for opportunism. Although aggressive self-interest will be ameliorated due the nature 
of the long-term contract which includes informal constraints and recognition of the mutual 
long-term benefit of co-operation, the “ hazards of opportunism hardly vanish on this account” 
(333). Williamson argues that these conditions (uncertainty and opportunism) pertain to real 
life and are not trivial in their influence over outcomes of different institutional arrangements. 
In fact, “ franchise bidding for public utility services under uncertainty encounters many of the 
same problems that the critics of regulation associate with regulation” (333).
179 In the ca se  of the franchise, ownership of the fixed asse ts  may be retained by a public authority, but the 
rights to their use and full m anagem ent responsibility (including investments) cede to a  private company
180 “The rivalry of the open market place disciplines more effectively than do the regulatory processes of 
the commission” (Demsetz, 1968: 65). Both Demsetz and Stigler (1968) argue that neither equipment 
durability nor uncertainty should pose problems provided use of the durable, contract-specific equipment 
is transferable.
181 S ee  World Bank (1996).
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Because the urban water industry is highly capital intensive, franchises must be given for long 
periods (typically more than 20 years). Clearly, there is an extremely high degree of 
uncertainty over such a long contract period.
The cost of ascertaining and aggregating consumer preferences through direct 
solicitation. The greater the cost and/or the more difficult to ascertain consumer preferences 
directly, the more complicated and less efficient the franchise bidding process. Consumer 
preferences for levels and standards of water supply can be ascertained through customer 
“ willingness-to-pay” surveys. These, however, are rather costly and not without problems. 
(See Chapter 7.)
The efficacy of scalar bidding. The more difficult it is to reduce the bidding to clearly 
defined and measurable parameters (scalar values of price, quality and quality) that are easily 
comparable, the more complex and open to abuse is the franchise bidding process.182 In the 
water sector price must be related to quality of service. It is possible for competing bidders to 
propose different price and quality combinations that may be difficult to compare. Even if this 
problem is solved (for example, by agreeing on both explicit and measurable quality criteria 
beforehand), monitoring the quality of service is essential and therefore a significant 
monitoring and regulatory capability is necessary. This monitoring may not always be 
efficacious. It may be possible for the franchisee to conceal lower standards or quality of 
service. For example, reduced expenditure on maintenance may not influence service quality 
in the short-term. This hazard is particularly serious in the period leading up to contract 
renewal.
The degree to which the technology is well developed. The more mature the industry with 
respect to technology development the more amenable it is to the process of franchise bidding, 
all other factors being equal.183 The technology used for water treatment and retailing is well 
developed and reasonably stable. Hence technology does not present a significant obstacle to 
franchise bidding.
182 The use of ex  ante consum er solicitation (having the customer base  decide on the credible 
commitments m ade by the bidders to individual consum ers during the bidding process) and holding the 
winning bid to the contract thus created, may overcome the problems posed w here simple scalar bidding 
is not feasible. However, Williamson asserts that this is not practical: "Although franchise awards can be 
reduced to a lowest bid price criterion, that is apt to be artificial if the future is uncertain and the service 
in question is a t all complex . Such awards are apt to be arbitrary and/or pose the hazard that 
‘adventurous’ bids will be tendered by those who are best-suited or most inclined to assum e political 
risks” (Williamson, 1985: 335).
183 “A once-for-all verdict with respect to the supply of a particular natural monopoly service is 
unwarranted. The better mode at an early stage of an industry’s  development may no longer be better 
later on when a lesser degree of uncertainty prevails. To the extent that difficult transition problems are 
apt to be posed in shifting from one mode to the other, this should be acknowledged and taken 
expressly into account at the o u tse t’ (Williamson, 1985: 329).
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Demand uncertainty. Franchise bidding is less appropriate where there is greater uncertainty 
in demand. The period of franchises for water retail typically lasts for more than 20 years in 
the case of a concession. Water demand forecasts over periods of this length have a marked 
degree of uncertainty. This tilts the weight of influence in the contract heavily in favour of the 
franchisee.
The degree to which incumbent suppliers acquire idiosyncratic skills. The greater the 
degree of idiosyncratic skills required (that is the greater the asset specificity) the more 
uneven the playing field at contract renewal time. Although many of the skills required to 
manage a water retail network are common to most water retail systems, some important sets 
of skills are very closely tied to the local environment.184 While the transfer of “asset- 
specific” staff between the incumbent franchisee and the new successful bidder is possible, it 
is not without difficulty and cost.
The extent to which specialised, long-lived equipment is involved. Where asset specificity 
of capital assets is high, and especially where such assets make up a substantial portion of the 
cost structure of the service, difficult problems of asset valuation arise. The water supply 
sector is a highly capital-intensive public service industry and hence these problems are 
particularly acute (Hanemann, 1997),
Political context. The greater the susceptibility of the political process to opportunistic 
representations and the greater the differential in capacity and ability between competing 
organisational forms (for example, between private companies wanting the franchise and the 
public sector currently supplying the service) the less level the playing field and more unfair 
the franchise bidding process is likely to be. The likelihood that regulation may expand its 
jurisdiction and the consequences of this also need to be taken into account. There needs to be 
an explicit recognition that the balance of power between the important interest groups has a 
significant influence over the outcome, affecting the distribution of resources, allocative- 
efficiency and resource-use efficiency.
M arginal-cost pricing. Franchise bidding gives no assurance that output will be priced 
“efficiently” (that is, “ Pareto-optimally” in neo-classical terms). This is an interesting point 
because many neo-classical economists tend to advocate both marginal-cost pricing where 
services are managed by public utilities and privatisation through franchise bidding (with the 
latter usually being deemed preferable where it is feasible) without recognising the
184 For example, effective customer relations largely depend on reputation and a history of service within 
that area. Customers tend to value familiarity and stability and are often wary of change. Other asset- 
specific skills may relate to peculiarities in the system  design, equipment used and maintenance 
histories.
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inconsistency in the arguments. Williamson notes that an elaboration of the franchise bidding 
process may be possible to ensure marginal-cost pricing, but that such action will have the 
effect of further reducing the benefits (to the extent that any exist) of bidding over regulation.
Execution problems. Even if it is assumed that the full contract period pertains,185 in the 
context of uncertainty, long-term fixed-price contracts are unlikely to be satisfactory. 
Although price flexibility by formulae may go some way to reducing these problems, it is 
usually a rough correction which is not likely to be satisfactory. Cost-plus contracts can track 
costs more accurately. However, these are subject to monitoring problems. The case fo r  the 
advantages o f  franchise bidding over regulation is severely weakened once issues o f  
monitoring become important fo r  franchise bidding. The counter argument goes as follows: 
because agents have a stake in renewing the contract, the incentive to cheat or be opportunistic 
during the contract will be significantly reduced and hence franchise bidding (even with 
monitoring) is still better than monopoly regulation. However, Williamson argues that there 
is much scope for opportunism-with-guile in franchise arrangements that may not threaten 
potential contract renewal. There is a danger that political skills (used to win the contract and 
undertake successful re-negotiation of the contract) may override the economic skills (of 
running an efficient enterprise) and hence the advantages of franchises over regulation may 
again be questioned.186
Bidding parity a t contract renewal. It is unlikely that the competitive playing field will be 
level at contract renewal for economic, administrative and political reasons. The economic 
advantage of the incumbent franchisee arises from the “ fundamental transformation” , that is, 
the introduction of specificity (as soon as a bilateral contract has been entered into) and the 
economic advantages arising from this, Administrative advantages arise from superior access 
to information for the purposes of asset valuation related to franchise transfer. Political 
advantages arise from the reluctance of both the incumbent franchisee and collaborating 
politicians to expose the existing contract and performance to scrutiny (and possible 
litigation).
In the light of the above arguments, Williamson is far less sanguine than most neo-classical 
economists (for example, Demsetz, 1968, Stigler, 1968 and World Bank, 1996) about the 
efficiency of franchise bidding vis-a-vis other organisational forms for a “natural monopoly” .
185 Contract periods are very unlikely to be cut short: the contract is designed for the full duration of the 
contract: the long term nature of the contract provides the incentive for investment in durable assets: an 
aborted contract would result in non-triviat transaction costs (litigation and delays): and those that 
awarded the contract would lose face.
186 In addition, there may be enormous scope for influence arising from disproportionate economic power. 
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, for example, has annual sa les of about $6 billion com pared to total sa les in 
the Ugandan water sector of $16 million.
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He asserts that problems associated with franchise bidding may be as intractable as those 
associated with regulation, especially where assets are specific and have a long economic life, 
and where there is uncertainty (all of which are present in the case of urban water supply).
Williamson’s arguments are convincing.187 From an economic theory point of view, there 
appears to be little or no advantage to privatisation through franchise bidding compared to a 
regulated private or state-owned monopoly. Economic theory, per se, therefore cannot offer 
guidance as to the most appropriate form of governance for a natural monopoly and the 
assessment of the efficiency of the different models must therefore be left to an appeal to other 
considerations or as a matter for empirical investigation.
Cursory overviews of franchise bidding in the urban water sectors in South Africa and 
Uganda are presented below to illustrate the point that choices related to franchise bidding, 
and consequently the outcomes, have much more to do with underlying political-economic 
dynamics rather than the Pareto-efficiency arguments for franchise bidding.
Franchise bidding in South Africa 188
The recent political changes in South Africa have been a catalyst for a fundamental review of 
water policy in South Africa. Prior to 1994, private sector engagement in the water sector was 
largely limited to service contracts such as traditional design and construction activity 
undertaken by engineering consultants and private contracting firms.189 The new government, 
facing large capital investment requirements to meet service goals in the water sector and, at 
the same time, unwilling to expand public expenditure significantly, introduced a policy of 
encouraging private sector participation in the water sector.190
The only two sizeable concession contracts have been signed in South Africa to date -  
Nelspruit and Dolphin Coast.191 Nelspruit ostensibly decided to give a concession for water 
and sanitation services because its service area had expanded from 24 000 people to 240 000 
(as a result of local go^rnm ent reform in South Africa) -  with an expected increase in 
revenue of only 17% -  and because Nelspruit was only able to borrow about $2 million 
whereas the investment need to expand services was of the order of $50 million.192 The
187 S ee  also Dasgupta (1993), Farrell (1986) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988).
188 This brief discussion is elaborated on in Chapter 7 with reference to the underlying political economy.
189 There were a few exceptions: m anagem ent contracts existed for som e towns and township areas and 
build-operate transfer schem es existed for a few water and w astew ater treatm ent works.
190 The conditions giving rise to this policy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
191 Only Nelspruit is discussed here in a cursory way. The key point m ade here could equally well have 
been with reference to the Dolphin Coast concession.
192 The information is from Goiz and Harrison (2000),
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decision was taken in August 1996 and the concession contract signed in April 1999. Key 
features of the contract include a stipulation that there would be no forced retrenchments of 
existing staff and that staff conditions would be the same or better. These conditions reflect 
the key concerns of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a powerful 
labour lobby in South Africa.
Johannesburg has sought to engage the private sector in its management of water supply and 
sanitation services. Although the incumbent management was in favour of a concession-type 
model, the Municipal Workers Union was strongly against this and was successful in 
removing this option from the reform alternatives under consideration. Consequently, the 
Johannesburg Council has opted for a management contract.193
One conclusion to be drawn from the South African experience is that the form of private 
sector involvement and the outcomes of the reform process are highly dependent on the 
political-economic context. Both neo-classical and new institutional theories are unable to shed 
light on these political-economic aspects of institutional reform for the reasons set out in 
Chapter 3. In South Africa there is a tension between government policies to encourage 
municipal service partnerships with the private sector and a strong labour movement which is 
fearful of the possible job losses and job insecurity that may result from this. (The ideological 
force of the World Bank in policy design is a possible third factor. However, the direct 
influence of the World Bank is considerably less in South Africa compared to countries which 
are extensively reliant on World Bank loans and funding.) The difference between government 
policy and actual practice (with very little progress with privatisation over the last six years) 
would seem to indicate that organised labour exerts some influence on government (see 
Chapter 7). In this context, economic theorising can help to inform the parties but is in itself 
likely to have only a marginal influence on the outcome.
Franchise bidding in Uganda 194
The Ugandan water sector is in the process of reform. The government is committed to 
private sector participation in the sector. Two privatisation models are being seriously 
considered at present: a concession for Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja or a lease contract for 
about 30 of the largest towns in Uganda (including Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja). The 
government’s arguments for private sector participation are two-fold: to reduce existing 
inefficiencies in the sector (a short-term goal) and to attract private investment into the sector
193 Pickering (personat communication, 2000).
194 The data on which this section was based were collected in Kampala and other urban towns in Uganda 
during an urban water sector reform project in the period August 1999 to July 2000. The data com es 
from government and consultant reports and interviews with influential governm ent officials.
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(a longer-term goal). On paper, the potential efficiency gains look impressive.195 However, 
significant risks are attached to the reform process: there is no guarantee that there will be 
sufficient private sector interest and competitive bidding; the regulatory capacity in Uganda is 
weak exacerbating the informational and power asymmetries highlighted above; and country 
political and economic risk means that private operators are likely to both place a high 
premium on bids and to require government guarantees (sovereign guarantees on loans and 
mitigation of foreign exchange risk).
Although it is government policy to promote increased private sector participation in the water 
sector, there is strong evidence that this is not a really a locally driven and owned policy, least 
of all in the urban water sector. The World Bank has played a significant role in policy 
development in Uganda and it can be forcefully argued that the Ugandan policies are really 
those of the World Bank, given the extent of its influence over the financial flows available 
for development in Uganda. For example, the World Bank has strong financial leverage over 
the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) through its loans; the “ institutional 
reform” (or more accurately privatisation) study was undertaken with World Bank financing; 
World Bank had veto rights over the choice of consultants and a strong say over how the 
recommendations of the study are implemented (or overridden) given the contingency of 
NWSC survival of further World Bank financing.196 Of course, this is not a unique nor recent 
phenomenon. World Bank influence over Ugandan water policy has its roots in the series of 
IMF structural adjustment programmes (starting in 1980 during the oppressive Obote 
dictatorship) which led to ever greater debt dependency.197 These programmes are critically 
examined by Mamdani (1994: 128) who shows how the interests of capital (both international 
capital and the local mafutamingi) came to predominate over those of the peasant farmers and 
co-operatives.
In this context, the choice of institutional arrangement for the water sector is clearly 
contingent on factors other than the economic theory of franchise bidding.
1951 have estim ated these gains to be of the order of $10 million per annum w hereas the total revenue 
potential is currently about $23 million per annum.
196 The consultants recom m ended a lease for 30 towns. The World Bank essentially overrode this 
recommendation by pressing for a lease for NWSC and a handful of additional towns, and providing the 
financing for further study of this particular option only.
197 Uganda’s debt-service ratio (m easured as the ratio of export earnings required to service the debt) 
jumped from 19% at the start of the first IMF structural adjustment programme in 1980 to 90% at the end 
of the second programme in 1990 (Mamdani, 1994: 132).
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Market structure -  the role of culture and ideology
In contrast to Williamson (1985) (see discussion above), North (1990) uses a dynamic analysis 
to understand the evolution of institutional forms over time. His is a much richer analysis 
which is more helpful in understanding the prevalence of certain institutional forms in the 
urban water sector in different contexts. North’s behavioural and methodological assumptions 
are summarised below and, following that, his approach is used as a guide to understanding 
the different institutional forms found in the water sector.
North defines institutions to include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape 
human interaction, be these formal or informal. Formal constraints are codified and refer to 
the constitution, legislation, common laws, bye-laws and contracts (political rules define the 
structure of the polity and economic rules define property rights). Informal constraints are 
defined by social convention and hence are part of socially transmitted culture; they are codes 
of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions; they include the extensions, elaborations and 
modifications of formal rules, socially sanctioned norms of behaviour and internally enforced 
standards of conduct.
North (1990) agrees with the bounded rationality and self-interest premises of Williamson 
(1985). However, he rejects Williamson’s assertion that efficiency is the primary driving force 
behind the evolution of contracting and institutional forms. North’s assumptions of fuzzy 
knowledge and incomplete feedback allow him to explain the persistence of non-optimising 
behaviour in terms of institutional constraints. Thus North rejects the evolutionary competitive 
assumption which underlies neo-classical economics, namely that even if all individuals are 
not rationally self-maximising, “ competitive forces will see that those who behave rationally 
will survive and those who do not will fail; and that therefore in an evolutionary, competitive 
situation [scarcity and competition are fundamental assumptions of neo-classical economics], 
the behaviour that will be continuously observed will be that of people who have acted 
according to such standards” (1990: 19). North questions the usefulness of equilibrium 
analysis for the analysis of institutions because of the possibility of multiple equilibria in 
institutional form and, more fundamentally, because of the dynamic change of institutional 
forms over time.
North (1990) has extended the thinking within the transaction cost school of new institutional 
economics by embracing the influence of ideology and other informal and formal institutional 
constraints on the form and functioning of institutions, particularly their evolution over time.
North asserts that institutions reduce uncertainty by defining and limiting the sets of choices of 
individuals, that is, institutions define the “ rules of the game” in society. Hence they structure
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incentives (in the economic, social and political spheres) by changing the “price” that 
individuals have to pay. Although individual agents continually attempt to maximise their own 
welfare (that is, there is a dynamic interaction between individual agents and institutions) there 
is no guarantee that institutional forms will evolve in a way that increases the efficiency of 
property rights (and hence the overall efficiency of the economy) over time. The primary 
reasons for this are uncertainty, the cost of obtaining information, asymmetry in information 
and poor or fuzzy feedback. These result in the persistence of poor models of reality and 
provide scope for ideology, dogma and other informal and formal institutional constraints to 
play an important role in the way in which societies function. Inefficient property rights 
persist because the market for political rights is “ inefficient” (in terms of the neo-classical 
conception of static efficiency). In turn, this market remains inefficient because of the 
persistence of economic interest groups that wield inappropriate influence.198 “Because much 
of economic history is a story of humans with unequal bargaining strength maximising their 
own well-being, it would be amazing if such activity were not frequently at the expense of 
others” (North, 1990: 134).
The inclusion of “ ideology” and “culture” , even if these are rather narrowly defined, (and 
noting the importance of formal and informal institutional constraints more generally) as 
partial explanatory variables in the evolution of institutions is an important advance over the 
work of Williamson. North’s explanation of why inefficient property rights persist is 
plausible. However, there is a methodological weakness in his argument. North moves from 
individual action (on organisations) to organisational action (on institutions) seamlessly as if 
they are one and the same thing. Thus North’s conception of institutional evolution is stated as 
follows: “ Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine 
the opportunities in a society. Organisations are created to take advantage of those 
opportunities, and, as organisations evolve, they alter institutions. The resultant path of 
institutional change is shaped by (1) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship 
between institutions and organisations that evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure 
provided by those institutions, and (2) the feedback process by which human beings perceive 
and react to changes in the opportunity set” (1990: 7). North does not show how the interests 
o f organisations are, or become, aligned with individual interests, and how competing 
interests between the organisation and individuals within the organisation are resolved. These
198 “T hese inefficiencies [in property rights] exist because rulers would not antagonise powerful 
constituents by enacting efficient rules that were opposed to their interests or because the cost of 
monitoring, metering, and collecting taxes might very well lead to a situation in which less efficient rights 
yielded more tax revenue than efficient property rights. The efficiency of the market for political rights is 
the key to this issue. If political transaction costs are low and the political actors have accurate models to 
guide them, then efficient property rights will result” (North, 1990: 52).
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matters are not as straightforward as they seem.199 Without a theory which explains how 
individual self-interest or maximisation relates to organisational interests, North’s theory 
remains, at best, incomplete and, at worst, seriously flawed.
Notwithstanding this weakness, it is possible to examine the practical efficacy of North’s 
analysis with reference to actual market structures found in the urban water sector, including 
the dynamic development of institutional forms over time. This discussion is very much 
illustrative in nature.
Privatisation, politics and ideology
The question arises: why have different institutional forms (and in particular, different 
patterns of ownership) evolved in different contexts? The question of causality in relation to 
privatisation is a vexed one. Nevertheless, North’s general approach may be used as a starting 
point for the examination of these issues.
The political and ideological frameworks informing and influencing the institutional structure 
in specific countries or regions can be divided into three broad categories: (1) a strong 
ideologically-based belief in the superiority of either nationalisation or private enterprise (vis- 
a-vis the other and with respect to services in general and the water service in particular), (2) 
a general preference for either public ownership or private sector involvement in urban water 
supply, and (3) an agnostic view on the relative efficacy of public or private ownership and 
management of water supply. Although it may be expected that the boundaries between these 
categories will be blurred, they still can provide a useful schema. For example, there is likely 
to be little disagreement with the view that, prior to 1989, eastern European countries were 
operating within a framework of a strong ideological preference for public ownership that 
precluded an examination of private ownership as a plausible and possibly attractive 
alternative. Similarly, the social-political context in most western European countries (at least 
from about 1900 to 1980) was largely one in which there was a general preference for the 
public ownership and provision of urban water services, premised on the view that water was 
an essential public good.200 There was a sea-change in the political and ideological landscape 
in the United Kingdom when Margaret Thatcher came into power: from a general preference
199For example, Olson (1970) showed that groups which exist to further the interest of their members are 
not automatically self-interested in the way that individuals are assum ed to be, at least the logic of 
individual self-interest cannot be applied in a straightforward way to group interest. Casson (1991) 
exam ines the role of leadership in groups. Hindess (1989) argues that political parties, trade unions, 
capitalist enterprises and state agencies are examples of actors w hose actions cannot be reduced in 
any system atic and coherent m anner to the rational choice model of individual action encapsulated in 
methodological individualism.
200 The dates correspond approximately with the public ownership of w ater supply in London (1902) and 
the election of the conservative Thatcher government in the United Kingdom (1979). The fight for public 
ownership of w ater supply in London began in 1851. S ee Mukhopadhyah (1981).
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for the public ownership and public provision of public services to at least a general 
preference for (and arguably a strong ideological belief in) the private ownership and 
provision of these same services. It was in this context that the privatisation of water services 
in England and Wales took place.201 Privatisation in England and Wales was advocated on the 
grounds of predicted improvements in economic efficiency (Maloney and Richardson, 1995). 
There is a convincing argument that the underlying motivation for privatisation had more to 
do with macroeconomic beliefs about public debt than with efficiency gains.202 At the very 
least, the choice for privatisation was hardly an agnostic one, in the sense of examining the 
evidence of efficiency gains arising from privatisation in the water sector elsewhere.203 
Furthermore, arguments against privatisation were not seriously countenanced.204 Opponents 
of privatisation argue that this mode of organisation is not necessarily more efficient than 
public provision, noting that the existing evidence is ambiguous and that, even if it were to be 
more efficient, the distributional effects are inequitable and undesirable (Schofield and Shaoul, 
1999). (There is an implicit assumption in this argument that income distribution is at least as 
important a goal as efficiency.) Opponents of privatisation also argue that the regulation of 
private companies is not effective because the scope for penalising private companies is 
limited and, consequently, consumer interests are not effectively protected under privatisation 
(Schofield and Shaoul, 1999).
An analysis of this kind could be applied to South Africa, though the limitations of such an 
analysis are readily apparent. The African National Congress (ANC) had traditionally been an 
opponent of the privatisation of public services including water. Ideologically, the ANC was 
socialist in orientation. Thus the reasons why the ANC has pursued a privatisation strategy
201 It is also important to note that the political and ideological context in Scotland w as quite different to that 
in England and privatisation of water services was strongly resisted. For a  brief account, se e  Maloney 
and Richardson (1995: 91 f). S ee  also Summerton (1998) and Kinnersley (1998).
202 Th!s view is widely held and well founded. The sector required major new investments as a result of a 
need to conform to European environmental and water quality standards and Thatcher wished to 
remove current debt and, in particular, projected future debt from government accounts. See, for 
example, Kinnersley (1994), Maloney and Richardson (1995:57) and Forem an-Peck and Millward 
(1994:331).
203 Such an analysis w as not undertaken. In any event, the published evidence is inconclusive. S ee 
footnote 168.
204 Maloney and Richardson (1995), who undertook a political analysis of the policy changes resulting in 
water privatisation in the United Kingdom, show that the prevailing governing framework was pro­
privatisation, that there were strong managerial interests in privatisation and that “outsider groups" 
including trade unions and environmentalists were marginalised: “They were clearly stakeholders in the 
sector yet had little or no influence" (1995: 89). They further noted that the "problem for these outsider 
groups is that the ‘interests of the Treasury in securing early flotations have been foremost -  along with 
the aims of existing m anagers’ (Riddell, 1991:111)" (Maloney and Richardson: 1995: 89). S ee also 
Feigenbaum e t al (1998) who argue that privatisation in Britain was system atic and ideologically driven, 
with the objective of “irrevocably converting Britain from a mixed to a  neoliberal market economy” (83).
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must go beyond a North-like analysis of ideology and culture.205 A similar point applies to the 
“new” Labour Party in the United Kingdom. Previously aggressively anti-privatisation, “New 
Labour” is now progressing with privatisation of public enterprises the Conservative Party 
was “ too timid” to touch
In the light of the above, it is evident that culture and ideology do influence the structure of 
the urban water market. Whilst such an analysis (even if undertaken in much more detail) is a 
useful starting point, it is inherently limited as its conception of culture and ideology are too 
narrow. North is not able to begin to explain why cultures and ideologies evolve as they do. 
In other words, North’s analysis is still too superficial; it fails to take into account the 
underlying political-economic forces affecting the development of the economic, political and 
cultural context within which the contending ideologies operate.206 In the case of privatisation 
in the United Kingdom, for example, Foreman-Peck and Millward point out that the important 
ideological changes were themselves a “ reaction to the experience of economic history” 
(1994: 332).
An institutional theory of price determination
Tool (1991) has reviewed the work of a number of institutional economists and proposed an 
“ institutional theory” of price determination. He makes the following points: exchange in a 
non-auction setting does not reduce to the maximising tenets of neo-classical economics; price 
discretion on the part of the producer predominates (that is, price-taking is rare); price 
discretion typically is based on a mark-up on production costs; and private pricing decisions 
should be subject to public appraisal. The key point is that pricing is primarily discretionary, 
emphasising the need for public review of prices. This is particularly relevant to water given 
its social importance.
205 Marais poses the pertinent question: “How is it that a liberation organisation stoutly linked to a  socialist 
trade union federation and in many ways shaped by long and intimate relationship with a communist 
party could so rapidly and resolutely adopt the practices and implement policies of right-wing social 
dem ocrasy?” (2001: 260). This point is taken up in Chapter 7 (Conclusions) with reference to a political 
economic analysis of South Africa.
206 Feigenbaum at al (1998:41) argue that privatisation may be used a s  a  strategy by certain interest 
groups or c lasses a s  a  m eans of re-aligning institutions and decision making process with the effect of 
privileging their interests vis-a-vis other groups or classes. They argue that the broad privatisation 
movement is better understood as a political movement rather than an administrative tool (to better 
achieve defined social goals) or an economic phenomenon (to maximise individual utilities). While this 
may be true, they do not show why political movements develop as they do and why and how they are 
able successfully to change the institutional landscape. Such an analysis requires an understanding of 
the political-economic dynamics.
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Public economies
Ostrom (1997) seeks to bridge the gap between markets for private goods and state provision 
of public goods. Her analysis was developed with common-pool resources and public goods in 
mind, where exclusion is problematic. It was developed for cases where both market and state 
provision of services led to sub-optimal outcomes and sought to show both why an alternative 
model of provision should out-perform these two alternatives and explain the existence of 
certain modes of provision in existence in the United States. This analysis has possible 
relevance to the provision of urban water because although exclusion is possible, it is not 
normally desirable.
She defines the concept “public economies” (in contrast to market economies) as being 
composed of collective consumption units. Collective consumption units are able to arrange 
for production, patterns of access, use and appropriation. A collective consumption unit could 
be a unit of government but this is not necessarily the case. A collective consumption unit’s 
primary role is to solve the problem of provision (distribution). The mode of production can 
be regarded as a separate question in terms of this analysis.
Ostrom develops a “polycentric theory” of governance to explain the complex patterns of 
service provision found in metropolitan areas in the United States. This theory is based on the 
following assumptions: urban public goods differ substantially in their production functions 
and the numbers of people simultaneously affected; individuals with relatively similar, but 
always evolving, preferences for public goods tend to cluster in neighbourhoods; preferences 
within neighbourhoods are more homogenous than across entire metropolitan areas; multiple 
“provision units” allow for performance comparisons and results in better service delivery; 
and, multiple “provision units” allows for fiscal equivalence whereby beneficiaries are 
primarily responsible for costs (Ostrom, 1997: 8). Ostrom asserts that redistribution is best 
assigned to very large units of government (state or national government). The theory has 
been applied extensively to the provision of police services in metropolitan areas in the United 
States.
This theory possibly could be used to explain the fact that there are over 50 000 water 
companies in the United States, most of whom serve a population of less than 3 300.207 It also 
could be applied to a developing country context where multiple supply technologies exist 
(piped water with individual connections and public standpipes, and local sources such as 
springs, wells or boreholes).
207 The Economist, 24 February 1996.
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The theory may be criticised on at least four counts. First, it assumes that production and 
provision can be separated and that they each pose separate questions. In the case of water 
supply, a cogent argument can be made that the mode of production significantly influences 
the arrangement of the provision of services. This is particularly the case where large private 
companies are involved in production. Second, the logical application of the principle of fiscal 
equivalence will lead to inequitable outcomes. This is a particularly important point in the case 
of water supply. Third, decentralisation of public services can lead to an increase in 
corruption and not the reverse.208 Fourth, whilst Ostrom’s theory attempts to bridge the gaps 
between political and economic analysis, it does not address the fundamental political- 
economic issues underlying the institutional arrangements, explain how these have evolved or 
show how they influence outcomes in terms of the distribution of resources.
Public versus private consumption
As a brief aside, it is worth noting that the discourse in this thesis has been “ overwhelmed” 
by the dominance of the private (individual) consumer in the neo-classical theory of 
consumption where household (and firm) demand for water is both the starting and end point 
of the analysis of demand. (This must necessarily be so in consonance with the methodological 
individualism of neo-classical economics.) Whilst institutional economics has provide some 
sort of counter-balance on the supply-side (addressing the structure of the “market” for the 
provision of water), no such counter-balancing force has been presented on the demand side. 
Fine (2000c), in his paper “ Wither the welfare state: public versus private consumption” , 
attempted to redress this imbalance. Whilst succeeding in demonstrating the conceptual 
poverty of approaches based on methodological individualism, he was unable to propose an 
alternative.209 Nevertheless, Fine does point out that an understanding of public consumption 
must be developed with reference to an understanding of the political economy of capitalism: 
“ Consequently, it is necessary to provide for a political economy of capitalism, including 
attention to its underlying structures, processes and tendencies, and how these are reproduced 
and transformed.” Such a project is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the “problem of pricing” being addressed in this thesis is largely in the context of provision of
208 Arrow (1997) m ade this point, citing the experience of education services in New York City. Ostrom’s 
reply w as that the corruption originated from the "other people’s  money” syndrome and that the only way 
to counter to this w as to apply the principle of fiscal equivalence. This reinforces the equity criticism of 
Ostrom’s theory. It is important to note that the World Bank’s  advocacy of decentralisation is premised 
on the assumption that this will lead to reduced levels of corruption (World Bank, 1999). This has 
certainly not been the case  in Uganda where the decentralisation of w ater services to local government 
has proved disastrous (field visit, Uganda, 1999).
209 “In addressing public consumption, the paper has shifted to a critical overview of a  number of 
approaches to the welfare state, but without providing an alternative” (Fine, 2000c).
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water through large-scale piped systems in cities to poor households in so-called developing 
countries serves to illustrate the point. This is a far cry from Schama’s “ fountains of ancient 
Rome ... building civic culture [and] creating a sense of civic belonging and responsibility” , 
albeit an idealised vision (1995: 288).
Implications of institutional economics for water pricing
Institutional economics points out that the market is just one of an array of institutions which 
affect the structure of demand and the outcome of economic transactions. Fundamental 
changes in institutions, and in particular the balance of power between institutions or 
economic interests, may significantly affect the pattern of demand and economic outcomes. 
Therefore an analysis that ignores the institutional structures underlying and affecting markets 
is incomplete.
Pricing rules typically will be a function of the institutional and ownership form. In particular, 
there is likely to be a difference in the pricing rules adopted by publicly-owned, privately- 
owned, privately-owned-regulated and privately-owned-franchised water utilities. The former 
are more likely to pursue an array of objectives in their pricing strategies (hence pricing rules 
are likely to be heterodox). The latter are likely to have won the contract on the basis of an 
agreed projection of the average cost of water supply and will typically (though not 
necessarily) pursue average historical cost pricing. Pricing rules for regulated water utilities 
will depend on the nature of the regulation.
Economic theory does not prove that privatised water utilities (either directly regulated or 
regulated in conjunction with franchise bidding for entry) are necessarily more efficient than 
publicly-owned water services providers. This is essentially an empirical matter on which the 
evidence is mixed.
If it is accepted that equity issues are important in the urban water sector, and it would be 
hard to argue against such a position (see Chapter 5), then it can be shown that no universal 
theoretical prescription for an “ optimal” pricing rule exists. This means that pricing policy 
must be grounded in an understanding of the specific and historical political-economic context.
The existing institutional and ownership forms are not primarily a product of efficiency 
considerations as asserted by Williamson. Institutional economics is not able adequately to 
explain how (and why) these institutional and ownership forms evolve over time.
Although institutional economics provides valid and useful criticisms of neo-classical 
economics, it does not go far enough. It fails to examine the underlying political-economic 
context to any significant extent. The influence of the political-economic context on the
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market structure, and consequently on water pricing, is illustrated in the next section. The 
argument is that urban water pricing cannot be understood without a political-economic 
analysis of the historical experience of specific cities.
4. The political economy of water pricing
Political economy vis-a-vis the politics of water pricing
It is obvious that water allocation and pricing are political.210 There are often significant 
benefits to be gained by certain classes (or specific interest groups within classes) through the 
development and control of water resources and the accompanying water projects.211 
Furthermore, it is hard to divorce water from its strong cultural and social affinities. Abu- 
Zeid, President of the World Water Council notes: “The cultural and socio-economic values 
o f water are still a very elusive subject. The importance of one or the other will vary from one 
society to another and from time to time, depending on specific historical background, cultural 
heritage, extent of fresh water availability and the socio-economic conditions of the concerned 
region” (Abu-Zeid, 1998, own emphasis).212
Classic case-studies used for discussions on the politics of water allocation and pricing include 
the following:213 the Middle-East -  the allocation of scarce water resources between Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine;214 the Nile River basin -  the building of the high Aswan Dam; 
and disputes over water rights between the riparian nations, especially between Egypt, Sudan
210 The words “rival” and “river” com e from the sam e Latin root “r/Vus"; a rival w as a person sharing the 
sam e river (Biswas, 1993). Wittfogel (1957) asserted  that every society is based on hydropolitics. His 
thesis that oriental despotism w as based on the control of irrigation system s has since been disproved. 
Nevertheless the broader point he w as making, namely the importance of the linkages between state, 
class and society, and access  to water resources, still stands. The history of political conflict over water 
is very long. S ee, for example, Hatami and Gleick (1993).
211 Singh, for example, concludes that “it has been shown that state policies in irrigation over time have 
been framed to m eet the requirements of specific interests. These have ranged from the need for 
expansion and consolidation of empires, the interests of the upper ca ste s  and the landed, the colonial 
revenue and allied requirements, and in post independence India the needs of the landed, educated 
elites like the engineers and bureaucrats, the politicians, contractors and industrialists.... The nature of 
irrigation development has discriminated against certain social groups, a s  well a s  those who have not 
been able to m anoeuvre sta te  policies to their advantage, or lost out in the competition for the pursuit of 
state power and p a tro n a g e .... Localised struggles against large dam s, and in pursuit of sustainable and 
equitable development, have the potential of redrawing the social relations in the Indian countryside” 
(1997:239).
212 Cultural and social values, except to the extent that they translate into individual utility (and by 
extension, economic dem and and willingness to pay), do not carry any weight in neo-classical 
economics. (See Chapter 3.)
213 For general overviews, se e  De Villiers (1999), Elhance (1999), Ohisson (1995) and Postel (1997).
214 S ee, for example, Hillel (1994), Lindholm (1995), Starr and Stoll (1988), Sherm an (1999), Lowi (1993), 
and Allan and Court (1996).
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and Ethiopia;215 the Aral Sea -  the “greatest man-caused ecological catastrophe our planet has 
yet seen” (De Villiers, 1999: 130) ;216 the Indian sub-continent: the sharing of the Indus River 
between India and Pakistan, the sharing of the Ganges River between Nepal, India and 
Bangladesh and disputes between states in India;217 south-east Asia: the sharing of the waters 
from the Mekong River between China, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam;218 China: 
the damming of the Yangt’ze River;219 United-States: groundwater mining in the south­
western United States; the sharing of water from the Colorado River; the pricing of water to 
agriculture and to cities in California; the water disputes between the United States and 
Mexico; and the export of water from Canada to the United States;220 and, Chile: water 
markets.221
These studies are mentioned because they all have relevance to urban water pricing.222 The 
studies are generally strong on the politics of water supply, but weak with respect to political- 
economic analysis. Some of the literature emphasises the potential for military conflict over 
water resources though these writings can be criticised for being alarmist.223 The political 
economy studies that do exist, relate to the political economy of large dams, irrigation, rural
215 See, for example, Waterbury (1979), Hultin (1995) and Collins (1990).
216 See, for example, Postei (1997).
217 See, for example, Corell and Swain (1995), Upreti (1993), Saiman and Uprety (2000), Wood (1999) and 
Crow e t al (1995).
218 See, for example, Ojendai (1995) and Bakker (1999).
219 S ee, for example, De Villiers (1999), Brown (1995), Jackson and Sleigh (2000).
220 Reisner (1986) leads the genre with a classic account of water politics in the United States: Martin et al
(1984) provides a case-study of surface and ground water pricing in Tucson, Arizona; Gottlieb (1988) 
gives an account of the w ater cartels in California. The Council of Canadians, who have identified the 
export of water to the United S tates a s  a campaign issue, requested a legal opinion from the W est Coast 
Environmental Law Association as to the status of water as a  commodity under NAFTA and WTO rules. 
They concluded that water could be construed as a  commodity under NAFTA and WTO trade rules with 
potentially significant third-party consequences for Canada.
221 S ee  Bauer (1998), w hose analysis shows the following: that the functioning and outcom es of water 
markets in Chile are heav'V influenced by the underlying political-economic structures; that the 
distributional consequences of water markets have been inequitable, favouring those with access to 
capital resources and hurting poor peasant farmers; that the benefits of w ater m arkets have often been 
exaggerated seemingly for ideological purposes; that transaction costs are high and externalities are 
pervasive, requiring extensive mediation in the market. On the basis of his analysis, Bauer cautions 
against undue faith in markets and argues for “moderation over faith in theory” (1998: 9).
222 Evidence of the strong and increasing linkages between water use for cities, agriculture and the 
environment w as presented in Chapter 1. S ee Postei (1999).
223 For example, in De Villiers’ “Water Wars" (1999), the title proclaims this potential loudly, but the 
em phasis may be more of a  marketing device on the part of the publisher b ecause the text puts forward 
a more m oderate view. Som e assert that views emphasising the potential for conflict (for example, 
Eihance: 1999) are overly pessimistic. Wolf (1998) states that “the more valuable lesson of international 
water is as  a resource w hose characteristics tend to induce co-operation and incite violence only in the 
exception" and Priscoli, editor of Water Policy, writes that “water is far more humanity's learning ground 
for building community than it is a  cause  of war” and further that the “history of social organisation 
around river basins and w atersheds is humanity's richest record of our dialogue with nature ... it is 
among the m ost fertile areas of learning how the political and technical interact” (Priscoli, 1998).
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development and water markets.224 Studies specifically focussing on the political economy of 
urban water pricing are rare.225
A recent World Bank conference entitled “The political economy of water pricing” was 
dominated by neo-classical economists and failed to get to grips with the historical power 
struggles and how these fundamentally influence water pricing practices.226 In fact, there 
appears to be a redefinition of the meaning of political economy with the term referring to the 
“difficulties of designing and implementing ‘optimal’ pricing reforms” , where optimal refers 
to Pareto-efficiency.227
In the following section, the pricing of water in Los Angeles is evaluated with reference to the 
specific and historical political-economic conditions and processes influencing the 
development and management of water supply. On the basis of this analysis, and with 
reference to experiences in other cities, including examples in South Africa and Uganda, 
conclusions are made with respect to the validity and importance of this type of analysis for a 
thorough understanding of urban water pricing.
The political economy of water pricing in Los Angeles
Space does not allow a full examination of the political economy of water pricing in Los 
Angeles. Nor is this necessary, for the purpose of this section is to illustrate what such an 
analysis might look like and the kind of conclusions that can be drawn from such an analysis.
The political-economic analysis commences with the early establishment of Los Angeles as a 
Spanish community in 1781. Key episodes in the history of the development and management 
of the water supply system are highlighted and analysed from a political-economic 
perspective. The influence of this history on contemporary arrangements and practices is 
demonstrated. Some conclusions, specific to Los Angeles, are drawn.228.
224 S ee  Singh (1997), Okwudili (1983), Ribeiro (1994) and Bauer (1998).
225 S ee  Ostrom (1953) who analyses power relations in the history of w ater supply development in Los 
Angeles, Bennett (1995), who examined the politics of protest in Monterey (Mexico), and Watson (1992), 
who studied the impact that social movements in the favelas in S ao Paulo had on w ater services 
provision.
226 S ee  Dinar (2000).
227 See, for example, Dinar (2000). Professor Michael Nelson, chairing a workshop on political theory and 
policy analysis, m ade the following remark: “When you look up political economy in the dictionary it says 
something like the following: 'economics in the policy making p ro c e ss '". This is clearly a facile 
understanding of political economy.
228 A brief historical overview of som e key events in the history of water supply to Los Angeles is given in 
Eberhard (1999b).
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Communal water rights -  a decisive early advantage
The Spanish pueblo system of communal water rights played a significant role in giving the 
Los Angeles community a “kick-start” . Ostrom comments:
In no other phase o f  modem life has the impact o f the Spanish origin o f Los 
Angeles been so great as in the establishment o f  the general policy o f  
community control o f  water resources. From the Spanish pueblo rights Los 
Angeles derived prior claim to the waters o f the Los Angeles River and thus 
secured a vital advantage in forging ahead to pre-eminence in southern 
California. The Spanish tradition o f communal enterprise provided, in part, 
the foundation o f  the later institutional pattern fo r  the administration o f water 
resources. (Ostrom, 1953: 27)
Los Angeles was the second civil pueblo to be organised in the Spanish domain that now
constitutes the State of California. Explicit rules were developed for governing water
distribution over and above the provisions declaring water to be subject to the common use of
the pobladores (citizens granted title to the use -  rather than ownership -  of parcels of land in
the pueblo , with the title being subject to strict obligations). The City of Los Angeles later
used these pueblo water rights to eliminate competition for the use of water from the Los
Angeles River water supply (including underground water). The resulting monopoly of the
rights to the basin’s water resources enabled the city to prevent competition by other
communities and individual farmers and thus to concentrate economic growth (comprising
industry, commerce and irrigated agriculture) within the city boundary (Ostrom, 1953: 232).
Origins of the powerful Department of Water and Power
Notwithstanding the communal origin of water supply, private enterprise was given a hand in 
the development of the first piped water supply and distribution system. It can be stated 
unequivocally that they botched it.229 The two primary effects of this unhappy episode were an 
insertion in the City Charter that severely proscribed the possibility of private management in 
the future and the limitation of direct political interference in the management of the water 
agency. Kahrl (1982) describes this latter development as follows:
Development o f  the city’s [new] system had to wait, however, until a method 
could be devised to ensure that management o f the water supply would be fully  
protected from political interference o f any kind. ... [The previous 
arrangement had] left the management o f  the system almost entirely exposed to 
the changing whims o f the electorate [and] was immediately discarded. In its 
place, the city charter was amended to establish a newly constituted Board o f  
Commissioners which would be almost entirely insulated from political 
considerations or public pressure.
229 The events leading to the transfer of the m anagem ent of water supply from private enterprise to public 
m anagem ent are described in Eberhard (1999b).
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The charter provisions adopted in January 1903 created a five-member board, 
none of whom would ever have to stand for popular election ... [but were] 
appointed by the mayor. ... [and whose] control o f  the finances o f  the city’s 
water [was] almost autonomous. ... [TJhese essential aspects o f the 
commission’s powers have never been eroded. And so its ability to pursue 
policies o f its own making without reference to popular reaction or the
concerns o f  elected officials, has been protected. (Kahrl, 1982: 17f  own
emphasis)
Kahrl may have overstated the case for autonomy because, in practice, approval for all large 
projects has to be obtained directly from the electorate through the necessary bond elections. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the Commissioners and the Department of Water and Power came 
to wield enormous power and influence as evidenced by the fact that it remains the largest and 
most influential municipal water agency in the United States to this day.
Water and the politics of power: the case of Owens Valley
When, in 1905, water demand exceeded the total supply available, the city was able to secure 
the necessary funds and general political support to develop a new supply of water from the 
Owens River to meet its needs. The availability of “excess” water from the expropriation of 
water in the Owens Valley enabled the city, in turn, “ to expand its territorial limits, to
reclaim the San Fernando Valley and to inaugurate a new era of urban growth and
development” (Ostrom, 1953: 232).
The potential of the Owens Valley to supply water to Los Angeles was discovered in 1890 by 
Frederick Eaton, a prominent local engineer.230 Mulholland, the superintendent of the Los 
Angeles City Water Department, revealed the plan to a delegation of city officials in 1905. 
The city officials approved the plan enthusiastically and supported the proposal that Fred 
Eaton make preliminary arrangements to acquire the necessary land and water rights. It is 
apparent that, right from the start, there was a double agenda: “ Eaton, who had plans to 
convert his vision into a fortune, had already taken steps to acquire water rights on the Owens 
River. ... Using the subterfuge that he was trying to develop large cattle holdings in the 
Valley, Eaton purchased and turned over to the city 22 670 acres of land in Owens Valley 
with all appurtenant water rights” (Ostrom, 1953: 13).
When it came to light that a syndicate linked to the Owens Valley project had purchased large 
tracts of land in the San Fernando Valley and made a profit of one thousand per cent, 
Harriman, a socialist candidate in the municipal elections in 1907, made the “ water plot” one 
of the central issues of his campaign, with the following allegation:
230 Eaton had, on previous non-concurrent occasions, served a s  superintendent of the Los Angeles W ater 
Company, the city engineer of Los Angeles and major of Los Angeles (Ostrom, 1953:11).
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Big business, realising the wonderful possibilities o f  profit to be made in 
exploiting land and water in the vicinity o f Los Angeles, conceives a gigantic 
plan and starts to carry it out with official aid. This plan involved the gobbling 
up o f  all available lands in and near the San Fernando Valley (about 100 000 
acres); the securing o f  the Owens River water to irrigate these lands, by first 
creating a fake water famine and frightening people into building an aqueduct, 
ostensibly to increase the city ’s water supply, but in reality to irrigate these 
lands thereby putting about $50 million profit into the corporation’s pockets, 
while the city gets none o f the aqueduct water. Brand, agent fo r  the interests, 
secured options on large holdings in San Fernando Valley; Eaton goes to 
Owens Valley and buys the water rights; and Mulholland prepares the minds 
o f the people with his reports o f a “water shortage” when there is abundance.
(Ostrom, 1953:56)
These allegations gave rise to a rushed investigation whose findings were inconclusive and 
ambiguous: “had this board had the necessary time to develop all facts along lines suggested 
by individuals, a knowledge of human nature indicates that men would have been found who 
had succumbed to temptation” (Ostrom, 1953: 58). The investigation itself was fraught with 
intrigue related to such fundamental issues as the composition of the board (Hoffman, 1981). 
City residents were divided over the findings of the commission though only a minority 
continued actively to oppose the water bureau.
The actions of the bureau in the Owens Valley caused significant hardship, suspicion and 
mistrust amongst residents of the Valley. This commenced with Eaton’s subterfuge pertaining 
to the initial land purchases in the Valley and was intensified in 1923 during a drought when 
the bureau purchased more land and water rights in the Valley:
Beginning in 1923, the water bureau plunged into the bitterest struggle in its 
history. ...
Owen Valley interests organised into pools to secure the greatest bargaining 
advantages and demanded that the city buy on their terms. The city bought 
whatever rights it could until it had exhausted the water bearing lands not 
committed to the pools detmnding excessive prices. The stalemate in 
bargaining was accompanied by a deluge o f protest against the department’s 
purchasing methods and relations with the people o f  Owens Valley 
[deteriorated]. Valley leaders came to the city to protest to civic groups and 
public officials. Demands that the city buy all o f  the ranches grew to include 
demands fo r  the purchase o f all the town properties as well, and to pay 
reparations fo r  intangible damages done to the prosperity o f business 
enterprise and to the economic livelihood o f  the town residents and 
agricultural labourers. (Ostrom, 1953: 62)
Mulholland, the head of the Water Bureau, refused to entertain these demands, believing the 
Owens Valley leaders lacked integrity and moral responsibility. In the face of this 
intransigence, the campaign became violent. The diversion works were commandeered and
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the aqueduct and some city wells were dynamited.231 Although the Los Angeles Record as a 
result of these disturbances vilified Mulholland, the overall influence of this campaign on 
municipal politics was fairly small. The appropriation of water rights from the residents of 
Owens Valley nevertheless had broader and longer-term consequences.
The portents of a power struggle over water in the western part of the USA were already seen 
in 1879.232 However, what was not foreseen was the strength of the urban areas to compete 
for this water and to be able to expropriate this water as a result of the dynamic accumulation 
of wealth.
The appropriation of the Owens River water was only a (small) part of a much more 
significant and fundamental process occurring in Los Angeles, namely, the dynamic 
accumulation of capital. The continued accumulation of wealth was threatened by the lack of 
water. The prior accumulation of capital by the city arising from the pueblo enabled the city 
to expropriate the water from the Owens Valley. The windfall gains made by key actors in the 
process are part of the same process of capital accumulation.233 Even though from a (static) 
resource allocation efficiency point of view it would have been more efficient to use the 
Owens Valley water to irrigate land in the Owens Valley rather than transport that same water 
at great cost to irrigate land in the San Fernando Valley, the capital accumulation that had 
already occurred in Los Angeles facilitated the further transfer of resources from peripheral 
areas to the centre. The fundamental driving force of the whole process was capital 
accumulation; resource “efficiency” issues were peripheral to this process.
It is probably true that long-run marginal-cost pricing would have delayed the implementation 
the of the Owens Valley scheme (though not necessarily true that this would have resulted in 
greater overall resource allocation efficiency).234 It is almost certainly true that if marginal- 
cost pricing had been implemented, irrigation in the San Fernando Valley would not have 
been economic with the consequence that the Owens Valley water would have been much 
more expensive than otherwise. This undoubtedly would also have hindered the development
231 The commandeering of the works enabled water to be diverted from the aqueduct and to flow down to 
Lake Owen. In addition to the dam age caused by withholding w ater from Los Angeles, the act was of 
symbolic importance because the building of the aqueduct had caused Lake Owen to dry up.
232 “Lands have no value without water. If the w ater rights fall into the hands of irrigating companies and 
the lands into individual farmers, the farmers will then be dependent on the stock com panies, and 
eventually the monopoly of water rights will be an intolerable burden on the people" (Powell, 1879, 
“Reports on the arid regions of the United States" in Ostrom, 1953: 229).
233 Just a s  the City w as in a privileged position to gain from the appropriation of the Owens Valley water (it 
could both afford it and w as in a  strong negotiating position) so  were the key actors. Eaton had the right 
connections and experience to be able to obtain prior knowledge of the schem e and access to capital to 
be able to purchase land before the impending price increases arising from greater demand.
234 S ee Chapter 3.
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of industry. Both effects (inhibited agricultural development and reduced industrial 
development) would have retarded the dynamic accumulation of capital in Los Angeles.235 Of 
course, it is not possible to spell out what the growth path of Los Angeles would have been 
were the Owens project to have been significantly delayed. Other centres on the west coast, in 
particular San Diego and San Francisco, were competing for the scarce capital resources 
necessary for development. Their development lagged behind Los Angeles which remains to 
this day the most important economic centre on the west coast.
The political economy of current day water pricing in Los Angeles
The pattern of current day water pricing in Los Angeles reflects, to some extent at least, past 
experiences. Los Angeles’ Department of Water and Power and the Metropolitan Water Board 
still have enormous power and influence, a legacy of decisions made early in the twentieth 
century. Although the tariff structure has changed over time, some of its characteristics appear 
to be relics of the past and the city is clearly resistant to moves towards marginal-cost pricing, 
or pricing approaches which support the “ sustainable development” orientation of 
environmental economists, such as conservation pricing and water markets.236
Recent events, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, portend a replay of the Owens Valley 
saga early this century and further confirmation of the predictions made by Powell in 1879 
(quoted above):
A few  years ago, the Basses, with a $7 billion empire in oil and real estate, 
raised a few  eyebrows when they began quietly buying up $80 million in 
irrigated farm  land in the sprawling Imperial Valley south and east o f [Los 
Angeles]. They were going to raise cattle. But it became clear, soon enough, 
that the Basses' real interest was in the perpetual federal water rights 
conferred with the 40,000 acres they acquired. Seen as a long-term arbitrage 
play, the strategy goes something like this: Eventually, water supplies fo r  this 
area o f vast urban sprawl and water-hogging agriculture [that is, southern 
California] will grow tight; those with the water, and the right to sell any 
surplus, stand to make megabucks. (Wall Street Journal, 1997)
The Metropolitan Water District, in an interesting role reversal, accuses the Bass of being
“profiteers trying to create a ‘water cartel’ in hopes of making a huge fortune on a resource
delivered to them essentially for free” (Wall Street Journal, 1997). On the other hand, the
billionaire Bass brothers are saying that the Metropolitan Water District, one of the world’s
biggest utilities, is “ a monopolist” and a “ water thief” (Wall Street Journal, 1997).
235 The growth of Los Angeles was significantly boosted by industrial developm ent during the 1920s and 
1930s fuelled by oil and the "explosion" of the car industry. See, for example, Marchand (1986),
236 Present day pricing structures are described in Eberhard (1999b).
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Wodraska, the general manager of the MWD, warned: “This is going to get nasty” (Wall 
Street Journal, 1997).237
This brief account illustrates the enormous potential for power-play and arbitrage in the area 
of water rights and the fact that the economics of water markets cannot be examined outside of 
an analysis of the political economy of who has acquired access to water rights and how this 
will influence possible and likely outcomes.
Implications of political economy analysis for pricing methodology
The principle points emanating from this case study of water pricing in Los Angeles are 
summarised below:
Political economy and Owens Valley. The expansion of Los Angeles into a world-class 
metropolis was, to a significant extent, based on the abundant availability of cheap water. This 
water was obtained by the construction of a massive water project (by the standards of the 
day) and the expropriation of water rights from the Owens Valley early this century. The 
implementation of Average Incremental Cost (AIC) pricing would have made this water 
prohibitively expensive, particularly in the crucial early period. The prior accumulation of 
wealth in Los Angeles (arising from a combination of fortuitous factors including its initial 
endowment of good local water resources) enabled the well-connected City bureaucrats to out- 
compete and politically out-manoeuvre rural residents in the Owens Valley. The effect was to 
concentrate wealth which had serious equity consequences. Belated political legislative 
intervention has sought to ameliorate the negative equity consequences and ensure that such 
events are not repeated. However, the advantages of the Owens Valley water supply to Los 
Angeles continue today largely unabated.238
Political economy and Im perial Valley. The Owens Valley saga has a potential latter day 
counterpart. The increasing disjuncture between the cost of developing new urban water 
supplies and the low price of agricultural water in California (which is heavily subsidised) in 
the context of privatised water rights creates conditions for arbitrage and windfall profits with
237 De Villiers reports that “the deal floundered when [the Basses] discovered that the [irrigation] authority 
owned the water rights, not the farm ers” (1999: 274). The irrigation authority decided to play the gam e 
itself and the Bass brothers sold the land and bought interests in United S tates Filter Corporation, the 
world’s  largest water treatm ent company (Postei, 1999:111).
238 W ater in Los Angeles is much cheaper compared to San Diego and other large coastal cities in 
southern California. As a result of Los Angeles' exclusive access to Owens Valley water resource (the 
capital cost of which is now fully paid for), the city is much less reliant on more expensive alternatives 
available through the Metropolitan W ater Board.
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negative equity consequences. The actions of the Bass brothers in the Imperial Valley lend 
weight to such a contention.239
M arginal-cost pricing. Throughout the history of water supply development in Los Angeles 
there has been a general and strong (largely political) resistance to marginal-cost pricing. 
Greater water scarcity and ever increasing marginal costs of supply augmentation have forced 
water utilities, in some instances, to implement selective forms of marginal-cost pricing in 
recent years. These new structures place higher prices on peak summer usage, require new 
developments to pay the full incremental costs of water supply augmentation necessary to 
support the new development, and penalise “ excessive” domestic use by charging the 
marginal cost of supply through a two-tier pricing system. However, the MWD backed away 
from its implementation of the new development charge and defended its basic premise of 
historic average cost pricing as follows:
Economists argue that setting the price o f  a product equal to its long-run 
marginal cost will lead to efficient allocation o f resources. Unfortunately, 
there are a number o f issues associated with such pricing methodologies in the 
water industry. First, calculation and estimation o f long-run marginal cost is 
inexact. Second, as a wholesaler facing significant hydrologic variances that 
alter available supply and short-run cost, setting the price at the long-run 
marginal cost can result in two unintended consequences -  excess supplies and 
excess revenues. Both o f these consequences can be moderated through 
scaling and other rate designs, but these adjustments lead to changes in the 
price signal. A t Metropolitan, we utilise traditional embedded cost rate 
making standards to set our basic rate which produces 65-70% o f our 
revenues and use short-run marginal cost methods to set our seasonal rates.
(Thomas, personal communication, 1998)
It is clear from this that both the interpretation and implementation of marginal-cost pricing is 
influenced by the political-economic context.240
Equity and retail tariffs. Although efforts have been made by Los Angeles to implement a 
retail tariff structure that protects low-income households from high water bills, this reform 
could not implemented without introducing significant concessions for the middle class which 
was able to exert a degree of pressure and influence on the pricing system that is 
disproportionate to its numbers.241
239 Of course, the extensive subsidisation of wealthy irrigation farmers in the Central Valley, for example, 
can also be explained with reference to a  political-economic analysis. See, for example, Reisner (1986).
240 R esistance on the part of property developers to the new development charges w as significant 
(Wodraska, 1998: personal communication). Property developers have also successfully influenced 
pricing reforms in Tucson, Arizona, S ee Martin e ta l  (1984).
241 S ee the detailed account given in Eberhard (1999b).
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Equity and w ater rights. The privatisation of water rights and the marketability of these 
rights, whilst potentially increasing total “ value added” per unit of water use (by reallocating 
use from less productive to more productive uses) carries with it the significant risk of 
increasing inequality. The experience of Owens Valley is testimony to this. This risk still 
exists today as is evidenced by the possible arbitrage play by the wealthy and powerful Bass 
brothers. The nature of these risks and the likelihood of their materialising are dependent on 
the political-economic context.
Resource sustainability. Historically, pricing has not been effective in ensuring resource 
sustainability in Los Angeles and California. Although recent changes to pricing structures 
and levels are likely to dampen demand, it is nevertheless unlikely that this, on its own, will 
ensure resource sustainability. Continued reliance on political and legislative intervention will 
be necessary which again underpins the importance of the political-economic context within 
which such legislative and political interventions take place.
A further conclusion to be drawn from this review and analysis of the political economy of 
water pricing is that, in practice, actual pricing structures and levels are always more likely to 
reflect the political-economic context than obey neo-classical pricing rules.
Why political economy matters -  some further illustrations
The influence of the political economy on water development and pricing is not unique to Los 
Angeles. Reference can be made to a number of other cities where studies show the 
importance of a political-economic analysis.242 Detailed conclusions pertaining to the influence 
of political economy on the market structure, pricing practices and outcomes will necessarily 
be specific to each city examined. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a number of points that 
have broader applicability.
The discussion proceeds with the following key questions in mind: What institutional patterns 
exist in the urban water sector? Through what processes have these institutional structures 
come into being? What consequences have these processes had for the distribution of 
outcomes?
Los Angeles and Tucson: examples of local government democratic pricing
Urban water pricing decisions are largely decentralised to the local (city) level in the United
States. (This is also a common practice in most developed and some developing countries.) In 
Tucson and Los Angeles, locally elected politicians make policies and final decisions on
242 S ee  Eberhard (1999ab).
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tariffs. The state or federal government imposes some outside constraints. For example, cities 
in California are required to prepare five-yearly urban water management plans, cities in 
Arizona are required to demonstrate sustainable water resource planning and use, and all cities 
in the United States must comply with various federal water quality and environmental 
provisions.
The power of citizens to influence water pricing is demonstrated in the cases of Los Angeles 
and Tucson. Powerful minority constituencies in each city have influenced tariff reform. The 
influence of business interests in general, and property developers in particular, on the tariff 
structure is readily apparent. Business tariffs have been consistently lower than domestic 
tariffs in these two cities historically although the gap has narrowed more recently. Low- 
income residents are catered for through the provision of a small free allocation of water in 
Tucson (though a fixed monthly connection fee is payable) and a direct monthly credit in Los 
Angeles. Median usage in Los Angeles is 40 kl/month and, considering the overall level of 
wealth, the credit of $5 that is equivalent to 8 kl per month is not generous but can 
nevertheless enable a household to get by without compromising health.243 The price of water 
for “ reasonable use” (variously defined in each city) has been kept at or below the historic 
cost figures.244 The tariff reforms appear not to have disadvantaged low-income families and 
have, overall, shifted costs to larger consumers of water despite the resistance on the part of 
larger consumers.
The experiences of Tucson and Los Angeles show that within a context of decentralised local 
level water management in which pricing decisions are made by locally elected political 
representatives, with increasing pressure being placed on the water resource, and in the 
context of a developed economy with universal access to in-house metered water, it is 
politically feasible to implement a full cost recovery (revenue neutral) progressive rising block 
pricing with high marginal tariffs which have the dual benefit of increasing incentives to use 
water prudently and catering for affordability constraints (through life-line tariffs for low 
levels of consumption or direct credits).
Botswana: a public water utility model
In Botswana, the public water utility was established with the dual mandate of universal access 
and financial autonomy (with the exception of government payment for provision of standpipe 
water to unserved areas). Beyond the broad mandate (derived politically through the
243 An innovation in Los Angeles is the extension of the water credit to households living in apartments 
(who typically do not have individual meters and who were previously excluded from the benefit) by 
adding it as a credit on the electricity bill.
244 In Los Angeles, the definition of “reasonable use" is particularly complex and arguably weighted in 
favour of owners of larger properties (ergo wealthier households).
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democratically elected parliament), utility management is essentially depoliticised. The water 
utility has managerial autonomy, being accountable to the defined mandate and not directly to 
political representatives. The utility has operated on a commercial basis and has implemented 
tariffs that aim to meet three objectives: full recovery of costs, affordability for basic 
requirements (life-line tariffs) and wastage reduction through providing incentives to conserve 
water (high marginal tariffs for higher consumption levels). The implementation of the last 
objective has not been popular, particularly amongst businesses, and consequently is under 
threat of revision (the tariff structure is applied equally to domestic and non-domestic uses). 
The effective and financially viable agency appears to have been able to implement tariffs that 
benefit most consumers (basic use is subsidised, reasonable use is moderately priced, services 
are reliable and service coverage is high in urban areas).
The Botswana water utility appears to have been able to avoid middle-class subsidy capture.245 
The effectiveness of the utility is somewhat of an exception when compared to many public 
water utilities in developing countries.246 This may be attributed to various factors: the relative 
economic strength of the country, especially the fiscal strength of all state institutions because 
of diamond revenues, a particular experience of colonialism, the country’s geo-political 
location close to a very much more developed economy, and a strong public service ethic 
within the civil service.247 However, a full understanding of the factors contributing to the 
success of the Botswana water utility would require a more detailed political-economic 
analysis.
Jakarta: historical legacies and political patronage
Jakarta is a city of contrasts, with a small central beautiful area originally developed during 
the Dutch colonial area which absorbs a disproportionate share of public expenditure and a 
large periphery consisting largely of slums with a severe lack of basic infrastructure. This 
pattern of development is a legacy of Dutch colonisation when expenditure in (then) Batavia 
was focused in the areas where the European colonisers lived:
245 The World Bank asserts  that “price subsidies to infrastructure almost always benefit the rich 
disproportionately. In developing countries, the poor rely on private vendors or public standpipes rather 
than private connections for water supply and they are infrequently served by sew erage system s” (World 
Bank, 1994: 81). S ee  Stigler (1970).
246 Public utilities in developing countries are often characterised by the absence of clear m andates, 
political interference in the day-to-day m anagem ent of the utility, poor perform ance and dependence on 
government for subsidies. S ee, for example, World Bank (1994). This is also the case  in Uganda (field 
visit, Uganda, 1999).
247 Botswana is one of just a  handful of “upper middle-income" econom ies in Africa (World Bank, 1999).
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Every budget was weighted in favour o f European interests in the city. Most o f  
the biggest items, such as road building and maintenance, street-lighting, 
drinking water provision, and payment o f  municipal personnel were items o f 
expenditure largely on behalf o f Europeans, since they were the ones who 
lived along and used roads most; street-lighting and drinking water were 
largely restricted to these areas. (Abeyasekere, 1987)
Indonesian independence did not significantly shift this original bias. President Sukarno’s 
desire to create national symbols appears to have been a greater priority than improving basic 
infrastructure:
Man does not live by bread alone. Although Jakarta’s alleys are muddy and 
we lack roads, I  have erected a brick and glass apartment building, a clover- 
leaf bridge, and our superhighway. I  consider money fo r  material symbols 
well spent. I  must make Indonesians proud o f themselves. They have cringed 
too long. (Sukarno, quoted in Porter, 1996).
Furthermore, the independent government wished to slow the growth of large cities, making 
this a policy priority during its first 15 years in power and banning migration into the city. 
The government feared that investment in urban areas would exacerbate in-migration and 
hence deliberately allowed conditions in the city to deteriorate (Porter, 1996). Although a 
“village improvement programme” was initiated in 1969, the focus was on roads and not on 
basic water supply and sanitation (Abeyasekere, 1987). Efforts to stem the growth of Jakarta 
were futile.248
The water supply infrastructure was not expanded adequately to cope with rapid population 
growth. Porter quotes the following account of typical conditions in those parts of the city 
without infrastructure (the greater proportion of the city):
The disposal o f  human waste created problems. The community built toilets 
put over the Cideng River. They were at least tolerably efficient when the river 
flowed but they were a disaster in the dry season or when the river was in 
flood. The river had long been too polluted to drink. [WJells were dug but 
their water became too contaminated fo r  consumption. It could still be used
fo r  washing though one had to queue fo r  quite some time to obtain a supply.
Drinking water became a precious and expensive commodity. It was 
distributed by traders who carted it in metal containers suspended from  a pole 
slung over their shoulder. ... [Poor families in central Jakarta] spend up to 
5% o f their incomes to buy a meagre eight litres o f  water per person per day, 
a minuscule amount. (Jellinek, 1985 in Porter, 1996)
Water services in Jakarta have historically been funded by the central government. The water 
utility has been under-resourced (only 20 percent of households have access to potable piped
water sources) and the system has been subject to patronage and corruption. Evidence of
nepotism was apparent during the privatisation of water services in Jakarta in 1998 when
248 The population quadrupled from 1.8 million to 6.5 million people in the period 1950 to 1980 and was 
estimated to be 8.3 million in 1990.
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concessions were granted to Thames Water and Lyonnaise des Eaux.249 It is clear that the 
outcomes of the privatisation process are contingent on the political-economic context which 
also provides the conditions in which corruption and nepotism can take place. A more detailed 
investigation of the processes leading up to privatisation (beyond the scope of this thesis) 
would yield a much richer set of information that would be able to explain how these 
processes came about and the distribution of the outcomes.
Shifting costs onto new development: Tucson and Los Angeles
Both Tucson and Los Angeles made efforts to shift the cost of developing new water supplies 
onto new property developments that were the proximate cause of new (incremental) water 
demand. These pressures were resisted by developers and, in the case of Tucson and the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, the policies were rescinded. The apparent 
“consensus” around the principle that those responsible for the increase in consumption 
should bear the cost of system expansion collapsed when the effects of the implementation of 
the consensus was felt. The debate around the responsibility for system expansion costs raises 
important equity issues. These issues are all the more acute in the context of a developing 
country where the wealthy already have a water supply and a relatively stable demand and 
where the bulk of system expansion is often needed to extend the system to cater for lower- 
income households.250
The political economy of price reform: Tucson and Los Angeles
An analysis of how tariff structures have changed over time in Tucson and Los Angeles is 
instructive as both are “ rich” cities situated in what have become water resource poor areas. 
Both cities originally implemented standard two-part tariffs (fixed monthly fee and constant 
volumetric tariffs). Both subsequently changed their tariff structures to decreasing block tariffs 
favouring large water consumers.251 Plentiful water resources were available to both cities at 
this time.252 The primary motivation for this change was the desire to attract and keep large 
water users (industries) and to promote economic growth.
249 For example, PT Garuda Dipta Swasta, which has a joint venture with Lyonnaise des Eaux of France to 
provide water to the western half of Jakarta, is part-owned by Liem Sioe Liong who is a long-time friend 
of then President Suharto. PT Kekar-Thames Airindo, which has a  joint venture with Tham es Water 
International to provide water to the eastern half of Jakarta, is part-owned by Suharto's eldest son, Sigit 
Harjojudanto (Jakarta Post, 6 February 1998).
250 Such is the ca se  in Jakarta as  noted above. It is also typically in the ca se  in cities in many developing 
countries including South Africa and Uganda.
251 Tucson changed its tariff to this form in 1964, Los Angeles much earlier.
252 A large groundwater aquifer in the ca se  of Tucson and the supplementary w ater from the Colorado 
River Aqueduct in the ca se  of Los Angeles.
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 4: Understanding the market for water Page 121
Los Angeles changed its tariff to a standard two-part tariff in 1977 in response to a significant 
drought; however, prices for industrial water were still lower than domestic water. Tucson 
changed from a declining to a mildly inclining two-block structure in 1974 and to a much 
steeper inclining block tariff in 1976 (the “water furore”).253 This “ radical change” arose 
primarily from a financial crisis stemming from poor planning and fast urban growth rather 
than a shortage of water per se. Since then this tariff structure has essentially been retained 
and become even steeper over time, though commercial industrial prices continued to be 
lower than domestic prices (with a surcharge on peak seasonal consumption rather than 
absolute consumption). Water tariffs in Los Angeles were fundamentally restructured in 1993 
with the implementation of a rising two-block tariff, with the second tier explicitly set at the 
marginal cost of supply. (Industrial and commercial water prices were conceptualised in a 
similar fashion to those of Tucson, that is, a surcharge on peak summer consumption related 
to average winter consumption.) The “ radical” change in pricing structure in Los Angeles 
was precipitated by the 1987-1992 droughts, with water restrictions being implemented in the 
latter part of the drought. In both cities, even though tariffs were structured so as to mute the 
effect on low-income and water-wise domestic consumers, the increased bills among large 
domestic consumers caused such extensive political reactions that tariff structures were 
revised in both cities to accommodate the disaffected wealthy minority constituencies.
Equity effects
A striking feature of the pricing experiences studied is the general absence of a rigorous 
equity analysis, the Los Angeles tariff reform of 1992 being the exception. When Los Angeles 
restructured its tariffs in 1992, considerable attention was paid to the effects on equity. The 
tariff restructuring resulted in consumer tariffs being reduced for 70 percent of domestic
253 The pricing system  followed the conventional approach of cost recovery using a two part tariff (which 
included a  discount on the unit cost of water for monthly consumption greater than 100 kl/month) until 
1974. A mildly increasing block tariff w as introduced in 1974. However, the combination of peak capacity 
constraints and revenue shortfalls prompted the W ater Department to revise its rate structures. The 
proposed changes (initiated by the civil engineering consultants traditionally used by the water 
departm ent during a periodic rate review) coincided with a change in political representation in Council. 
The “New Democrats" had been elected on a generally pro-conservation, pro-“green” and anti- 
“urban sprawl" agenda and had gained control of the council. The new Council supported the proposed 
changes that sought to reallocate costs towards consum ers responsible for the costs and to dampen 
peak sum m er dem and through seasonal and rising block pricing. The new tariffs caused a furore in the 
sum m er of 1976 and led to the recall of the New Democrat councillors. However, the story is more 
complicated than the water issue alone because the New Democrats w ere perceived by the business 
community to be anti-growth and by implication anti-business. There appears to be som e truth in the 
assertion that the water issue w as used (or manipulated) by the business community a s  a m eans of 
removing the New Democrats from office. Support for this view point stem s from the fact that once the 
New Democrats were removed from office the business community (as represented by the Chamber of 
Commerce) wholeheartedly supported essentially the sam e tariff structure that the New Democrats had 
passed . (As an important aside, this point illustrates the fact that the real political motivations for certain 
actions may not be what they are represented to be.) The principles of the new tariff system have 
remained essentially intact since 1976. The difficulties caused by the “radical” change of the pricing
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consumers with costs shifted onto larger (wealthier) consumers (City of Los Angeles, 1992). 
However, the negative outcome for a small minority of relatively wealthy residents in the San 
Fernando Valley resulted in further adjustments to the tariff, reducing consumer bills for 
larger consumers. This was considered to be (or marketed as) an improvement in equity by 
the Citizen Committee that oversaw the tariff review. However, this committee was weighted 
in favour of the San Fernando residents. Using an alternative frame of reference, the equity 
improvement is questionable.
The role of water services and water pricing in capital formation
The study of water development in Los Angeles in the early part of this century suggests that 
water played a key part in the development of Los Angeles as a major industrial and economic 
centre in the United States. The analysis also shows that if marginal-cost pricing had been 
implemented, prohibitive prices could have been an important stumbling block during the 
early capital accumulation process. Key industries (including agriculture) benefited (and 
continue to benefit) from cheap water.
It can be argued that water also played a part in the development of New York as a world- 
class financial centre. Chase Manhattan Bank has its origins in the private Manhattan Water 
Company. The subterfuge around the creation of this company, with its monopoly of the 
water supply and freedom to pursue business interests of its choice, facilitated the growth of 
the Manhattan Bank and gave it an early advantage over its rivals.254 This theme is taken up in 
the concluding chapter.
Understanding the privatisation -  nationalisation -  privatisation cycle
Private enterprise dominated the provision of water services in the late nineteenth century. In
most countries this gave way to the dominance of public sector provision of services from the 
early twentieth century onwards. More recently, private sector involvement in the 
management of water services is increasing.
The World Bank (1999) provides the following explanation: Early experiences with private 
sector investment and management of water services proved unsatisfactory because of 
inadequate regulation. Regulation issues were poorly understood and there were disagreements 
about how the benefits of the public fire-fighting service should be paid for. Disputes between 
the government and private companies were lengthy and costly and resulted in most systems 
being taken over by governments. Governments are inherently inefficient providers and have 
systematically under-priced and under-resourced water services. In Europe, increasing
system  (which w as by all accounts not so radical) resulted in an explicit policy of small incremental 
change (rather than significant change) in water policy and tariffs which remains to this day.
254 The story is well told in Koeppet (2000).
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political pressures to meet more stringent environmental standards, linked with the capping of 
public expenditures,255 have increased the pressures on public water services providers who 
are turning in greater numbers to the private sector to seek private investment. In developing 
countries, public service provision has been particularly inefficient, governments are short of 
capital for investment, and therefore governments are turning to the private sector “ to be their 
saviours” , to increase efficiencies and to provide private capital for investment. Private 
sector involvement is much more likely to be “successful” (that is, to be “ efficient” ) now 
than in the past because the regulatory issues involved are much better understood.
This analysis can be criticised on a number of accounts: It fails to look at these developments 
in the light of capital formation, the key driving force of capitalism; it fails to examine the 
consequences of privatisation in terms of the distribution of outcomes; it fails to recognise the 
positive externalities attached to the provision of piped water and wastewater services, 
arguably a much more important motivation for the public provision of services;256 and it is 
contradictory in its argument that governments will be able to effectively and efficiently 
regulate private enterprise (in the presence of sunk costs, asymmetric information and other 
constraints) yet are unable to manage water services effectively themselves.
Privatisation as ideology
The advocacy of privatisation by agencies such as the World Bank could be understood from 
an ideological perspective. For example, it could be argued that the underlying motivation for 
privatisation is that it allows private capital greater access to the potentially lucrative 
monopoly water market.257 World Bank policy is itself a product of political economy and it 
can be noted that the governance of the World Bank is dominated by the advanced western 
capitalist economies.
The conditions which have enabled private firms much greater (and rapid) access to this 
market in recent years can only be explained adequately with reference to the broader 
political-economic framework. This point is taken up in the concluding chapter. For now, the 
Postefs caution is apt: “ there is ample reason for heightened vigilance [because] given the 
pace at which privatisation is occurring, it seems unlikely that adequate rules and regulations
255 This is tied to the monetary targets related to the common currency.
256 Private com panies failed miserably to provide safe water supplies to the broader urban population. See, 
for example, Blake (1956) and Koeppel (2000).
257 It is interesting to note that the privatisation of wastewater services is seldom advocated. It is unlikely to 
be coincidental that the prospects for profits in this business are much less than is the case for water 
supply.
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are in place in many cases to protect the resource base, ecosystems and the poor” (Postei, 
1997, xxix).258
Institutional memory: the case against privatisation in Los Angeles
The early experience of privatisation in the case of Los Angeles has created an institutional
memory embodied in the City Charter which renders the future privatisation of the service 
highly improbable.259
Privatisation outcomes
What effect will privatisation (through long-term concessions) have on the distribution of 
decision-making and benefits? The exact (short-term) distribution will depend on the specific 
concession contract. In most cases, the contract gives the private company a clear mandate 
and responsibility. The price for the (near-term) future is fixed and guidelines for setting 
prices in the longer-term are set out in the contract. Future uncertainty makes price fixing 
beyond the near-term impossible. However, this flexibility in turn provides the private 
company with the potential to influence future prices and arrangements to its own benefit. 
Thus the key danger of privatisation is not the near-term results (which are likely to be 
positive in most cases) but the longer-term outcomes. How the longer-term works out depends 
very much on the power relationships between the contracting parties (determining the 
likelihood of effective enforcement of regulations). It may be argued that there will be a 
tendency for the distribution of the power in key respects to shift to the company over time 
(through regulatory capture) and that, likewise, this will lead to shift in the distribution of the 
benefits.260 If this argument is correct, then the ultimate consequences of this are likely to be 
the concentration of power, capital and benefits and an increase in inequality.
Responses to significant price increases
The restructuring of tariffs in Tucson and Los Angeles, that had the effect of significantly 
increasing water bills, generated significant consumer opposition, even in the context of 
relative consumer affluence. In the case of Tucson it resulted in a shift to an explicit policy of 
incremental change. In Los Angeles the tariffs were revised to accommodate the disaffected
258 Postei cites the recent privatisations in Buenos Aires, Dakar (Senegal), Casablanca, Mexico City, 
Malaysia and Adelaide (Australia) and notes that som e 30 to 40 more are in progress. She further notes 
that many of these  contracts are being awarded to a handful of giant French and British water 
com panies creating a concentration of power and control inimical to the interests of the poor. Ju st two 
French com panies supply water to over 100 million people (Postei, 1997: xxx).
259 Stated intentions by Republican politicians to privatise water services in Los Angeles have never 
materialised (Wodraska, personal communication, 1998). This is probably largely the result of the 
constitutional provision which requires that privatisation be put before the electorate and be supported 
by a two-thirds majority.
260 Forem an-Peck and Millward note that “the US experience of regulatory capture and/or over-investment 
is clear" (1994: 201).
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wealthy consumers who represented a powerful interest group. These two experiences provide 
salutary (though slightly different) lessons for advocates of radical tariff reform.
Resistance on the part of consumers to large tariff increases is an understandable and natural 
phenomenon. However, the likely consequences of this resistance to tariff reform ought to be 
understood by the tariff reformer. Failure to do this may undermine the objectives of the 
original reform. In Tucson the tariff reform was used as a pretext for certain interest groups to 
achieve essentially unrelated political ends. However, the process generated a lack of trust 
between citizens and elected representatives that were to have longer-term implications.
In both Tucson and Los Angeles the negative response of wealthy consumers to tariff 
increases was underestimated. In both cases, the tariff reform had shifted costs significantly to 
larger wealthier consumers. In both instances, wealthy consumers succeeded in having the 
primary negative effect of the tariff (increased bills) ameliorated. If tariff reform advocates 
are serious about shifting costs onto larger consumers, it will be necessary for them to plan 
and develop strategies to counter the reactive but politically significant responses of the 
minority of large consumers who are adversely affected by the changes.
5. Implications for a critical-realist pricing methodology
In light of the preceding discussion, it is possible to put forward the following “ stylised facts” 
concerning the political economy of water pricing.
History matters in at least three respects. The original allocation of property rights and the 
distribution of resources matters. Current outcomes are a function of these past allocations, 
that is, there is path dependence. Current institutional forms are influenced by past forms, that 
is, there is institutional memory (or to put it more strongly, institutional sclerosis). These 
points have been demonstrated in the preceding section.
The initial and early appropriation of resources has a major influence on future outcomes, 
often bestowing decisive advantages on the individuals and organisations able to secure the 
initial property rights and to exploit these for their own benefit. Put another way, the initial 
playing field was highly unequal. The origins of Chase Manhattan Bank and the growth of Los 
Angeles into an major national economic centre are prominent examples. The specificities of 
the political economy of water played an important role in each instance.
The initial unequal distribution of resources and wealth is perpetuated within the capitalist 
system through informational and capability asymmetries. For example, wealthy people in 
strategic positions and with access to privileged information were able to secure windfall
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profits in both Los Angeles and New York. Imperfect markets, in particular the absence of 
price-taking on the part of producers and the presence of informational asymmetries, are 
prevalent in capitalist economies. Numerous examples of these within the urban water sector 
have been provided. Within such a system, poor households historically have “ lost out” with 
severe social consequences. Early private capitalist ventures in water supply development 
were notorious for paying scant attention to the needs of poorer communities.261
Social crises have provided the impetus for the reform of urban water supply within capitalist 
economies, initially through regulation and then later predominantly through direct public 
management. The extension of the political franchise and the consequent increase in the voice 
of affected communities through both the national and local democratic systems played an 
important role in extending and improving water service provision to poorer communities.262
The law and legal processes historically have been subject to disproportionate influence by the 
wealthy. Examples of this include the commission of inquiry into the Owens Valley saga, the 
formation of Chase Manhattan Bank and the rescinding of development charges in Tucson. 
Gross inequalities in power and wealth, together with monopoly markets and informational 
asymmetries, provide opportunities for rent seeking and arbitrage plays. The Bass brothers 
foray into water in Californian is an example of this.
The development of urban water supplies within capitalist economies is part of a broader 
capital accumulation process, taking place at the local, national and international levels. The 
distributional outcomes of this capital accumulation process are particularly significant within 
the water sector because of its importance for health and environmental sustainability.
The polity is crucial as this will determine the “ social contract” between government, 
capitalist interests and society, and determine the distributional and environmental 
outcomes.263 Social movements can influence resource allocation and can improve access to
261 In many instances, the outbreak of Cholera epidemics in urban cities can  be attributed to the failure of 
private water com panies to provide services to poor communities. S ee  Forem an-Peck and Millward 
(1994: 42) and Koeppel (2000).
262 S ee  Forem an-Peck and Millward (1994) and Koeppel (2000).
263 S ee  Hirst (1997) in Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997).
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resources among poor communities,264 but this influence is constrained by international 
political-economic considerations and the role of multilateral and bilateral development and 
finance agencies.
264 S ee Bennett (1995) and W atson (1992).
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Chapter 5: Water thirst
Taking justice and inequality seriously
All human beings have an inherent right to have access to water in quantities 
and o f a quality necessary to meet their basic needs. This right shall be 
protected in law. (Gleick, 1998: 501)265
Households with half the mean income will spend twice the average 
percentage [o f household income] on water, while those with twice the median 
income will pay half. Itideed it is expensive to be poor in Khartoum. Among 
the poorest households, the only major item o f expenditure available fo r  
sacrifice is their food budget. It is therefore probable that the high cost o f 
water in the squatter area is a major contributor to the high rates o f 
malnutrition which prevail there. (Cairncross and Kinnear, 1992:188)
Economics has a thousand ways to talk about efficiency and none to talk about 
equity. (Robert Solow, 1986)266
1. Introduction
The fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be summed up succinctly as follows: 
“ every competitive equilibrium is a Pareto-optimum; and every Pareto-optimum is a 
competitive equilibrium” (Dorfman et al, 1958). It is remarkable that the issue of equality is 
completely absent from this theorem even though it provides the justification for neo-classical 
pricing theory. Amartya Sen has pointed that a Pareto-optimum situation could be completely 
disastrous from a social point of view (Sen, 1985: 10).
The consideration of equality lies at the heart of moral philosophy. Equality can be considered 
in many different spaces, for example, utility, liberty, capabilities, opportunities, wealth and 
outcomes. The choice of space is contested and no agreement exists within moral philosophy 
as to which space should enjoy priority. Utilitarianism prioritises the space of individual 
utilities, John Rawls’ “justice as fairness” prioritises liberty and the equal holding of primary 
goods and Sen prioritises the equality of capabilities. The implications of these three 
approaches for water pricing are explored in this chapter. The moral philosophy of 
utilitarianism underpins the neo-classical approach to pricing where equality of utility 
(preferences) is prioritised. The approaches put forward by Rawls and Sen support, as a
265 Gleick (1998:491) asserts that this right is implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
states: “Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well being of himself 
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing ... .” (Article 25, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, United Nations General Assembly, 1948).
266 This remark w as m ade by Robert Solow when introducing Amartya Sen a t the award of the Frank 
Seidman Distinguished award in Political Economy, 1986.
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minimum, a “basic needs” approach to water provision and pricing where an “ adequate” 
level of water use is secured for everybody. A more radical interpretation of both Rawls and 
Sen would support the examination of antecedent diversity and may justify a more 
fundamental redistribution of resources so as to ensure equality in the holding of primary 
goods (Rawls) and equality of capabilities (Sen).
Some neo-classical economists are willing to consider equity issues (other than equality of 
utility) within a neo-classical pricing framework. Two approaches are reviewed in this 
chapter: social welfare functions and basic needs pricing justified by externalities. Both of 
these approaches are limited as they fail to take into account the political-economic context 
within which these analyses take place and hence are not aware of important factors which are 
likely to influence the outcomes of the analyses.
Neo-classical economics provides a theory of welfare measurement. But this theory is of 
limited value because it relies on the assumption that the value of a dollar’s worth of demand 
for a good is independent of the wealth of the consumer. It is possible to use social welfare 
functions to overcome this, but the choice of social welfare function is subjective and value­
laden. The distinct danger of this approach is that the political-economic context is ignored.
Contingent valuation presents an alternative methodology for assessing consumer demand and 
welfare. In this method, a fictitious market is postulated and respondents are asked to bid for 
different quantity-price combinations of goods. The most forceful criticism of this method (as 
applied to water) is that households are presented with a “double-contingency” , that is, they 
are asked to value a service outside of their experience and to value an unknown future 
quantity of water consumed.
I will argue that nonparametric density distributions provide a more transparent and value- 
neutral mechanism for analysing welfare effects of price reforms compared to the other 
available alternatives. In this chapter, the mathematics of this method are explained and an 
application of this method is presented using primary data collected for Grahamstown (South 
Africa). Empirical evidence generated by alternative methodologies is also reviewed in the 
chapter and the inherent limitations of these methodologies are demonstrated.
A specific focus on equality and justice is warranted in the context of urban water pricing 
because of the profound inequalities present in the sector (especially in developing countries) 
and the devastating social consequences of these inequalities.267 Nevertheless, the 
consideration of equality is just one component of urban water pricing. I argue that the
267 T hese have been illustrated in Chapter 1.
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critical-realist methodological approach to pricing proposed in this thesis is able to incorporate 
equality considerations successfully within a comprehensive urban water pricing framework.
2. Some philosophical considerations 
Equality of what?
Sen, in his monograph Inequality Re-examined (1992), poses two fundamental questions: Why 
equality? and, Equality of what? With respect to the former, he makes the important point that 
all prominent theories in political philosophy (dealing with social arrangements) are 
egalitarian in the sense that they use equality as the key criterion of evaluation within their 
theory. Sen points out:
It is arguable that to have any kind o f plausibility, ethical reasoning on social 
matters must involve elementary equal consideration fo r  all at some level that 
is seen as critical. The absence o f  such equality would make a theory 
arbitrarily discriminating and hard to defend. (Sen, 1992:17)
With respect to the second question, Sen points out that it is the different bases for equality
(what he terms “ basal equality” ) that define the points of dispute between different social
theories.
The premise “ equality o f some kind is o f  fundamental importance” is accepted as the 
departure point for this chapter. Given this premise, two questions are explored: What should 
the basis of this equality be? and, What implications does this choice have for a critical-realist 
approach to urban water pricing?
Three views are considered: utilitarianism (as it is embodied within neo-classical economic 
theory), Rawls’ “justice as fairness” , and Sen’s “equality of capability” . These views have 
been chosen because they represent three prominent conceptions of equality, each of which 
has very particular implications for the treatment of equality in the context of urban water 
pricing.268 Each of these approaches is evaluated below with the view to informing a critical- 
realist approach to urban water pricing.
Utilitarianism and neo-classical economic theory
Sidgwick presented a clear statement of classic utilitarianism along the following lines: a 
society is just when it is arranged so as to achieve the greatest net satisfaction summed over
268 T hese three views do not, of course, cover the full spectrum of possibilities. The purpose of this chapter 
is to illustrate som e key them es. A com prehensive approach would require an examination of all (or at 
least more) of the contributions to the debate on equality in political philosophy.
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all individuals belonging to it (Sidgwick, 1907). The key principle underlying modem 
utilitarianism is “ giving equal weight to the equal interests of all the parties” (Hare, 1981a: 
26).269 In terms of utility, utilitarianism values changes in utility incurred by different 
individuals equally. Thus, utilitarianism sees value, ultimately, only in individual utility, 
which may be defined in terms of some “ mental characteristic, such as pleasure, happiness or 
desire” (Sen: 1992: 6). It is important to note that if utility is defined entirely in terms of 
individual choice (preferences), then interpersonal comparisons are not permitted and 
judgements about welfare are rendered an impossibility (Sen, 1992: 6).
Welfare economics is fundamentally utilitarian; social welfare is maximised through the 
maximisation of the sum of individual utilities. In turn, welfare economics provides the 
fundamental justification for the Pareto-efficiency claim. The problems of this claim are even 
more profound than suggested in Chapter 2, particularly in the context of entrenched 
inequality. Sen presents a forceful criticism of utilitarian theory in this context:
In so fa r  as utility is supposed to stand fo r  individual well-being, it provides a 
rather limited accounting o f  that, and it also pays no direct attention to the 
freedom to pursue well-being.
This way o f  seeing individual advantage is particularly limiting in the presence 
o f entrenched inequalities. In a situation o f persistent adversity and 
deprivation, the victims do not go on grieving and grumbling all the time, and 
may even lack the motivation to desire a radical change in circumstances.
Indeed, in terms o f a strategy fo r  living, it may make a lot o f  sense to come to 
terms with an ineradicable adversity, to try to appreciate small breaks, and to 
resist pining fo r  the impossible or the improbable. Such a person, even though 
thoroughly deprived and confined to a very reduced life, may not appear to be 
quite so badly o ff in terms o f the mental metric o f desire and its fulfilment, and 
in terms o f the pleasure-pain calculus. The extent o f a person's deprivation 
may be substantially muffled in the utility metric, despite the fact that he or 
she may lack the opportunity even to be adequately nourished, decently 
clothed, minimally educated, or properly sheltered. (Sen, 1992: 7)
This fundamental discontinuity between utility and well-being is vividly described by Sen. 
More especially, the misleading nature of utility metrics may be particularly important where 
social differences are entrenched, for example, in the cases of class, gender, caste or 
community (Sen, 1992).
269 H are's starting point is that “moral statem ents in their central use express prescriptions, and these have 
to be universalizable" (1981b: 7). His reasoning proceeds a s  follows: “If we know that in making a moral 
judgem ent w e are prescribing universally for all similar cases, we shall not prescribe for others what we 
are not prepared to prescribe for ourselves were we identically placed. This will lead us to give equal 
weight to equal preferences of a l l . ... Thus we shall be, as utilitarians do, counting everybody as one 
and nobody as  more than one, and shall be trying to maximise the satisfaction of everybody’s 
preferences, treated impartially.... If this method were applied directly to acts, it would enjoin us to 
judge them by their utility, in the se n se  of preference satisfaction" (1981b: 7).
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A further important criticism is provided by Elster who puts utility and preferences in 
historical perspective, arguing that utility and preferences can only be understood in terms of 
how these developed over time, and the historical influences and processes affecting this 
development. He poses two relevant questions:
Why should individual wants and satisfaction be the criterion o f  justice and 
social choice when individual wants themselves may be shaped by a process 
that preempts the choice? And, in particular, why should the choice between 
feasible options only take account o f  individual preferences i f  people tend to 
adjust their aspirations to their possibilities? (Elster, 1982: 219)
The importance of the political-economic context within which preferences and utilities are 
formed and especially the historical development of the political economy are self-evident.
I draw two primary conclusions from the above discussion. Utilitarianism in general, and the 
use of utilitarianism in neo-classical economics theory in particular, does not provide an 
adequate approach for tackling issues of justice and equality, especially in a context of 
entrenched inequality. The formation of preferences and utilities can only be understood in a 
historical context and it is therefore necessary to undertake context-specific political-economic 
analyses in order to understand prevailing distributions of welfare (however defined) and the 
effects that these have on outcomes.
Justice as fairness
Rawls’ “justice as fairness” was developed as an alternative to utilitarianism and is an attempt 
to put forward a systematic case for an intuitive approach to the challenges of justice and 
equality.270 Rawls proposes that justice is the “ first virtue” of institutions with the implication 
that justice has priority status in society:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare 
o f  society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the 
loss o f  freedom fo r  some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It 
does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few  are outweighed by the 
larger sum o f  advantages enjoyed by the many. (Rawls, 1971: 34)
Rawls’ theory is based on two principles.
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system o f  
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system o f liberty fo r  all.271
270 Although Rawls contrasts his approach to those of intuitionists, Rawls’ approach can itself be described 
a s  intuitionist, albeit of a more systematic variety. See Rawls (1971: 34f) and Kymlicka (1990: 50f).
271 This w as later restated a s  “Each person has equal right to a fully adequate schem e  of equal basic 
liberties which is compatible with a similar schem e of liberties for all" (Rawls e t al, 1987:5, own 
em phasis).
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Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to 
the greatest benefit to the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle; and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions o f  
fa ir  equality o f opportunity.272 (Rawls, 1971: 302)
Two priority rules are invoked: the priority of liberty and the priority of justice over 
efficiency and welfare,273 Finally, these concepts are tied together into a “ General conception 
of Justice” :274
All social primary goods -  liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and 
the bases o f  self-respect -  are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution o f any or all o f  these goods is to the advantage o f the least 
favoured. (Rawls, 1971: 302f)
Rawls’ theory of justice has spawned an extensive literature. Much of this literature is critical 
of Rawls, whilst at the same time acknowledging the important contribution that Rawls has 
made to political philosophy.275 An exploration of this secondary literature lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The discussion that follows is restricted to making a few key points which 
have relevance to a critical-realist approach to urban water pricing.
“Justice as fairness” defines equality much more broadly compared to utilitarianism: it asserts 
that there is to be equality in primary goods which includes liberty and opportunity, income 
and wealth, and the bases of self-respect. There is thus to be a resource-based (as opposed to 
utility or preference based) equality in both means and ends. The “difference principle” 
ensures that inequality in primary goods is only socially desirable if  this inequality benefits all, 
including (and especially) the least advantaged. Thus there is a specific focus on the least well- 
off.
272 This w as later restated as " . . .  to the great benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls et al, 1987: 5, own 
emphasis).
273 These may be formally stated as follows: “First priority rule (the priority of liberty): The principles of 
justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sale of liberty. 
There are two cases: (1) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system  of liberty shared by all; 
(b) a less than equal liberty m ust be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. Second priority rule (the 
priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare): The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the 
principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to 
the difference principle. There are two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity m ust enhance the 
opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity; and (b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance 
mitigate the burden of those bearing the hardship" (Rawls, 1971: 302).
274 Much of Rawls’ theory of justice is occupied with providing the motivation and justification for these 
statem ents. Briefly, Rawls employs two argum ents -  an intuitive argum ent and an argument based on a 
social contract. The first is straight forward, the second entails an elaborate construction of an “original 
position" and a  “veil of ignorance”. The method by which Rawls derived his theory of justice is not of 
primary concern here.
275 Sen, for example, acknowledges an indebtedness to Rawls in his thinking on justice and inequality, 
whilst at the sam e time departing from Rawls quite fundamentally (Sen, 1992: xi). There is also an 
extensive literature debating the exact claims of the theory and Rawls has spent a lot of effort clarifying 
these  claims. See, for example, Rawls (1985).
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Rawls fails to specify the contents of the primary goods in any detail and thus the implications 
of the theory in terms of practical application remain somewhat vague. Nevertheless, it would 
be reasonable to suppose that the equal holding of primary goods would imply that universal 
and equal access to adequate water services would be secured in a just society as conceived by 
Rawls.
Rawls’ theory is unable to escape the criticism that it is essentially subjective (though this does 
not necessary diminish its challenge to utilitarianism nor its importance).276 There is no a 
priori reason why liberty should have such complete priority within a lexicographical ordering 
nor is Rawls able convincingly to demonstrate that the principles of justice he proposed would 
be the result of rational consideration (Rawls’ “ reflective equilibrium”).277 Hence Rawls’ 
theory is subject to an adaptation of McCloskey’s methodological maxim: a theory of social 
justice is to be preferred which is accepted by society, that is, which has proved to be most 
persuasive.278 There is, of course, no reason why a society could not (or should not) choose 
Rawls’ theory of justice, but this choice cannot be arrived at through “ reflective reasoning” 
alone as Rawls attempts to do.
A more fundamental criticism of Rawls’ theory of justice is that it presents a vision (Rawls’ 
vision) of a just state without accounting for how a society might reach such a state (or 
indeed, for how societies have arrived at their current unjust states).279 From this point of 
view, the theory can be criticised for being idealistic and of limited practical relevance. 
Nevertheless, the theory does pose important questions and can provide an important starting 
point for a debate on justice and equality.280
Equality of capability
Sen (1992) notes that a choice for the primacy of equality in one space (for example, liberty) 
will necessarily result in inequality in other spaces (for example, wealth). Key issues which 
arise from this are the choice of the space in which equality is to be judged, and an
276 Hare, for exam ple asserts  that “one of Rawls firmest intuitions is that utilitarianism is wrong” (1981b*. 6).
277 Rawls later modified his principle of liberty to a lesser version in response to a  strong criticism from Hart 
(1973). S ee  Footnote 271.
278 S ee McCloskey (1983). It is possible to argue that Rawls' theory is an attem pted justification for liberal 
democratic capitalism, however, more radical interpretations exist of the implications of, and 
requirements for, the equal holding of primary goods subject to the difference principle. See, for 
example, Kymlicka (1990: 50f).
279 It would be hard to argue that the current distribution of "primary goods" in society (to borrow Rawls'
term) is just in any way. Bauer (1981) makes a bold attempt with his "producers’ rights to the product” 
argument, but this is refuted by Sen (1985).
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examination of the implications of this choice for inequality in other spaces. There are, of 
course, no a priori rules which can guide us in this choice. Clear thinking can help to make 
the choices and underlying assumptions explicit. It is likely that some choices will be more 
contentious than others and hence an objective of the reasoning undertaken by Sen (and also 
here in this thesis) is to find and define the space (or spaces) of equality over which there is 
likely to be most agreement.
Sen proposes that “ equality of capability” should occupy the “basal equality” space (Sen, 
1992). Capability is defined as the “capability to function” and a capability set is defined as a 
“person’s freedom to choose from possible livings” . Sen thus makes a distinction between 
capabilities (a freedom to function) and achieved functions, that is, between the freedom to 
choose to achieve different functions and the actual achievement of functions (for example, 
nourishment and good health). This distinction is motivated by the belief that it is important 
to attach both an instrumental and intrinsic value to freedom. In this sense, the approach is not 
dissimilar to Rawls’ priority of basic liberties. Sen argues:
The gap between resources that help us to achieve freedom and the extent o f  
freedom itself is important in principle and can be crucial in practice ... 
Freedom is one o f  the most powerful social ideas, and its relevance to the 
analysis o f  equality and justice is fa r  reaching and strong. (1992: 37, original 
emphasis)
This is remarkably similar to Rawls’ priority of liberty. However, Sen contrasts his approach 
to Rawls’ focus on primary goods:
Capability represents freedom whereas primary goods tell us only about the 
means to freedom . ... Equality o f freedom to pursue our ends cannot be 
generated by equality in the distribution o f primary goods. We have to 
examine interpersonal variations in the transformation o f  primary goods (and 
resources more generally) into respective capabilities to pursue our ends and 
objectives. (Sen, 1992: 84, 87, original emphasis)
But this misses the point, because the priority of liberty comes before the equal holding of 
primary goods in Rawls’ schema. The confusion appears to arise in the respective definitions 
of liberty and freedom.
A distinct limitation of this conceptual approach is that capability sets, like utilities, are not 
directly observable whereas functionings are. So from a practical point of view it is likely to 
be more feasible to relate well-being to achieved functionings rather than using capability sets 
(freedom to function). Either way, the evaluation of the equality of capability or functions 
must still be measured in a particular space. Sen suggests the beginnings of a basic set of
200 Nozick, for example, sta tes that “political philosophers must either work within Rawl's theory or explain 
why not. [Our considerations are illuminated by ] Rawls’ masterful presentation of an alternative 
conception" (1974: 183).
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capabilities for primary evaluation: “ the ability to be well-nourished and well-sheltered, the 
capability of escaping avoidable morbidity and premature mortality, and so forth” (1992: 45). 
Of course even these capabilities have to be weighted vis-a-vis each other and an ordering will 
necessarily be incomplete as a result of inevitable ambiguities.
Despite these limitations, Sen argues that “ the informational base of functionings is still a 
much finer basis for evaluation of the quality of life and economic progress than various 
alternatives commonly recommended, such as individual utilities or commodity holdings” 
(1992: 53). This is certainly true in the sphere of water supply. Ready access to potable water 
is clearly a basic functioning which is essential to the realisation of other primary capabilities 
such as nourishment and health. From a capability perspective, therefore, there is a strong 
argument for equality in the functioning space of adequate potable water supply.
Capability and efficiency
The question posed by neo-classical economists arises in this context: how do the equality 
considerations of equal functionings in the space of water supply relate to efficiency (or 
aggregative) considerations, that is, the maximisation of social welfare? There are essentially 
three types of answers to this question. The first is to assert that efficiency considerations are 
dominant and therefore to reject the equality debate, or at least reject it as being irrelevant to 
economics. The second is to reject the question altogether by asserting that a utility-based 
conception of welfare is irrelevant. (This entails a wholesale rejection of neo-classical 
economics.) The third is to accept a broader conception of social welfare which is not 
narrowly utility-based but which includes aggregative considerations within an “equality of 
capability” framework. This latter approach is recommended by Sen (1992: 136f). Notice that 
this represents a reversal of priorities from “ efficiency first” (neo-classical economics) to the 
priority of “equality of capability” , but does not dismiss aggregative considerations as 
unimportant.
A key economic argument against the priority of “equality of capability” is that “ equality of 
capability” itself (or policies to achieve greater “equality of capability” ) distorts incentives, 
reduces the aggregate welfare and hence is detrimental for everyone. The fundamental basis of 
this argument is that outcomes are a result of individual choices (concerning the activities 
undertaken and the level of application in these activities). The corollary of this argument is 
that, for a given set of preferences, relative prices in a competitive market provide the 
“ correct” incentives and ensure the maximisation of utility and hence social welfare. Any 
adjustment to prices necessarily distorts incentives and hence reduces welfare. This argument
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is undermined if it is recognised that the more fundamental distribution of outcomes is the 
result of “ antecedent diversities” in the ability to productive (Sen, 1992: 142).
For example, in the context of urban water supplies in developing countries, the productive 
capability of a household is clearly impaired if members of a household are required to spend 
many hours a day collecting water and if use of this water increases the risk of disease.281 In 
this case it can be argued that the incentive distortion of providing subsidised water supplies, 
say, is much less than the aggregative welfare loss arising from the overall inequality of 
capabilities in society (the lack of access to a safe water supply). This is a mild interpretation 
of the antecedent diversity argument.
Sen makes a broader point in this context:
In general, the possibility o f  incentive distortions may be a good deal less with 
egalitarian policy in this case [antecedent inequalities in capabilities arising 
from  gender or age] than in the standard economic models involving 
individuals whose fortunes diverge because o f their own chosen levels o f 
application. ... Egalitarian policies to undo inequalities associated with 
human diversity are much less problematic from a point o f  view o f  incentives 
than policies to undo inequality arising from differences in effort and 
application, on which much o f the incentive literature has tended to focus.
(1992; 142)
This argument can be taken much further. For example, it can be argued that the “ fortunes” 
(or ill-fortunes) of individuals arise primarily from “antecedent diversity” in the ownership of 
the means of production and have much more to do with the relative shares of the returns on 
production accruing to capital and labour.282 If the essence of this analysis is accepted, then 
equality of capability can only be achieved if there is a fundamental redistribution in the 
ownership of the means of production.
In any event, the logical force of the argument put forward by Sen points towards the need to 
understand the reasons underlying the “antecedent diversity” in the welfare of individuals, 
households, classes and societies. Such an understanding can only be accomplished through a 
context-specific political-economic analysis of the historical processes leading to the present 
inequalities.
281 In South Africa, for example, many rural households spend more than two hours per day collecting 
water, and in Uganda, water collected from shallow wells in urban areas is prone to contamination 
(Palmer, 2000: personal communication; Ssebabi, 2000: personal communication).
282 In this context it may be pointed out that the determination of the “appropriate" return on factors of 
production in joint production is manifestly an impossible task. Hence the actual allocation of shares is 
necessarily the result of conflict and is determined by the political-economic context.
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Equality and contest
Three alternative views of justice and equality within political philosophy have been briefly 
reviewed above. These are by no means exhaustive but serve to make the point that alternative 
approaches to the questions posed by inequality exist and that there is no consensus in the 
literature on the “ right” approach. This adds weight to the critical-realist approach which 
recognises open systems as a fundamental fact of life.
Each view has different implications for the treatment of inequality within the water sector. 
The utilitarian view supports a neo-classical treatment of welfare and hence marginal-cost 
pricing. Rawls’ “justice as fairness” supports a “basic needs” approach to the provision and 
pricing of water (in which a basic level of provision is universally secured for society as a 
whole). Sen’s “equality of capability” approach emphasises the need for equality in freedoms 
to function. When translated into practice this would seem to imply support for a basic needs 
approach to the provision and pricing of water. (In other words, its practical content in this 
instance does not differ from Rawls’ “ equality in the holding of primary goods” .)
A more radical interpretation of Sen’s “equality of capability” extends to production. Equality 
in this sense could only be addressed through an understanding of the historical political- 
economic reasons for the current distribution of the ownership of productive resources (and 
the distribution of the surplus arising from production). In this light, both utilitarianism and 
Rawls’ theory of justice can be criticised for being ahistorical, that is, for being unable to 
explain (or at least not being interested in explaining) why inequality exists and how it came 
about.
Neo-classical theory is based on tire utilitarian philosophy and is primarily concerned with 
maximising utility based on preferences. It is essentially marginalist, posing the following 
question: Accepting current circumstances as given, how can resources be re-allocated so as 
to improve Pareto-efficiency? This approach is not concerned with the question of equality 
(except in so far as to require that marginal utility be treated with equal value between 
individuals).
In Rawls’ theory of justice, liberty assumes absolute priority and justice has priority over 
efficiency and welfare. Rawls’ difference principle seeks to cater for efficiency considerations 
by allowing for differential holdings of primary goods, but this is only justified if the 
inequality in holdings benefits the least well-off.
Sen argues for an incorporation of efficiency considerations within a “ equality of capability” 
framework. Here efficiency is defined much more broadly to mean “ the efficiency with which
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the defined objective is achieved” . There is an implicit recognition that the relevant objectives 
will be socially determined, and hence the political-economic context is crucially important.
In summary, I contend that the meanings of justice, equality and efficiency in any given 
context are socially determined and, further, that the meanings and importance attached to 
each of these concepts are inevitably contested. The nature and outcomes of this contest are 
the product of the specific political-economic histories.
Within the urban water sector (and especially in developing countries), issues of justice, 
equality and efficiency are undoubtedly prominent. Thus the practice of urban water pricing 
will be heavily influenced by how the contest over the meanings is played out. In this context, 
it is not possible to understand urban water pricing practice in any specific location without 
understanding the political-economic history.
3. Neo-classical pricing and equity -  a critical review
Some economists are willing to consider equity issues within a neo-classical pricing 
framework. Two possible approaches are discussed below. In the first approach, a social 
welfare function is postulated and on this basis the optimal trade-off between efficiency and 
inequality modelled. The second approach treats “basic needs” as an externality (the cost of 
inequality) and dispenses with the social welfare function.
Welfare function approaches to the efficiency-inequality trade-off
A number of different models have been developed which attempt to model the optimal trade­
off between efficiency and equity in the context of a public service.283 None of the models 
explain all facets of the optimal trade-off between efficiency and equity in a satisfactory 
manner and no synthesis model which predicts the relationship between efficiency and equity 
for the general case exists. Nevertheless, on the basis of a review of these models, Bahl and 
Linn came to the following two tentative and general conclusions. First, if the price-elasticity 
of demand for access is high, and if access fees are not related to income, then a larger share 
of the agencies budget should be raised through use-related tariffs. For example, if access is 
denied to poor households because they cannot afford the access fees, then these fees should 
be lowered and user charges raised. Second, if access fees can be related to income, and if the 
price-elasticity of demand for access is low (over the relevant income and price range), and if
263 S ee  Munasinghe and Warford (1978), Feldstein (1972ab), Munk (1977) and Ng and W eisser (1974). 
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demand for the commodity is highly price-elastic but income-inelastic, then a larger share of 
income should be derived from access charges (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 276).284
I identify and discuss below the analytical and practical problems which would have to be 
addressed before a general model addressing optimal pricing to achieve dual efficiency and 
equity goals could be successfully developed and applied.285
Successful application of models of this type require knowledge about the price-elasticities of 
consumer demand for different consumer categories and for different dimensions of public 
service. It will be shown in Chapter 6 that these price-elasticities are difficult to estimate.
The final incidence of charges for, and benefits from, a public service must be identified. For 
example, if water is used as an input in an industrial process, the benefit (or otherwise) of a 
subsidy or tax may or may not be passed on to the consumers of the product produced. 
Therefore, factor-supply elasticities and price- and income-elasticities of the final product also 
need to be known. Furthermore, even if the product is a final product, gains may be 
capitalised into the land value, for example, which may create a benefit for the land owner 
rather than the consumer of the service.
The problem of second-best pricing raises questions as to the validity of shadow pricing as a 
means of improving efficiency. Even if the validity of shadow pricing is accepted, there is 
uncertainty with respect to the choice of technique and the accuracy of measurement.286
Given the necessarily subjective nature of social welfare functions, the choice of function and 
weighting values used is inevitably socially contested. This points to the need to understand 
the underlying political-economic dynamics. The social welfare functions typically used in the 
models assume that the same additional unit of disposable income in the hands of the poor is 
worth somewhat more than in the hands of the rich. This assumption has been criticised by 
Harberger (1978) who asserts that these welfare functions tend to over-estimate the altruism of 
individuals.
284 These results for a two-part tariff are similar to those of Feldstein for two services (1972a). If it is 
possible to consider each dimension of the service (access and use) a s  separa te  services w hose 
dem ands are independent of each other, then the Munasinghe-Warford model can be reformulated for 
each dimension. However, if dem ands are related (and it is likely that they will be), then the problem is 
more complex.
285 Five points were identified by Bahl and Linn: (1) estimating price-elasticities, (2) final incidence of 
benefits, (3) calculation of shadow prices and social weights, (4) differentiation of prices by income 
group, and (5) m anner of income redistribution (1992:276f). The following discussion u ses these five 
points as a framework, however, som e have been elaborated on and new ones have been added.
2861 discuss issues related to shadow pricing more fully in Chapter 3.
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Basic needs pricing
Basic needs of consumers can be treated as an externality of consumption, providing an 
alternative methodology to social welfare functions. The approach advocated by Harberger 
(1978) is described below.
The approach assumes that rich and poor consumers have different demand curves which are 
both modified by the social benefit arising from small quantities of water. These curves are 
depicted in Figure 3 (which come from Bahl and Linn, 1992). On the basis of these 
assumptions, consumption would be socially optimal at QPOOR and QR1CH, with the 
corresponding prices PP00Rand PRICH. It may be seen that PP00R is less than PRICH and that PR1CH is 
equal to the marginal cost of production. Of course the problems related to the definition and 
estimation of marginal cost, identified and discussed in Chapter 3, still pertain.
The main point of the analysis is to show that the “ altruism” of society only extends in a 
limited way, that is, up to some point where additional consumption by poor consumers has 
no further “ social” benefit. In this approach, individuals are not really altruistic at all; they 
are merely matching their “ true” benefits and costs.
Social
Private
Social
MC
RICH
Social & Private
POOR
RICH
POORS o c i a l r
'RICHPOOR
Figure 3: Basic needs pricing -  an externality approach
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Measuring the externalities associated with water consumption is difficult. Nevertheless, if the 
overall framework is accepted, then the above argument is, at least in some sense, intuitively 
plausible:
The rest o f  society wants the recipients o f [subsidies] to spend more money on 
feeding and clothing their children, not on what are judged to be [luxury]287 or 
trivial items. (Harberger, 1978: 9)
This approach requires value judgements with respect to the definition of basic need and the 
social value of this basic need consumption. Hence the analysis is unable to escape from two 
more fundamental questions: Who gets to decide? And, How are these decisions made?
Subjectivity and context
In the above discussion it was recognised that pricing decisions have distributional outcomes. 
Two theoretical rationales were provided for including distributional considerations within a 
neo-classical pricing framework. First, it was argued that the use of a social welfare function 
with distributional weights could account for welfare distribution within a Pareto-efficiency 
optimising framework. Second, it was shown that inadequate consumption amongst the poor 
causes externalities which can be corrected through a “basic needs” pricing framework thus 
increasing Pareto-efficiency. An overriding theme in the discussion was that both the choice 
of technique and its method of application are inherently subjective. A key implication of this 
is that choices will be governed by a combination of ideology and the political-economic 
context.
4. Measuring social welfare and inequality
The measurement of social welfare and inequality is a particular concern in relation to water 
pricing in developing countries because water is a basic necessity and because of the 
prevalence of highly skewed income distributions in these countries.
The theory of welfare measurement 
Consumer welfare
Assuming a rational, continuous and locally non-satiated preference relation with 
differentiable consumer expenditure and indirect utility functions, the welfare effect of a 
change in the price of a commodity can be measured either as the equivalent variation (EV) or
267 The word “sumptuary” meaning “limiting private expenditure in the interests of the S tate” w as used. This 
would appear to be an inappropriate word in the context. Perhaps the word “sumptuous" was intended?
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as the compensating variation (CV). The EV can be thought of as a measure of the amount of 
money a consumer would be indifferent about accepting in lieu of the price change. The CV 
measures the compensation that would have to be given to a consumer after the price change 
in order to bring the consumer back to her original utility level. In general, the values of EV 
and CV will be different, though each method is equally valid as a way of measuring the 
change in consumer welfare.
The EV and CV may be expressed in terms of the Hicksian demand curve as follows:
where p.! is the vector of the prices of other goods which are all held constant, and where the 
integral is in the limits p° to p 1 for good 1.
Because the Hicksian demand curve (h,) is not directly observable, the calculation of EV and 
CV requires the mathematical transformations described in Chapter 3. Where there are no 
wealth effects arising from the change in the price of a good, EV will equal CV and both are 
equivalent to the change in the Marshallian consumer surplus,
Marshall defined consumer surplus as “ the excess of the price which he [the consumer] would 
be willing to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which he does pay” (Marshall, 
1920). Thus changes in consumer welfare can be approximated as the change in Marshallian 
consumer surplus arising from either a price change or a quantity restriction. This can be 
directly measured using the observable market (or Walrasian) demand curve (x,). For a price 
change:
over the integral limit p° to p1 where AV is the average variation.
Where wealth effects and/or price changes are small, then the “ error” in AV will be small.
Much of the literature concerning welfare analysis in relation to water demand uses 
Marshallian consumer surplus as the measure of consumer welfare. This is justified by the 
expectation that the AV error will be small. For example, Dandy (1992: 1759) states:
Other measures such as compensating variation or equivalent variation may 
be superior on theoretical grounds, but Willig (1976) and Randall and Stoll 
(1980) have shown that differences will be small fo r  commodities (such as 
water) which have a small income-elasticity o f  demand.
This approach to the evaluation of consumer welfare is only valid for the evaluation of 
individual consumer welfare. The approach therefore requires that the changes in the welfare
EV (p°, p!, w) =  J h, (pt, p.i, u1) dp! 
CV (p°, p \  w) =  J h, (p„ p.i, u°) dp!
( 1)
(2)
AV (p°, p !, w) =  Jx , (pl5 p.,, w) dp! (3)
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of each individual (or possibly household)288 be measured and also that price-elasticities of 
demand for individual households be calculated. This data typically are not available and 
hence an analysis of this type is not possible. An alternative is to measure the welfare change 
of a so-called representative household. However, this approach is clearly problematic, 
especially in a context where welfare inequalities between households are significant.
An alternative measure of consumer welfare changes
Dinwiddy and Teal (1996) propose the following practical approach for the measurement of 
welfare in the context of cost-benefit analysis, an approach which is equally applicable to 
price reform. Assuming that monetary measures can provide useful measures of changes in 
social welfare, Dinwiddy and Teal have shown that the measurement of welfare effects of a 
public sector policy or project can be summarised in the following two measures (1996: 56):
dC, (4)
dW  = ZQ dpt + dY  (5)
The first equation says that the change in welfare (dW) can be evaluated in terms of the sum 
of changes in the value of consumption in commodity markets, that is, at the market prices 
faced by the consumer and the changes in consumption (dCj). The second (equivalent) 
expression says that welfare change can be evaluated in terms of changes in consumer prices 
(dp) and income (dY). Dinwiddy and Teal note that “ the rationale for using market prices in 
the welfare measure is that these prices represent consumers’ valuation of commodities, there 
is no implication that they reflect Pareto-efficient outcomes” (1996: 265).
While it is generally preferable to examine welfare effects in the context of the overall 
economy, Dinwiddy and Teal assert that a partial equilibrium analysis may often be used to 
good effect as “ the only necessary additions to welfare change in the primary market are 
social consequences from other markets subject to some form of distortion” (1996: 265).
This method of calculating welfare effects assumes that the (implicitly social) value of a 
change in consumption is the same for both a poor and a rich consumer. This is a highly 
problematic assumption which is clearly untenable in the context where there are wide 
disparities in income and where the good in question is water.
Making inter-household welfare comparisons
It may be expected that, in general, for a given quantity and price of the particular good 
consumed, the greater the household income and wealth, the smaller the price-elasticity of
288 The transition from individual welfare to household welfare is not straightforward (Deaton, 1997).
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demand. On the other hand, larger households are likely to have a higher price-elasticity of 
demand compared to smaller households, ceteris paribus. Inter-household welfare 
comparisons are complicated by differences in household characteristics. Deaton and 
Muellbauer have developed a model, based on Engel’s approach, which enables more 
plausible inter-household comparisons (1980: 193). At the most basic level, the welfare 
comparison is conducted with reference to a standardised household. The analysis can then be 
extended to incorporate different household characteristics, such as the adult-child 
composition. Inter-household welfare comparisons are complicated in the case of urban water 
use because the nature of usage changes as consumption increases.
Making reliable inter-household welfare comparisons is a particularly difficult task where 
there are wide disparities in income, consumption and household size in a community, 
conditions typically found in developing countries.289
Willingness-to-pay
Willingness-to-pay is an alternative approach to the analysis of water demand and consumer 
welfare. The premise here is that the supply of a service should match the demand for the 
service as measured by the consumers’ willingness-to-pay. The implicit assumption of this 
approach is that the value of a dollar’s worth of demand for a good is independent of the 
wealth of the consumer. This assumption has been criticised in relation to the neo-classical 
approach to consumer welfare presented above. Nevertheless, this approach enjoys 
widespread support. A brief critical review of this approach is presented below.
Where no market for urban water exists, researchers have used contingent valuation studies to 
estimate consumers’ willingness-to-pay for water. This methodology has been both advocated 
and popularised by the World Bank. Essentially, contingent valuation or willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) studies create a hypothetical market for water by setting up an auction or bidding 
process (“ game” ) with respondents (potential consumers) in a structured survey. Various 
techniques are introduced purportedly to reduce the three kinds of bias that may arise, 
namely, strategic bias, starting point bias and hypothetical bias (see Whittington et al, 1990). 
For example, starting point bias may be tested for by creating two sample populations which 
use high and low opening bids respectively. Much of the literature is sanguine about both the 
accuracy and efficacy of these studies (Singh et al, 1993, World Bank Water Demand 
Research Team, 1993, Whittington et al, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1998). However, there 
have been few instances where pre-project WTP studies have been compared to actual
209 S ee, for example, the data presented for Grahamstown, South Africa on page 157.
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payment records.290 Two studies that have done an after-the-fact review are Griffin et al 
(1995) and Whittington et al (1993). These studies concluded that contingent valuation studies 
of willingness-to-pay were a better predictor of behaviour than other approaches. However, 
while this may be true for individual households, it is not true for the community as a whole. 
The first study ignored the time dimension, that is, how long households take to connect once 
the system has been built. The second study is misleading because actual connections have 
been much slower than predicted by the WTP study and this is not mentioned at all in the 
study (Cairncross, personal communication, 1997).
Cairncross and Kinnear (1992: 183) are critical of contingent valuation studies:
Most studies have used the "conditional" approach, in which the potential 
consumers are asked how much they would be willing to pay fo r  the given 
level o f service, although the response to such questions may be biased in 
several ways. Respondents may be unaccustomed to answering hypothetical 
questions, may answer in such a way as to finish the interview as soon as 
possible, or may give deliberately false replies with a view to pleasing the 
interviewer, or to obtaining a water supply at the cheapest possible price . A 
further weakness o f  the approach is that it can only focus on the consumer's 
decision whether or not to use and pay fo r  the water supply. The method 
cannot be used to assess the degree to which charging fo r  the water will lead 
consumers to reduce their consumption; those who do not currently pay fo r  
water have difficulty enough in stating how much they use at present, without 
having to guess how much they would use under hypothetical circumstances.
These criticisms are valid. Experience in other fields suggests that contingent valuation tends
to over-estimate willingness-to-pay (Loomis et al, 1996). At a more fundamental level,
contingent valuation undertakes an income-blind valuation: “ if a poor person places a value of
one [dollar] on something, it has a higher value for that person than a one [dollar] valuation
from the rich person; therefore to derive a social valuation by aggregating all individual
valuations is highly problematic” (Van Horen, 1996: 18). Goldblatt (1997: 119f) notes two
further limitations of contingent valuation studies. The first, which he calls “ double
contingency” , refers to the fact that consumers are asked to value a service outside of their
experience, namely both an improved level of service (for example, yard taps compared to
communal taps) and an unknown future quantity of water consumed. In this context,
volumetric based bids for water are particularly problematic. The second limitation is that
contingent valuation studies are unable to take into account the effect of political and social
factors and the influence that these may have on both demand and payments. Goldblatt (1997)
cites the example of consumer boycotts in South Africa prior to 1994 and the hypothesised
“culture of non-payment” arising from this.
290 Cairncross contends that there have been only two cases in which actual behaviour is compared to that 
predicted by willingness-to-pay studies (Cairncross, 1997, personal communication).
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The contingent valuation studies undertaken in Uganda suffered from all of the weaknesses 
identified here (field visit, Uganda, 1999).
Social welfare functions
The standard neo-classical approach to the evaluation of consumer welfare (presented above) 
is not able to account for the social evaluation of inequality. Social welfare functions have 
been developed for this purpose and are briefly described here.
Atkinson (1970) gave prominence to the use of social welfare functions for the measurement 
of social welfare. Generically, the social welfare function has the form:
W =  V (x„x2, . . .x N) (6)
where the x ’s are some measure of welfare or living standard, such as per capita income and 
where N represents the total population.291
Deaton says that the social welfare function should be thought of “ as a statistical ‘aggregator’ 
that turns a distribution into a single number that provides an overall judgement on that 
distribution and forces us to think coherently about welfare and its distribution” (1997: 135).
In general, it is desirable that W exhibit the following three properties. First, if the value of 
one of its arguments increases, the value of W should not diminish. Second, social welfare 
should only depend on the list of welfare levels in society and not on who has which level of 
welfare. Third, more equal distributions are preferred to less equal ones. An equity preference 
is guaranteed if the welfare function is quasi-concave. This implies that social welfare will be 
increased by any transfer of x  from richer to poorer provided the transfer is not sufficiently 
large to reverse their positions.
A social welfare function with these properties can be used to generate a number of different 
kinds of measures of social welfare such as inequality, absolute poverty, and distribution.292
In order to use the social welfare function for these purposes, it must be assumed that the 
function V is homogenous of degree one. The welfare function then can be rewritten as 
follows, where p  is the mean of the x ’s:
W =  p  V ( Xj/p, x2/p  ... xN/p) (7)
This enables the mean value of x to be separated from the distribution of x.
291 The x’s  could also denote a m easure of household welfare, in which ca se  N would be the number of 
households.
292 Illustrations of different welfare functions are presented in Deaton (1997: 136f).
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There is a distinct danger when reducing the measure of welfare, inequality, poverty or 
distribution into a single scalar number. This is because there is always substantial uncertainty 
about how to weight the distribution (for example, the degree of preference for equality or 
reduced poverty, and how to measure the poverty line in the latter case). Another reason is 
that the representation of welfare inequality or extent of poverty by just one number hides the 
richer detail that lies beneath its calculation.
Nonparametric depiction of social welfare
On the basis of the above reasoning, Deaton (1997) advocates the use of graphical techniques 
for representing distributions. One common technique is the use of Lorenz curves (or integrals 
thereof) which gives graphical representation to measures of inequality. However, simple 
density functions, and in particular nonparametric density functions, can often be a very useful 
tool for analysing distribution and Deaton is a strong advocate of this approach (1997: 169). 
An advantage of using nonparametric density functions is that they are not dependent on any 
particular economic theory (and consequently the assumptions implicit in, or explicit to, the 
theory). Rather, nonparametric density functions allow the data to speak for themselves, 
unfiltered and untainted by theory. Mukherjee et al (1998: 35) term this “ exploratory data 
analysis” . They qualify this with a caution though: “ Data themselves do not tell you anything 
unless you engage with data in a dialogue which is theory-inspired. It is necessary to fire 
questions at the data so as to get hints and clues from them .” Exploratory data analysis 
explores the data from different angles; it also proceeds by carefully examining the residual 
remaining after readily detectable fits have been removed, and makes extensive use of 
analytical graphics. A further aspect of this approach is to incorporate sensitivity or 
“ fragility” testing.
Nonparametric density functions, in particular the joint density of welfare and consumption, 
can be used to describe the differential effects of price reform on the well-being of the rich 
and poor. This may be a particular useful tool for assessing the welfare effects of water price 
reform in developing countries. Nonparametric density functions are discussed in more detail 
below.
Nonparametric density functions
Nonparametric density functions have the potential to offer a value neutral approach to the 
evaluation of the welfare effects of price reform in the urban water sector. In this section the 
mathematics underlying nonparametric univariate and bivariate density functions are 
described.
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Univariate functions
Histograms and normal density functions provide a visual representation of the position and 
spread of the data and are all that is needed for many purposes. For example, Deaton shows 
the histograms of (log-)normal distributions for per capita expenditure for South African 
households. In this case the log-normal distributions closely approximate the actual 
distributions as represented by histograms (1997: 170). However, there are a number of 
disadvantages to histograms: the choice of the number and the size of categories is arbitrary, 
this choice may affect the distribution where data points are clustered near the category 
boundaries, and the representation is discrete which poses problems for certain kinds of 
analysis (for example, mapping density functions against each other).
One way to get around this problem is to use a nonparametric density function. In lay terms, 
the idea of a nonparametric density function is to create a continuous density function that is 
as close as possible to the original data by using a kind of weighted moving average. The 
nonparametric density function has the form:
f(x) =  1/nh K(.) (8)
where n is the number of observations, h is the bandwidth and K(.) is the kernel function. The 
kernel function K(.) has the form:
K( (x -x )fh ) (9)
At each point x, all values in the population or sample are related to x via the kernel function. 
The kernel function should have three properties: it should be positive and integrate to unity 
over the band, it should be symmetric around zero and it should be decreasing in the absolute 
value of its arguments (Deaton, 1997: 173).
The Epanechnikov Kernel is a popular choice:
K(z) =  0.75 (1 - z2) for -1 < z < 1
=  0 for | z | >  1 (10)
Other functional forms for the kernel are discussed in Deaton (1997: 173). The choice of
bandwidth is of some significance as excessive smoothing can hide important information.293
Bivariate functions
An important advantage of the nonparametric density function presented in the above section 
is that the analysis can be extended easily to two-dimensions.294
293 Methods for estimating an appropriate initial bandwidth are discussed in Deaton (1997:175).
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A question related to the choice of bandwidth arises in this case: should the same bandwidth 
be used in both dimensions? This question is resolved by transforming the data such that the 
transformed variables have equal variance and are orthogonal to one another. The bivariate 
kernels can then be applied symmetrically to estimate the density functions and the data 
transformed back in the final stage.
All of these operations can be done in one stage. For the Epanechnikov kernel, the bivariate 
kernel has the following form:
K(z/t z2) =  (2/71) (1 - z 2 - Zi2) 1 (z 2 +  z i  <  1) (11)
The data are transformed using its variance-covariance matrix before applying the kernel 
smoothing. This can be accomplished by defining
ti2 =  Cq - - x) (12)
where V is the 2 x 2 variance-covariance matrix of the sample, and calculating the density 
estimate as:
f(xux2) = 2(detV)-,/2/(7tNh2) S i=1...N (1- t 2/h2) 1 (tj < 1) (13)
Deaton summarises this exposition as follows:
The bivariate estimates display the empirical structure underlying any 
statistical relationship between two variables. Just as the univariate densities 
are substitutes fo r  histograms, bivariate densities can be used in place o f  
cross-tabulation. In the context o f welfare measurement, bivariate densities 
can illustrate the relationship between two different measures o f  welfare, 
calories and income, or income and expenditure, or between welfare measures 
in two periods. They can also be used to display the allocation o f public 
services in relation to levels o f living [and] to illuminate the distributional 
effects of pricing policies. (1997:179, own emphasis)
The practical application of bivariate density analysis will be illustrated in the next section. 
The empirical evidence
Given the important influence that the reform of water prices may have on welfare and equity, 
the lack of empirical literature on the subject is remarkable. Four kinds of studies are briefly 
examined here: the determination of the income-elasticity of demand, the demand for access 
to water, the results of contingent valuation studies, changes in welfare using the Marshallian 
consumer surplus method and nonparametric bivariate density analysis.
294 In principle this analysis can be extended to multi-dimensions, however, in practice this creates a 
number of difficulties: there is a computational cost, very large sam ple sizes are required and the 
presentation of the results is difficult (Deaton, 1997:179).
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The income-elasticity of water demand
Income elasticities reported by Hanemann (1997) for the United States are shown in Figure 4. 
The results display a wide range with the majority of studies reporting an income-elasticity of 
less than 0.5.
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Figure 4: Income-elasticities for the USA (32 studies)
Katzman (1977) calculated arc income-elasticities by income group in a developing country 
context and obtained the following results: 0.24 - 0.3 for the poor to middle range and 0.32 - 
0.39 for the middle to rich range. Cairncross and Kinnear (1992) found the income-elasticity 
of demand to be zero amongst households in informal settlements buying water from vendors.
The empirical estimation of the income-elasticity of demand for water is open to the same 
criticisms raised in Chapter 6 with respect to the estimation of the price-elasticity of demand. I 
assert that, in general, either arc-type measurements of income-elasticities of demand or 
nonparametric bivariate analysis of the consumption and income density distributions are 
preferable methods of analysis as these are not susceptible to the problems of parametric 
regression analysis.
The demand for access
There is very little data available on the price-elasticity of demand for access to urban water 
supplies. In theory, the price-elasticity of demand for access should be zero if connections are 
made compulsory. However, in practice this is usually not workable, especially in developing 
countries. Evidence from Columbia suggests that a significant number of urban households 
will choose not to connect to the public water system despite legal connection requirements 
(Bahl and Linn, 1992: 298). The price-elasticity of demand for official connections is likely 
to be a function of how easy it is to connect illegally to the network and how much this costs 
relative to an official connection. For example, in Bogota and Jakarta, illegal connections
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have been quite common in poor neighbourhoods and have been related to the high cost of 
connections (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 298). McPhail (1994) also concluded that in the urban 
areas of Tunis, it appears that the most important obstacle in connecting to the piped water 
system is the utility-required cash down payment. Some attribute this to a failure in the 
household credit market rather than the cost of the connection (see Singh et al, 1993). 
Alternatively, illegal connections could arise as a result of an unfulfilled demand due to a the 
lack of institutional capacity or adequate infrastructure to make the connections (McPhail, 
1993). The price-elasticity of demand for connections is also likely to be a function of income 
and is likely to be much higher for low income households compared to high income 
households. If alternatives are available, then the price-elasticity of demand is likely to be 
higher than otherwise.
Contingent valuation methods can be used to assess the willingness-to-pay for individual 
household connections to a piped water system. However, poor households in developing 
countries generally will not be able to pay the full capital cost of the connection and hence the 
value of undertaking contingent valuation surveys solely for this purpose is questionable.
Contingent valuation
Goldblatt (1997) notes that remarkably few studies have been undertaken in the water supply 
sector in general.295 It is also apparent from his review that even fewer willingness-to-pay 
studies on water have been undertaken in urban areas.
The available evidence on water vending suggests that where public supplies are not adequate, 
it is the poor who end up paying most (per unit) for water and it is not unusual for these 
households to spend up to 20 percent of their income on water and sometimes even more than 
this (Goldblatt, 1997: 25; Cairncross and Kinnear, 1992).
A number of studies found willingness-to-pay surprisingly high (Whittington et al, 1989, 
McPhail, 1993). However, it is not possible to generalise from these results.
Meta-surveys have been undertaken in an attempt to understand the key factors affecting 
willingness-to-pay. Determinants of willingness-to-pay may be divided into three categories: 
socio-economic and demographic, the nature of the supply and available alternatives, and the 
perception of the role of government. Although household income was found to be an 
important determinant, it is not necessarily the overriding determinant (Goldblatt, 1997: 30). 
Gender and education have been found to be statistically significant determinants of 
willingness-to-pay. The difference in the characteristics of existing and proposed
295 Goldblatt’s  (1997) excellent review of contingent valuation studies is used a s  the primary source for the 
evidence presented here.
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improvements to supplies is a strong determinant of willingness-to-pay; so is the amount that 
people are currently paying for water. It has been found, not surprisingly, that people are 
willing to pay substantially more for private connections than access to a public tap (Goldblatt, 
1997: 30). Lastly, the attitude of the community towards government and the perception of the 
role and responsibility of government as well as the likelihood and expectation that the 
government will provide subsidised services significantly influences willingness-to-pay. The 
World Bank has noted that “ the sense of entitlement and equity may be a significant obstacle 
to the charging of realistic prices for water” (World Bank Water Demand Research Team, 
1993: 58).
Goldblatt (1997) undertook a contingent valuation study of willingness-to-pay in two informal 
urban settlements in South Africa. His study found that there was almost universal agreement 
amongst the households surveyed that payments for water supplies were necessary; some 64 
percent of households would only connect to a piped water supply system if their monthly 
expenditure was below five percent of their income (thus the results were broadly supportive 
or the traditional “ five percent rule”); this amount equated more or less to the operating cost 
of a full level of service but only fo r  a very small amount o f water and could not cover 
operating costs for the likely consumption from a private connection nor the capital costs.
There were two very distinct limitations to the study. First, households could estimate how 
much they were willing to pay on a monthly basis but were unable to estimate how much 
water they would consume with a private household connection, and in particular the marginal 
value of the increased consumption.295 Second, the survey was unable to determine how 
political and social factors affect willingness-to-pay. The report noted that the results of a 
willingness-to-pay study “ [do] not negate the possibility that political will is the transcendent 
force controlling the speed of improvements in water supply” and further that it does not 
provide answers to “ the moral questions concerning the welfare role o f  government, and 
whether water supplies, and other urban services, are a good vehicle for pursuing welfare 
strategies” (Goldblatt, 1997: 117). For example, Goldblatt argues that “ although poor urban 
residents are willing to pay an amount adequate to cover the [costs of] their water supplies, it 
[may] not [be] appropriate to expect low-income households to spend five  percent o f their 
income on water alone. Given the importance of water as a basic need, it could be argued that 
it provides a useful vehicle for subsidisation of the poor” (1997: 117). In fact, the results of 
the survey support this argument. Households were having to pay for water from vendors 
from public standpipes and were consuming less than 15 led which is generally regarded as
296 Goldblatt notes that the results “suggest that respondents m ade their bids based on a percent of budget 
available for w ater supply or on a total monthly amount they were willing to pay and not on a valuation of 
a quantity of water per se"  (1997:120).
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inadequate. This may have to do with supply constraints (wide spacing of public taps), but it 
is equally probable that the small consumption arises from financial constraints, that is, the 
high cost of the water from vendors. The last point is that the reliability of willingness-to-pay 
surveys to predict consumer behaviour can be ascertained only by conducting follow-up 
studies in the communities after they have received improved water surveys.
The author collected data on willingness to pay for water in urban areas in Uganda (Eberhard, 
2000). Where alternative sources of water are not readily available, willingness to pay for 
water is high, up to $3 per kl which is more than six times the price of water from the piped 
network. “Willingness” , in this sense, is a misleading term; it is more likely that households 
are faced with worse alternatives or no real choice at all. Households “ afford” these high 
payments in the sense that they actually make them, but many households spend more than 
10% of their incomes on water, suggesting that sacrifices on other important expenditure 
items are being made. It is therefore not surprising that the availability of alternative water 
sources significantly affects the willingness to pay for vended water or standpipe. Average 
consumption from standpipes is between 10 and 15 litres per capita per day (led). Many 
households rely on informal water sources for additional needs (primarily bathing and 
washing). The consumption of water from standpipes is not price sensitive (average 
consumption from standpipes charging very different prices for water is very similar).
A considerable proportion of households without private connections currently spend $6 per 
month for water from standpipes and/or vendors (20% of households spend less than $40 per 
month on all expenditure items, hence for 20% of households an expenditure of $6 accounts 
for more than 15% of household expenditure). Households who are currently paying $6 per 
month for public standpipe water could “ afford” (arguably) a private connection provided 
they did not have to pay for the physical cost of the connection nor a fixed monthly fee, and 
the household was able to limit its consumption to 11 kl per month (equivalent to about 75 led 
for a family of 5). (Average consumption for private connections is 32 kl per connection per 
month.) The high cost of connection ($200) is a real barrier to accessing the piped network. 
New private connections also are constrained by the absence of an adequate secondary and 
tertiary distribution network in many places.
In summary, contingent valuation surveys of willingness to pay cannot be used to demonstrate 
price-quantity relationships, nor are they useful for predicting the rate of connecting to a 
network, although they can give an indication of a maximum amount that households may be 
willing to pay on a monthly basis for improved water supplies. The latter result needs to be 
interpreted cautiously as it does not take into account the political and social context of
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services provision. Also, typically there may be a proportion of households who may prove to 
be unable to pay for services even though they may be willing to pay.
Consumer surplus and welfare
Renzetti (1992), noting that very few studies have been undertaken which examine the welfare 
effects of water price reform, undertook such an analysis for Vancouver, Canada. Renzetti's 
starting premise was that marginal-cost pricing will maximise social welfare. He noted that 
marginal-cost prices, in fact, can be interpreted in different ways and he tested three different 
types of marginal-cost pricing (Ramsey pricing and two forms of seasonal two-part short-run 
marginal-cost pricing with a revenue constraint) against both the currently employed pricing 
practice and average historic cost pricing. In order to analyse the overall welfare effects of a 
change in the pricing schema used, he assumes that the distribution o f household water 
demand is identical to the distribution o f  incomes and then makes use of a “ representative 
household” to make the Marshallian consumer surplus welfare evaluations. The consumption 
data set for this “ representative household” is obtained by dividing aggregate residential water 
purchases per month by the number of residential consumers. Residential water demand 
estimates are calculated using a two-stage least squares approach with an instrumental variable 
for price (to avoid simultaneity bias) (Renzetti, 1992: 153).
The results of the regression analysis of water demand show an income-elasticity of less than 
0.1 which flatly contradicts the assumption used to generate the “ representative household” . 
The estimates of the price-elasticity of household demand were found not to be statistically 
significant but were used nevertheless, ostensibly because “ they are quite close to the 
estimates of summer and winter price-elasticities reported by Howe and Linaweaver [1967]” , 
and notwithstanding the fact that these estimates were calculated 25 years previously 
(Renzetti, 1992: 154). (No other justification was given for the use of the statistically 
insignificant results.) The price-elasticity for demand for water is also calculated as an average 
point-elasticity irrespective of consumer income. This is obviously a problem for the validity 
of the welfare analysis undertaken. A separate demand equation was calculated for aggregate 
industrial demand and the price-elasticity of demand for industrial water was estimated to be - 
1.9. Renzetti did not comment on the fact that the calculated elasticity is large compared to 
those reported in other studies, nor did he suggest any reasons for this.
The change in aggregate welfare was estimated by measuring the change in each user group's 
(residential and industrial) Marshallian consumer surplus. First the Marshallian surplus for the 
representative household was estimated, then this was aggregated over all income levels. 
While Renzetti notes that “ it is well understood that the change in welfare of a heterogeneous 
population is not perfectly indexed by a change in aggregate Marshallian consumer surplus”
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he defends his choice of method by making two assumptions: the demand for water is 
independent of the demand for outputs from the commercial sector, and the industrial sector is 
either perfectly competitive or faces a linear demand curve (1992: 158). These are not 
particularly plausible assumptions. Quite apart from this, Renzetti's analysis in unable to take 
account of the distributional outcomes between households.
Renzetti found that implementing a revenue constrained two-part price with a fixed charge to 
make up the deficit and a marginal price based on off-peak short-run marginal costs and peak 
long-run marginal costs would result in an overall increase in welfare of about 4 percent 
compared to average cost pricing. In contrast to this, implementation of Ramsey prices would 
result in a net reduction in aggregate welfare of 13 percent compared to average cost pricing.
The price changes result in an increase in aggregate consumer surplus in the industrial sector 
and a reduction in aggregate consumer surplus in the residential sector. This is because the 
demand of water was estimated to be much more price-elastic in the industrial sector 
compared to the household sector and the marginal-cost pricing rule reduced the commodity 
charge for industrial consumers.
The restrictive assumptions necessary for the calculation of the overall welfare effect of price 
reform using the Marshallian consumer surplus mean that the results obtained from the 
analysis may be misleading. The use of a representative household and the assumptions 
required to sustain this are especially problematic. Moreover, the method is not able to 
analyse the inter-household welfare distribution implications of water price reform, a topic 
that is particularly important in a developing country context. I conclude that Renzetti's 
methodology is not suitable for the analysis of the welfare effects of water price reform.
Distribution analysis using density functions
No studies of distribution or inequality in relation to the provision and pricing of water using 
density functions have been reported in the literature. Deaton (1997) used this approach to 
study the distributional implications of reform to the price of rice in Thailand and the 
implementation of an age-qualified state pension in South Africa.
Nonparametric density functions appear to be a promising methodology for use in the analysis 
of the distributional implications of water policy and pricing reform. The author applied this 
method to a case-study of water pricing in Grahamstown, South Africa (Eberhard, 1999c). 
The analysis is based on census data (by enumerator area), the municipal valuation roll and 
water consumption data from the municipal billing system.
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It is not easy to link the census data directly to water consumption data. The Central Statistics 
Service does not release household level data in such a way as to make a direct link to water 
consumption information possible. However, average household income per enumerator area 
(typically a geographically contiguous grouping of 100 to 300 households) can be calculated 
and used to good effect.
Average household income. Average monthly income per household in each enumerator area 
(EA) in Grahamstown together with the cumulative population across these is shown in Figure 
5. (Data were obtained for 83 enumerator areas.)297 The discrepancy in average incomes 
between the areas with low and high monthly incomes is striking. This data could be used to 
target tariff policies. For example, connection pricing policies (the cost of a new connection 
and the monthly or annual fee) could be based on area characteristics if other more suitable 
information is not available.
A verage Incom e by EA
6 000 45000 
% 40000
35000 o
30000 ■=4 000
in
25000 2
20000 %
15000 3
10000
mwHtiiian-HHiHwmwitiiwfHmwHiumuiHHHiiuumtiil 0
income by EA cumulative population
Figure 5: Average household income (Rands) by Enumerator Area (EA) in Grahamstown 
Household size distribution. The census data also provide information on household sizes 
which are presented in Figure 6. The data show that average household sizes of more than 6 
are not uncommon. Of more interest is the distribution of household size within the 
enumerator areas. It is not uncommon for one-sixth of households in an enumerator area to 
have a household size of more than 10 and for maximum household sizes to be up to twenty. 
This analysis suggests caution with respect to the progressivity claim of steep increasing block 
price structures.
297 Enumerator a reas with less than fifty households were discarded.
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Figure 6: Household size distribution by enumerator area in Grahamstown
Census data, when analysed by enumerator area, can provide a useful cross-check on the 
likely outcomes of different pricing policies and may be used to improve the targeting of price 
subsidies in the absence of more suitable information.
The valuation roll provides another useful source of information for the pricing policy analyst. 
Typically, the valuation roll provides information on the land and/or property values in the 
municipal area, the type of land-use (for example, business, residential or institutional), the 
property area and amount of general rates levied. In contrast to the Census information, this 
data can be correlated with water consumption information.
In the case of Grahamstown, the valuation roll was obtained. (Unfortunately, the roll was only 
available for “ Grahamstown West” -  this area was formerly zoned as “white” under 
apartheid policies.) Non-parametric analysis was used to map the density distributions of 
water consumption against residential property values and property areas respectively in 
Grahamstown West. The results of this analysis (presented in the Appendix 2) show there are 
quite clear relationships between the density distributions of property value and consumption, 
and between property area and consumption, although there is a significant spread in the data. 
In the case of property value, there is a significant density concentration where property 
values are in range R40 000 to R80 000 and water consumption in the range 10 to 30 kl per 
month. However, there is no obvious relationship between consumption and property value 
where consumption exceeds 30 kl per month. In the case of property area, these are clustered 
in the range 400 to 1200 m2 with corresponding consumption in the range 10 to 30 kl per 
month. Again, there is no obvious relationship between property area and consumption where
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consumption exceeds 30 kl per month. This analysis could be extended to examining the 
incidence of different price reforms (in relation to both annual rates assessments, annual or 
monthly fixed charges and linear or non-linear consumption related charges).
The results of this analysis show that nonparametric density analysis may be a powerful tool 
for examining the incidence of different water pricing reforms. Alternative multiple- 
regression-type analyses have significant limitations which are discussed in Chapter 6.
Summary and conclusions
The review of the neo-classical theory of welfare measurement revealed a number of inherent 
limitations. Consumer well-being bears little relation to welfare as measured by the utility 
metric. The theory of consumer welfare is dependent on the measurement of individual 
consumer welfare. In practice, welfare measurements often rely on the constitution of a 
“ representative consumer” but this hides important inter-household effects and the 
aggregation of welfare effects across consumers using this construction is not strictly valid. 
Aggregate welfare measures typically rely on the highly problematic assumption that the value 
of a change in consumption is the same for rich and poor consumers alike. Although social 
welfare functions are able to address this issue, their use gives rise to other own problems -  
the choice of welfare function and the weights used are subjective and the results may hide 
more than they reveal. It is not the subjectivity itself that is a problem, but the tendency for 
the subjectivity to be unacknowledged or insufficiently emphasised in practical applications.
Contingent valuation methodology is flawed with respect to both theory and practice. 
Theoretically, households are required to leap across a double contingency -  to value a service 
both outside of their experience and with an unknown future quantity-price combination. In 
practice, surveys also may suffer from strategic and starting point biases. The political- 
economic context will typically have an overriding influence on consumer demand and welfare 
yet contingent valuation methodology is unable adequately to take this into account.
Nonparametric density functions provide a promising methodology for analysing the 
distributional effects of price reform because it is not theory laden, it enables the “ data to 
speak for themselves” and it is transparent.
There is remarkably little literature reporting empirical measurements of welfare and 
inequality within the water sector. The available literature was reviewed and its limitations 
and weaknesses pointed out. An application of nonparametric density analysis to distributional 
issues in an urban water context in South Africa was demonstrated. This showed that this
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approach has considerable potential though it also has limitations which are imposed by data 
constraints.
5. Implications for a critical-realist approach
An analysis of justice and equality inevitably involves subjectivity. This does not present a 
valid objection to the consideration of these topics.298 Political philosophers endeavour to 
develop a coherent framework within which justice and equality can be evaluated. Three 
viewpoints were presented: utilitarianism, Rawls’ “justice as fairness” and Sen’s "equality of 
capability” . The differences between these philosophical approaches arise largely (but not 
exclusively) from the choice of the basal equality space and the relative emphasis put on this 
space. It was pointed out that the choice of space in any context, and indeed the meanings 
attributed to the concepts of justice and equality, will be socially determined and contested, 
and will be dependent on the specific political-economic history. Therefore, an analysis of 
justice and inequality which ignores the contestedness of the meanings of justice and equality 
and ignores how current injustices and inequalities came into being will be of limited value.
The prominence and importance of justice and equality issues in the water sector in general, 
and the urban water specifically, was noted. The practice of urban water pricing will be 
heavily influenced by how the contest over the meanings is played out. Consequently, it is not 
possible to understand the practice of urban water pricing in any specific location without an 
understanding of the political-economic history giving rise to present circumstances.299 
Further, it was argued that Sen’s emphasis on the “ freedoms to function” provides the 
analytical space to examine antecedent diversities in functionings and capabilities, including 
entrenched inequalities arising from gender, race, class and age. In order to meet Rawls’ 
“ equality of primary goods” and Sen’s “equality of capability” goals, an approach to urban 
water pricing should seek, at a minimum, to secure universal access to and use of a specified 
threshold consumption necessary to be healthy and productive. A more radical interpretation 
of Rawls and Sen would imply greater emphasis on the redistribution of primary goods to 
ensure equality of capability. The feasible means to achieve these goals remain unexplored by 
Rawls and Sen.
Different approaches to the measurement of welfare and inequality were critically reviewed. 
The specific weaknesses of traditional social welfare evaluation within neo-classical economics
29B It may be noted here that the analysis of efficiency likewise requires numerous and important subjective 
judgem ents. (See Chapters 2 and 3.)
299 A methodology for undertaking a  political-economic analysis of urban water pricing w as presented in 
Chapter 4.
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were highlighted. Various alternatives were examined, including contingent valuation and 
nonparametric density analysis. Empirical evidence was presented and evaluated. It was noted 
that there is a remarkable paucity of systematic evaluation of the welfare and equity effects of 
price reforms in the water sector. Primary data for Grahamstown were analysed using 
distributional analysis and bivariate nonparametric density functions, demonstrating the 
potential benefits of these techniques to supplement the understanding gained from a political- 
economic analysis of water pricing in any particular context.
In conclusion, the review of justice and inequality presented here reinforces and extends the 
conclusions presented in Chapter 4. Moreover, to borrow from words of an earlier period, a 
sole focus on inequality is to ‘make the great error of reformers and philanthropists ... to 
nibble at the consequences of unjust power, instead of redressing the injustice itself (Mill, 
1965: 953).
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Chapter 6: The water environment
Ensuring sustainability
The decimation o f the Aral Sea in central Asia ranks among the more dramatic 
in a long list o f natural areas destroyed, degraded, or at grave risk from  
human use and abuse o f water. The damming, diverting, and polluting o f  
watercourses with little regard fo r  the environmental services they provide has 
wreaked havoc on the world's wetlands, deltas, lakes, and riverine habits. Of 
all the threatened forms o f biological diversity on earth, aquatic life may be 
the most in jeopardy. (Postel, 1992: 61)
1. Introduction
Water is inextricably linked to the natural environment and the development of a pricing 
methodology would be incomplete without consideration of the relationship between water 
pricing and the environment.
Environmental concerns became prominent in the water sector in the early 1970s. Engineering 
solutions to the problems of “water scarcity” dominated the debate at that time. Issues related 
to water resource quality and ecological stress came to the fore in the 1980s. The field of 
environmental economics grew rapidly in response to the popularisation of these concerns in 
the “water crisis literature” (my term). A combination of factors has led to increased 
opposition to large dams and the search for new solutions to meet future water demands and to 
manage water stress. I argue that both technologically-based and narrow environmental 
economics-based solutions are ill-conceived as they fail to take adequate account of political- 
economic considerations. (Section 2 presents a detailed criticism of the neo-classical based 
environmental economics approach.) Postel (1997) takes the search for solutions a step further 
by calling for the development of a “water ethic” . While this is admirable, the conditions 
under which such an ethic might develop are left unexplored. I argue that the social value 
attributed to the environment, and hence the nature and effect of social interaction and 
management of the environment, are fundamentally contingent on the underlying political- 
economic dynamics. The nature of these dynamics is illustrated with reference to the debate 
around large dams.
The efficacy of pricing to achieve “efficient” resource use is dependent both on the definition 
of efficiency and on the actual effect price changes have on water demand. Much of this 
chapter is devoted to examining the theory and empirical measurement of water demand in 
detail. It shows that the practice of demand measurement is formally inconsistent with neo­
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classical demand theory and demonstrates that insurmountable methodological and practical 
hurdles exist (Section 3). This renders empirical price-elasticity estimates of demand largely 
meaningless for all intents and purposes.
I discuss alternative definitions of efficiency and argue that X-efficiency and optimal 
beneficial use provide more satisfactory definitions of efficiency which are more explicitly 
cognisant of the political-economic context and which are able to be pursued in conjunction 
with the consideration of equity and environmental sustainability concerns (Section 4).
Finally I conclude that water resources management is fundamentally a product of the 
underlying political economy.
I make two original contributions in this chapter. The critical review of the econometric and 
theoretical literature on water demand is more comprehensive and detailed than any that exists 
in the literature at present. It presents a serious criticism of the practice of empirical analysis 
in the field with important practical consequences. These consequences, when combined with 
the critical review of the environmental literature on sustainable development, present new 
insights into urban water pricing which contribute substantively to the critical-realist approach 
to urban water pricing advocated here.
2. Water pricing and the environment
Environmental concerns influence water pricing in many ways. Space does not permit a 
comprehensive review and the discussion therefore is restricted to policies and approaches 
advocated by environmentalists in three areas: the “global water crisis” , opposition to large 
dams, and sustainable development.
“Global water crisis”
Malin Falkenmark was the first to make the “global water crisis” viewpoint prominent. In the 
early 1970s she asserted that a crisis exists (or looms in the near future) because the “stock” 
of fresh water resources is inadequate to meet current and future needs locally in many 
countries and regions (and even globally).300 Although this theme is neither new nor unique to 
water resources,301 it has gained increasing international currency and a plethora of books on 
the “global water crisis” has been published.302
300 S ee Falkenmark and Lindh (1975).
301 See, for example, Meadows e ta l  (1972) and Brown (1995).
302 See, for example, Clarke (1991), Gleick (1993) and Postel (1992,1999).
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Falkenmark and Lindh (1975) focused on hydrology and the need to remedy the crisis by 
“extensive interference with the natural hydrological cycle” to “ transfer water from the places 
where it is available to the places where it forms a necessary ingredient of human life” by 
means of large projects. This required the application of hydrological skills and international 
co-operation to achieve “more efficient joint use of multinational water resources” .303 The 
limits to this supply side approach were soon recognised in the context of the cost of large 
projects and a ground swell of opposition to these on various grounds (see below). An 
approach that focuses only on supply side measures is clearly flawed.
In response to the increasing opposition to large-scale water supply projects, Clarke (1991) 
emphasised local approaches to water scarcity. He called for a “ water security programme” 
comprising the following initiatives: to increase local water availability through initiatives 
such as water harvesting and improved management; to increase local (decentralised) storage; 
to include water needs in development project planning; to develop local food storage; to 
stabilise water prices and ensure affordability, especially for poor households, and to maintain 
food self-sufficiency in staples; to create a “water aid agency” to supply financial and 
technical aid to water crises and for pro-active water planning to avert crises; and to develop 
an early warning system for droughts (Clarke, 1991: 175). Obviously, local approaches can 
provide solutions in a limited range of contexts only. Certainly, such an approach will not 
solve the problems of water supply for large urban centres (and will probably be of only 
limited application in rural areas).
Whilst Postel (1997) also presents an “alarmist” view with respect to the availability of global 
water resources,304 the policies and strategies she advocates to avert this “ impending crisis” 
are more holistic and balanced than the “supply side” and “ local sources” solutions presented 
above. Recognising that supply side options cannot be ignored and that local sources should be 
responsibly exploited, she recommends reducing demand through conservation, improved 
efficiency and better management. She embraces the importance and necessity of providing 
economic incentives to help achieve these objectives: “ setting prices closer to the real cost of 
supplying water is a key component of both urban and industrial conservation” (1997: 166). 
However, Postel argues that economic incentives on their own are insufficient, and may result 
in perverse outcomes, and calls for the establishment of a “water ethic” which has, at its 
base, a “deep appreciation of water’s fundamental role as the basis of life” (1997: x):
303 This statem ent, which is the only one in the book with any economic content, is not amplified at all.
304 Postel argues that over 50 percent of accessible water resources w as being used in 1990 (35 percent 
for irrigation, industry and domestic needs and 19 percent for in-stream flow requirements): that water 
dem and trebled between 1950 and 1990 and is expected to double again within the next 35 years; and 
that water resources will be over-reached by 2025 (Postel, 1997).
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Without [this ethic], we will keep whittling away [water’s] life sustaining 
ecological functions. Drip irrigation, low-flush toilets, and other efficiency 
measures are critically important because they enable us to do more with less.
But i f  we use the water saved through efficiency measures merely to fill more 
swimming pools, to irrigate more golf courses, and to support millions more 
meat-rich diets, we will get no closer to a sustainable world; we will simply 
allow unsustainable levels o f consumption and population growth to persist a 
bit longer. (Postel, 1997: x)
This “ethical approach” recognises that the inequality in resource allocation and excessive 
luxurious resource use are primary contributors to resource constraints (particularly those 
affecting the poor). In this context, Postel criticises the trend towards the commodification of 
water as follows:
In principle, there is nothing wrong with properly valuing water’s role as a 
commodity. ... The risk, however, is that water’s economic functions will be 
elevated over its life support functions, and that the three pillars o f 
sustainability -  efficiency, equity and ecosystem protection -  will not be given 
equal weight. (Postel, 1997: xxviii)
In Postel’s view, the pressure for the commodification of water has arisen out of the need to 
finance rising capital and operating and maintenance costs of water supply but she cautions 
that privatisation is inherently risky to both the poor and the environment.
Many economists would point out that, as the scarcity of a resource increases, price 
adjustments will automatically result in demand being balanced with available supplies.305 
Further, environmental economists would argue that the proper valuation of the environment 
would remove price distortions and create the right balance between development and 
conservation (see below). In response, Postel argues that, at least as far as the environment 
and water are concerned, price responses are both too little and too late,306 and furthermore, 
“ getting the prices right” is not enough because a mere correction of prices does not address 
equity concerns in any real way, and without this sustainable development will be 
unachievable.
Whilst Postel’s approach implies a political-economic analysis, her proposed solution (the 
development of a “environmental ethic”) is utopian and lacks substance: it fails to address 
important concerns such as who will develop it, how it will be developed, and in whose 
interests it will be developed, The solutions proposed are of limited value because they are not 
grounded in political-economic realities.
305 Higher prices can potentially serve the dual function of reducing dem and and  increasing supplies.
306 S ee  the Aral S ea  and the Colorado River Delta examples cited later in this chapter.
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Opposition to large dams
Large dams play an important role in supplying water to cities in both the developed and the 
developing worlds. Opposition to large dam projects has begun to exert an important influence 
on the development and status of these projects. The voices against large dam development are 
numerous and a comprehensive review is not presented here.307 Key arguments against the 
development of large dams are outlined below.
Pearce (1992) argues that “ everywhere large projects are both the consequence of and the 
justification for authoritarian government” and comments that it is “ no surprise” that the US 
Corps of Engineers is the prominent builder of large dams in the United States and that 
“Stalin’s secret police supervised the construction of [the Soviet Union’s] dams and canals” 
(Pearce, 1992: 345).
Ward (1997) argues that large dams lend themselves to political influence and that this has 
served to promote some large dams, citing as an example the High Aswan Dam. Ward 
contends that political influence (to achieve various political goals and/or private financial 
gain) is “more likely than not” to affect large dam construction decisions and gives the 
example of British finance for the Malaysian Pergau dam being (illegally) contingent on 
Malaysia’s purchase of British military hardware and resulting in the go-ahead of an unsound 
dam project.308
Large dams often involve large-scale community displacements with consequent social and 
economic costs.309 In some instances unique community lifestyles are lost forever as occurred, 
for example, during the construction of the Kariba Dam in Zimbabwe. Large dams may also 
adversely affect health. For example, Lake Nasser, formed behind the Aswan High Dam, has 
been blamed for a “dramatic increase” in waterborne diseases (Postel, 1997: 57).
Large dams almost inevitably give rise to significant environmental damage. The kinds of 
damage include increased salinity in soils and water bodies, loss of natural exploitable 
resources (for example, fish stocks) and loss of species. The environmental (and economic)
307 S ee, for example, Ribeiro (1994), Ryder (1990), Lavergne (1984), Goldsmith and Hilyard (1984), 
P earce (1992), Ward (1997), and Topping (1995).
300 The aid am ount w as £234 million. The value of the armaments deal which included jet fighters and 
subm arines w as £1.3 billion. An all-British consortium also won a £400 million construction contract for 
the dam. The ODA (the conduit of the British aid money) had advised the Foreign Secretary that “the 
dam w as not a  sound development project” (“High court rules money for dam project w as unlawful” The 
Guardian, 11 November 1994, quoted in Ward, 1997: 57).
309 The Three Gorges Dam will require the resettlement of many hundreds of thousands of people (Ward, 
1997).
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damage caused to the Aral Sea is considered to be largely irreversible (Postel, 1997).310 The 
damming and over-exploitation of the Colorado River in the United States has resulted in 
irreversible damage to the Colorado River delta in Mexico taking away the economic base and 
livelihood of whole communities dependent on the delta (Postel, 1997). There appears to be a 
trend towards the decommissioning of (mostly small) dams in the United States in an effort to 
restore natural environments.311
Ribeiro (1994) argues that very large projects primarily serve to further capitalist interests and 
while some people assert that large dams, per se, are anti-developmental and undemocratic 
and should not be constructed under any circumstances (Pearce, 1992).312 Others argue that 
large dam construction should only go ahead where the benefits exceed the cost provided that 
the costs accurately reflect the true costs, including the environmental, social and other 
damages and all opportunity costs. The latter group contend that cost benefit analyses need to 
be more thorough than in the past. In this context, the World Commission on Dams was 
established in 1998 with the brief of “bringing a more responsible approach to investments in 
large dam projects by conducting the first-ever independent global review of their costs and 
benefits” and “ to establish standards for large dams and assess alternatives” .313
Large dam projects in developing countries invariably require international finance. 
Consequently, multinational finance agencies such as the World Bank have considerable 
influence.314 Large dam projects clearly are a “ site of contest” . The outcomes of this contest, 
and the relevance of these outcomes for particular countries, will be determined by specific 
political-economic forces. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to international 
capitalist interests mediated through multilateral finance agencies.315
310 The Aral S ea, which has shrunk to such an extent that som e of the S ea 's  ports are now more than 
30km away from the water, ed to yield over 25 000 tons offish per annum but now the harvest is zero 
(Ward, 1997:51).
311 S ee  Gleick (2000).
312 S ee also Singh (1997).
313 “By working closely with both advocates and opponents of large dam s, the Commission's 12 members 
will seek  to overcome the deadlock which has polarised the international debate on large dams" (Press 
statem ent on the creation of the Commission on 18 February 1998). The meeting, at which the decision 
to establishm ent the Commission w as taken, was hosted by the World Bank and lUCN-The World 
Conservation Union and included a broad array of stakeholders.
314 In South Africa, for example, the construction of further phases of the Lesotho Highlands W ater project 
could be contingent on international financial support.
315 Ribeiro (1994) gives an excellent account of the political economy of large dam construction.
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Pricing and sustainable development
David Pearce’s writings are used as the basis for the discussion on pricing and sustainable 
development presented below.316 The implications of sustainability for a critical-realist 
approach to urban water pricing are evaluated in the following section.
Defining sustainable development. Pearce et al (1990a) take as their starting point the 
following definition of sustainable development: “ to ensure that development meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” ,317 Pearce et al (1990a) argue that there are three core implications of an understanding 
of sustainable development for economic analysis: the natural environment has a value over 
and above its pure “ resource utility value” because the state of the environment affects both 
directly and indirectly a wider concept of “wealth” which includes the quality of life; the time 
horizon of economic analysis should be extended to include future generations;318 and intra- 
generational equity concerns must be addressed because inequalities give rise to environmental 
degradation. Pearce et al (1990a) argue that maintaining a constant stock of wealth (capital 
and money assets) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for sustainable development. 
They assert that the value of the stock of natural assets must also be maintained, or at the very 
minimum the sum of the stock of capital and natural assets must be maintained. Toman (1994: 
409) notes that sustainability is “ intimately wrapped up with human values and institutions” 
hence implicitly recognising the political-economic underpinning of the meanings attributed to 
sustainability and its practical manifestations. In this light, he argues for the imposition of 
“safe minimum [environmental] standards determined through political discourse and other 
complex social processes” (1994: 409).
A focus on environmental sustainability thus extends neo-classical economics in three ways: it 
highlights the rights of future generations; it recognises that inequalities give rise to 
environmental degradation; and it requires the measurement of the stock of environmental 
resources as part of welfare accounting.
316 S ee  Pearce (1989), Pearce et al (1990ab), P earce and Turner (1989) and P earce and Warford (1993). 
David Pearce is a prolific writer on the subject of environmental economics and sustainable 
development. He has consulted extensively for international organisations including the OECD and 
World Bank and his influence is significant.
317 This is taken from the Brundtland Commission’s  report “Our common future" (WCED, 1987) which 
established the concept of sustainable development as the basis for an integrated approach to 
economic policy (Pearce et al, 1990a). S ee  Pearce et al (1990a) for a  discussion of alternative 
definitions of sustainable development.
318 Applied welfare economics typically is highly “presentisf (occupied with the current generation). Any 
positive inter-generationa! discount rate has the effect that the welfare of individuals living one 
generation in the future is scarcely relevant to current decision making (Toman, 1994: 400).
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Valuing the natural environment. Pearce et al (1990a) argue that natural environmental 
assets are not valued because of market failure (arising from the absence, or poor functioning, 
of markets). They disagree with the argument that markets don’t exist because the resource is 
not scarce and that markets will develop spontaneously as scarcity increases.319 Various 
techniques are advocated for placing values on the environment.320 Although Pearce et al 
recognise that these techniques are not without problems, they allege that an answer that is 
“approximately right” is better than an answer that is “precisely wrong” .321 Pearce fails to 
point out that the values attributed to the natural environment are inherently subjective and 
inevitably socially contested, and therefore profoundly influenced by the political-economic 
context.
Pro-active versus reactive policies. Pearce et al (1990a) argue for a pro-active approach to 
environmental degradation notwithstanding the general “ time preference of consumers” (who 
would prefer to delay ameliorative expenditure) and the potential for delay to generate 
additional information that may reduce future costs. Three important factors counter these 
preferences for delay: risk aversion in the presence of uncertainty; the irreversibility of some 
environmental degradation; and the cost escalation often associated with increased 
degradation. They argue that these push the balance in favour of anticipatory rather than 
reactive environmental policies. On the other hand, political-economic factors are likely to act 
in the opposite direction, that is, to push costs onto future generations. Pearce does not make 
this latter point explicit.
Cost-benefit analysis. Pearce et al (1990a) argue for greater efforts to be made to integrate 
environmental costs and benefits into project appraisal and for the inclusion of a sustainability 
constraint within any programme of investments. The latter may be accomplished through the 
inclusion of a project with positive environmental benefits that negates any negative outcomes 
caused by the other projects such that environmental assets in the aggregate are maintained. 
The general argument underlying this is that higher costs (and hence prices) will reduce 
environmental damage but this is not necessarily the case (see below).
Pricing and sustainability. Pearce and Warford summarise their argument for using price 
incentives to promote environmental sustainability as follows:
319 Their argument against this is based on the fact that many processes of environmental dam age are 
irreversible and that markets in environmental resources often develop too late to prevent this dam age 
or do not develop at all (where property rights are difficult or impossible to assign).
320 S ee  Pearce et al (1990a) and Dixon and Hufschmidt (1986),
321 Toman (1994), for example, notes that environmental impacts may be uncertain, large and irreversible, 
posing particular problems for the meaningful valuation of environmental assets .
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Prices are powerful incentives. I f  prices are set too low, excessive use is made 
o f the resource. The extreme example is zero-priced resources. ... To secure 
an efficient use o f resources, outputs should be priced at their marginal social 
cost, which comprises the marginal costs o f production and the external costs 
o f the resource degradation caused by producing the good. (Pearce and 
Warford, 1993: 32)
The marginal cost of production referred to is the long-run marginal cost although the 
definition and calculation of this are assumed to be unproblematic and are not discussed at all. 
This argument is, of course, the standard neo-classical one, but with a greater emphasis on 
externalities. Environmental economists (such as Pearce) stress market failures, in particular 
those which cause private costs to diverge from social costs. This failure is attributed to 
inadequately defined property rights. They assert that this failure can be fixed through two 
routes: full privatisation (in which private property rights over the resource are established) or 
public regulation. They recognise that the former may not be feasible in all circumstances 
though they have no problems with that option in principle. For the latter they recommend 
using market-based incentives.
Whilst recognising that market failure provides a rationale for government intervention in 
markets, Pearce strongly cautions that public intervention in resource pricing frequently 
results in prices being set below even the private cost of production or supply (even in 
developed countries) with consequent “excessive” or wasteful use of resources and 
“considerable environmental degradation” (Pearce and Warford, 1993: 32, 174).322 Of 
course, the Pareto-optimality claim in this context suffers from the same defects present in the 
standard neo-classical approach. Interestingly, Pearce and Warford recognise the divergence 
between the theory and practice, and the political-economic ramifications of this. For this 
reason they point out the contradictions in the policy advocacy of international agencies: 
“Although international agencies advise the developing world that interventions distort market 
signals and contribute to environmental degradation, they should also recognise that rich 
countries engage in similar policies” (1993: 174).323
Implications for a critical-realist approach
Economic value. A key tenet of the environmentalist approach is that water in and of itself 
(the drop of water in the stream or in the ground) should be assigned an “economic value” . It
322 For example, they note that electricity prices in the United S tates are set, on average, at a level 23 
percent below the long-run marginal cost price and that the adoption of marginal-cost pricing could save 
$60 billion worth of energy (Pearce and Warford, 1993:181).
323 This is a ca se  of "do as  I say  and not as I do”. It can be argued that such approaches are to the 
advantage of capitalist interests in developed countries who continue to benefit from subsidies and 
“price distortions" whilst advocating their elimination in developing countries.
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is argued that the under-pricing of resources is a key causal factor in the “overuse” of natural 
resources and the consequent environmental damage. The use of markets and other economic 
tools are advocated to determine the “true economic” value of water (see “ Methodology for 
valuing water” below). The subjective nature of the determination, together with the 
contingency of the valuation on the prevailing income distribution, is seldom made explicit. 
Postel (1992) provides a rare criticism of the dangers of over-reliance on pricing, pointing out 
the perverse social consequences of, say, shifting “low value” water for agriculture to “high 
value” water for watering golf courses. Clearly, pricing is only a part of a much larger social 
picture that cannot be ignored. Over-reliance on a “get the prices right” argument is clearly 
dangerous and likely to be politically untenable.
M aintaining the stock of water sources. A strong definition of sustainable development 
implies that the physical stock of water resources available (measured in both quantity and 
quality) should be maintained for future generations. A weak definition of sustainable 
development implies that the sum of the value of the stock of the water resources and the 
value of the capital (money wealth) stock should be maintained over time.
In the case of groundwater, the strong definition would imply that the rate of extraction should 
not exceed the rate of replenishment. This could be achieved either through regulation or 
through pricing (with the price set such that demand equals the natural rate of replenishment). 
A weak definition would imply that the groundwater resource could be over-exploited or 
degraded provided that the wealth created by this action more than compensates for the value 
of the water and the environment that is lost or degraded. This raises the problem of how to 
value the environment (see below).
In the case of surface water, a strict application of the strong definition is probably untenable 
because it would mean that no consumptive use of the water could take place. A non-strict 
application of the strong definition could assert that the extraction of water from a river or 
stream is permissible as long as “no” (or minimal) harm is done to the natural environment. 
Minimum stream flow requirements could fit into this definition of sustainable development. It 
is likely to be easier to regulate this directly rather than by using price.324 In this case, that 
portion of the water resource required to maintain the proper functioning of the environment 
is not subject to pricing or competing uses at all and is, in the true sense of the word, 
“priceless” .
324 Minimum stream  flow requirements have been legislated in som e countries (for example, the United 
S tates and South Africa).
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The weak definition of sustainability would mean that the value added from using the water 
resource must be able to more than compensate for the damage. From an environmental point 
of view it is obvious that this definition is not very satisfactory as there is no guarantee that 
the value added will indeed be used to maintain the stock of natural assets.
An important point to note is that different approaches to the achievement of sustainability 
typically will have very different distributional consequences. A review of environmental 
legislation in the United States shows that the policies on water resources have moved from a 
weak to strong definition of sustainability over time and that this move has been contingent on 
political-economic developments.325
Methodology for valuing water. Pearce asserts that the privatisation of property rights would 
result in the proper valuation of the resource and hence in sustainability. This assertion is 
dubious. In the case of exclusive and sole private ownership of an aquifer, for example, there 
is no guarantee that this aquifer will be managed sustainably.326 Given that the water resource 
is fugitive, water rights are particularly difficult and complex to define, giving rise to high 
transaction costs. One of the more intractable problems with the privatisation of the resource 
itself is the issue of equity.327 Valuing water by means of a market is likely to be applicable in 
only a limited number of circumstances and other means of valuing water are necessary. 
Methodologies for the valuation of water are discussed in Gibbons (1986). The emphasis of 
these methods is on the utilitarian use of water in the environment, for example, the value of 
water for its pollution assimilation capacity or for recreation. Establishing values for the water 
resource itself remains problematic.
Pearce et al (1990a) argue that measurement difficulties should not cause valuation to be 
abandoned and that it is better to err on the side of higher rather than lower values, which is 
in accordance with the general sustainability preference for proactive policies. These 
arguments rest on the assumption that the “proper” valuation of the resource (assuming such 
an evaluation is achievable) will have the desirable consequences in terms of environmental 
sustainability. But this is by no means guaranteed. Attributing an economic value to water is 
clearly a subjective exercise that will be socially determined and dependent on the underlying 
political-economic context.
An alternative approach is to adopt “third best pricing” (Rogers, 1995: personal 
communication). This simply means paying particular attention to the outcomes of any price
325 S ee Frederick (1994).
326 S ee Porter (1996).
327 See, for example, Bauer (1997).
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change. This “ method” emphases that water is part of a wider system, that numerous 
“ feedback loops” exist and that it is not so much the absolute level of the price that matters 
but the effect that price has on a desired set of socially determined objectives.
Pricing and future investments -  cost benefit analysis. The role of cost-benefit analysis in 
the selection of water supply projects has always been somewhat problematic because of the 
difficulty of measuring benefits.328 In practice, the cost of the project is typically reduced to an 
average “price” per unit of water and it is presumed that, as long as there are consumers who 
are willing to purchase the water at that price, then the benefits will exceed the costs.329 A 
“ sustainable development” approach to cost-benefit analysis emphasises the need to include a 
resource cost and all environmental costs in the cost calculation. Not only is the determination 
of these costs subjective, the cost of future projects is also dependent on the subjective choice 
of discount rate.
Pricing and choice of discount rate. Pearce et al (1990a) argue that the discount rate should 
be set equal to “ the” market rate for capital (without recognising that capital markets are 
fragmented and imperfect) and argue that risk and intergenerational equity issues should be 
addressed separately. They assert that the arguments for using a lower social discount rate are 
not persuasive because there is no objective basis for determining this rate. This argument is 
inconsistent because they do not use the same logic when advocating the valuation of natural 
resources that similarly has no objective basis of measurement. The inherent subjectivity 
involved in the choice of discount rate was shown in Chapter 3. The implication of this 
subjectivity is that economic analysis cannot be divorced from political-economic 
considerations.
M arginal-cost pricing. The sustainable development agenda of environmental economists 
generally supports the basic contention of neo-classical economics that resources should be 
priced at their marginal cost. The argument for this is based on the simple premise that if a 
resource is priced at below its marginal social cost, “ too much” of the resource will be used, 
resulting in environmental damage. This is not so much an allocative-efficiency argument as a 
“ resource damage” argument. The inherent subjectivity in the determination of marginal 
social costs and the distributional effects of marginal-cost pricing have been discussed in 
previous chapters.
W ater ethic. The sustainability arguments of the “water crisis” advocates (for example, 
Postel, 1997) largely coincide with those of the environmental economists, who believe that
328 See, for example, Schur (1993).
329 The World Bank has used this approach, historically.
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sustainability can be achieved through the appropriate valuation of the environment and that 
this can be largely achieved using market-based or market friendly techniques. The 
environmental economists’ advocacy of marginal-cost pricing is compatible with neo-classical 
marginal-cost pricing. However they emphasise market failures and recommend ways to value 
environmental costs and benefits in the absence of markets. The need for political intervention 
to implement these recommendations is implicit in their discussion. However, important 
equity issues and the political economy implications of public intervention (or non­
intervention) are not explored. Postel (1997) questions the efficacy of a purely economic 
approach suggesting that, in the absence of an appropriate “water ethic” , it is inevitable that 
water resources will be degraded. The political economy underlying both the absence and 
formation of such an ethic remains unexplored.
Legislation. Legislation is likely to remain an essential component of regulating 
environmental use to promote sustainability. Pricing on its own it distinctly limited. 
Legislative developments are clearly contingent on the underlying political-economic context, 
a fact demonstrated in the history of the development of environmental legislation in the 
United States.330
3. Understanding water demand
Much of the empirical literature on water demand is concerned with the measurement of the 
response of water demand to changes in price. The rationale for this is obvious: if it is 
asserted that marginal-cost pricing will result in the Pareto-efficient allocation of resources 
then it must be shown that water demand does respond to price, and preferably that this 
response is elastic. The empirical literature on water demand that seeks to prove the above 
assertion should be based on the neo-classical theory of consumer demand.
The theory of household water demand
The conceptual poverty of the neo-classical theory of demand has been eloquently stated by 
Fine et al (1996):
330 S ee  Frederick (1994).
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[The theory is distinguished by] its debasement o f human rationale to the level 
o f individualist and calculated hedonism; significantly, production and 
consumption share common analytic principles, with the latter equivalent to a 
self-employed firm  manufacturing “utils” at minimum input cost. ... The 
theory is the sanie irrespective o f  the nature o f the goods or activities 
concerned. ... [Goods are not understood as] distinct, vertically organised 
structures o f provision subject to a wide range o f socio-economic and cultural 
forces which have complex and contradictory outcomes.
Notwithstanding this, the neo-classical theory of household water demand is often taken as a 
given in the water demand literature and then totally ignored in practice. The implications of 
the general theory for the empirical analysis of demand in general, and for water demand in 
particular, are set out below.331
Neo-classical theory starts with the primacy of the preferences of individual consumers (in this 
case, households).332 If consumer choices are assumed to be “ rational” , then it follows that 
there exists a “preference representation function” , which is called an ordinal utility function, 
of the form :333
u = f(q) =  f(ql5 q2, ..., qN) (14)
where qt is the amount of the rth commodity consumed and where there are N  commodities.
The consumer’s choice problem then is reduced to the constrained maximisation of utility,334 
That is,
max u(qj, q2) ..., qN) subject to the household budget constraint 15)
The household budget constraint is usually (though not necessarily) assumed to be linear and 
is represented by:
Z  M i = w (16)
where w is defined as the total outlay (total household expenditure).
In principle, the solution to equations (15) and (16) is the system of ordinary or Marshallian 
demand functions:
qj =  gi (p, w) (17)
331 The discussion follows Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Hanemann (1997).
332 The terms consum er and household will be used synonymously in the text that follows, a practice that is 
hard to defend, but follows almost all the literature.
333 It is said to be an ordinal utility function because the purpose of the function is to order preferences.
The function represents a preference ordering, but is not necessarily unique.
334 Rational consum ers, by definition, wish to maximise their utility.
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That is, each choice of the optimal quantity of good i to consume (qt) is a function of the 
vector of prices ip) and the total household outlay (w).
It should be noted that the linear budget constraint imposes two restrictions on the properties 
of demand functions, namely, that they add up and are homogenous of degree zero. The first 
restriction is represented as follows:
The second restriction refers to the absence of “money illusion” and may be expressed as 
follows:
where K  is some scalar multiplier.
It is important to note that the budget constraint for a household facing a multipart water tariff 
will not be linear. The implications of this will be discussed later.
consumer maximisation problem (equation 15) is extremely difficult. The mathematical 
derivation of demand requires that preferences be strictly convex and that a consumer buy 
some of every good, and further that the utility function be smooth enough to differentiate 
twice. Nothing in the specified consumer axioms guarantees this nor can additional axioms be 
introduced to ensure this without making unrealistic assumptions (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980:36).
Historically, many econometricians interested in the empirical analysis of demand have tended 
to accept these severe restrictions. Two forms of the utility function that have been used 
frequently in the past are the Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary utility functions:
u = A q ^ 1 q2a2 ... qNaN (20)
The restrictions on the Cobb-Douglas function are that A > 0 and 2#,- = 1. In the Stone- 
Geary utility function (equation 21), the ys are interpreted as minimum levels of consumption 
(utility is derived only above a threshold consumption y^.
For the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the ordinary demand function takes the form:
£ p kgk(pt w) = w (18)
gi(Kp, Kw) = gi(p, w) (19)
A general analysis in which the Marshallian demand (equation 17) is directly derived from the
u = A(qL - y,).*1 (q2 - y2)«2 ... (qN - yN)aN (21)
i =  1 ... N (22)
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For the Stone-Geary utility function, the demand function takes the form:
qi =  Y>+ ( w - S p i Y i )  i =  1 - N
Fi
(23)
Price-elasticities can be calculated from the derivatives of these demand functions. Thus the 
own price-elasticity of demand is:
For the Cobb-Douglas utility function this is always equal to -1 because of the restrictions 
placed on the form of the utility function.
Consumer demand theory predicts that the own-price-elasticity of demand will be negative, 
however, there is nothing in the theory that suggests that it should equate to -1. The Cobb- 
Douglas utility Junction therefore places too many restrictions on the analysis o f water 
demand. Similarly, the Stone-Geary utility function also places unnecessary restrictions on 
demand that are unlikely to hold in practice, although these restrictions are somewhat less than 
those imposed by the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Because of the theoretical and practical problems inherent in the “consumer maximisation of 
utility” approach to consumer demand analysis, alternative approaches have been developed. 
One such approach is the cost minimisation approach, which is analogous to the production 
problem. Hence the equivalent of utility maximisation is to:
minimise w = E  Pi qi subject to u(q) (25)
This has also been called the dual problem and the theory surrounding it duality theory.225 
The basic steps used in this approach is to start with a cost function, differentiate this to get 
the compensated (or Hicksian) demand, invert the cost function to get the indirect utility 
function, and substitute the indirect utility function into the Hicksian demand function to get 
the Marshallian demand.
The process starts with the definition of a cost function as a function of prices and utility: 
c(p, u) = w (26)
The cost function is differentiated to get the Hicksian demand function:
i = 5g! (Pi ...Pn,w)
'i “  Qi Spj
(24)
(27)
335 S ee  Chapter 3.
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The cost function is also inverted to get the indirect utility function:
u =  v (p, w) = c (p, v (p, w)) (28)
The indirect utility function is substituted into the Hicksian demand to get the Marshallian 
demand:
g (p, w) =  h(p, u) =  h(p, v (p, w)) (29)
Hence the form of the Marshallian demand curves can be directly derived from the cost 
function.
From duality theory it can be shown that the four general basic properties of demand arising 
from the axioms of rational choice are that they add up, are homogenous of degree zero in 
prices and total expenditure, and their compensated price responses are symmetric and form a 
negative semidefinite matrix (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 44).
The rationality of consumer choice in practice can be proven (or disproven) by measuring the 
so-called Slutsky equation, which is derived from differentiating the middle identity in 
equation (27):
5h; Sg, 5g; 
s*= ^ = - ^ + - ^  <30>
Hence Sy can be calculated directly from an empirically derived set of measurable Marshallian 
demands. Duality theory asserts that if consumer choice is rational, then Sy must be 
symmetrical and negative. Further the theory states that if sy is symmetrical and negative then 
consumer choice (in that particular measurement context) is rational.
Thus, in principle, it is possible to test the theory of demand, that is, to see whether or not 
actual consumer demand response to total outlay and prices behaves in a manner that is 
consistent with that predicted by the axioms of rational choice.
A number of models have been developed to test the theory of consumer demand 
empirically.336 The results of these models show that, in general, “ the restrictions of the 
theory [required to confirm rational demand] do not hold, at least on aggregate data” and that 
“demand functions fitted to aggregate time-series data are not homogenous and probably not 
symmetric” (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 74, 78). Despite this negative conclusion, 
Deaton and Muellbauer are of the opinion that it is not necessary "at this stage” to “abandon”
335 T hese models include the modelling of individual commodities, a logarithmic dem and function, a  linear
expenditure system, a translog model, the Rotterdam model, and the “almost ideal dem and system ” 
(AIDS), and are reported in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980: 60f).
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the axioms of choice and that the misspecifications inherent in the current models should be 
corrected First. They stress the importance of intellectual honesty:
It is our view that a careful transition from theory to application is a 
fundamental prerequisite o f sound econometric work, and we find  much 
current empirical work profoundly unsatisfying [sic] because o f  the lack o f  
such a basis. We believe that many o f  the problems encountered so fa r  can be 
resolved by careful theoretical analysis and that better models have higher 
explanatory power. But it is much more than a question o f  models that f it  well.
The real challenge is one o f intellectual honesty; we must construct models 
that are fundamentally credible as representations o f  the behaviour and 
phenomena we are trying to understand. (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 80)
On the basis of their experience they make the following pertinent points and 
recommendations concerning the modelling of consumer demand. Here these are interpreted 
in the context of urban water demand.
In nearly all of the empirical work they reviewed, they found that (consumer) demand theory 
is used in a *'highly cavalier” fashion in which “relatively little attention is paid to moving 
from theoretical abstraction to empirical reality” (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980:80). This 
statement is certainly applicable to the water demand literature. For example, Hanemann 
(1997: 60) concedes that almost all o f  the empirical demand specifications found in the 
literature are formally inconsistent with neo-classical demand theory.
Aggregation over commodities poses non-trivial problems for the correct application of the 
theory (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 80). Strictly speaking water is not a single commodity 
-  for example, water for drinking, washing and irrigation by the same household will each 
have different demand functions. Therefore, the treatment of water as a single commodity 
(which is almost universally the case in the empirical literature) is not theoretically justified 
and may lead to erroneous results and conclusions.
Most studies treat aggregate data (aggregation across consumers) as if they represented the 
demand of a single consumer on the basis of a common (though usually unstated) argument 
that the problem of aggregation is unimportant. However, there is no reason to suppose that 
this is valid, and this is particularly the case where social choice and inequality are important 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 81). There is clearly the case in the urban water sector, 
particularly in developing countries.
Durable goods represent a special category in consumer demand because they are indivisible, 
they may have a high unit cost and they last through more than one unit time-period. 
Nevertheless, in empirical studies, durable goods are seldom treated in a manner that is 
consistent with these characteristics. This is relevant to water demand in two respects, first, in 
the “purchase” of a water connection, and second, in the investment in a range of durable
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goods that profoundly influence household water demand including property (land), 
landscaping, the house (the building), plumbing fixtures and water using appliances.
Empirical analysis of demand typically treats prices as an exogenous variable. However 
implicit or explicit rationing may occur which fundamentally affects consumer demand. In the 
case of water supply, the type of water connection (and, in some cases, the availability of a 
water connection at all) may place physical limits on water demand in many instances that are 
an important form of non-price rationing. Even the price of water itself may not be truly 
endogenous. In the case of municipal water supplies managed by a democratic local authority, 
consumers (or some groups of consumers) may exert a significant influence on the price of 
water. (The water pricing experiences in Los Angeles described in Chapter 4 support this 
contention.) Also, in the case of rising block rates, the water price is itself a function of the 
quantity consumed. This poses particular challenges for empirical analysis that have not been 
satisfactorily resolved in the literature.337
Uncertainty about future prices will affect investments in water using (or saving) durable 
goods. Uncertainty also affects short-term demand decisions, for example, there may be 
considerable uncertainty regarding the quality of the water supply.
A satisfactory theoretical and empirical treatment of water demand would have to take all of 
these considerations into account, yet it is almost universally the case that many o f these 
important factors are ignored in the empirical literature on urban water demand.
Hanemann (1997) applies the neo-classical theory of demand to the analysis of household 
water demand. In this analysis he treats the household as if it were a single individual 
consumer rather than a collection of individuals each with different preferences.338 He also 
treats water as a single commodity. This latter restriction is problematic, especially when it 
comes to the empirical modelling of water demand.
Hanemann’s exposition of the theory of consumer demand as applied to water is a simplified 
version of the general theory of demand given above. He deals with only two of the possible 
forms of the utility function, namely, the Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary utility functions. 
Although Hanemann notes that the application of duality theory makes it possible to use less 
restrictive functional forms (such as a translog utility function) he states that these flexible
337 T hese problems are not unique to the water sector. Fine et a/ (1996) show the limitations of the 
application of neo-classical dem and theory to food consumption.
338 This simplification m akes the exposition more straightforward. Hanemann (1997: 56) asserts that the 
treatm ent can be readily extended to a  collection of individuals making up a household with no added 
restrictions in the theory. However, there is som e doubt as to whether this claim is justified.
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forms “have not yet been used much in modelling the residential demand for water” and does 
not take the exposition any further (1997: 60).
For example, an indirect utility function could be specified as the following translog function 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 74):
u = v (p, w) = a 0 + E  a k log ^  1  E E  Py log (**) log ( ^ )  (31)
The Marshallian demand function can be derived from this using Roy’s Theorem and actual 
data tested against these demand functions (see Christensen et al, 1975). It has been argued 
that because equation (31) can be regarded as a second-order Taylor expansion of any 
arbitrary utility function, if the data fit the Marshallian functional form reasonably well then 
the theory can be assumed to hold. However this reasoning is false because the model can 
only be guaranteed to be accurate in the exact locality of the particular price-income ratios and 
thus a poor fit does not mean that the theory necessarily has to be rejected. Despite this 
limitation, it is true that translog functions such as the one above offer an improvement over 
the more severe and less acceptable restrictions imposed by other functional forms.
The above discussion is largely of academic interest. In practice, much of the literature has 
tended to take a more ad hoc approach, estimating a single demand equation for water using a 
simple functional form such as a linear demand equation in which the residential demand for 
water is regressed on the price of water and consumer income (Hanemann, 1997: 60). For 
example:
q, = a - p p i  + yy (32)
where q] is the demand for water, pj is the price of water and y  is the household income.
Log-log and semilog (on either quantity or price) alternatives to the above equation have also 
been used:
In qi =  a  - P In p, +  y In y (33)
In q, =  a  - Ppi +  yy (34)
q, =  a  - P In p! +  y In y (35)
The own-price and income-elasticities associated with these demand equations are given in 
Table 5 below (Hanemann, 1997).
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Table 5: Own-price and income elasticities
demand equation type Own price r\ income r\
linear "PPi /  q. y y / q i
log-log -P y
semilog on quantity (equation 34) “PPi yy
semilog on price and income -p /q , y / q i
Note that in the case of linear demand, the estimated own-price-elasticity is a function of both 
price and quantity, in the case of the semilog demand (on quantity) own price-elasticity is a 
function of price only, and in the case of semilog demand (on price and income) own price- 
elasticity is a function of quantity. The relevant prices and quantities quoted are usually the 
median or mean prices. However, for significant ranges of either price or quantity, estimated 
elasticities that are a function of these are theoretically dubious because actual elasticities will 
vary across the range. Note also that the log-log demand function postulates an isoelastic 
demand curve (a constant elasticity independent of price and quantity). There is no a priori 
reason to believe that demand curves exhibit this property.
The above equations may be modified to include other explanatory variables such as the prices 
of other goods (particular important complements and substitutes, for example, energy prices 
and water efficiency appliances), climate variables (rainfall, evapotranspiration, temperature) 
and household and property characteristics.
Significantly, Hanemann notes that all of the above demand equations are formally 
inconsistent with the theory o f  demand because they cannot be derived from the maximisation 
of a utility function without relaxing the restrictions necessary to ensure rational choice (1997: 
60). These equations can only be made consistent with economic theory i f  all other 
commodities are lumped into a single aggregate and consumers are conceived as having 
preferences for just two goods, water and the non-water aggregate of all other consumer 
“goods” . Equally important, empirical analysis bears out the fact that the choice of the form 
of the demand equation significantly influences the results (Hanemann, 1997: 61).
Much of the empirical literature on water demand uses some form of aggregate data. This 
involves “something of a leap from a theory that applies to individual agents [to the analysis 
of] data that are more aggregate than the theory contemplates” (Hanemann, 1997: 66). In 
most cases, the problem of aggregation is important and the theory applicable to an individual 
consumer cannot to applied to aggregate consumption.
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One of the limitations of empirical analysis is that it relies exclusively on the historical record 
and is not useful for predictive purposes where price changes are outside of the historic range 
or where there have been fundamental shifts in policies or institutional structures.339
The discussion now turns to the empirical analysis of water demand. First, methodological 
issues are highlighted and discussed and, second, empirical findings and their implications are 
presented.
Measuring water demand -  methodological considerations
Much of the empirical literature is focused on residential water demand in developed 
countries, particularly the United States.340 Relatively little work has been undertaken on water 
demand in developing countries.
The purpose of water demand analysis
The end to which demand analysis is undertaken will influence the methodology employed. 
The analysis of water demand is often undertaken for the purpose of water demand forecasting 
and less frequently for the purpose of welfare analysis. If the purpose of water demand 
analysis is solely for the purpose of providing improved water demand forecasting, then 
empirical analysis is used to calculate own-price-elasticities of demand. In this context, 
theoretical considerations such as the consistency of the demand equation form with utility 
maximisation and rational choice assumptions are not of prime importance. On the other hand, 
the analysis of consumer welfare requires a more rigorous approach to the application of 
theory in order for appropriate conclusions to be drawn.
Model structure for consumer demand
Most water economists have used a partial equilibrium framework for analysis of the urban 
water demand (Renwick, 1996).341 The validity of partial equilibrium analysis in the context of 
urban water has been discussed in Chapter 3.
Equation form and theory
The importance of the form of the demand equation for theoretical consistency has been 
noted. Three other considerations may be important: assumptions about how price-elasticities 
vary with price and quantity, goodness of fit, and ease of estimation.
339 This is called the Lucas Critique after Lucas (1976).
340 The literature on industrial water dem and is not extensive and is not considered here.
341 Hansen (1996), who provides an analysis of the relationship between electricity prices and water 
dem and in Copenhagen, is one of the few economists to take the price of at least one other commodity 
(in this case  a complement) into account. Interestingly, he found that w ater dem and w as more 
responsive to changes in the price of electricity than the price of water itself.
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The choice of the functional form depends on the purpose of the empirical modelling. Strict 
conformity with neo-classical demand theory may not be important. If the estimated price- 
elasticities are to be used to forecast future water demand based on known future price 
increments, the validity and accuracy of the prediction will depend on the extent to which 
future prices remain close to the range used in calculating the price-elasticity estimates. The 
linear, semilog and log-log estimates are likely to give different future water demand estimates 
because they make different assumptions about how price-elasticities vary with price and 
quantity.
The choices of linear, semilog and log-log demand equation forms may yield statistically- 
significant different results. Because there is no a priori reason for choosing any particular 
equation form, the uncertainty attached to any particular price-elasticity estimate is increased.
Stone and Whittington assert that “ since there is little a priori reason for selecting one 
production function over another, there is no preferred functional form of the single equation 
water demand model” (1984: 55). They note that “ the choice of functional form is usually 
determined on the basis of two (sometimes conflicting) criteria: best fit, and ease of 
estimation” and conclude that a search for the functional form that yields the best fit can 
“quickly become an exercise with little theoretical content” (1984: 55).
Hanemann (1997) and Espey et al (1996) undertook surveys of the water demand literature 
and reported on the forms of the demand equations used in empirical studies (see Table 6).
Table 6: Demand equation forms used in practice
Study Demand equation form (no. o f estimates)
Linear Log-Log Semilog Other Total
Hanemann, 1997 : Review o f  
54 studies: 1951-1991
41 45 10 0 96
Espey et al, 1996: Meta­
analysis o f  24 studies
38 86 0 124
Neither study observed the use of more sophisticated functional forms, such as the translog, 
which are more consistent with neo-classical consumer theory. Dandy et al (1997) used a 
piece-wise linear form of the demand equation arguing that the influence of various factors 
(such as household size and income) on water demand may change over the price and quantity 
range in a step-wise fashion.
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Choosing the independent variables
Consumer demand theory is primarily concerned with the effect of price and income on 
consumer demand. However, other factors also have a significant influence on demand. In the 
case of urban water supply, the following independent variables have been used in the 
modelling of domestic water demand: water supply characteristics, climate, household 
characteristics, and outdoor and indoor housing characteristics.
Where there are no supply side restrictions, there is strong evidence that demand is influenced 
significantly by household income, the price of water and climate (Espey et al, 1996; Griffin 
and Chang, 1991). Proper consideration of additional parameters, namely, the demographic 
characteristics of households and housing (both indoor and outside) characteristics may 
enhance the understanding of water demand (Espey et al, 1996). In developing countries, the 
modelling of supply-side constraints may be important (Mu et al, 1990).
Theoretical and practical constraints influence the selection and choice of independent 
variables. The theoretical constraints arise because of simultaneity. For example, water 
consumption is undoubtedly a function of both income and wealth but income and wealth are 
typically highly correlated. This poses problems for the accuracy of the estimates derived 
from a multivariate regression that includes both parameters as independent variables. 
Practical constraints arise because of the lack of availability of relevant data. For example, 
indoor water demand may be influenced by the type and number of plumbing fixtures installed 
in a house, however, data on this may not be available or may be time consuming and/or 
costly to obtain. Issues related to the specification of variables are discussed below.
Quantity. Typically some kind of average water demand is measured. This is because 
consumer metering typically occurs with a periodicity of between one and three months. This 
periodicity allows seasonal fluctuations in water demand (but not variations in daily peak 
demand) to be measured.
Income. Where actual household or per capita income data are not available, some 
researchers have used house or property value as a proxy (Howe and Linaweaver, 1967). 
Because general rates and taxes are usually levied in some proportion of assessed property 
value by local governments, some information on property values is usually available, even in 
developing countries. However, this data may be inaccurate. Lyman (1992) used both 
household income and property value and asserted that his results showed that both were 
important and merited individual attention. In this case there is an obvious problem of 
multicoil inear ity if an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used.
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Indoor param eters include household and housing characteristics. Household size and age 
distribution may affect water demand. Hanke and de Mare (1982) differentiated between 
adults and children and assert that they increased the explanatory power of their model by 
doing so. Lyman (1992) used average age together with the numbers of children, teenagers 
and adults in the household and showed these to be important explanatory variables. Housing 
characteristics include house size and age, and plumbing fixture data. Reliable information on 
these parameters is unlikely to be available in developing countries.
W eather specification. It has long been recognised that weather is an important explanatory 
variable in the analysis of residential water demand (Howe and Lina weaver, 1967). However, 
specification of the weather variable has generally been rather inaccurate, typically 
incorporating rainfall as a proxy (Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989).342 Nieswiadomy and 
Molina (1989) argue that an appropriate specification of the weather variable, particularly in a 
hot and dry climate where lawn irrigation is an important component of seasonal demand, is 
of the form:
weather =  e - r (36)
where e is the potential evapotranspiration for the dominant lawn cover in the area being 
studied, and r the rainfall. Further, they argue that it is important that the calculation of the 
weather variable matches the billing cycle (Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989). Others argue 
that the rainfall variable in the above specification is inaccurate and that effective rainfall (er) 
should be used where er tries to account for the distribution of rainfall. That is:
weather =  e - er (37)
For example, Dandy et al (1997) used:
er =  0.6r (38)
Notwithstanding these corrections, rainfall variability may influence water demand in a way 
which is not accurately captured by the weather variable.
Area. Irrigated area may be an important variable determining outdoor water use. Accurate 
data on irrigated area are usually unavailable but can be approximated as total plot area less 
house area or as some function of plot size. Plot size itself can be used as a proxy in the 
absence of better data. This data may not be available in developing countries.
342 The study by Foster and Beattie (1979) is a notable exception.
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Supply side constraints. Analysis of supply side parameters is rare. Renwick (1996) 
examined demand where supplies were restricted by drought. Water pressure was used in only 
one of the studies reviewed (Howe and Linaweaver, 1967).
Dynamic variables. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980: 328) assert that the inclusion of a lagged 
consumption variable in the demand equation can yield a considerable increase in explanatory 
power for a number of reasons. Liquidity constraints may delay the purchase of durable 
goods. Imperfect or asymmetrical markets may constrain the sale of used assets. Search costs 
related to determining actual consumption and marginal costs delay the achievement of 
equilibrium. Tastes are affected by previous consumption (1980: 374). It is difficult to 
determine the specific causal factors in any particular context empirically. It is tempting to 
dispense with the lagged dependent variable, but Deaton and Muellbauer caution against this:
Consumption, income, prices and assets all share largely common trends, so 
that correlations between them and significant regression coefficients may 
simply be because o f the nonsense correlation problem . The high t-values and 
low Durbin-Watson statistics that are usually associated with such 
consumption functions should act as a warning but are frequently ignored.
Given the large autoregressive element in the consumption data series, the 
inclusion o f  the lagged variable will largely protect investigators against the 
most obvious spurious correlations. However, the frequent exclusion o f the 
lagged dependent variables on the grounds that their entry causes the 
relationship to "collapse" is a testimony both to the effectiveness o f the cure 
and to the greater difficulty in finding a theoretically satisfactory relationship 
that outperforms a simple autoregression. (1980: 333)
Carver and Boland (1980) were the first to undertake empirical analysis of the relationship
between short- and long-run water demand price-elasticities using a lagged dependent quantity
variable. The theory suggests that long-run price-elasticities should be greater than short-run
elasticities because consumers are able to adjust their stock of water-using appliances in the
long-run. Carver and Boland (1980) used a flow adjustment model in which lagged
consumption is included as one of the variables:343
Q,-Qm = / > ( Qt*-Qt-i) 0 < p  < I (39)
where p  is the proportion of the desired adjustment actually achieved, Qt is the actual 
consumption at time t and Qt* is the desired or equilibrium consumption based on the values of 
the independent variables at time t. Q * is assumed to be linearly related to the independent 
variables:
q ;  =  a  +  p X  +  s (40)
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where X is a vector in independent variables and a  and p (a vector) the parameters to be 
estimated. Substituting into the previous equations gives:
Qt =  a p  +  (1 - p )  Qt., +  pp X  +  p& (41)
where the short-run coefficients are given by pp  and the long-run coefficients by p.
Although OLS estimation of the above model specification will yield consistent estimates, 
these tend to be biased for small samples (Gujarati, 1995: 603). Carver and Boland (1980) 
made the point that this equation should not be used for a single set (one cross-sectional unit) 
of time-series data because the time-related trend can be confounded with the lag effect, but 
went ahead and used it on a small sample. Few other studies have included a lagged 
dependent variable.344
Conservation and education. Only a few studies have included non-pricing policy variables 
in their models (Renwick, 1996, Nieswiadomy, 1992, Agthe and Billings, 1996, Moncur, 
1987).
Specification of the price variable.
One of the key debates in the literature of water demand analysis is the specification of the 
price variable in the case of non-linear pricing where the unit price of water is itself a function 
of consumption.
Average or m arginal price? Early studies used either the average price (for example, Wong, 
1972, Young, 1973, and Foster and Beattie, 1979) or the marginal price (for example, Howe 
and Linaweaver, 1967, and Danielson, 1979). That is:
q =  f(pm, v) (42)
q =  f(pa, v) (43)
where pm is the marginal price, pa is the average price and v is a vector of other independent
variables.
343 The model was developed by Nerlove (1958) and it assum ed that the actual adjustm ent to consumption 
is som e fixed percentage of the total equilibrium (“desired") adjustment. This partial adjustment model is 
described in Gujarati (1995: 599).
344 The exceptions include Dandy et al (1997), Lyman (1992), Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991), Moncur 
(1987) and Young e ta !  (1983). Lyman (1992) and Moncur (1987) used the sam e flow adjustment model 
a s  Carver and Boland (1980). Lyman (1992) also chose to use a  lagged price specification a s  this led to 
a regression fit of higher quality.
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However, both of these price specifications are problematic because demand is a function of 
both average price and marginal price in cases where the intra-marginal price differs from the 
marginal price (pm ^  p j .  That is:
q = f(pa, Pm, v) (44)
Renwick noted that “block pricing violates the standard assumption in the theory of consumer 
demand that consumers can purchase unlimited quantities of a good at a fixed exogenous 
price” (1996: 90). The problem arises because price is no longer exogenous. Thus the 
demand equation may be restated as follows:
q = f(p, v) and p = f(q) (45)
The controversy largely concerns the significance of the relative influence of each price 
dimension on demand in practice and which approach is most accurate in depicting the actual 
demand function.
The Taylor-Nordin specification. Taylor suggested the use of both the average and the 
marginal prices in the case of block pricing. Nordin (1976) demonstrated that Taylor’s 
specification was not correct and modified it by using the marginal price and a “difference” 
variable (D) to take into account the infra-marginal effect. The difference variable measures 
the difference between the actual bill and what the bill would have been if all units were 
priced at the marginal price. That is:
q = f(pm, D, v) (46)
D =  (q‘ x p j  - (q x p j  (47)
where q is the actual amount of water consumed. The difference variable thus attempts to 
capture the effect of price-induced income changes on demand.345 The difference variable is 
expected to be positive for increasing block schedules and negative for decreasing block 
schedules. This method postulates perfect information on the part of the consumer.
Although Nordin’s method has been used widely in the empirical analysis of water demand,346 
opinions differ as to which price specification is better and how much this matters. Some have
345 Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976) describe the additional variable (that is, the intramarginal expenditure 
or difference variable respectively) as measuring the income effect due to intramarginal price changes. 
However, Renwick (1996) notes that it is uncertain whether the effect m easured is a pure income effect. 
This is because the difference variable is constructed ex-post and its value depends on the relative 
strengths of income and substitution effects of rate changes (Howe, 1982). Hence Renwick (1996) notes 
that “it can only be an approximate way of introducing the effects of the intramarginal parts of the rate 
structure".
346 S ee, for example, Billings and Agthe (1980), Schefter and David (1985) and Nieswiadomy and Molina 
(1989).
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argued that, as a matter of principle, the marginal price specification is correct.347 Others have 
argued that Nordin’s method is a more accurate specification (Renwick, 1996). Still others 
have argued that average prices motivate consumer behaviour because of imperfect 
information (Foster and Beattie, 1981). Lastly, some have held the position that it is 
ultimately an empirical matter whether consumers respond to marginal price, average price or 
some combination of both.348 On this last point, conflicting results have been found. For 
example, the estimates of Foster and Beattie (1981) under the alternative specifications for 
aggregate data were statistically indistinguishable whereas the meta-analysis of Espey et al
(1996) showed that different price specifications led to statistically significant differences in
elasticity estimates (pooled aggregate and disaggregate data). Schefter and David (1985)
hypothesised that part of the controversy arises from the use of aggregate data rather than 
household level data, however, Nieswiadomy and Molina’s household level study using panel 
data failed to resolve the controversy (1989).
Price perception model. In an attempt to escape these problems, Shin (1985) developed a 
model based on perceived price. Basic consumer demand theory assumes that consumers are 
well-informed and hence respond to the marginal price, whereas in practice consumers may be 
ill-informed of the marginal price and base their decisions on the average price (as perceived 
from the total bill). Shin (1985) developed a price perception model that can test this price 
perception empirically.
The price that the consumer responds to (the perception price) is formulated as a function of 
both marginal and average price:
p* =  Pm (Pa /  Pm)k (48)
If k =  1, then p* =  pa and if k =  0, then p* =  pm. The price perception parameter k can be 
empirically determined using a log-log form of the demand equation:
In Q =  a  +  P j In pm +  kpx In (pa / p j  +  p2 y +  ... (49)
Shin applied this equation to decreasing block pricing in the domestic electricity sector and 
showed (for a particular data set) that consumers respond to average price. Nieswiadomy and 
Molina (1991) extended Shin’s analysis to increasing block pricing in the domestic water 
sector. They showed (for a particular data set) that consumers are likely to respond more to 
marginal price than average price, though their conclusions were qualified by the uncertainty
347 Gibbs (1978) and Griffin and Martin (1981).
348 S ee, for example, Shin (1985), and Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991).
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inherent in the estimates. Differences between marginal and average price and the presence 
and significance of a fixed monthly fee are likely to affect the outcome of the analysis.
Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) noted that Shin’s method (used and extended by Nieswiadomy 
and Molina, 1991) has a drawback because of the potential for test results regarding the more 
appropriate specification to be inconclusive.
Choosing the data set
Aggregation. In general, the analysis of consumption data at the level of individual consumers 
is preferred.349 Most studies undertaken to date have used aggregate data for practical 
reasons.350 Undertaking micro-level empirical studies requires the availability or collection of 
household level data. The problem is more acute in developing countries where adequate 
micro-level data are either costly to collect or of dubious accuracy.351
Cross-section analysis examines water demand relationships at a point in time. There are at 
least four problems associated with using cross-sectional data: First, the price-elasticity that is 
measured is the variation of demand in response to price across space at one point in time. To 
apply these elasticities to temporal changes in price requires the assumption that the same 
individuals will respond to real price changes over time in the same way in which different 
individuals have responded to difference prices across space. This is a rather “heroic” 
assumption (Hanke and de Mare: 1982). Second, cross-section analysis cannot distinguish 
between short-run and long-run price-elasticities of demand. Third, cross-section analysis of 
water consumption data is prone to the problem of heteroscedasticity, particularly where there 
are wide disparities in income between households.352 Fourth, in contexts where there are 
small variations in the price variable, the analysis has limited predictive value because, at
349 S ee Danielson (1979), Schefter and David (1985), Lyman (1992), Renwick (1996) and Saleth and Dinar
(1997).
350 Saleth and Dinar (1997) note that 79 percent of 124 studies published during 1967 to 1993 are related 
to macro and aggregate data (see also Espey, 1996).
351 Studies that have employed household level data include Jones and Morris (1984), Chicoine and 
Ramamurthy (1986), Deller et al (1986), Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989,1991), Lyman (1992), Hewitt 
and Hanemann (1995) and Renwick (1996).
352 Gujarati notes that “in cross sectional data involving heterogeneous units, heteroscedasticity may be 
the rule rather than the exception" (1995: 368). In cross-sectional water dem and analysis it may be 
expected that the disturbance term (unexplained error) may be greater am ongst higher income 
households com pared to lower income households. Thus heteroscedasticity is expected to be a 
particular problem in contexts w here there are wide disparities in wealth. Although heteroscedasticity 
does not destroy the “unbiasedness" and consistency properties of OLS estim ators, these estimators 
are no longer minimum variance or efficient and therefore t and F tests  of significance may be highly 
misleading. Even if heteroscedasticity is expected, it may be hard to detect and it is even harder to 
correct the problem (Gujarati, 1995: 389).
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best, prediction is only valid within the relevant price and quantity ranges present in the study. 
Notwithstanding the above, many studies have used cross-section analysis.353
Time-series analysis enables the same water consumers to be tracked over time and their 
response to price changes to be measured.354 The type of analysis is of limited value in 
contexts where changes in the real price of water are small because it is difficult to control the 
analysis for other important variables (such as changes in household income). This is because 
time-series analysis assumes that the under-lying time-series is stationary (Gujarati, 1995: 
709). On the other hand, where price changes are large, it is likely that demand will not only 
shift along the demand curve but also that the demand curve itself will shift. Therefore, the 
calculated price-elasticity is not strictly a point-elasticity but some average measure of how 
demand has changed in response to price. Furthermore, it may be expected that time-series 
data on water consumption are autocorrelated to some extent due to inertia. The presence of 
autocorrelation in time-series data may also arise from data manipulation and model 
misspecification.355 Furthermore, time-series data are prone to spurious regressions.356 Studies 
using time-series data include Young (1973), Billings and Agthe (1980) and Agthe et al 
(1986).
Pooled data analysis combines both cross-sectional and time-series data into one analysis. 
The principle advantage of this is that less data are required. However, the limitations of both 
cross-section and time-series analysis are carried through to pooled data analysis. Only a few 
studies have used pooled data.357
Data selection. The selection of the data set is likely to be constrained by practical factors 
such as the availability and reliability of data. Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) suggest that “ the 
best data that a water utility can easily collect” are the appropriate data to use.
353 S ee  Nieswiadomy (1992), Jones and Morris (1984), and Foster and Beattie (1979). Studies that have 
used micro-level data for cross-section analysis include Howe and Linaweaver (1967), Danielson 
(1979), Hanke and de Mare (1982), Deller et a / (1986), Chicoine e f a / ( 1986), Jones and Morris (1984), 
Agthe and Billings (1987), Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), Schneider and Whitiach (1991), Hewitt and 
Hanemann (1995), and Renwick (1996).
354 S ee  Mills (1990) and Harvey (1991) for a discussion of econometric analysis using time-series data.
355 Autocorrelation can be tested  for using the Durbin-Watson d  Test provided the model does not include 
a lagged dependent variable (Gujarati, 1995:421). However it should be noted that the cf Test may be 
an indication of specification bias rather than pure autocorrelation (1995:439).
356 Granger and Newbold (1974) suggest that an R2 > d is a good rule of thumb to suspect that the 
estimated regression suffers from spurious regression.
357 T hese include Lyman (1992), Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), Moncur (1987) and Hanke and de Mare 
(1982).
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Estimation technique
Regressing price and the problem of simultaneity. It is generally recognised that the use of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) where the tariff structure is of the increasing block form will 
yield biased estimates. In empirical work it is difficult to escape the problem of simultaneity 
bias in either demand specification (pm or p j  because price remains a function of quantity in 
both specifications and hence the price variable (either pm or pa) will be correlated with the 
random error term.358 If Nordin’s approach is followed (using pm and D), then in the case of 
an increasing block structure the coefficient on the marginal price will be biased towards zero 
and the coefficient on the difference variable away from zero (Nieswiadomy and Molina, 
1989). Saleth and Dinar (1997) argue that the difference variable solves the problem of 
simultaneity on the pm variable because it captures the price-quantity adjustment potential even 
though they note that the difference variable may itself be subject to simultaneity problems. 
However, their claim is highly questionable in the light of the failure of empirical studies to 
verify the properties expected of the difference variable (see, for example, Nieswiadomy and 
Molina, 1989).
In an attempt to overcome these simultaneity problems (particularly prevalent when ordinary 
least square regression is used), other estimating approaches have been used, including 
instrumental variables359 and two- or three-stage least squares.360 However, Saleth and Dinar 
note that these corrections for simultaneity could themselves lead to other equally serious 
econometric problems, for example, multicollinearity in two- and three-stage estimation 
techniques (1997: 19).
There is no regression technique that solves the simultaneity problem satisfactorily. There 
appears to be a general preference for Nordin’s method with the use of instrumental variable 
and two-stage least squares techniques in the literature, despite the limitations and potential 
bias of these techniques (see, for example, Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989).
The bias of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression when using Nordin’s marginal price and 
difference specification in the presence of decreasing and increasing block tariffs is 
demonstrated by Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989). Their results confirm that OLS regression 
results in this context generally should be assumed to be unreliable.
Saleth and Dinar (1997) contend that if incomplete consumer information is postulated (and 
demonstrated), then an average price specification may be both valid and able to be estimated
358 See, for example, Terza (1986).
359 S ee Deller e ta !  (1986), Agthe e t a l (1986), and Jones and Morris (1984),
360 S ee  Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989), and Renwick (1996).
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accurately using OLS even if the actual price structure is non-linear. The grounds for this 
claim are weak.
Alternatively, OLS estimates will be reliable if the price variable can be shown to be 
exogenous, even in the context of a non-linear price structure. A test for endogeneity is 
presented below. Interestingly, Saleth and Dinar also contend that the difference variable fully 
captures the “adjustment potential”361 and that there is no need for any “explicit correction for 
simultaneity through econometric means” and hence recommend the use of the OLS 
estimation technique even though they do not explicitly test for endogeneity (1997: 22). The 
validity of this approach is questionable.
Testing for endogeneity. The endogeneity of prices in a non-linear pricing structure (which 
leads to the problem of simultaneity) can be tested using a method proposed by Hausman 
(1978) which asserts that the OLS estimator will be consistent and asymptotically efficient 
under the null hypothesis that prices are exogenous, but will be inconsistent under the 
alternative hypothesis.
An application of this test in the case of an increasing block water tariff structure is presented 
by Agthe et al (1986). They show that OLS estimates were biased in the case of their data set 
(time-series data for Tucson with an increasing block tariff structure).
Instrum ental variables. Because of the problems of simultaneity inherent in OLS regression 
in the context of non-linear pricing, many studies have used the instrumental variable (IV) 
technique as a means of trying to overcome this,362
“The strategy of instrumental estimation is to identify a new variable or variables correlated 
with price but orthogonal to the disturbance term of the regression” (Jones and Morris: 1984). 
In their analysis a marginal price instrument (and associated infra-marginal rate variable) was 
developed from average water use by the “rate class” (that is, block 1 or 2), and an average 
price instrument was developed by regressing the observed average price on the exact tariff 
information. However, they found that the instrumental variable estimation was not 
fundamentally different from simpler OLS approaches for their data set.363 The reason for this 
appears to be the disproportionately large effect of the infra-marginal rate and fixed charges 
on demand. Thus, although they claim their finding is encouraging in the sense that the
361 By this they m ean the simultaneous adjustment between price and quantity.
362 Jones and Morris (1984), Deller, Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986), Agthe e ta l  (1986) and 
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989).
363 Cross-section of 100-200 households in Denver, Colorado, using annual w ater use in 1976 with 
household information from a questionnaire and billing records from the w ater utility.
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simpler OLS estimation techniques can be used as effectively as more complex techniques, 
such a claim is tenuous.
Agthe et al (1986) acknowledged that a potential problem with the instrumental variable 
technique is that the choice of an appropriate instrumental variable depends on the judgement 
of the researcher.
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) used the IV technique developed by Terza (1986). In the 
first stage, water demand was regressed on actual marginal prices that the household would 
face at different levels of demand. In the second stage the actual rate schedule and predicted 
quantity demanded were used to obtain predicted marginal prices. The difference variable was 
calculated using the predicted marginal prices. Terza (1986) asserted that both of these 
adjustments are likely to improve the reliability of the estimates though they note that the 
method may overcompensate for OLS bias as a result of linearisation of the rate schedule.
The findings of Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) confirm the assertion of Agthe et al (1986), 
namely that specification matters in the case of the IV technique and that the choice of 
specification is a matter of subjective judgement.
Two-stage least squares. An alternative though similar method to instrumental variable 
estimation is the two-stage least squares estimation technique (2SLS). Nieswiadomy and 
Molina (1989) used this in their analysis of household data for Denton, Texas and obtained 
estimates that compare favourable with the IV technique used on the same data. They 
regressed observed marginal price and difference against the other independent variables and 
the actual block prices, and then used the predicted price and difference in the second stage as 
regressors.
Three-stage least squares. Renzetti (1992) used an iterative three-stage least squares 
procedure. In the first regression, he regressed observed average cost against the features of 
the pricing schedule so as to obtain an instrumental variable proxy for the price of water. This 
method follows Jones and Morris (1984).364
Simultaneous equations. Agthe et al (1986) used the following three-equation system:
Q =  f(pm, D, X, , B,) (50)
Pm “  g(Q> X2, B2) (51)
364 Renzetti (1992) includes in a footnote the fact that Terza (1986) argued that the instrumental variable 
approach may artificially linearise the price schedule and thus produce a spurious negative correlation 
between quantity and price, but leaves the discussion there. Renzetti (1992) also notes in another 
footnote that he had corrected for heteroscedastic errors. Further details of the three-stage least 
squares procedure are not given.
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D =  h(Q, X3, B3) (52)
where the first equation is the demand function for water and the other two equations capture 
the effect of the changes in the supply side of the market resulting from shifts and other 
changes in the rate structure. X] is the vector of independent variables (income, weather 
etc.). X2 and X3 are vectors of dummy variables indicating shifts in the entire rate structure 
(X2) and shifts in the rate structure and/or fixed charges (X3). Bl5 B2 and B3 are vectors of the 
parameters to be estimated and which were estimated using a three-stage least squares 
technique with all three equations specified as linear systems.365 Using the same data set as 
Billings and Agthe (1980) they obtained a different price-elasticity estimate (-0.59 versus - 
0.49).
Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) claim that simultaneous equations do not solve the endogeneity 
problem because there is no single measure of the marginal price or difference given that 
planned consumption differs from observed consumption by the unobservable perception 
error.
A discrete-continuous choice model. All of the above models explicitly regress quantity 
against price. This approach is clearly of limited value in the case of increasing block rates 
because price is itself codetermined by quantity. Hence the consumer choice problem is really 
reduced to choosing both the consumption and the price (which is represented by the 
consumption block). This point is taken up by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) who note that the 
labour supply literature is of relevance here because the piece-wise linear budget constraint is 
common to the analysis of demand in both the labour market and for water under an 
increasing block rate. This literature has developed a discrete-continuous model to overcome 
the problem of correct model specification that arises because of the phenomena of 
codetermination and the non-linear budget constraint.356
The model preserves the codetermination of the quantity consumed and the marginal price and 
(income) difference pertinent to that quantity without having to resort to simultaneous 
equations through the discrete choice that is included in the single likelihood function. 
However, the specification assumptions required to construct a two-error discrete-continuous 
choice model are restrictive and furthermore, the model is considerably more complex than 
the simpler OLS, IV and 2SLS models. The model has been applied to one set of data only 
and the robustness and consistency of the model are yet to be proved.
365 OLS estim ates in this context are systematically biased (Kindler and Russell, 1980, Gujarati, 1995).
366 The relevant labour supply literature is summarised in Moffitt (1986) and the discrete-continuous model 
as  applied to w ater dem and presented in Hewitt and Hanemann (1995).
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Discrete choice within a developing country context. Mu et al (1990) assert that the 
application of conventional water demand analysis techniques in many developing country 
contexts is inappropriate. They point out that while in developed countries consumers have no 
choice in their supply, this is often not the case in developing countries. For example, in many 
rural villages (in Africa, say) households have a choice of water supply (for example, vendor, 
well or kiosk). In such cases modelling the choice of water supply source may help to inform 
project planning. Mu et al (1990) present a discrete choice approach to this problem using a 
multinomial logit model noting that this is commonly used in the modelling of household 
discrete choices (Amemiya, 1981). The model has the form:
where Ph (j) is the probability of household h choosing source j, X is a vector of source 
characteristics and Z a vector of household characteristics and a  and p are the parameters to 
be estimated. This assumes that the utility function is additive (vih =  pX^ +  a,jZh) and a 
Gumbel distribution of the error term (Ify =  v itl +  eih) with s having a mean of zero and a 
scale parameter of 1. Different assumptions concerning the distribution of s will lead to 
different choice models (Mu et al, 1990).
Large price changes and arc-elasticities
Where large price changes are effected, the calculation of point-elasticities (the price-elasticity 
of demand at a single point on the demand curve) is inappropriate and it may be better to 
calculate an arc-elasticity, that is an average price-elasticity over the relevant price and 
quantity range (Hogarty and Mackay, 1975). The arc-elasticity is defined as:
where q* is the average quantity for each consumer over the range, that is, (q0 +  q t)/2 and p is 
the average price, that is, (p0 +  pi)/2.
This method is appropriate for use with time-series data and a large price change (increase or 
decrease). For robust results, the data should be controlled for exogenous variable such as 
income changes and weather.
Hogarty and Mackay (1975) used an adjacent community as their control and adjusted the 
percentage change for each individual in the modelled community (which experience price 
changes) by subtracting the percentage change in consumption experienced in the control 
community (which experienced no price changes). That is:
Ph(j) =  exp ( p x jh +  otjZh) / S  exp ( px*  +  c * ) (53)
Bare = (Aq/qj) x (Ap/p)'1 (54)
Fare =  [(Aqj/q,) - (AQ/Q)] x (Ap/p)1 (55)
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where qj is for the modelled community and Q is the consumption for all consumers in the 
control community.
Katzman (1977) employed a variant of this method in a developing country context. He 
regressed time-series data using consumption for stratified groups of consumers (by income, 
neighbourhood and rate category) as the dependent variable and trend (1 ... n), rainfall and 
price (a dummy variable indicating pre- or post-price increase) as the independent variables. 
The linear model used was:
qit= a +  p t X +  p2 Rt +  P3 X R t +  M
where qit is the consumption in month t for group i, X is the dummy variable equal to 0 pre- 
price increase and 1 post-price increase, Rt is the rainfall in month t, t is the trend variable 
(1... n months) and a  and P are the parameters to be estimated.
The arc-elasticities for each group were calculated by inserting the mean values and 0 and 1 
for the price dummy into the fitted equations.
Summary and conclusions
Linear and log forms of the demand equation are most commonly used in the literature even 
though these are formally inconsistent with consumer demand theory.
The choice of independent variables may be constrained for practical reasons. The most 
essential variables that should be included are household income (or some proxy thereof), 
weather and price. The modelling of supply side constraints may be important.
Where non-linear pricing schedules are used, the marginal price is not equal to the average 
price and a decision has to be made concerning the specification of the price variable. Any 
specification of the price variable in this context results in estimating problems because of the 
violation of key assumptions necessary for the main tenets of the theory to hold.
In general, micro-level data sets are to be preferred to aggregate data sets. However micro- 
level data may not be available or may be of dubious accuracy. The use of cross-section 
analysis to estimate demand curves relies on the “heroic” assumption that price-elasticities 
derived from inter-consumer comparisons of demand can be applied to inter-temporal 
variations in price for the same consumers. It is also prone to the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. Time-series analysis also has limitations. Where price changes are small 
this method is likely to be inaccurate because it assumes a stationary underlying trend. Where 
price changes are large the resulting measure is not a true point-elasticity because the demand 
curve would have shifted at the same time. Pooled data analysis has the advantage of requiring
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less data but the limitations of both time-series and cross-section analysis pertain. No wholly 
satisfactory data set exists in practice and compromises must be made.
The choice of estimation technique may be important, particularly where price is itself a 
function of consumption. In general, the assumptions necessary for the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) technique to give valid estimates do not hold when the pricing structure is non-linear. 
Other estimating techniques, namely instrumental variables and two- or three-stage least 
squares have been used in an attempt to overcome the problem of simultaneity. However these 
techniques may give rise to other equally serious econometric problems and the results are 
sensitive to the choice of model specification. Regression analysis in the presence of a non­
linear price function is inherently problematic and great caution needs to be exercised when 
interpreting results. Unfortunately, non-linear pricing is commonly found in practice.
Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) used a discrete-continuous choice model in an attempt to 
overcome the problems of simultaneity present in other regression models. The method gives 
very different results compared to other estimating methods for the same data set. The 
robustness of the results obtained has not been tested.
Where price increases are significant, the calculation of point-elasticities is likely to be 
inappropriate. Arc-elasticities provide a measure of the average response of demand to price 
over the relevant price and quantity range. This “ rough and ready” method has been used 
infrequently in practice even though, in certain contexts, it can provide a measure of demand 
response to price that is not fraught with the theoretical and practical problems associated with 
the other more complex methods discussed here. Such a method may be particularly 
applicable in developing country contexts.
Assumptions concerning the form of the demand curve are frequently made without 
justification. Where price reform moves the price outside the range of historic experience, the 
application of statistical regression techniques to historical data is generally not helpful to 
predict the demand response to these changes. Although income is universally included as an 
independent variable, few studies report price-elasticities as a function of income, an 
important omission. Lucas (1976) made the important point that the parameters estimated 
from an econometric model are dependent on the policy prevailing at the time and will change 
if there is a policy change. Therefore significant changes in the price structure and/or price 
level will render the price-elasticity estimates obtained under different conditions invalid.
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Measuring water demand: the empirical evidence 
Overview
Summary results of the review of empirical price-elasticity estimates are presented in the 
Appendix 3. Key points arising from this review are presented below.
Distribution of results. Hanemann (1997) surveyed the literature on price-elasticities of 
demand undertaken in the United States since 1950. A graphic depiction of the estimates 
arising is given below.
Price elasticity distribution for USA studies
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Figure 7: Distribution of price-elasticity estimates for the USA
Approximately one third of estimates are in the range 0 - 0.3, a further third in the range 0.3 
to 0.6 and the remaining third larger than 0.6. Less than one tenth of estimates show that 
demand is elastic. Mann (1989) undertook a review of the available price-elasticity estimates 
and concluded that, “ in brief, the most reliable empirical results clearly indicate that urban 
water demand is highly price-inelastic, with the possible exception of seasonal (sprinkling) 
demand” .
Com parability. Carver and Boland (1980) make the important point that comparisons 
between dissimilar studies are fraught with difficulties and should be avoided. In particular, 
distinctions should be made between studies using aggregate versus micro data, cross-section 
versus time-series or pooled data, the type of water demand, areas with different climates, and 
communities with different income characteristics (level and distribution). The influence of 
methodology employed should also be noted (see below). An examination of sub-groups 
within the set of estimates for water demand in the USA reveals that in all the sub-groups
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(grouped by type of use, time of use, location and type of data), a wide range o f estimates 
exists.
The influence of methodology on results. That methodology matters and profoundly affects 
the results of the analysis of water demand is ably illustrated by comparing the Nieswiadomy 
and Molina (1989) and Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) studies. Both studies used the same 
micro data set yet reported significantly different results, even for similar estimation 
techniques.367 Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) and Hanemann (1997) concluded that 
specification matters but they were unable to shed light on which specification is more 
correct.368 Saleth and Dinar (1997) used OLS to analyse demand in the context of a steep 
increasing block structure; on finding a positive and significant price-elasticity for an average 
price specification, they concluded: “this means that price has a dominant positive effect on 
water consumption among economically well-to-do households” and they did not question 
possible bias in their estimation technique.369
Data reliability. The quality and nature of the data profoundly influence the results. Yet there 
is little discussion in the literature on data reliability, a particular problem in developing 
countries. On the consumption side, meters may be inaccurate, there may be transposition 
errors in manually entered meter readings, meter readings may be missing, estimated or 
guessed, consumption may be wrongly attributed and bills may be wrongly calculated. Wide 
variations in water usage between consumers and over time (for the same consumer) make 
errors difficult to detect. Households may have incentives to misreport income, household 
size, and so on, in surveys. The accuracy of social, economic and demographic data in poor 
neighbourhoods is particularly doubtful.
Confidence intervals. Any estimate of the price-elasticity of demand has a confidence interval 
attached to it. It is remarkable how little attention is given to this in the literature. The 
question of confidence intervals becomes even more important when considerations of data 
uncertainty and the influence of methodology on results are also included in the interpretation 
of confidence intervals. In fact, the uncertainties attached to many estimates may be so large 
so as to render the estimates meaningless for all practical purposes.
367 For example, the slightly altered instrumental variable and two-stage least square specifications used 
by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) yield positive but insignificant price param eters w hereas Nieswiadomy 
and Molina report significant negative price param eters for essentially the sam e data set.
368 A discrete-continuous choice model developed by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) calculated elastic 
price-elasticity estim ates (-1.6) com pared to inelastic estim ates (-0.55 to -0.86) calculated by 
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) using IV and 2SLS estimations for the sam e data set.
369 This is notwithstanding the fact that Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) have shown OLS estim ates to be 
biased in this context. Neither do they draw any specific attention to a price-elasticity of -5.3 calculated
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Threshold consumption. The water demand study by Cairncross and Kinnear (1992), one of 
the few undertaken in developing countries, confirms the fact that there is a minimum 
threshold consumption which consumers value very highly. They found an effective zero 
price-elasticity of demand even in the context where households pay an average of 55 percent 
of their income for between 25 and 30 led of water from vendors. This result is confirmed by 
studies that have examined the relationship between consumption and water carrying distance 
in rural areas (see, for example, White et al, 1972).
Multiple households. Where multiple households share a common meter and are responsible 
for the water bill in proportion to their share of the total consumption, the price incentive is 
muted and it may be expected that elasticities are smaller. This is borne out by the Hansen 
(1996) study in Denmark in which the price-elasticity was found to be less than -0.1 in the 
context where a large proportion of households in a city shared meters.
Outdoor water demaud. Peak seasonal demand (usually occurring in the summer and related 
to garden irrigation) is likely to be more elastic than that for indoor usage, ceteris paribus. 
This is borne out particularly by the seminal study by Howe and Linaweaver (1967) that 
undertook separate metering for indoor and outdoor water usage. Other studies also support 
this supposition (for example, Lyman, 1992).
Peak demaud and costs. The Howe and Linaweaver (1967) study demonstrated the influence 
of garden irrigation (sprinkling) on peak demand and hence on system capacity costs.
Price-elasticity as a function of income. It is remarkable that only a few of the studies 
reviewed calculate and quote price-elasticity as a function of household income. Agthe and 
Billings (1987) showed that, in the case of a mildly increasing block pricing structure in 
Tucson, price-elasticities decreased as income increased. A similar (though more striking) 
pattern was found by Renwick (1996). She calculated price-elasticities of -0.53 for low- 
income, -0.21 for middle income and -0.11 for high-income groups. Martin and Wilder 
(1992) quoted sample means (consumption, income and delinquency rate) by income category 
for the three categories chosen but did not calculate separate price and income-elasticities for 
each group. Katzman (1977) grouped his data by consumer type (rich urban, poor urban and 
poor rural). He does not quote separate price-elasticities although he did not calculate arc 
income-elasticities by income group (0.24 to 0.3 for the poor to middle range and 0.32 to 0.39 
for the middle to rich range). Saleth and Dinar (1997) reported price-elasticities by housing 
category, but the results obtained were inconclusive.
for consum ers consuming more than 15 kl per month using a marginal price specification and OLS 
estimation, a degree of elasticity never before found and reported in the literature.
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Price-elasticity and equity. Very few of the water demand studies reported in the literature 
discuss equity issues. Agthe and Billings (1987) argued for a steeper inclining block structure 
in Tucson on the basis of the assertion of combined equity and efficiency improvements. 
Martin and Wilder (1992) modelled delinquency rates as a function of price and household 
income. They found a strong inverse relationship between income and delinquency rates and 
noted that “low income households find it more difficult to remain current in paying water 
bills and are consequently more likely to face cutoff ” , and further that “ the burden of 
increased rates includes the loss of service by some households” (Martin and Wilder, 1992: 
99). Renwick (1996) found in her study area that price policy may shift the conservation 
burden to lower income households. Cairncross and Kinnear (1992) found that pricing can 
discriminate against the poor because at low (subsistence) levels of consumption the price- 
elasticity of demand may be zero. Equity issues were discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
Price-elasticity and rate  structure. Nieswiadomy and Cobb (1993) analysed the influence of 
rate structure on price-elasticity. Whilst acknowledging that their analysis suffered from 
incompletely corrected selectivity bias, they noted that price-elasticities under increasing 
blocks were higher than those under decreasing blocks suggesting that increasing block 
structures were “conservation orientated” . However, they also concluded that consumers are 
more likely to respond to average prices than marginal prices. A more obvious point is made 
by Saleth and Dinar (1997): the steeper the blocks and the higher the marginal prices, the 
more likely it is that consumers will respond to marginal price rather than average price and 
the greater the price-elasticity of demand (with respect to marginal price).
Technology adoption. Renwick (1996) modelled the adoption of water saving technologies. 
She found that price policy, non-price policy and technology change may all reduce household 
water demand. Households with higher incomes are more likely to adopt water efficient 
irrigation technologies when subsidies are provided for water saving appliances. If lower 
income households adop., water efficient irrigation technologies, they are more likely to be 
particularly labour intensiv e technologies such as grey-water use and hand irrigation.370 Poor 
(and elderly) households are likely to apply very much higher implicit discount rates in their 
decisions to purchase water saving devices because they are more risk averse and the 
opportunity cost of the money used to purchase the goods is much higher than for higher 
income households (Pearce et a/: 1990a). This further supports the findings of Renwick (1996) 
and may have important policy implications. For example, Woodwell (1992) argues that 
supply-side investments in consumer level water saving technologies may be more efficient
370 “The adoption of water efficient technologies reduces dem and most am ong higher income households 
because wealthier households tend to have more bathrooms and other w ater using capital within the 
home and maintain larger lots with more landscaping" (Renwick, 1996: 82).
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than using marginal-cost pricing and relying on households and industries to invest in water 
saving technologies.371
Composition of the aggregate. Few studies disaggregate the data in accordance with the 
different demand characteristics of different groups of households. Renwick (1996) found that 
the composition of the aggregate matters. She found that policy responsiveness and thus the 
distribution of the conservation burden differ depending on the policy instrument and the 
characteristics of the household classes. Saleth and Dinar (1997) analysed their sample 
grouped by housing type and consumption and found significant differences between groups. 
Only one of the studies in the USA surveyed by Hanemann (1997) quoted different price- 
elasticities for different income groups. In the context of developing countries, income 
inequalities may be extreme and thus there may be wide disparities in income even within 
income-stratified groups of consumers. This should be borne in mind when drawing policy 
conclusions from empirical results.
W ater restrictions. Renwick (1996) found that water allocations, landscape irrigation 
restrictions and improvements in landscape irrigation technology shift the “conservation 
burden” to households with larger landscaped areas.372
Policy sequencing. Renwick (1996) found that policy sequencing (for example, pricing versus 
restrictions) may influence the reduction in demand attributable to a particular policy 
instrument when more than one policy is implemented.
M etering. There is strong evidence that water demand is affected by metering and a non-zero 
marginal price for consumption. Howe and Linaweaver (1967) demonstrated the differences in 
water use between households in metered and unmetered areas which otherwise had similar 
characteristics.373 Hanke (1970) undertook a time-series analysis of water demand in Boulder 
(Colorado) and demonstrated that both indoor and outdoor water use decreased in the short- 
run in response to metering and that this decrease was maintained over time.374
371 “Data specific to Denver show that the potential gains in aggregate consum er surplus attributable to 
supplier-financed investments in improved water-use efficiency are many times larger that potential 
gains from reformed [marginal cost] pricing. An expanded efficient pricing rule which incorporates these 
supplier-financed investments, promises substantial improvements in economic efficiency” (Woodwell, 
1992).
372 S ee also Dandy (1992).
373 The ratio of sum m er sprinkling to sum m er potential evaporation w as 0.6 for m etered areas compared 
with 1.8 for unm etered areas.
374 The ratio of actual to “ideal” sprinkling changed from more than 150 percent before metering to about 
80 percent after metering.
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Large price increases. Hogarty and Mackay (1975) used arc-elasticities and time-series data 
to calculate demand responses to large changes in die marginal price.375 They obtained mean 
elasticities of between -0.56 and -0.86 (though these were not statistically significantly 
different from one another)376 for the price increase and close to zero for the price decrease. 
Hogarty and Mackay concluded that: “ residential water consumption, even for domestic use, 
is highly sensitive to large increases in (marginal) rates; response to rate increases is as great 
in the short-run (3 months) as in the long-run (12 months); and, residential water consumption 
is relatively insensitive to decreases in (marginal) rates following large increases” (1975: 
793). They attribute the elasticity of the price responsiveness to a combination of income and 
substitution effects. The income effect arises because higher water tariffs may reduce 
discretionary income by a much higher proportion than total income in the short-term because 
a large proportion of total income may be pre-committed to monthly fixed payments. The 
substitution effect arises from the adoption of new practices (for example, fixed leaks and 
shorter showers). The asymmetry in demand response to price changes may arise from the 
tendency for some of the substitution effects to be less reversible.
Implications of empirical results for methodology
Different methodologies (equation form and estimation technique) yield significantly different 
results for the same data, particularly in the context of non-linear pricing schedules. There is 
therefore considerable methodologically induced “noise” in all water demand estimates. This 
uncertainty is further exacerbated because of data unreliability that is particularly prevalent in 
developing countries.
Lack of homogeneity amongst consumers as a whole means that aggregate estimates of price- 
elasticities gloss over differences between consumers, a problem which is exacerbated in 
developing countries where disparities in income are typically stark.
Results of different demand studies are seldom comparable because of differences in 
methodology and the estimation context. The results of a demand analysis in one study cannot 
be transferred to another area with any confidence.
375 The area studied w as a newly developed area comprising largely young professionals living in 
tow nhouses in Blacksburg, Virginia, USA. The price changes were +24 percent and -55 percent 
respectively. Subtracting the percentage change in quantity from an adjacent control community 
controlled exogenous influences on dem and.
376 This is a rare explicit acknowledgement of the uncertainty implicit within statistical estimates.
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The calculation of point-elasticity estimates in a developing country context typically will be 
inappropriate.377 There are no a priori grounds for assuming the demand curve to be of any 
particular functional form. Point-elasticities are only accurate at the respective mean values of 
the estimating equation. Lack of homogeneity amongst consumers means that the estimate of 
the price-elasticity at the mean value is not useful (particularly for the purposes of welfare 
analysis). When moving away from the mean value, different assumptions concerning the 
form of the demand curve will influence the estimated price-elasticities. Arc-elasticity 
estimates therefore may be more appropriate.
Implications for a critical-realist approach
Estimating the price-responsiveness of water demand typically appears to have been done for 
one or more of the following purposes: to “prove” demand theory; to display the researcher’s 
skills in econometric techniques; to show that pricing is an effective tool to enhance 
“efficiency” ; and/or, to assist in making water demand forecasts.
The review of the theory of water demand and the methodology applied in the analysis of 
water demand has shown that if the primary purpose of empirical estimates is to prove 
demand theory, then this effort has been futile because empirical methodology (as used in 
practice) is formally inconsistent with the theory of demand.
The results of empirical studies show that demand for water is price-inelastic. The logical 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that relying on price alone to improve water-use 
“efficiency” is ill-conceived because the welfare effects of changing prices will be much 
larger than the “efficiency” effects and hence an analysis of price reform which does not 
examine the welfare effects of price reform is both selective and biased. This is not to say that 
prices do not affect demand; rather, policies which seek to enhance efficiency only through 
pricing are ill-conceived. This is all the more apparent in the light of the criticism of the 
Pareto-efficiency claim of marginal-cost pricing presented in Chapter 3. Clearly a more 
satisfactory definition of efficiency is needed. This topic is addressed in the next section.
The usefulness of price-elasticity estimates is restricted to assisting in demand forecasts. 
Unfortunately, the efficacy of price-elasticity estimates to improve water demand forecasts is 
limited due to four key factors: the dominant influence that the stochastic climate variable has 
on water demand, the uncertainty in the price-elasticity estimates arising from methodological 
and data induced “noise” ; the Lucas critique combined with the inadmissibility of applying
377 Reddy (1996), for example, applies a calculated point-elasticity estim ate (-0.4) to a 100 percent 
increase in the urban water price in order to estimate demand. This is clearly inappropriate and likely to 
result in erroneous water dem and forecasts.
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statistical estimates beyond the range in which they were estimated; and, the inability to 
transfer estimates from one context to another.
4. Understanding water-use efficiency
Water-use efficiency is defined in the neo-classical economics literature purely in terms of 
allocative-efficiency that, in turn, is based on consumer demand preferences. Within this 
framework, water use is only efficient when the marginal price of water is equated to its 
marginal cost. The theoretical difficulties with this definition have been discussed in Chapter 
3. Moreover, the review of pricing practice presented in Chapter 1 showed that water is 
hardly ever priced at its marginal cost (however defined). Arguments as to why this is the case 
were advanced in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the empirical difficulties of determining the 
price-elasticity of demand for water have been demonstrated. Even if these limitations are 
accepted as being unproblematic, the “efficient” allocation and use of water are premised on 
the existing income distribution and hence are neither objective nor value neutral. Finally, the 
implementation of marginal-cost pricing (with the objective of achieving allocative-efficiency) 
may cause a significant and regressive change in income distribution (see Chapter 5).
In the light of the above, the neo-classical allocative-efficiency definition of water-use 
efficiency clearly is not very satisfactory. Alternative and more operational definitions of 
efficiency are technical or x-efficiency and optimal beneficial use. These concepts are defined 
and discussed below. It is argued that they are likely to be more useful in analysing the 
efficiency effects of price reform, especially in a developing country context.
X-efficiency
A process may be said to be X-efficient if it is accomplished with the minimum expenditure of 
total resources. In the case of water use, say in a production process, technical efficiency is 
achieved when the value of the sum of water use and other inputs is minimised, that is:
output =  min X value(water use, other inputs)
In terms of this definition, an initiative to conserve water is not technically efficiency if the 
reduction in water use (as measured by its value) is less than the value of the additional inputs 
required to achieve the same output (with future flows discounted to the present). If the same 
output is achieved by using less water and no additional inputs, then X-efficiency is 
unambiguously improved and it is not necessary to place a value on any of the inputs. 
However, X-efficiency improvements are typically achieved through employing a new
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combination of inputs with some inputs decreased and others increased. The measurement of 
technical efficiency improvements thus typically is dependant on how resources are valued.
At the risk of making a rather obvious point, a zero marginal price for water (for example, a 
fixed monthly charge which is independent of the amount of water used) will not encourage 
X-efficiency in water use because no additional cost is imposed on the user for additional use 
of water. Similarly the higher the marginal cost of water to the user, the greater the incentive 
for X-efficiency use because the higher the cost of marginal consumption.
Although, at face value, X-efficiency does not appear to be very different to static-allocative- 
efficiency defined within neo-classical economic theory, there is an important difference. X- 
efficiency does not make an overall welfare maximisation claim (Pareto-optimality) and 
therefore is not subject to the objections to the Pareto-optimality claim of marginal-cost 
pricing. Furthermore, X-efficiency may be advocated in a way that is fully cognisant of the 
political-economic context and outcomes of X-efficiency pricing.
It may be concluded that, as a general rule, and subject to equity and sustainability 
considerations, it is desirable that tariffs create incentives that promote X-efficiency in water 
use, water production, wastewater treatment and disposal, and institutions.
Optimal beneficial use
Optimal beneficial use may be defined as “the best possible use of a resource in the public 
interest” , that is, optimal beneficial use achieves the desirable combination of social, 
economic and environmental objectives that is in the best interests of the public. The concept 
requires that the social, economic and environmental values of water use, as well as both 
intra- and inter-generation concerns, be taken explicitly into account. The definition of 
efficiency in terms of optimal beneficial use thus recognises the social value of water and the 
fact that it is inappropriate to value water solely in terms of the value placed on the resource 
by the “highest bidder” .
Optimal beneficial use emphasises the need for social choice in the way in which water is 
allocated and used. Hence optimal beneficial use can only be understood within an historically 
specific context. Actions to achieve optimal beneficial use would need to take into account the 
appropriate balance between promotion and enforcement, given due consideration to research, 
pilot projects, education and general communication activities and are likely to work best in a 
supportive framework which includes regulatory incentives and penalties, and the provision of 
information on best practice and comparative performance.
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Implications for a critical-realist approach
Although the general goal of “efficiency” is likely to be uncontroversial, there are very 
different understandings of what this actually means in practice. The review of theory 
presented in Chapter 3 showed that an exclusive focus on allocative-efficiency is 
inappropriate. Technical efficiency is a more direct measure of the efficiency of resource use 
and can be useful in assessing the efficiency-effects of price reform. Optimal beneficial use 
emphasises the social value of water and the need for social choice in the way in which water 
is allocated and used.
In this context, the following two general principles are proposed: pricing policy should 
recognise both the economic and social nature of water and make use of all three definitions of 
efficiency as appropriate to the particular context; and higher consumption-related prices will 
generally promote X-efficiency in water use, although the effects on equity and sustainability 
need to be assessed and taken into account.
The first principle rejects the neo-classical “price equals marginal cost” rule as the exclusive 
basis for promoting water-use efficiency. The second principle recognises that water demand 
is somewhat price responsive and that metering water and requiring consumers to pay in 
proportion to the amount of water consumed are likely to increase X-efficiency in water use 
but that these improvements must be weighed against the equity and sustainability outcomes. 
The principles thus explicitly recognise the importance of the political-economic context.
5. Summary and conclusions 
Sustainability and pricing
The goal of ecological sustainability is unlikely to be achieved solely through a pricing 
strategy and other interventions will be necessary. These would typically include legislative 
interventions such as the stipulation of minimum flow requirements. Such interventions, in 
turn, will influence the availability and relative scarcity of water and hence may affect pricing 
strategies.
Higher water prices will generally promote ecological sustainability but not necessarily 
guarantee it. Moreover, the equity implications of higher prices must be taken into account. 
The political-economic context will have an overriding influence on water pricing and 
management practices and the outcomes these have on the environment and the achievement 
of ecological sustainability.
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Understanding water demand
In general it is expected from the theory that water demand will be responsive to price, that is, 
higher water prices will result in reduced water demand, ceteris paribus, and that water 
demand will increase as income increases. Although the exposition of the theory of water 
demand is relatively straightforward, it is no easy matter to apply this theory in a general and 
consistent matter to the empirical analysis of water demand. Almost all empirical modelling of 
water demand recorded in the literature to date is formally inconsistent with the neo-classical 
theory of preferences and demand. Thus, the damning point made by Deaton and 
Muellbauer’s (1980: 80) -  demand theory is very often used in a “highly cavalier” fashion 
with little attention being paid to formal consistency between theory and application -  is 
applicable to the water demand literature.
There is considerable controversy and little agreement on three key methodological 
considerations: the choice of the appropriate equation form, the specification of the price 
variable and the choice of estimation technique. All three significantly effect the empirical 
results.
If the lack of data availability and reliability, which is a particular problem in developing 
countries, is added to the methodologically induced uncertainties, then it may be expected that 
the results obtained from empirical studies are likely to have wide confidence intervals 
rendering the results to all intents and purposes meaningless. The review of the empirical 
results confirmed this expectation, showing unambiguously that methodology significantly 
influences the results and that the results, in general, have very wide confidence intervals.
The parameters estimated from an econometric model are dependent on the policy prevailing 
at the time and will change if there is a policy change. Significant changes in the price 
structure or price level outside the historical range will render the application of price- 
elasticity estimates obtained under different conditions invalid.
The usefulness of this kind of empirical demand analysis for welfare analysis is highly 
questionable. This is because welfare analysis requires the examination of the demand 
behaviour of individuals rather than groups of households. The use of a “ representative 
household” to model welfare effects, a method often employed to circumvent this problem, 
may yield misleading results, particularly where income disparities are stark.
Results from different demand studies are generally not comparable with one another. 
Similarly, the results of demand studies are generally not transferable from one context to 
another.
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There appears to be little merit in employing complex methodologies that attempt to estimate 
point-elasticities of demand, particularly in developing countries.
Understanding efficiency
X-efficiency and optimal beneficial use are more satisfactory definitions of efficiency in the 
light of the shortcomings of the neo-classical static-allocative-efficiency definition. The 
valuation of resources implicit in all three definitions is subjective, but this is explicitly 
recognised in the two alternative definitions whereas this is not the case for the Pareto- 
efficiency definition. In general, the promotion of x-efficiency is likely to be a desirable social 
goal and should be promoted subject to equity and sustainability considerations. The need for 
a balance between these considerations is captured in the concept of optimal beneficial use that 
explicitly recognises the primacy of the political-economic context.
The political economy of water and the environment
The current political orthodoxy in the OECD counties and its multinational institutions, 
specifically the IMF and World Bank favours privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation and 
market pricing, with private management of infrastructure monopolies through competitive 
tendering. This approach emphasises water as a tradable commodity, much like any widget. 
But the wise use of water is intrinsic to sustainable development and the market, on its own, is 
unlikely to deliver this. Hence regulation and direct public action in the public interest are 
needed to safeguard the environment. This requires both political will and a conducive 
political economic context. Hence, water resources management (when linked to the aim of 
promoting sustainable development) is fundamentally a political-economic product.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
An outline of a critical-realist approach to urban water pricing 
with specific reference to South Africa
Observed reality is generated by underlying structures [but] our knowledge o f  
these is inevitably incomplete; reality can only be understood as an open 
system, so there is scope fo r  a range o f understandings. But each 
understanding can be discussed rationally in relation to our [necessarily 
subjective] perceptions o f the underlying structures and processes. (Dow,
1997: 88)
1. Introduction
Earlier chapters have presented the justification for developing a critical-realist 
methodological approach to the policy and practice of urban water pricing (Chapters 1 and 2) 
and critically reviewed key constituent elements of this approach (Chapters 3 to 6). It remains 
the task of this chapter to illustrate how these constituent elements may be assembled and 
hence to provide an outline for a critical-realist methodological approach to urban water 
pricing. I do this with specific reference to South Africa.
The approach developed here asserts the absolute priority of political economy (in terms of 
understanding the constraints on and scope for price reform), which is consistent with a 
critical-realist methodological framework. Within the context of South Africa, I also assert the 
priority of justice over other water pricing policy goals. This is consistent with Sen’s 
argument for equality o f  capability in the context of antecedent diversity (as discussed in 
Chapter 5) and, further, is based on the proposition that a proper understanding of the political 
economy of South Africa will invariably lead to this conclusion (see Section 2). There is 
nothing inherent in the critical-realist methodology to suggest that it must be this way; the 
methodology only requires that the subjectivity and limitations of the choices be recognised 
and made explicit, and that the possibility of a range of understandings be acknowledged.
It should be noted at the outset that water policy (and hence practice) in South Africa has 
undergone a process of rapid and significant evolution in recent years. This process 
commenced in 1993 and was coincident with the drafting of the new (interim) constitution. 
The first policy statements to make a break with the past were contained in the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) published as a key pillar of the ANC’s election 
manifesto in late 1993. The RDP become official government policy in May 1994, though in
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an eviscerated form.378 The first white paper on water policy by the newly elected democratic 
government was published in November 1994.379 This was followed by further policy 
documents and legislation which include a further white paper on water policy,380 the Water 
Services Act (1997) and the National Water Act (1998).381 This evolutionary process is still 
ongoing. At the time of writing, policies are being refined and regulations related to the actual 
and proposed legislation are being developed. Pricing practices are in transition as a result of 
these changes as well as the reform of local government.382 The focus of the analysis presented 
here is on these recent changes. The analysis endeavours to understand these changes in terms 
of a critical-realist approach to water pricing and in relation to the broader political- economic 
context.
2. Towards a political economy of water in South Africa
I argued in Chapter 4 that market structure has a profound influence on water pricing 
practices and outcomes and, further, that the structure of the market is contingent on the 
underlying political-economic dynamics. In this chapter I demonstrate how an analysis of the 
political economy of the South African water sector might proceed and outline some of the 
outcomes of the specific South African political economy in terms of its macro-economic 
policies, the structure of the “water market” (institutions) and how these influence pricing 
practices. I have not endeavoured to present a comprehensive political-economic analysis of 
the South African water sector (space does not allow), but only to illustrate how such an 
analysis might proceed. Particular issues related to equity, sustainability and efficiency are 
elaborated in the sections that follow.
378 The RDP White Paper w as a watered down version of the original RDP (the so-called "base document”) 
for reasons discussed in the following section. S ee Marais (2001).
379 “W ater Supply and Sanitation Policy: W ater -  an indivisible national asset" (DWAF, 1994). The White 
paper w as drafted in the main by white liberals (the principal author w as Len Abrams) and reflected 
World Bank thinking in many (though not all) respects.
380 “White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa" (DWAF, 1997a).
381 The water policy White Paper asserts government custodianship of water, refutes private ownership of 
water, delinks w ater use  rights from land rights and em phasises the need to redress economic and 
social imbalances arising from past policies and practices. The policy and Act are stam ped with the 
character of Kadar Asmal stam ped on it, who w as heavily influenced by (old) labour party policies in the 
UK while in exile (in reaction to Thatcherism).
382 A new two-tier system  of local government is being implemented in South Africa in term s of the 
Municipal Structures Amendment Act (2000) and the Municipal System s Act (2000). These provide for 
the reallocation of responsibilities for water services provision to district governm ent from municipalities.
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An outline for a political economic analysis
A political economic analysis of the water sector in South Africa would need to develop a 
detailed understanding of a number of key historical events and processes including but not 
limited to the following: the development of the gold mining industry on the Witwatersrand;383 
the development of water infrastructure to supply the gold mining industry, specifically the 
formation of Rand Water and the nature of the private legislation governing its mandate and 
responsibilities; the development of towns and cities on the Witwatersrand to service the 
mines, the development of secondary industries and the related development of water 
infrastructure and institutional arrangements (for example, the changing relationship between 
Rand Water and these towns over time); the municipal management of water infrastructure in 
other cities and towns and the relationship between these and the national government; the 
effect of apartheid policies and legislation on the spatial development of infrastructure and the 
corresponding funding and pricing policies;384 the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of 
national government with respect to water and, in particular, government funding and pricing 
practices with respect to agricultural schemes, joint agricultural and urban schemes, urban 
schemes and inter-basin water transfer schemes; the formation of other water boards, 
specifically the formation of Umgeni Water to provide bulk water to Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg and the evolution of its mandate over time to include the supply of water to 
rural communities; the development of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and, 
specifically, the nature and content of the agreements between South Africa and Lesotho with 
respect the assignment of rights and obligations; the influence of the development of “ strategic 
industries” such as Sasol (petroleum from coal), Eskom (electricity) and Iscor (iron and steel) 
on water infrastructure development; the outcomes of economic development under apartheid 
and its effects on the spatial and racial distribution of household income; the political- 
economic conditions leading to the first democratic elections in 1994 and the consequent 
influences on government policy (specifically, the negotiated settlement between the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the National Party, the constitution and workings of the “ tri­
partite alliance”385 and the influence of national and international capital over government 
policy),386 the core elements of government policy, including fiscal discipline, a “ basic needs”
383 S ee, for example, Fine and Rustomjee (1996).
384 See, for example, the history of water development in Grahamstown (Eberhard, 1999c).
385 The tri-partite alliance is between the African National Congress, the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party.
386 S ee  Marais (2001) for a more general discussion.
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orientation and privatisation, and the influence of these on the water sector;387 the origins and 
outcomes of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, particularly the reasons for its 
early demise;388 the “ flagship” role of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry under 
the leadership of Kadar Asmal and the implications of this for national water policy and urban 
and rural water infrastructure; the political and institutional transitions within local 
government, specifically the reallocation of roles and responsibilities for municipal water 
infrastructure; the origins and implications of the national governments “ free basic water” 
policy initiative; and the development of so-called “Municipal Service Partnerships” for water 
services in Johannesburg, Nelspruit, the Dolphin Coast and other areas.389
Time and space do not allow a detailed examination of these issues, though some points are 
elaborated below. Nevertheless, it is possible to substantiate some of the “ stylised facts” 
asserted in Chapter 4 with specific reference to the political economy of the water sector in 
South Africa.
There is no doubt that the allocation of property rights and distribution of resources under 
apartheid has profoundly influenced the development of water infrastructure in South Africa. 
Despite the shift to a democratic government in 1994, current outcomes still very much 
reflect past allocations.390 Marais argues convincingly that the central concerns of capital were 
“ transparent and aggressively expressed” during the transition, namely, the “need for a 
market economy, for social and political stability, for continuity in state institutions and for 
restraint from  radical redistributive programmes” (2001: 84). Consequently, the unequal 
distribution of resources under apartheid continues to be perpetuated in the post-apartheid era 
and efforts to redress inequalities have been severely constrained (see below).
Reforms in the water sector in South Africa have arisen as a result of the much larger and all- 
encompassing political-economic crisis leading to a change in the polity.391 This underlines the 
fact that the polity is crucial as it determines the social contract between government, capital 
and society. As will be shown below, the social contract has extended benefits to poor 
households only in a limited way and has taken place within a framework of protecting the 
integrity of the capitalist system. This is consistent with Marais’ assertion that the historical
387 The key docum ents here are the government’s  macro-economic policy “Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution” (GEAR) (DOF, 1996) and the “Reconstruction and Development Programme” (ANC, 
1994).
380 A detailed account is given in Marais (1998).
389 The term “Municipal Services Partnerships" is used in many instances a s  a  euphemism for private 
sector participation in local government.
390 Evidence of this is presented in Section 1.3.
391 S ee  Marais (2001) for an analysis of this process.
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privileging of the political over the economic by the ANC allowed “ for the possibility of a 
settlement based on significant restructuring of the political sphere, [but] broad continuity in 
the economic sphere ” (2001: 85).
For the reasons identified above, the sections that follow are largely illustrative in nature, 
giving emphasis to the present context at the expense of a more detailed understanding of the 
dynamics leading to this context.
The political economy of macroeconomic policy
At the time of the first democratic elections in 1994, there was a general consensus within the 
ANC-led alliance that South Africa should embark on a large-scale social and economic 
infrastructure investment programme seeking to redress the imbalances and deprivations of 
apartheid and, at the same time, to restructure the economy so as to achieve rapid and 
sustained economic growth. The ANC recognised (at least at the level of rhetoric) that these 
two objectives were intimately linked: economic growth depends on social and political 
stability, which in turn depends on the capacity of the government to deliver the prospect and 
reality of a better future to the majority of the population, These views provided both the 
justification for, and are reflected in, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
which formed an integral part of the ANC election manifesto.392 The RDP played an important 
role in the first years of the ANC government in reorienting government expenditure towards 
infrastructure investment focused on meeting the basic needs of South Africans, specifically in 
the areas of water supply, electricity, schools and clinics.393
The development of a more comprehensive macroeconomic strategy called GEAR (Growth, 
Employment And Redistribution) coincided with (and arguably was responsible for) the 
demise of the RDP.394 The rhetoric of GEAR asserted that the strategy was designed to 
facilitate rebuilding and restructuring the economy such that the economy would contribute to 
the realisation of the following long-term vision: a competitive fast-growing economy which 
created sufficient jobs for all work-seekers; the redistribution of income and opportunities in 
favour of the poor; a society in which sound health, education, and other services are
392 Marais asserts  that the RDP originated with the Reconstruction Accord developed by COSATU in 1991 
and w as adopted by the ANC at the last minute and becam e “touted a s  the hub of a strategic 
programme” (2001: 95, 133). Albie Sacks (now a Constitutional Court judge) admitted that the ANC had 
no analytical framework at all at the time and w as reduced to policy improvisation (Marais, 2001: 98).
393 S ee, for example, Marais (2001). For a more critical review of the RDP programme, se e  Bond (1994).
394 The GEAR macroeconomic strategy is set out in DOF (1996). Marais argues that the eventual fate of 
the RDP reflects “the outcome of the struggle to determine the class bias of an ANC-managed 
hegemonic [transformation] project” (2001: 99).
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available to all; and an environment in which homes are secure and places of work are 
productive (DOF, 1996).
The core elements of the strategy included the following: a renewed focus on budget reform to 
strengthen the redistributive thrust of expenditure; a more rapid fiscal deficit reduction 
programme to contain debt service obligations, counter inflation and (ostensibly) to free 
resources for investment; the accelerated restructuring of state assets to optimise investment 
resources (a euphemism for privatisation); an expansion of the infrastructure investment 
programme to address service deficiencies and backlogs; and a monetary and exchange rate 
policy which aimed for low (but positive) real interest rates, low inflation and a stable 
currency. With respect to revenue, the strategy asserted that “ international experience 
confirms that it is on the expenditure side that the state budget is most effectively able to 
contribute to redistribution” , but that “ it is nonetheless important that the incidence of 
taxation should remain progressive, while at the same time impacting across a broad base so 
as to avoid excessive rates” (DOF, 1996: 9).
The strategy asserted that “ the provision of basic household infrastructure, in particular, is a 
relatively low cost and effective form of public intervention in favour of the poor and 
consistent with the reduction of income inequalities” (DOF, 1996: 15, own emphasis). The 
strategy noted that “ improved water and sanitation is typically the first priority of rural 
communities” , and that commitments have been made to “ some 500 projects costing R1.5 
billion” (US$350 million) (DOF, 1996: 15).395 The strategy further noted that the rural water 
supply programme will ultimately result in the supply of potable water to the 12 million 
people currently without adequate access, and that this will make a major contribution to 
poverty relief (1996: 15).
In practice, the GEAR policy was essentially a fiscal stabilisation policy with strong emphasis 
on debt reduction and inflation targeting. For example, public sector borrowing declined from 
9% of GDP in 1994 to just over 2% in 2000 and government debt was stabilised at 50% of 
GDP from 1995 onwards after increasing from 30% to 50% in the period 1985 to 1995 (South 
African Reserve Bank time-series data). It can be argued that investments in infrastructure 
were relatively modest and based on a minimalist definition of basic needs (see Section 3). 
Thus the macro-economic policy imposed important restrictions on the water sector by 
constraining the investment resources available to the sector and limiting the funds available 
for subsidising the operating costs of water services. One important implication of GEAR for
395 In this chapter, I have converted South African Rands to US dollars (for e a se  of reference) using the 
following conversions for the years 1993 to 2001 respectively: US$ = 3, 3.5, 3 .6 ,4 .3 ,4 .6 , 5.5, 6.5, 7 and 
8 .
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water pricing policy is the government’s emphasis on cost-recovery through user 
contributions.396 The rhetoric of GEAR (if not its reality) indicated that a core component of 
the macro-economic policy should be the redistribution of both income and opportunities in 
favour of the poor. This could provide a rationale for more progressive water investment and 
pricing practices which have a greater effect in reducing the inequality in income distribution. 
However, the balance of economic forces has mitigated against a more progressive outcome. 
The reasons originate in the political and economic compromises inherent in the ANC- 
NationalParty political settlement. Marais (2001) ascribes the ANC’s “ short walk to 
economic orthodoxy” to a combination of factors including the influence of the IMF and 
World Bank,397 the ability of capital to co-opt the ANC elite, the lack of technical capacity 
related to economic policy within the ANC, the debilitating international context including the 
collapse of Soviet-style socialism and the crises within Western European welfare systems, the 
growing influence of bourgeois and petty bourgeois layers within the ANC, the need of South 
African capital to expand beyond South Africa and the “ serious complicating factor of 
globalisation” . Marais notes that the compromise carried a “ steep price” :
Trade and financial liberation, a privatisation programme, a regressive tax 
system, ultra-low inflation targets (above all favouring financial capital) and a 
vast array o f other business-friendly adjustments. The tone was patently 
neoliberal, albeit leavened with a rhetoric to the contrary and, more 
importantly, later also by commendable changes to the labour market and 
affirmative action policies in the workplace. (Marais, 2001:136)
Notwithstanding these macro-economic constraints, the government claims it has made good 
on more than 60% of its RDP-based election promises. For example, it claims that some 6 
million people have benefited from the government’s community water supply programme in 
the period 1994 to 2000. Based on these asserted achievements, Thabo Mbeki was 
emboldened to claim that “ it would be difficult to find examples elsewhere in the world where 
a negotiated transfer of power took place, where such progress has been achieved in so short a 
time to redefine the nature of the new society” (1998). The statement does have some merit, 
though the claimed redefinition of society is clearly hyperbole.
Marais (2001) outlines elements of an alternative macro-economic strategy premised on the 
“ art of the possible” and which include more flexibility in the fiscal deficit, a prescribed asset 
requirement for institutional investors to raise capital for investments in social infrastructure,
396 “To promote the efficient use of water, the policy will be to charge users the full financial cost of 
providing access  to water, including infrastructure development and catchm ent m anagem ent activities. 
This will be done on an equitable basis and according to the realistic reasonable programme which has 
already begun. To promote equitable access to water for basic needs, provision will also be made for 
som e or all of these  charges to be waived” (DWAF, 1997a: 4).
397 This notwithstanding the fact that their direct leverage over South Africa w as limited.
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increased state expenditure on social services (particularly health and education), resisting 
downward pressures on wages, and implementation of a universal income grant of about R100 
($16) per month. However, Marais (2001) acknowledges that the prognosis for establishing 
the political pre-conditions for implementing an alternative along these lines is not good.
Institutional outcomes and their influence on pricing practices
The national government sets bulk water prices in terms of a national water pricing strategy 
(developed in terms of the water policy White Paper and National Water Act). The water 
tariff is made up of three components: an infrastructure charge, a catchment management 
charge and an “ economic” charge. The former is intended to recover the costs of 
infrastructure, the second to recover the costs of water resource management and the 
“economic” charge is meant to reflect the scarcity value of water in that particular context 
(that is, to provide an economic signal to encourage the “efficient” allocation of water). 
Infrastructure costs are based on a return on revalued assets (set at 4%) and full operating and 
maintenance costs in the case of water supplied to urban areas and industries. In the case of 
agriculture, the infrastructure charge is intended to recover the ongoing refurbishment and full 
operating and maintenance costs. The basis of determining the economic charge has not been 
decided by government. In view of the fact that the water tariffs calculated in terms of this 
strategy (finalised in 1999) are much higher than the tariffs historically applied, the tariffs are 
being phased in over five years. A special dispensation for “emerging farmers” (black South 
African farmers) has also been created whereby the full water tariffs are introduced over a 
longer time span (10 years). Hence, in practice, the “ economic charge” will not come into 
effect for a number of years.
The bulk water pricing strategy tries to balance efficiency, sustainability and equity objectives 
in a politically and socially acceptable manner (a key objective of the Water Policy White 
Paper). The pricing strategy was developed through a consultative process and appears to have 
received support (or at least acceptance) by affected constituencies. It is too early to evaluate 
the outcomes of the policy. The pricing strategy has been criticised by the World Bank for not 
basing prices on marginal costs and for not using markets to determine the “economic” 
charge.398 In fact, the South African government has gone much further than most 
governments in charging full costs for irrigation water and has been criticised for not taking 
into account the social implications of this policy in terms of the loss of farm worker jobs as 
the area irrigated in South Africa declines (Versveld, 2001: personal communication).
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Local government has the constitutional responsibility for the provision of water services 
which are accessible, adequate, affordable and sustainable. Local governments receive some 
funding from national government (mainly in the form of an “ equitable share” of national 
revenue and conditional capital grants) but are heavily reliant on property taxes and user 
charges to sustain service delivery.399 Retail water tariffs are set by local government but must 
comply with national policies. In general, the national pricing policies are not prescriptive. 
Local governments are strongly encouraged to provide the first six kilolitres of water for 
domestic use free of charge in terms of the Free Basic Water Policy (see below). Thus water 
pricing policy goals may be negotiated and reconciled largely at a local level within a national 
policy and legislative framework.
There is an ambivalence within government concerning institutional arrangements for water 
supply, specifically as they relate to the involvement of the private sector in management and 
service provision.400 This ambivalence reflects the contradictions within the ANC-COSATU- 
SACP alliance.
It is government policy to promote municipal service partnerships, a euphemism for greater 
private sector participation.401 (International development agencies, including the World Bank 
and the IFC, also actively encourage privatisation in South Africa.)402 However, in the 
Municipal Systems Act (2000), there is a general presumption in favour of service delivery by 
the municipality itself. This reflects a negotiated position between the ANC government and 
COSATU.403 The ostensible drivers pushing greater private sector participation are increased 
technical efficiency (lower costs of provision) and greater access to capital (in an environment 
where public funds are constrained -  although this latter point may be contested). It has been
398 The World Bank w as involved, together with the author, in the early s tag es  of the pricing strategy 
development. The government has not ruled out the use of water markets, but has stated that an active 
pro-market strategy is inappropriate at this time (Muller, 2001: personal communication).
399 The equitable share is not nearly sufficient to cover local government’s  constitutional responsibilities for 
service provision. In term s of the 2001/2 national budget, local government is due to receive just R6 
billion from national government through the equitable share which is less than 3% of national revenue.
400 There are many possible definitions of privatisation. The definition employed here refers to various 
forms of private participation in the provision and m anagem ent of water services (that is, som e form of 
public-private “partnership”) and not necessarily to outright private ownership of asse ts . Necessary 
elem ents for an activity to be defined a s  a  public-private partnership include genuine participation by 
both public and private sectors, at least one common objective, non-fleeting contract duration and an 
appropriate allocation of risks (Stacey, 1997: 14).
401 It would appear that the use of the word partnership is an attempt to characterise the relationship 
between the private and public sectors as  being an equal and mutually beneficial one. This is, of course, 
not necessarily (nor typically) the case  (see Chapter 4). Government’s  privatisation policies are evident 
inter alia in the White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (DPLG, 2000).
402 See, for example, Bond (1998).
403 The political-economic dynamics between the ANC and COSATU are analysed in Marais (2001). He 
shows how the ANC has m anaged to suppress the socialist agenda of COSATU and explains the 
political-economic forces leading to the ANC’s "accommodation" of capital.
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estimated that only between 100 and 150 municipalities (out of the then 800 or so) are able to 
secure loans from private banks and lending institutions (Jackson and Hlahla, 1999: 556). The 
latest restructuring of local government is likely to make matters worse. Constrained public 
resources for water resources reflect broader political choices. For example, the government 
has been willing to commit itself to spending more than R45 billion ($5.6 billion) on 
armaments over the next few years. Key fears that have been voiced by unions, local 
government politicians and others include the potential loss of jobs, “ reducing costs for the 
wealthy at the expense of the poor” , and higher costs of service provision (as a result of high 
transaction costs, high profits and/or poor efficiencies).404 Other key risks relate to universal 
basic services provision being compromised, the deterioration of service quality, 
environmental externalities not being adequately catered for, alienation of communities, 
corruption of elected representatives and municipal officials, and undermining local council 
accountability (Fourie, 2000: 159). These risks are typically exacerbated where there is a poor 
regulatory framework, insufficient regulatory capacity and the danger of regulatory capture. 
All of these conditions are present in South Africa.
In addition to the presumption of municipal service delivery in the Municipal Systems Act, the 
power to cap tariffs resides with the national Minister of Provincial and Local Government. 
This latter provision is viewed as a key constraint to greater private sector interest and 
involvement in municipal services provision in South Africa (Schur, 2001: personal 
communication). Notwithstanding this, the interests of capital (both internal and international) 
may be seen as an important driver towards increased privatisation in the water sector in 
South Africa.405
Experiences with private sector participation in the operation and management of water 
services in South Africa have been fairly limited to date. Some examples are as follows: two 
concessions (Nelspruit and Dolphin Coast), a large management contract (Johannesburg), a 
Build-0 wn-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) contract for a wastewater reclamation plant (Durban)
404 For example, “Councillor Mower (ANC) indicated that the corporatisation process w as aiming at cutting 
costs to the wealthy a t the expense of the poor. He also pointed out that the process had not been 
negotiated with the unions and that the ANC could not support the proposal (for corporatisation of water, 
electricity and solid waste services in Cape Town)” (Council of the City of Cape Town minutes, 28 March 
2001). The South African Municipal Workers Union has argued that public-private partnerships cater to 
the needs of capitalist operators and not the needs of local communities: privatisation jeopardises the 
jobs of municipal workers and will result in a model of urban governance which limits the space for 
democratic engagem ent, and disadvantages the poor (Ronnie, 1996; SAMWU, 1999, Urban Futures,
2000).
405 The then Lyonnaise des Eaux (now Suez), for example, se t up an office in South Africa as early as 
1993 for the specific purpose of securing privatisation contracts in the w ater sector in South Africa 
(Ambert, 1993: personal communication). This represents just the tip of the iceberg -  municipal water 
m anagers in South Africa frequently receive uninvited visits from private sector international water 
com panies (Macleod, 2000: personal communication).
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and a pilot programme looking at innovations to better serve poor communities (Durban). I 
discuss these briefly below.
Despite a signed 1998 “framework agreement” between two prominent South African unions and 
the South Africa Local Government Association (SALGA) which specifies that involvement of 
the private sector in service delivery should only be a last resort (that is, if there is no public 
sector provider willing or able to provide the service), long-term concession contracts were 
signed for Nelspruit in April 1999 and Dolphin Coast in January 1999 amidst protests by the 
unions.406 It is significant that both concessions were signed before the implementation of the 
Municipal Systems Act which, in effect, put into law the framework agreement. Details of the 
concession contracts are not publicly available for scrutiny and it is too early to reach any 
definitive conclusions on both the nature and performance of the contracts. Nevertheless, in both 
cases the (initial) water price (together with the basis for escalation) was determined as part of 
the bidding and negotiation process. Any price adjustments outside of the standard escalation 
clause must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The relative bargaining strengths of the 
municipality vis-a-vis the private company will determine the outcome of these future tariff 
adjustments. In view of the discussion given in Chapter 4 together with the review of the 
political context presented above, the scope for surplus extraction as a result of power 
asymmetries is likely to be large in the South African due largely to local inexperience in 
these contracts, the weak regulatory framework and the relative strength of the international 
companies vis-a-vis municipalities.407
Coincidentally, the contract between Siza and KwaDukuza (the Dolphin Coast municipality) 
has been renegotiated recently (June 2001). Siza requested and secured a 40% reduction in the 
investment requirement as well as a 15% increase in the water tariff above that provided in 
the contract. The reasons given were an oversupply of infrastructure and a serious shortfall in 
revenue. In the words of the General Manager: “The pipes are in place but the customers 
aren’t there” (Business Day, 6 June 2001). Siza threatened to walk away from the contract 
unless their demands were met. KwaDukuza, the contracting municipality, could have called 
in the performance bond but chose not to. KwaDukuza has some 60 000 inhabitants, two- 
thirds of whom earn less than R800 ($100) per month, and an annual budget of less than $30 
million. In contrast to this, the multinational company SAUR has 23 000 staff and an annual 
turnover of about $2 300 million. In a context of an inadequate national regulatory framework 
and little government support to KwaDukuza it is inconceivable that the negotiations were not
406 Biwater has the majority share in the consortium which won the bid for Nelspruit. In the case of Dolphin 
Coast, the concessionaire is Siza whose main shareholder is SAUR.
407 The South African government has implicitly admitted as much by publishing a request for proposals to 
assist the government in strengthening the regulatory framework.
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 7: Conclusions -  an outline of a critical-realist approach Page 223
affected by the existing severe power and information asymmetries. It is no surprise that the 
national business paper recorded that “ the KwaDukuza municipality is reported to have 
renegotiated the contract on a basis favourable to the company” (Business Day , 14 June 
2001).
In Johannesburg, a five year management contract was signed in February 2001 between the 
city’s newly formed public water company (Johannesburg Water) and Johannesburg Water 
Management Company (a joint venture between Northumbrian Water Group (51%), Suez 
Lyonnaise des Eaux (20%) and Water Services South Africa (29%), a local subsidiary of Suez 
Lyonnaise des Eaux. The contract covers both water and wastewater services in the 
metropolitan area. The catalyst for the process was the financial crisis faced by the city in 
1997. The ostensible justifications for the contract were to improve the city’s financial 
position by securing a dividend from the water utility and reducing the city’s need to raise 
capital. Neither of these objectives are likely to be achieved in the short term -  a significant 
dividend is not likely to be realised by the city for many years and the management contract 
will not affect the utility’s ability to raise private capital finance in a discernible way. 
Nevertheless, consultants involved in the process believe the city got a “good deal” -  good 
management at a relatively low cost with payments tied to credible performance targets -  even 
though the key initial objectives are unlikely to be realised.408 It is probable that both the city 
and the private contractor view the management contract as a first step towards greater private 
sector participation. The private company may have been willing to offer its services as a 
“ loss-leader” in the hope of positioning itself as the preferred bidder for what ultimately 
might be a much more lucrative concession. Given the two primary needs -  better 
management and access to low-cost capital -  it is not clear that the net benefits of bringing in 
a foreign based company to South Africa will outweigh the alternative option of making use of 
local managerial talent (Still, 2001: personal communication). A key risk to South Africa 
more generally is the potential expropriation and export of a profit (or cash flow) stream 
which would otherwise have remained in South Africa.
In 1998 Durban Metro Water Services (the water department of the city of Durban) designed 
and negotiated a 20 year BOOT contract for a water recycling plant with Durban Water 
Recycling, a purpose-built company whose principle shareholder is a subsidiary of Vivendi. 
This appears to be a well-balanced contract which serves the interests and needs of both 
industries and the city: industries benefit by receiving water suitable to their needs at a much 
lower cost than available alternatives and the city benefits by having reduced capital needs
408 Contractors were asked to bid for a share of savings through reducing non-revenue water. Interestingly, 
all bidders opted for a very low share, preferring the major share of m anagem ent fees to be fixed 
(Pickering, 2001: personal communication).
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(and hence lower costs and prices for its other consumers). According to Macleod, head of 
Durban Metro Water Services, the example serves to illustrate that private participation per se 
need not be problematic; the important questions to consider are how the private sector is 
engaged and how public and private interests are balanced (Macleod, 2000: personal 
communication).
Durban Metro Water Services also initiated a pilot programme with Vivendi, Mvula Trust and 
the Water Research Commission to “demonstrate how a partnership of NGO, public and 
private sectors can address the issues of providing adequate and sustainable water and 
sanitation services to poor communities” (World Bank, 2001b).409 More specifically, the 
objectives of the project are to provide acceptable and affordable water and sanitation 
services, to manage water in a responsible way, to create community awareness of health, 
hygiene and conservation issues, to adapt and refine appropriate management systems, and to 
involve community-based enterprises (2001b). According to Macleod, the partnerships “ are 
helping to prepare the utility, Council, labour and other stakeholders for the future, a future 
where there will be much more involvement of the private sector. Through these partnerships, 
local government is learning how the private sector works and thinks, and how to structure a 
contract and act as regulator. The private sector firms are learning about poverty in South 
African cities, and are also learning to relate to and respect local government” (World Bank, 
2001b). Macleod argues that these projects can be beneficial if you “ run small programmes 
first, work in specific local communities, emphasise collaborative doing and learning, involve 
those who might otherwise be opposed (for example, unions), and structure arrangements so 
that there are no residual obligations” (2001b).
There are two possible responses to this pilot project. It could be argued that this type of 
project is the “ thin edge of the wedge” (practically admitted by Macleod above) and that these 
projects are really a means to a much greater end for private companies (full or significant 
control of water services in Durban and other large cities in South Africa). Alternatively, it 
could be argued that the private sector can be engaged on mutually beneficial terms provided 
the right balances are struck between private and public interests. Advocates of the former 
point of view will argue that the interests of the private sector (shareholder profits) are 
fundamentally opposed to broader public interest and hence it is naive to believe that the 
alternative view point has any validity. A rejoinder to this is that, given the political-economic 
context in South Africa, it could be argued that it is inevitable that capitalist interests will 
prevail and hence the only alternative is to try to engage with these on terms that are as
409 Mvula Trust is an NGO providing assistance to rural communities with the provision of water and 
sanitation services. The W ater R esearch Commission is a national public agency which funds water 
research from a levy on water sales.
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favourable to the public interest as possible. If this last point is correct, then perhaps the 
approach adopted by Macleod is the only pragmatic one.
Some have gone so far as to pose the question: has the state deliberately set up public-public 
partnerships to fail in order to strengthen the argument for private sector participation? (Pape,
2001).410 In support of the argument, Pape quotes a DWAF official: “ I suspect we will be 
moving to a private sector model but it’s taking too much time ... do you keep paying 
subsidies and get nothing in return?” (2001: 24). Pape’s argument is akin to conspiracy 
theory, implying a coherence of purpose (and the power to achieve this purpose) within the 
state that is simply not there.
Alternatively, it could be argued that local governments have no choice but to seek greater 
private sector participation. For example, Gotz and Harrison (2000) support this argument in 
the following manner:
The cap on borrowing by municipalities (as determined by the Department o f  
Finance) coupled with their increased responsibilities has put them into a 
position whereby they are realistically unable to deliver services without 
looking fo r  financial assistance beyond the public sector. The increased 
expectations on municipalities through the Municipal Infrastructure Investment 
Framework and concepts such as developmental local government have meant 
that municipalities are in the position o f increased responsibilities, increased 
jurisdictions and insufficient finance.
Elaborating on this theme, the justification of municipal service partnerships is articulated as 
follows in an official government publication:
Today many municipalities are unable to provide municipal services to all 
their citizens. There are many reasons fo r  this. In some instances, it may be 
that the municipality does not have adequate funds. In other cases, it may be 
because the municipality is unable to manage the service properly -  that is, to 
provide good services at an affordable cost to itself, its communities and other 
users. (Citizens Guide to Municipal Service Partnerships, 1999)
This argument touches on a point rarely raised by those opposed to private sector involvement 
in water services, namely, the record of public sector delivery, in many instances, is very 
poor. In South Africa, the “ white” local authorities generally did a reasonably good job in 
delivering services to the then “ white” areas. Services were reliable and reasonably cost- 
effective (PDG, 1994). However, the democratisation of local government in South Africa has 
provided great challenges: not only are local authorities more thinly stretched in terms of 
skills and resources (a result of the rationalisation of resources across wider boundaries to 
include the previously heavily under-resourced black local authority areas), but the stable and
410 Pape (2001) evaluated the first public-public partnership in South Africa, between Rand Water and Odi, 
a local authority. Public-public partnerships are proposed as a viable alternative to public-private 
partnerships by the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU).
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cohesive social compact which existed between the consumers and the local authority (in the 
case of many of the old white areas, but not in the case of the then black local authority areas) 
is fundamentally threatened. Without the development of a new broader and more inclusive 
social compact, and the provision of greater resources, it is questionable whether the old 
model of municipal service delivery in South Africa can meet the new challenges of universal 
provision of basic services and financial sustainability. In this context, an approach which is 
agnostic about ideology but is focussed on (and willing to experiment and be innovative in) 
developing approaches for providing better services for more people and at a lower cost would 
seem to be most appropriate. Cutting out private sector options on the grounds of ideology 
alone is clearly short-sighted. This is not to say that the potential pitfalls of private sector 
involvement should not be taken seriously.
Sylvy Jaglin makes the important point that institutional frameworks cannot be imposed 
successfully from the outside, rather it is the existing system of social relations which will 
determine how well any system will work, not the institutional structure itself (2001: personal 
communication). This would suggest the importance of placing a very significant emphasis on 
process and on building social compacts. This is a lengthy and time-consuming process which 
cannot be undertaken in a matter of weeks or months. It is perhaps for this very reason that 
speedy privatisation processes have so often come aground on the rocks of conflict.
The role of the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) in South Africa illustrates the 
problems associated with ignoring this line of thinking. The MIIU was set up specifically to 
promote greater private sector involvement in municipal service delivery (with the 
performance of staff evaluated in terms of the number of deals signed). The standard terms of 
reference for a feasibility study of service delivery options for water and sanitation services 
requires consultants to investigate the services status quo, evaluate service delivery options 
(including a full range of private sector participation arrangements), consult and make a 
recommendation to the council within 100 days. It is impossible to undertake any meaningful 
consultation within such a short period, particularly in a context where both labour and the 
governing legislation is antipathetic to the cause of privatisation so boldly advanced by the 
MIIU and where local authorities are newly created institutions with cultural divisions and 
lack of trust between politicians and officials. Hence it is not surprising that of the more than 
100 feasibility studies commission by the MIIU, only a handful has resulted in contracts being 
signed -  the MIIU appears to have been hoisted by its own petard.
This discussion has served to illustrate, albeit briefly, that a critical-realist approach to pricing 
must not only take into account the effect of the current institutional arrangements, but also 
the prospects for institutional transformation and the underlying political-economic forces
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governing these changes. Furthermore, the discussion shows that a range of understandings 
are likely to co-exist at any one time and that these understandings are based on necessarily 
subjective perceptions. Institutional outcomes and pricing practices will flow from the balance 
of political and economic power underlying these perceptions.
3. Taking justice and inequality seriously
The political and economic imperative of addressing the injustices of the past and reducing 
inequality is likely to be a key outcome of any detailed examination of the political economy 
of South Africa. The same examination will also identify both the constraints to addressing 
injustices and the scope for reducing inequalities.
In the context of urban water pricing, and within a critical-realist framework, the following 
kinds of questions would need to be addressed: How should equitable access to water services 
be defined and to what extent should this be a priority in terms of resource allocation? What 
are the relationships between income inequality, affordability and cost-based water pricing and 
what are the implications of this for water pricing policy? What role should (or could) 
subsidies play in the pricing of water? and, What scope is there for water pricing policy to 
contribute to the reduction in inequality?
There is not one stable set of answers to the above questions. The questions themselves will 
continue to be rephrased and the answers refined or amended as time passes and conditions 
change. Moreover, the methodology used to address these questions may be contested and is 
likely to change over time. Some of the questions may never be answered in a definitive way. 
All of this is consistent with a critical-realist methodology. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
outline some ways in which these questions have been or could be answered in the South 
African context.
Equitable access
Because historic investments in infrastructure have favoured certain groups at the expense of 
others, “neutral” forward looking policies which ignore past investments will serve only to 
entrench existing inequalities. It is therefore not surprising that the newly elected democratic 
government in South Africa sought to develop policies and legislation which were intended 
actively to address the issue of inequality in access to water supply.
The following constitutional rights are of fundamental importance to the water sector in 
general and water pricing in particular: the right to equality, the right to dignity and life, the 
right to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being, the protection of property
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 7: Conclusions -  an outline of a critical-realist approach Page 228
rights from expropriation without compensation, and the right of access to adequate nutrition 
and primary health care services. The last right is interpreted in the 1997 White Paper as 
follows: “ Every child has a right to, amongst other things, basic nutrition and health services. 
Access to sufficient affordable clean water fo r  hygiene purposes should be seen as part of the 
primary health care service” (DWAF, 1997).411
The 1994 White Paper on Community Water Supply and Sanitation defined a basic water 
supply as the consumption of a minimum of 25 litres per person per day, with access to the 
water supply within 200m of each household, a minimum flow at the source of 10 litres per 
minute, availability on a regular daily basis, 98% assurance of supply, effective operation and 
maintenance of the system, and safe to drink (DWAF, 1994: 15), a definition which draws 
heavily on the World Health Organisation guidelines.
In terms of this definition, about 3 million households in South Africa did not have an 
adequate water service in 1997. About 80% of households without access to adequate water 
services reside in rural areas (DCD, 1998). The capital cost of making up this backlog (up to 
a basic supply as defined above) is approximately R6 billion (or 0.7% of GDP).412 The 
National Infrastructure Investment Framework (NIIF) estimated a total five-year investment 
requirement for water services of R23-33 billion. Thus the costs of upgrading currently 
inadequate services to a basic standard are not large in relation to the total investment 
requirements. Nevertheless, pricing policy may profoundly influence the total investment 
requirements in at least three ways. First, pricing policy will affect the demand for new 
connections and, in particular, the distribution of service levels. Second, pricing policy will 
affect water demand and change the timing of investments in new capacity. Third, pricing 
policy will affect the distribution of the cost and benefits in accordance with how it allocates 
revenue responsibility.
South Africa has adopted a “ basic needs” framework for addressing the question of equitable 
access to services. This approach appears to be consistent with Harberger’s neo-classical 
“ basic needs pricing” approach -  that is, the altruism of the consumer and tax-payer does not 
extend beyond providing for universal access to a (minimalist definition of) a basic service 
which is adequate to maintain health. Although the approach could be thought of as being 
consistent with either of two alternative approaches, namely Rawls’ “ equal holding of primary
411 It should be noted that this right is what is known as  a “second generation right”; government would be 
required to prove in court, should it be challenged, that it is taking reasonable steps to m eet this right.
412 Capital costs are dependent inter alia on service level, consumption, settlem ent characteristics, 
topography, existing infrastructure, labour costs, material costs, distance to the water source, technical 
efficiency and econom ies of scale. S ee  DCD (1997) and PDG (1994). South African GDP in 2000 was 
R873 billion (US$124 billion).
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goods” or Sen’s “ equality of functioning” , this would require very moderate assumptions 
concerning the definition of primary goods (in the case of Rawls) and the definition of basic 
functioning (in the case of Sen). Bolder and more progressive interpretations of primary goods 
and/or basic functionings could arguably lead to the definition of a higher standard of service 
as the basic guaranteed service for each household.413 Clearly an important constraining factor 
has been the government’s macro-economic policy (defining the government’s willingness to 
commit resources to investments in water supply) and, in turn, the political-economic 
dynamics that gave rise to this policy in the first instance (as previously discussed). Although 
it is not possible to get trends in capital expenditure in the water sector, this trend is likely to 
mirror total local government expenditure which is shown in Figure 8 below (sourced from 
South African Reserve Bank time-series data).
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Figure 8: Trend in local government capital expenditure in South Africa (R million)
The data shows very clearly that capital expenditure by local government has been on a 
significant declining trend since 1985, halving in real terms from a peak of R14 billion per 
annum in 1985 to about R7 billion per annum in 2000.
The question “ equality of what?” in the context of access to water supply is thus socially 
determined. I have shown how the contest over meanings and interpretations of equality has 
played out and further, how it is contingent on the underlying political economy of South 
Africa, particularly as reflected in its macro-economic policies.
413 Such an argument has been put forward by Patrick Bond (2001).
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Income inequality, affordability and pricing
The level and distribution of household income, and the degree of inequality are of 
considerable importance in the consideration of the pricing of domestic water consumption 
because they will have an important influence on the pattern of water demand and the 
affordability of water services. More than 3 million households live below the poverty line of 
R353 per month ($1.50 per day) (Marais, 2001: 194). Average household expenditure in 
South Africa was estimated to be R1 090 ($300) per month in 1993 (Deaton, 1997). However, 
household incomes were very unevenly distributed between race groups. For example, 
average household expenditure per month amongst white households was R4 615 ($1 500). 
When converted to an individual per capita expenditure (PCE) equivalent, the mean individual 
PCE is almost seven times larger for white people than it is for black people in South Africa 
(Deaton, 1997). Income distribution is also very unevenly distributed between households both 
across and within race groups.414 The cumulative distribution of income (PCE expressed as 
Rands per month per person) for the white and black population in South Africa is shown in 
Figure 9 (Deaton, 1997: 166). The gap between black and white South Africans is stark. The 
poorest 40% of South Africans are overwhelmingly African, female and rural (Marais, 2001: 
194). South Africa was the third most unequal society in the World as measured by the Gini 
coefficient (World Bank, 1996b).
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of Per Capita Expenditure (PCE) in South Africa
Both income levels and service costs will vary by locality. Nevertheless it is possible to 
provide an indication of likely levels of affordability for water services in South Africa as a
414 In 1993, the poorest 20% of South Africans spent only 3% of all PCE and the poorest 20% of black 
people spent only 5% of all PCE spent by black people. The poorest 50% of South Africans spent only 
13% of all PCE (Deaton, 1997:160).
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 7: Conclusions -  an outline of a critical-realist approach Page 231
whole using the income data from Deaton (1997) and the following assumptions related to 
costs and affordability. The full monthly costs per household (inclusive of all capital costs) are 
R30, R60, R90 and R150 respectively for communal standpipes, yard tanks and house 
connections (“ normal” and “high” use);415 and a household can afford a water service if the 
cost of the service is less than or equal to 5% of household income or expenditure.416
The above assumptions were combined with black household income distribution data to show 
the overall levels of affordability of water services amongst black households in South Africa. 
Less than 5 % of black households in South Africa can afford the full cost of an in-house water 
connection with consumption of 40 kl per month, and only some 15% of black households can 
afford the full cost of an in-house water connection with consumption of 20 kl per month. 
However, some 40% of black households can afford the operating and maintenance costs of 
an in-house connection using 40 kl per month and about 60% can afford the operating and 
maintenance cost of an in-house connection using 20 kl per month. More than 80% of black 
households can afford the operating and maintenance costs for a communal standpipe water 
supply, and about 70% of households can afford the operating and maintenance costs of a yard 
tank supply. The reality of water cuts confirms the picture of lack of affordability painted 
here.417
In the context of a high degree of income inequality, water pricing which is directly related to 
the cost of service provision is likely to have a regressive effect on income distribution. The 
likely influence of cost-based water pricing on income inequality in South Africa is illustrated 
in Figure 10.418
415 Operating and maintenance costs are affected by the level of service, the level of consumption, 
econom ies of scale, the age of the infrastructure and operating (technical) efficiency. These costs are 
based on the following assumptions: fixed costs of R5 for communal standpipes and R10 for yard tanks 
and house connections: a variable operating cost of R1/ki; consumption of 5 ,1 0 , 20 and 40 kl per 
household per month for communal standpipes, yard tanks and house connections (“normal" and “high” 
use) respectively: costs are purely a function of service level, each of which has an assum ed fixed 
consumption.
416 This rule of thumb (the so-called “5% rule”) is commonly used and has som e empirical support in the 
South African context. S ee  Bahl and Linn (1992) and Goldblatt (1997). Macleod has suggested that the 
5% rule may be too high and proposes a 2% rule instead (Macleod, 1997, personal communication).
417 “Thousands of water connections are cut off each month because users cannot afford the service 
fees”(Marais, 2001:190).
418 The following assum ptions were used: in-house water supply, a fixed cost of R10 per month, a variable 
cost of R3/kl, a  base consumption of 66 led for a family of five with a  household income of R500, a 
constant family size across the income range, an income elasticity of dem and of 0.5 for the income 
range R500 to R5000 per month, 0.4 for the range R5000 to R10 000 per month and 0.3 for the range 
R10 000 to R15 000 per month.
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Figure 10: The influence of cost related water pricing on inequality
Figure 10419 shows that a poor household with an income of R500 ($62) per month and 
consuming just 66 litres per capita per day would have to spend 8% of its income to cover the 
cost of service provision whereas a household with an income of R15 000 ($1875) per month 
would have to pay only 1 % of its income to cover the cost of the water service even though its 
per capita consumption is 350 litres per capita per day. The overall effect of cost-based water 
pricing on income distribution in South Africa is clearly regressive.
In summary, income distribution in South Africa is highly skewed. Pricing policy that 
exacerbates this inequality is likely to be undesirable. Cost-based pricing typically will 
exacerbate income inequality because the income elasticity of water demand is low (much less 
than 1). Notwithstanding the fact that the above considerations are likely to be balanced with 
the incentive effects of pricing in terms of promoting efficient use and financial and ecological 
sustainability, it is not surprising that South Africa has not opted for a full cost-recovery 
approach to domestic water pricing and has implemented subsidies for water services as 
discussed below. Notwithstanding this, it also must be recognised that the extent to which 
water pricing is able to address the profound income inequalities found in South Africa is 
severely circumscribed.
419 W ater use (in litres per capita per day -  led) is plotted as  a function of household income. The monthly 
water bill (in Rands per month) is derived from the consumption (and is also plotted against household 
income). The monthly bill a s  a  percentage of household income (“% share  of income" on right-hand y- 
axis) is calculated and plotted against household income.
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Subsidies -  rhetoric versus reality
Subsidies in water sector in South Africa take the following forms: capital subsidies to assist 
with the development of bulk infrastructure; capital subsidies to assist with household access 
to water and sanitation services; operating subsidies arising from the “equitable share” 
policy.420 It is impossible to quantify these flows because some of the grants are made 
available for a composite set of services and it is not possible to determine what portion of 
these grants have been allocated specifically to water supply. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, 
there is little doubt that the capital costs of ensuring universal access to basic water supplies 
could be fully covered by capital subsidies, and the operating costs of supplying a “ basic 
needs amount” of water to poor households could be fully covered by operating subsidy, with 
both sources of subsidy coming from national government. A five year programme to 
eliminate the backlog would require expenditure of R1.2 billion ($150 million) per year, less 
than 0.2% of GDP. The amount to be made available through the “ equitable share” policy for 
the subsidisation of operating costs for basic services has been estimated to be R86 ($16) per 
month per household earning less than a R1100 ($140) per month (DOF, 1998).
The historical trend in grants from national to local government is shown in Figure 11 
(sourced from South African Reserve Bank time-series data).
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Figure 11: Trend in recurrent grants to local government in South Africa
420 These subsidy mechanisms are described in DCD (1998b), DOF (1998), DBSA (1998) and DWAF 
(1997a).
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There was a significant increase in grants to local government during the 1980s, however, in 
the last three years grants (as a share of total local government revenue) dropped to pre-1985 
levels. This demonstrates that the ANC government has not been successful is shifting 
significant resources to the subsidisation of municipal services.
It has been government policy to provide the capital infrastructure for a basic water service 
(as defined above) free of charge. In practice many households are still without a basic supply 
of water even though this policy has been in place for more than six years. The ANC 
government’s initial policy on operating subsidies was that households should pay the full 
operating and maintenance costs, subject to affordability.421 In practice this policy has not 
been extensively applied. Water charges are not applied effectively in many rural and urban 
areas. Average payment levels on government water schemes serving about 6 million rural 
people are between 1% and 2% of the costs of supply (Muller, 2001: personal 
communication). The president announced a new policy on charges for basic water supply 
during the local government elections at the end of 2000. Election posters read “ Free water 
and electricity for all” . The policy intention is that government will provide six thousand litres 
of water each month to poor households at no charge.422 Importantly, the government has 
made no additional monetary provisions for this policy in its national budget and it appears to 
be the intention that the funds for this policy are to come either from consumer cross-subsidies 
at the local level or from local government’s equitable share of national revenue.
The constraints imposed by the government’s macro-economic policies are evident in its water 
subsidy policies which are consistent with a basic needs framework employing a minimalist 
definition of a guaranteed minimum service package. It could be argued that, given South 
Africa’s fiscal resources, the definition of basic services could (or should) be expanded to 
include a higher level of service and ensure a greater average consumption of water by 
households. The Department of Water Affairs has taken a (small) step in that direction with its 
promotion of the Free Basic Water Policy. However, its willingness to implement more 
progressive subsidies and its ability to influence the Ministry of Finance to provide greater 
resources for subsidies remain in doubt.423
421 “The basic policy of Government is that [water] services should be self-financing at a local and regional 
level. The only exception to this is that, where poor communities are not able to afford basic services, 
Government may subsidise the cost of construction of basic minimum services but not operating and 
maintenance or replacement costs" (DWAF, 1994:19).
422 This equates to 25 led for a household of eight.
423 Marais argues that government departm ents’ “persuasive weight is limited by the powerful super- 
ministry status of the finance ministry and by the fact that the president's office wields a formidable hand 
in policy making”(2001: 208),
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Redressing past inequalities
During the apartheid years, South Africa’s cities, towns and rural areas were divided into 
vastly unequal confines -  one well-endowed with municipal services, management capacity 
and the economic development necessary to pay for the services; the other under-resourced, 
poorly located and suffering from deliberate restraints on economic development. This 
inequality has, in many cases, led to basic needs not being met (as outlined above), created 
extensive hardships for those living in deprived areas, and often resulted in health problems.424 
The inefficiencies of the apartheid spatial form have also slowed economic development. At 
the level of the household, this is because being forced to live in poorly serviced areas has 
stifled productivity and reduced business opportunities. At a national level, the inefficiencies 
created by the apartheid spatial form have, inter alia, added to the cost of installing services, 
intensified the need for service subsidies and increased the cost of producing goods and 
services.
These inequalities are also reflected in domestic water consumption patterns in South Africa. 
Although average domestic water consumption is not unduly low in the major urban areas of 
South Africa, water consumption within the urban areas of South Africa is highly unevenly 
distributed. In particular, the distribution of water consumption between previously defined 
and designated “ white” and “black” areas is highly skewed. For the purposes of illustration, 
the distribution of water consumption between the previously defined “ black” (solid line) and 
“white” (dotted line) areas in Grahamstown is shown in Figure 12 (the data comes from 
Eberhard, 1999c).
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Figure 12: Consumption distribution in "black" and "white" Grahamstown
424 The cholera epidemic in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal in 2000 is a ca se  in point.
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Supply-side factors provide an important constraint on consumption in “ black” Grahamstown 
-  many households in “ black” Grahamstown do not have on-site water connections, for 
example. Nevertheless, affordability is also an important constraining factor (Eberhard, 
1999c). It has been argued in Chapter 5 that it is highly desirable that households consume at 
least 50 litres per person per day. Hence a water tariff policy which encourages greater 
consumption water amongst poorer households, and reduced consumption where this is high 
(typically for relatively wealthy households), could play an important role in reducing 
inequality.
South Africa’s domestic water pricing policy seeks to do this:
Hie policy o f  sliding tariff scales is endorsed. The basic approach identifies 
three separate tariffs: A life-line or social tariff to cover basic human needs.
The quantity shall not exceed 25 led. The tariff shall be set [to zero]. Normal 
tariff. This is fo r  normal use. The quantity shall not exceed 250 led and shall 
be provided at cost (operating, maintenance and capital) including the losses 
incurred though the life-line tariff. Marginal tariff. Water consumption 
exceeding 250 led will be charged fo r at the marginal cost defined as the 
present day cost o f the latest or next augmentation scheme. (DWAF, 1994: 24, 
modified to reflect the new “free water ” policy)
Comparative analysis of international experience suggests that domestic consumption of 
between 100 and 200 litres per person per day is sufficient to maintain a high standard of 
living (Eberhard, 1999b). Such an average level of consumption is already attained in South 
Africa’s major urban areas. However, as shown above, domestic consumption in South Africa 
is highly skewed widi a minority consuming large quantities of water (often in excess of 300 
litres per person per day) and a majority of households consuming much less than 50 litres per 
person per day. This suggests that it may be appropriate for pricing policy to seek to achieve 
the dual goals of encouraging consumption where this is less than 50 litres per person per day 
(rather than the 25 litres per person per day which is currently the policy) and discouraging 
consumption where this is in excess of 200 litres per person per day. Alternatively, instead of 
subsidising water directly, government could provide a universal basic income grant sufficient 
for households to afford basic amenities (see above).
This discussion has sought to illustrate how the political-economic context governs both the 
rhetoric and reality of water pricing policies and practices as they relate to inequality. The 
fundamental tension between a popularly expressed desire for universal free basic services and 
the conservative neo-classical macro-economic policy is again evident. The outcomes will be 
determined to a large extent by the process of institutional transformation within local 
government as previously discussed.
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4. Ensuring environmental sustainability 
South Africa’s water resources
South Africa is a water scarce country, its limited water resources are spread unevenly across 
the country and it suffers from hydrological extremes.425 Areas of mineral wealth and 
economic development are not coincident with run-off and groundwater is not abundant. In 
several river catchments the current water requirements far exceed the natural availability of 
water and it has been predicted that, overall, the available water resources will be insufficient 
to meet projected demands within the next 30 years or so.426 Future resource development 
costs are expected to be significantly higher than past investments in water supply capacity in 
many areas in South Africa. The most striking example is the costs associated with the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project -  the long-run marginal cost of supply of raw water into the 
Vaal River system was estimated to be R1.50/kl (41 US c/kl) compared to the average 
historic cost of R0.30 /kl (Roome, 1995: personal communication). These cost increases are 
significant because of the dominance of Gauteng both in terms of economic activity and in 
terms of urban and industrial water use.
International experience indicates that countries with renewable freshwater resources below 
1 000 m3 per capita per year are “ likely to experience chronic water scarcity on a scale 
sufficient to impede development and harm human health” (WRI, 1996). South Africa’s total 
per capita availability of annual renewable fresh water is estimated at 1 220 m3 based on a 
population of 41 million people (CSS, 1998). Current estimates of population growth imply 
that the country’s per capita water resources will dip below the 1 000 m3 benchmark within 
the next 10 years.
Defining sustainable development
In this context, the South African government has attempted to develop answers to the 
following question: How can sustainable development and the sustainable use of water 
resources be assured? In order to answer this question, government has had to define the 
meaning of environmental sustainability and work out the role that pricing could and should 
play to promote sustainability.
425 Both severe and prolonged droughts as well as floods occur periodically.
426 “Now looming is the full utilisation of the overall conventional water resources of the country in about 30 
years should the efficiencies of water utilisation by the different users not be dramatically improved and 
should the current growth trends ... continue to apply" (DWAF, 1997b: 65).
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I have argued that a strong definition of sustainable development implies that the physical 
stock of water resources available (measured in terms of both quantity and quality) should be 
maintained for future generations, and that the adoption of this definition of sustainable 
development was much more likely to secure environment sustainability compared to a weak 
definition (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, I have argued that the actual definition of 
sustainability development adopted in any particular context will be socially determined and 
contingent on underlying political-economic factors. Contrary to the views of many neo­
classical economists, I argued that pricing could play only a limited role in ensuring 
environmental sustainability and that legislative interventions to protect the environment would 
be of critical importance.
South Africa’s approach to ensuring environmental sustainability affirms these arguments. 
South Africa’s definition of sustainable development has changed over time, reflecting 
economic and political priorities and environmental conditions. As pressure on the water 
environment has grown, South Africa has moved from a weak to a stronger definition of 
sustainable development. The change in the polity provided an opportunity for South Africa’s 
water law to be rewritten from scratch. A strong definition of environmental sustainability lies 
at the heart of the new legislation. Key elements of this approach are outlined below.
Ensuring ecological sustainability
The Water Act provides for the determination of an “ environmental reserve” which is not 
subject to pricing. The environmental reserve defines the minimum flow requirements for a 
particular river (or stretch of river). In terms of the Act, the river must then be managed in 
such a way so as to ensure that these minimum flow requirements are met. Given the 
minimum flow requirements, hydrological models are used to determine the “ surplus water” 
which is available water for extraction and allocation to users. The minimum flow 
requirements are determined on the basis of the water needs for the proper ecological 
functioning of the river. Only surplus water (as defined above) may be allocated to users and 
priced. Where existing allocations exceed the availability of surplus water, these allocations 
will need to be reduced. In the past, the quantity and quality of return flows into the river 
system were controlled by a permit system. The cost of the permit was based on an 
administrative fee. In terms of the new Water Act, the quantity and quality of return flows 
into die river system will be controlled through a combination of legal, administrative and 
pricing mechanisms. The new Water Act is still in the process of being fully implemented and 
hence it is too early to judge its efficacy. Notwithstanding this, the legislation is held in high 
esteem internationally (Mike Muller, 2001: personal communication).
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5. Improving efficiency
I have argued that X-efficiency provides a more satisfactory definition of efficiency in the 
light of the shortcomings of the neo-classical static-allocative-efficiency definition, and have 
argued that the promotion of X-efficiency is likely to be a desirable social goal and should be 
promoted subject to equity and sustainability considerations (see Chapter 6). The practical 
implications of this approach are explored in a cursory manner below with reference to water 
use in South Africa.
Understanding water use patterns in South Africa
A pricing policy which seeks to improve water-use efficiency must start with an understanding 
of the existing pattern of use and demand. Some key questions need to be answered: How is 
water allocated between users? For what purposes is water being used and how efficient is the 
water use in achieving these purposes? What role can water pricing play in influencing water 
use and water-use efficiency?
Estimates of overall water use in South Africa are summarised in Table 7.
Table 7: Water use estimates for South Africa
(million kl per annum) 1980 1990 1996 2000 2010 2030
Urban and domestic 1 500 2 280 2 170 3 220 4 480 6 940
Mining and industrial 1 780 2 400 1 600 3 400 4 510 3 380
Irrigation and forestry 10 100 11 410 12 340 12 860 13 940 15 870
Environmental 2 950 2 950 3 930 2 950 2 960 4 230
Total 16 300 19 050 20 050 22 440 25 890 30 420
Sources: Columns 1, 2 ,4  and 5: DWAF(1986); Columns 3 and 6: DWAF (1997b) which includes 
estim ates for Lesotho and Swaziland.
The implied growth rates are given in Table 8.
Table 8: Water use growth rates for South Africa
(% per annum) 80-90 90-00 00-10 97-30
Urban and domestic 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.6
industrial (including mining) 3.1 3.5 2.9 2.3
Irrigation and forestry 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.8
Environmental 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Total 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.3
Sources: First three columns: DWAF (1986); Last column: DWAF (1997b).
Urban and industrial growth were significantly over-estimated in DWAF (1986). 
Nevertheless, high annual growth rates (3.6%) continue to be used for future forecasts. Most 
of the new demand for water is expected to originate from the municipal (urban and domestic)
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and industrial (including mining and power) sectors. Environmental water resource 
requirements are in the process of being revised and hence are uncertain at this stage. The 
reasoning behind the water use projections is not well documented. The potential influence of 
price changes and improvements in water use efficiency have not been taken into account 
hence the projections represent a “business as usual” scenario.
Power generation is a significant water using sector in South Africa. The choice of technology 
in power generation (“wet” versus “dry” cooling) plays an important role in water use. 
Eskom has managed to reduced water consumption per unit of electricity generated (by coal 
fired power stations) by more than 41% in the 10 years from 1987 to 1996. The decline in 
both the total water use and specific water use is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Water use for electricity generation in South Africa 
Improving technical water-use efficiency
The electricity generating sector provides a dramatic example of the potential role of 
investments and innovation in water-wise technologies to improve technical efficiency and 
reduce water use. Higher water prices are likely to promote such investments and innovation. 
However, on their own, prices may be an inadequate or insufficient incentive.
Scope for improvements in technical water-use efficiency is not restricted to the energy sector, 
but also includes the agricultural, manufacturing and domestic water use sectors. 
Manufacturing as a whole contributes approximately 22% of the total GDP while consuming 
approximately 5 to 8% of the total annual renewable water resource. The petroleum, 
chemicals and pulp and paper sectors use a major share of the water consumed within the 
manufacturing sector, therefore focusing specifically on incentives to promote improvements 
in technical water-use efficiency in these sectors would be sensible in a context of increasing 
water scarcity.
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In a survey of water use in urban areas in South Africa, 35% of municipalities reported an 
unaccounted-for water rate of more than 15% (PDG, 1994). This indicates that there is 
considerable scope to reduce water losses and unaccounted-for water through improved water 
management.
Agriculture is a large user of water, yet the value added to the economy per unit of water 
consumed is significantly lower than industrial water use. There is considerable scope for the 
improvement of water-use efficiencies within agriculture. There is also scope for the 
reallocation of water from low value crops to high value crops. This will increase the overall 
benefit derived per unit of water consumed in the agricultural sector. The reallocation of 
water from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector could potentially increase the overall 
benefit derived per unit of water consumed in South Africa. However the forward and 
backward linkages between agriculture and industry need to be factored into the calculation of 
the net benefit of such a transfer. The pricing of irrigation water is likely to lead to increased 
irrigation efficiencies, especially if combined with research and investments in improved 
irrigation technologies.
6. Concluding remarks
A key stated objective of the South African government in its management of water is “ to 
achieve optimum, long term, environmentally sustainable social and economic benefits for 
society” from the use of water (DWAF, 1997a: 34). The means of achieving this objective 
lies in the concept optimal beneficial use that may be defined as the best possible use in the 
public interest. The 1997 White Paper makes three points related to the promotion of optimal 
beneficial use: (1) there should be an appropriate balance between promotion and 
enforcement, (2) promotion through research, pilot projects, education and general 
communication activities will work best in a supportive framework which includes regulatory 
incentives and penalties, and (3) the provision of information on best practice and comparative 
performance with respect to water use will help to identify problem areas and encourage 
corrective action.
I have argued in this thesis that optimal beneficial use in the public interest must necessarily 
be subjectively determined and that the process of determination is itself contingent on the 
underlying political economy. Clearly water pricing has an important role to play. 
Nevertheless, pricing is just one element and on its own can only achieve limited objectives. 
Thus pricing practice must be located within a coherent understanding of the political 
economic context, recognising its limitations and seeking to determine the effects of pricing 
on equality, efficiency and sustainability when used in tandem with other mechanisms
Rolfe Eberhard Urban water pricing: a critical-realist approach PhD Thesis: SOAS Economics
Chapter 7: Conclusions -  an outline of a critical-realist approach Page 242
(specifically legislation and subsidies transfers). Moreover, actual pricing practices in South 
Africa will be determined largely by the outcomes of the institutional transformation in local 
government in South Africa and the fundamental tension between public and private delivery 
of water services. A critical-realist approach to water pricing can only be worked out through 
direct engagement in the processes of politics, policy making and institutional transformation, 
all of which are situated directly within the governing political-economic context. In essence, 
this is the practical meaning of a critical-realist water pricing methodology.
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Appendix 1 
Tariff structure, marginal price and 
consumption
No explicit charge for water.
Average price = zero, marginal price = zero
Where water is not charged on a volumetric basis, the marginal price of water use is zero. A number of cities do 
not meter domestic water and do not charge in proportion to the amount of water used. Some examples are given 
below.
Country /city
Scotland (Edinburgh) 
Ireland (Dublin)
Source Comment
Sullivan, 1996 Revenue from banded property tax.
Sullivan, 1996 Revenue from general taxes.
Both of these cities have relatively abundant water resources and ail houses have private water connections. The 
need to conserve water is not urgent and the urban water agencies do not face steep costs for expanding 
supplies. It would appear that equity considerations dominate in both cases because revenue is raised through a 
progressive wealth or income related tax. The European Commission is placing pressure on Ireland to introduce
ch arges related to w ater consum ption._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Separate water charge, but not directly related to water consumption.
Average price > 0, marginal price = zero_____________________________________________________________
W ater is charged  for sep ara te ly  b ased  on som e proxy m easu re  used  to estim ate  av erag e  w ater use._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Netherlands Sullivan, 1996 Charge based on house characteristics (number of toilets,
(Amsterdam) number of rooms, garden size).
Sudan (Khartoum)______ Adam, 1997_______ W ater ch arges s e t  on the b a s e s  of h o u se  size._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Although payments may reflect water usage better than where no proxy for water use is used, residents have no 
incentive to conserve water as this will not affect their water bill. Where water is relatively abundant and the need
for capacity  expansion  is low (or at least its cost is low) this type of charging system  m ay be appropriate._ _ _ _ _ _ _
Direct charge related to water consumption, but subsidised
Average price < average historical cost, marginal price > 0 but < average cost
The consumer pays a non-zero and positive marginal price for water (there is a volumetric charge), but the service
is subsidised from non-water related revenues.________________________________________________________
Italy Destro, 1997 “The water pricing policy in Italy has been guided by a range of
social and developmental considerations, rather than 
commercial principles." Operating costs are not recovered and 
all major construction has been financed by the government. 
Spain Maestu, 1997 Tariffs fully recover operating costs but only a share of capital
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ costs. However, this sh a re  in increasing over time._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
World Bank financed World Bank, 1992 A review of World Bank financed (drinking) water projects
projects showed that the effective price charged for water is only about
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 35% of the av erag e  cost of supplying it._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
In many countries, the revenue raised from the sale of water is insufficient to cover costs. The consequence here 
is that both the average and marginal price of water are below actual costs and thus there may be a tendency
towards the “wasteful" consumption of water and inefficient use of resources._______________________________
Average price = average historical cost, marginal price > 0
The service is revenue neutral, that is, revenue matches costs.___________________________________________
France Montginoul, 1997 Towns are required by national law to balance their water
budgets. Charges include an abstraction levy (resource cost). 
The principle is that users should pay for the cost of the 
services received.
USA Wahl, 1997 “Nearly all water districts charge for their water on the basis of
average costs. The principle derives from the legal requirement 
in most districts that charges must be set to recover costs, but
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ no higher.”_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
In m any countries, urban w ater ag enc ies are  required to cover their co sts  and  not g en e ra te  a  surplus._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Average price > average historical cost, marginal price > 0
Surpluses are generated from the sale of water______________
Israel Yaron, 1997 The bulk water price is set nationally hence regional cost
differences are not reflected. Retail prices are set by 
municipalities who make large profits. For example, Tel Aviv 
made a profit of 44% and other towns made profits of 80%,
135% and 169% in 1989-90. “In general the wealthier the 
community, the greater the profit margin."
South Africa PDG, 1994 Municipalities are allowed, by law, to make a 10% profit on their
water trading account. However, in practice, and especiaily in 
the past, some cities have made significantly greater profits. 
Private utilities Private utilities are almost always required to cover their costs
and allowed to make a reasonable return (profit) on their 
investments. In developing countries, private utilities may
__________________________________________ receive public subsidies but still make profits.________________
It is a relatively rare occurrence that profits are made from the sale of water from public agencies. Both South 
Africa and Israel are water poor countries. This policy raises the marginal price of water which supports 
conservation efforts.
Marginal price = marginal cost (and average price equal average cost)
Although marginal-cost pricing is sometimes stated as a pricing goal in country policy statements, in practice, 
water prices are rarely set explicitly to equal marginal costs. Some pricing practice (for example, rising block
tariffs) may very roughly approximate marginai-cost pricing some of the time.________________________________
Botswana Thema, 1997 The marginal tariff in the upper block is set to reflect the scarcity
of water and the long-run marginal cost of extending supply.
The first block is subsidised and overall the revenue matches 
expenditure.
USA Wahl, 1997 “Some utilities in water short areas in the USA use inclining
blocks where the marginal price may reflect the marginal cost of 
capacity expansion. However, flat rates are more common."
Selective marginal-cost pricing in Los Angeies is discussed in Chapter 4.
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Appendix 2 
Nonparametric density analysis: 
empirical results
Figure 14: Consumption versus property value (Grahamstown)
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Figure 15: Consumption versus property area (Grahamstown)
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Appendix 3 
Price-elasticities of demand for water -  
selected studies
Table 9: Price-elasticities of water demand -  selected studies
Source Price-
elasticity
Com m ent
short-
run
long-
run
study  a re a ; period; ra te  s tructu re ; 
da ta ; estim ation ; eq u a tio n s ; specification  
sa m p le  sc re en in g ; 
c o m m e n t
Residential water demand
A gthe e f  a / (1986) 
A gthe & Billings (1987) 
Billings & A gthe (1980)
C arv e r & B oland (1980)
-.27
-.40  to 
-.56
-.02
-.60
-.27 to 
-.49
-.02 to 
-.7
T ucson ; 1974-77; mild inc reasing  blocks 
A, T; SE; L; pm+D
sing le residen tia l; a v e ra g e  for T ucson  
T ucson ; 1974-80; mild inc reasing  blocks 
M, P; SE; L; p m+D 
R ep o rted  by in co m e g roup  
T ucson ; 1974-77; mild inc reasing  blocks 
A, T; LS; L, LL; p m+D 
single residen tia l; a v e ra g e  for T ucson  
e s tim a te s  b ia se d
W ashing ton , DC; 1969-74; m ixed ty p es 
A, P; LS; L; p m , Qt_i
Utilities (13); a v e . w a te r  prod ./connection
D andy e t al (1997) -.63 to 
-.77
A delaide; 1978-92 ; fre e  a llow ance
M, P , LS, L, Pm+D , Q t-i
sing le residen tia l (random , 400);
D an ie lson  (1979)
F o s te r  & B eattie  (1981) 
G ibbs (1978)
H anke an d  d e  M ar6 (1984) 
H ogarty  & M ackay (1975)
-.15
-.27
-.29  to 
-.69
-.51
-.56 to 
-.86
0
R aleigh, NC; 1969-74; »  1 s t block
M, P; LS; LL; pm
H o u seh o ld s (random , 216);
es tim a te s  b ia se d
urban  U nited S ta te s ; 1960; m ixed
A, X, LS; SL; pa
cities (218); a v e ra g e /h o u se h o ld  for city 
reg ional m o d e ls  d e v e lo p e d  
Miami, 1973; m ixed ty p e s  
M, X, LS; SL; p m
h-holds (random , 355 ) a c ro s s  11 utilities
co m p a re d  p m to p a
Malmo, S w e d en ; 1971-8; c o n s tan t
M, P , LS; pm
single h o u se h o ld s  (69)
B lacksburg , VA; 1971-73; 2 part 
M, T, arc; p m 
h-holds (all, 120) 
arc-elasticity fo r  tariff in c rea se  
A rc-elastic ity  for tariff d e c re a se
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H ubbell (1977)
J o n e s  & M orris (1984)
K atzm an (1977)
Martin e t al (1984)
Martin & W ilder (1992)
M oncur (1987)
N iesw iadom y & Molina
(1992)
N iesw iadom y & Molina
(1993)
R enw ick (1996)
S ale th  an d  D inar (1997) 
Y oung (1973)
-.1 to - 
.2
-.27  to 
-.52
-0.5
-.07 to 
-.29
-.26
-.32 to 
-.7
-.35  to 
-.68
-.22 to 
-.6
-.46  to 
-.64
-5 .3  to 
3 .0
-.41 to 
-.62
Nairobi;
M, X; LS; L
H ousehold  (400), su rv ey
D enver; 1976; m ixed
M, X, IV; L, SL; pa or p m
h-ho lds (re p re sen ta tiv e , 889) + su rvey
b ia se d
P e n a n g , M alaysia. A rc-e lastic ities
T ucson ; 1976-1979 ; mild inc reasing  
M, P; IV; SL; p m
H ouseho ld  (2100) + c e n s u s  d a ta
C olum bia, S ou th  C aro lina; 1980-1; 2 part
M, P; LS, 2S ; LL; pa, Pm
h o u se h o ld s  (19 0 0 0 ) u rb an  & su b u rb an
Honolulu; 1972-83; *  uniform
M, P; SA S; L; pm , Q n
single h o u se h o ld s  (1281) + su rvey
US cities; 1984; m ixed
A, X; LS; LL; p a k
w ate r utilities (430), AWWA, c e n s u s  
US cities; 1984; m ixed 
A, X; Logit; LL; pm 
cities (229), AWW A, c e n s u s  
2 tow ns in California; 1990s; mixed 
M, P; IV; pm+D 
ho u seh o ld  su rv ey  (117) 
m o d e lled  tech n o lo g ica l adoption  
H yderabad ; 1991/2 ; in c reasin g  block 
M, P; LS; p a, pm+D
gro u p ed  by h ousing  ty p e  (survey, 862 hh) 
T ucson ; 1946-71; m ixed 
A, T; LS; L, LL; p a 
a v e ra g e  p roduction  p e r  connection
R e s id e n tia l  “ in - h o u s e ”
C a irn cro ss  & K innear 
(1992)
0 K hartoum , S u d a n ; 1978; vending  s a le s  
M, X, Arc; pa 
h o u seh o ld  su rv ey s  (57) 
com parison  b e tw e e n  com m un ities; very  
low  co n su m p tio n  (<30 led)
D anie lson  (1979) -.31 s e e  ab o v e
H an se n  (1996) < -.1 D enm ark; 1981-90; tw o-part 
A, P; LS; L, SL; p a
housing  type (d e ta c h e d , row, ap a rtm en t) 
sm a ll cc sprinkling, h igh  cc h e a te d  w ater
H ow e & L inaw eaver (1937) -.23 u rban  USA; 1961-66; m ixed 
M, X, LS; L; pm
39 study areas, separate indoor metering
Lym an (1992) -.42 -.64 M oscow , Idaho; 1983-87; tw o-part 
M, P, LS; LL; p m 
h o u se h o ld s  (30); w in ter
R e s id e n tia l  “ o u td o o r  
u s e ”
D an ie lson  (1979) -1.38 s e e  ab o v e
Hewitt & H an e m an n  (1995) -1.60 D enton, T ex a s ; 1981-85; incr. 2 block 
M, P; DC; LL; pm
single h -ho lds (random , 121); su m m er 
s a m e  data  s e t  a s  N&M (1989) incr. blck.
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H ow e & L inaw eaver (1967) 
Lym an (1992)
N iesw iadom y & Molina 
(1989)
-1 .39 
to -1.7
-.7 to 
-1.6
-2 .6  to 
-3.2
-.55 to 
-.86
urban  USA; 1961-66; m ixed 
M, X; LS; LL; p m
39 a re a s ,  s e p a r a te  o u td o o r m etering  
s e e  ab o v e ; su m m e r
D enton, T ex a s ; 1981-85; incr. 2 block 
M, P; 2 S , IV; L; p m
sing le h -ho lds (random , 121); su m m er
W illiams and  S u h  (1986)
-.09 to 
-.36 
-.29  to 
-.48
D enton, T ex a s ; 1976-80 ; deer, block
USA; 1976; m ixed
A, X; LS; SM; p m , pa
w a te r  utility a n d  s ta te  c e n s u s  d a ta
C o m m e rc ia l & 
in s t i tu tio n a l
W illiams an d  S u h  (1986) -.14 to 
-.36
s e e  ab o v e
Notes: Data: A =  aggregate, M — micro, X =  cross-section, T =  time-series, P =  pooled. 
Estimation: LS =  ordinary least squares, IV = instrumental variables, 2S = 2-stage least 
squares, SE =  simultaneous equations, DC =  discrete choice, SAS =  model of Fuller and 
Battese (1974) programmed for SAS by Drummond and Gallant (1983). Equation: L = linear, 
LL = log-log, SL — semilog, TL =  translog; CD =  Cobb-Douglas. Specification: pa = 
average price, pm = marginal price, D =  difference variable, k =  price perception 
parameter, +  = used in same equation, =  lagged Q.
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Price-elasticity estimates -  United States
Table 10: Price-elasticity estimates for the United States
See following two pages
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